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Abstract  
This thesis introduces and develops the idea of “contemporary religious conflict”. It 
proposes that international humanitarian law (IHL) should incorporate an 
understanding of religious approaches to the use of force in order to better address the 
shortfall of humanitarian protections that have become typical of conflicts involving 
“unconventional armed groups”. Due to this shortfall having a relationship with what 
may be termed the “war on terror”, the intention is to focus explicitly upon the capacity 
for religious ideology to influence how force is used, and how IHL should address this 
challenge. 
Contemporary religious conflict is not introduced as a new category of armed 
conflict intended to supplement those already existing in IHL, but as a means of better 
balancing the use of force with humanitarian concerns by acknowledging the 
deterministic influence the adoption of religious features may have upon how an 
armed group uses force. A distinct framework for understanding conflicts with a 
religious component provides a more nuanced method for balancing state interests 
with humanitarian principles. This thesis accordingly sets out to determine how 
religious conflicts function differently from non-religious conflicts, and to what extent 
these differences challenge the assumptions concerning the use of force inherent in 
IHL. In order to determine how IHL may adapt to these stresses, this thesis will draw 
upon both historic and present-day approaches to religious conflict, as well as 
contemporary state practice in conflicts involving religious interest groups, with an 
overt focus upon key current examples such as ISIS.1 Whilst IHL has conventionally 
been disinterested in the rationale behind armed conflicts, acknowledging that the 
adoption of religious ideology can have a causal relationship with how force is used 
permits shareholders in IHL to more effectively determine their role in limiting the 
adverse implications of armed conflict, and ensuring humanitarian principles are 
applied in an appropriate manner. 
This study depends upon contemporary examples of religious conflict, 
necessitating a focus upon examples derived from the Islamic tradition, largely within 
the context of what is frequently termed the “war on terror”. Whilst this study 
explicitly focuses upon central examples such as ISIS, the intent is to propose a general 
basis for a differentiated understanding of religious conflict applicable in a wider range 
of instances. 
  
 
1 ISIS; an abbreviation standing for the “Islamic state of Iraq and Syria,” a high profile terrorist group, 
and briefly territorial pseudo state.  Also known as ISIL, the Islamic state and Daesh. The term ISIS 
will be used to refer to the organisation through this thesis for the sake of clarity.  
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) suggests that wars or “armed conflicts” should 
be governed by a set of humanitarian principles, and sets out a system of laws and 
rules to ensure that this is the case.1 The history of IHL and the previous “laws of war” 
indicate that a need often arises to restate existing laws, or generate new ones to ensure 
that these principles exist in new situations.2 If the principles of IHL can be taken as 
axiomatic, then there is a need to see them applied effectively in all situations that can 
be described as armed conflict. This thesis will contend with the challenge of ensuring 
that IHL remains relevant and effective, with a specific focus upon contemporary 
situations in which IHL is seriously challenged.  
 For the past eighteen years, many of the world’s states have to some extent 
participated in what is often described as the “war on terror.”3 The international legal 
system has struggled to stay abreast of developments in this conflict as states, 
confronted by unconventional opponents, trial new weapons and strategies, often 
invoking novel legal arguments to support these innovations.4 The complexity of this 
exercise is compounded by the evolving nature of the threat, with the terrorist 
networks of the first act having now given way to jihadist armed groups and even what 
are termed proto-states,5 organisations that not only capable of conquering and holding 
 
1 For these principles see Marco Sassòli, Antoine A. Bouvier and Anne Quintin, How Does Law Protect 
in War? Cases, Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International 
Humanitarian Law (3rd edn, 2011) 1-2. 
2 Amanda Alexander, ‘A Short History of International Humanitarian Law’ (2015) 26 European Journal 
of International Law 109, 124. 
3 The use of this term is frequently criticised; Borhan Uddin Khan and Muhammad Mahbubur Rahman, 
"Combating Terrorism under Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Regime", (2008) 12 Mediterranean 
Journal of Human Rights 379; regardless, it serves to denote an ongoing world-historical event that 
covers a number of tangible practices and operations, as well as referring to a set of distinctive 
assumptions and beliefs about the nature of conflict. See Richard Jackson, Writing the War on 
Terrorism : Language, Politics, and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester University Press 2005) 8. 
4 Whilst states have recognised that they need new strategies and methods in relation to many modern 
conflicts the law has been slow to adapt, resulting in the laws of war being “disconnected” from the 
military realities of modern war. see generally, Ganesh Sitaraman, ‘Counterinsurgency, the War on 
Terror, and the Laws of War’ (2009) 95 Virginia Law Review 1745. 
5 Audrey Kurth Cronin, ‘ISIS is not a terrorist group’ (2015) 94 Foreign Affairs 87, 98. 
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territory but administering and governing the places they capture.6 This threat is best 
exemplified at the current juncture by one organisation, the group known as ISIS. 
 When considering this problem, it is first vital to consider how to describe what 
exactly is happening, and how a group like ISIS are to be defined. Terms like “state” 
and “armed group” are important in this regard. They are not only descriptive but assist 
in determining what rules apply when armed conflict is taking place.7 Similarly, 
thresholds are applied “armed conflict” for the purpose of preserving it from being 
applied to situations not meriting its application,8 are critical. Unfortunately, as this 
thesis will set out, groups like ISIS9 straddle the boundaries that both international law 
and IHL has established for identifying organisations capable of engaging in an armed 
conflict, and for determining when they are doing so; this could translate into a 
difficulty determining what actions states are permitted to undertake. Whether by 
design or fortune, groups like al Qaeda and ISIS have fomented a challenge to 
international law, one that is in part responsible for the ongoing nature of the “war on 
terror.” 
For instance, it is possible to consider the aforementioned ISIS. Developing 
from a terrorist organisation, the group was able to seize territory in two separate 
nation-states in a step that to some, changed the groups' fundamental nature.10 Since 
declaring the existence of a caliphate in 2014,11 the group has frequently been 
misunderstood. Whilst some saw the groups’ caliphate declaration as an assertion of 
statehood, this represents a failure to grasp the meaning of the term caliphate both in 
 
6 Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, ISIS Governance in Syria (Middle East Security Report 2014) 
4. 
7 Specifically, the manner in which a group is classified can determine if a situation is an international 
al or non-international armed conflict.  Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict : International 
Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge University Press 2010) 150-152; this is important  
8  Whilst this is intended to prevent IHL being applicable to low level disturbances and domestic 
criminally, It is possible to specify numerous “low intensity” situations that represent a profound 
humanitarian threat whilst not meeting the thresholds required for armed conflict to exist.  See generally 
Robin Geiβ, ‘Armed Violence in Fragile States: Low-intensity Conflicts, Spillover Conflicts, and 
Sporadic Law Enforcement Operations by Third Parties’ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red 
Cross 127. 
9 ISIS also called ISIL, the Islamic State or Daesh. 
10Whilst there has yet been no authoritative assertion that ISIS represented a state, its real characteristics 
have been sufficient to merit examination. See Marco Longobardo, ‘The Self-Proclaimed Statehood of 
the Islamic State Between 2014 and 2017 and International Law’ (2017) 33 Anuario Español de 
Derecho Internacional 205.  
11 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, “A Message to the Mujahideen and the Muslim Umma in the Month of 
Ramadan” (1 July 2014) <https://kyleorton1991.wordpress.com/2014/07/02/the-leader-of-the-islamic-
state-explains-the-caliphates-vision/> accessed 4/09/2019 
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classical Islam and as used by ISIS.12 There is really no term available in international 
law that accurately describes an organisation like ISIS, with this gap indicative of the 
absence of any appropriate approach to address such organisations. This is important, 
as there are key decisions to be made in this regard; it is important that the scale of the 
threat the organisation presents be recognised, along with their capacity to wage armed 
conflict, this clearly being the case.13 On the other hand, in light of the organisation's 
genocidal conduct and rejection of international law,14 there is concurrently a need to 
ensure that the organisation is not legitimised, and such behaviours are not incentivised 
in the practice of future armed groups.  
There is then the manner in which the organisation understands its’ mandate 
to use force.15 This thesis will assert that religious war is different when compared to 
the type of wars states have customarily fought. The usage of the term Jihad by groups 
like ISIS is distinctive enough to challenge both Islamic jurists and international 
lawyers. Moreover, the meaning of the term jihad has evolved within the context of 
the war on terror, with groups responding to the axioms of their own ideology, as well 
as being driven by the requirement to deviate ever further from the conventional use 
of force.16 The net result of this process is the rejection of existing restrictions on the 
use of force in wartime, in which groups like ISIS explicitly target civilians, both as a 
strategy and an end in itself.17 This makes the problem all the more important to 
confront. Whilst states are constrained in their use of force, the situation suggests non-
state groups are clearly incentivised to disregard international humanitarian law.  
 The ISIS conflict and the war on terror, in general, is indicative of the species 
of endless forever wars that that are likely to characterise much of human violent 
 
12 “Caliphate” has a meaning that is in many ways exclusive of “nation state” See Sanjeev Kumar, ‘ISIS 
and the Sectarian Political Ontology: Radical Islam, Violent Jihadism and the Claims for Revival of the 
Caliphate’ (2018) 74 India Quarterly 119. 
13 Thomas Maurer, ‘ISIS’s Warfare Functions: A Systematized Review of a Proto-state’s Conventional 
Conduct of Combat Operations’ (2018) 29 Small Wars & Insurgencies 229, 238. 
14 Isis crimes in this regard are well documented. See for instance UN Human Rights Council, “They 
Came to Destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis (UNHRC 2016). 
15 In order to produce an idealised utopian Islamic society, groups like ISIS have produced an ideology 
that not only permits the killing of non-Muslims, but professed Muslims also. See Mohamed Badar, 
Masaki Nagata and Tiphanie Tueni, ‘The Radical Application of the Islamist Concept of Takfir’ (2017) 
31 Arab Law Quarterly 134; additionally, this ideology makes little distinction in terms of not killing 
civilians.  
16 The factors that serve to incentivise armed groups inculcated with religious ideology to behave 
brutally and defect from international regulations will be explored in detail through this thesis.  
17 ISIS specifically call for the killing of civilians. See Dabiq 15 (al-Hayat media 2015) 279-80; 
moreover, they have seemingly rediscovered that killing civilians can be a useful means of furthering a 
cause. See Benjamin Valentino, Paul Huth and Sarah Croco, ‘Covenants without the Sword: 
International Law and the Protection of Civilians in Times of War’ (2006) 58 World Politics 339.   
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interaction moving forward; conflicts that that may mutate and evolve, but never truly 
end.18 As this study will explore, IHL, whilst universal in its aspirations, is intimately 
bound to the archetype of interstate conflict, and is therefore in a poor position in 
relation understanding such threats. As understanding is a precursor to adapting the 
framework of regulations applicable in armed conflicts, this presents a problem. 
 
1.2 The contention of this thesis 
 
Ultimately, this thesis contends that both IHL and international law in general need to 
adapt in order to ensure conflicts involving what will be termed “unconventional 
armed groups” can be regulated effectively and in such a manner as to best preserve 
humanitarian interests. This is to be demonstrated by referring to the case of the war 
on terror and the instance of ISIS specifically; outlining adjustments that could be 
implemented in order to better address this particular threat and that may be beneficial 
for IHL more generally moving forward. This thesis, therefore, argues several 
essential points, the first of which requires considering the temporal scope of IHL, and 
the circumstances in which it developed. It will be contended that IHL is in theory 
equipped to adapt to the challenge posed by groups like ISIS, having accomplished 
changes that are no less drastic in the past. Yet due to IHL’s reliance on the model of 
interstate war, IHL is poorly disposed to accurately understand the differences 
between a group like ISIS and the more conventional armed groups encountered in the 
past. This itself is unsurprising. International law has developed primarily in situations 
in which states contended with one another. It can be suggested that this is no longer 
the case, though most situations of non-state international armed conflict have broadly 
conformed to the state archetype of armed conflict. Accordingly, IHL may be 
challenged should the parties involved or their approach to using force deviate 
radically from the state archetype. 
 The second part of this study is aimed at demonstrating the capacity for 
religious ideology and its underlying social structures to not only mobilise a 
population to exhibit the use of organised violence, but do so in a manner that 
challenges the capacity for international law to classify such movements, as well as 
IHL’s rationale for determining when armed conflict exists. This involves considering 
 
18 Federico Sperotto, ‘The future of the American fight against terrorism’ (2014) 81 Rivista di Studi 
Politici Internazionali 221, 229-230. 
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some extra-legal bodies of knowledge that predate IHL. This generalised 
understanding of “religious conflict” of “Holy war” will then be related to the current 
challenge of ISIS; as ISIS and similar organisations are mobilised on a contemporary 
religious basis, they are organised in a manner that is atypical when compared to both 
states and more conventional non-state groups. Moreover, these groups use force in a 
distinctive manner. As groups like ISIS are different from more conventional non-state 
armed groups, they do not always align with the objective criteria set out in IHL, 
questioning the effectiveness of IHL in relation to such situations.  
The final part of this study is concerned with modernising IHL in order to 
permit more rapid and comprehensive responses to unconventional armed groups. 
Using the example of ISIS and the understanding of contemporary religious conflict 
generated in the course of this thesis, the intention is to examine the solutions and 
proposed means of adapting IHL to the realities of fighting a group like ISIS. This 
study will, therefore, consider the potential approaches to classifying a group like ISIS 
in international public law. This is important, as it will determine the response states 
take. Following this, adaptations proposed to IHL in relation to ISIS will be examined, 
with the intention of understanding what approach might be most appropriate, in terms 
of ensuring the welfare of civilians as well as the aim of bringing such conflicts to a 
rapid and humane end.  
A key assertion that will be made in this thesis is that IHL has been contrived 
to contend with state and state-like conflicts. Confronting groups like ISIS within such 
a framework of this nature is difficult, yet remains an important question to consider. 
This is because ISIS has demonstrated an effective model for mobilising a population 
and using force in a manner that is distinct from both states and previous non-state 
armed groups. If IHL is not reformulated to permit states to effectively address such 
threats, then the actions exemplified by ISIS are likely to be employed well into the 
future. Accordingly, a mandate exists to explore possible means of adapting IHL.  
 
 
1.3 Research questions  
 
On a basal level, the thesis hopes to offer insight into the following question:  
How can IHL ensure that appropriate protections are applied to conflicts involving 
unconventional armed groups of the type exemplified by ISIS? 
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This problem may be subdivided into three questions: 
 What are unconventional armed groups? How are they different from the non-
state armed groups discussed in relation to non-international armed conflict 
(NIAC)? 
 
 Is the existence of transnational non-state armed groups of a religious 
character challenging to IHL? How so? 
 
 What potential solutions have been identified as a possible means of resolving 
any shortfall of humanitarian protections in conflicts involving transnational 
non-state armed groups? Which are the most viable in relation to the case of 
ISIS? 
 
 
1.4 The wider context of this thesis and position in the field  
 
To date, there have been many papers, books and theses engaging with the subject of 
ISIS and the challenges to IHL posed by aspects of the war on terror are again well 
covered in the scholarship. An article published prior to this thesis indicates the 
problem, titled Beyond the Pale? Engaging the Islamic State on International 
Humanitarian Law.19 This article is effective in addressing many of the challenges this 
group poses to IHL. Many of the problems are again reflected in The Fight Against 
the Islamic State and Jus in Bello.20 This study is not unique in recognising the 
potential for using examples within the war on terror to illustrate many of the stresses 
facing international law.21 There have been many studies exploring the question of 
whether action needs to be taken to bring IHL into closer alignment with today’s 
 
19 A. Bellal, ‘Beyond the Pale? Engaging the Islamic State on International Humanitarian Law’ (2016) 
18 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 123. 
20 Vaios Koutroulis, The Fight Against the Islamic State and Jus in Bello (2016) 29 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 827 
21 Scharf (n 67) Michael P. Scharf, ‘How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law’ (2016) 
Paper 1638. Faculty Publications 1.  
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threats; both ISIS and the war on terror are often explicitly referenced in regard to this 
process.22 
This study distinguishes itself by its approach to the problem. Building upon 
an awareness of the causal relationship between ideology and how war is fought, this 
study seeks to determine why ISIS and similar organisations challenge IHL so 
radically. Much of this involves drawing upon key examples of ISIS publications, as 
well as the theological grounds established by the group’s key theorists. In addition, 
there is a rich field of scholarship considering contemporary Islamic ideology, with 
Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea23 representing an influential example. This 
study devotes significant space to the task of incorporating an understanding of 
ideology and determining how the adoption of religious ideology has a deterministic 
influence on the use of force by unconventional armed groups. 
The majority of scholars exploring ISIS in relation to IHL have connected the 
question to the issue of compliance; when considering state attitudes to IHL, they have 
largely sought to examine how both states and groups like ISIS can be induced to more 
closely adhere to the existing rules and principles contained in IHL. An additional 
tendency has been to think about ISIS within the same epistemological foundations as 
conventional war; when considering how ISIS is posing a challenge, their impact is 
often considered upon the basis of a single facet; for instance, in discussing ISIS as a 
“transnational armed group”. This study aims to start from a different position; arguing 
that groups like ISIS are foundationally distinct from both states and conventional 
armed groups, and present a multifaceted challenge to IHL in its application. The 
objective here is to indicate some of the mechanisms existing in IHL that make it 
prohibitively costly, or even impossible, for states to apply when contending with 
groups like ISIS. This will effectively serve to contribute to existing scholarship, by 
expanding the discussion of how and why groups like ISIS challenge IHL to consider 
the influence of contemporary religious ideology on armed groups as a means of 
charting the way IHL must take moving forward.  
 
 
 
 
22 Marco Sassòli, ‘Transnational Armed Groups and International Humanitarian Law’ (2006) 6 Program 
on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, Harvard, Occasional Paper Series 1. 
23 Shriaz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (Hurst 2016). 
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2  IHL’s capacity to adapt, and the challenge posed by ISIS 
and other unconventional armed groups to this process 
 
2.1 Introduction   
 
This thesis sets out with the aim of understanding if groups like ISIS represent a 
challenge to how armed conflict is understood, and if so, what changes are warranted 
in relation to the prevailing legal framework in order to effectively respond to this 
challenge. The basic definition of armed conflict expresses that one exists whenever 
there is a resort to armed force between states, between a state and an organised armed 
group, or between two or more organised armed groups.1 Whilst this definition is 
remarkably simple, it is possible to suggest that some friction may emerge in 
attempting to identify the parties involved, or what features need to be present for an 
armed conflict to be taking place. In short, the laws of armed conflict (LOAC) or 
alternately international humanitarian law (IHL) has always depended upon objective 
features derived from a model of interstate war when determining the presence of an 
armed conflict, and to identify whether or not an armed group is of sufficient scale and 
character so as to be formally recognised as capable of contesting an armed conflict.2 
This system has fared well for much of its brief, modern history; the state approach to 
the use of force has happened to be the most effective and therefore has been 
manifested by states and non-state groups alike.3 Today, however, unconventional 
armed groups, ISIS being the central example,4 for instance overtly disdain the state 
approach to the use of force; this presents a challenge in that a system orientated 
 
1 ICRC, ‘How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in International Humanitarian Law?’ International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Opinion Paper, March 2008, 1. 
2 As Sassòli describes, interstate war is the “Prototypical” form of war in international law. Marco 
Sassòli, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in 
Warfare (Edward Elgar 2019) 168. 
3 As Beer notes, the modern system of international law has been so effective and so widely accepted 
as it reflects states’ inclinations in regard to the use of force; as rational actors, states are not inclined 
to use force excessively, as this would be inefficient. See Yishai Beer, ‘Humanity Considerations 
Cannot Reduce War’s Hazards Alone: Revitalizing the Concept of Military Necessity’ (2016) 26 
European Journal of International Law 801; it is worth noting that many non-state groups conform with 
this principle of “economy of force” in addition to deferring to the broad principles of IHL consistent 
with their wish to become states themselves. See Hyeran Jo, Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and 
International Law in World Politics (Cambridge University Press 2015) 9–10. 
4 This study is far from the first to identify ISIS as a central challenge for both IHL and international 
law more broadly. See for examples Vaios Koutroulis, The Fight Against the Islamic State and Jus in 
Bello (2016)29 Leiden Journal of International Law 827; Michael P. Scharf, ‘How the War Against 
ISIS Changed International Law’ (2016) Paper 1638, Faculty Publications 1. 
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around interstate war may misunderstand the threat posed by such groups, failing to 
determine what rules should be applied. All is not lost, however; IHL has demonstrated 
a capacity to adapt in the past, with mechanisms existing to provide for changes in the 
nature and scope of warfare. One limitation, however, perhaps particularly apparent 
in relation to the threat posed by groups like ISIS, is the necessary precursor of 
understanding the nature and extent of the challenge before presuming to propose 
changes. This thesis proceeds with the grand aim of articulating how IHL is being 
challenged by religious armed groups and determining how the system should adapt. 
The aforementioned group ISIS will be serving as the key example of this challenge, 
and it is therefore important that the challenge arising from this group is understood. 
Before asserting that the laws governing armed conflict need revisions, it is important 
to first understand what these rules are, where they come from, and the process by 
which they are changed and adapted.  
This chapter will first relate in brief the sources and history of the regulatory 
framework that is today identified as IHL. This will serve to demonstrate that at its 
inception, the laws governing warfare comprised a reciprocal arrangement between 
states engaging in military contests with this point of origin remaining an important 
consideration. It will be contended that whilst the system has demonstrated immense 
flexibility in adapting to different kinds of warfare and the different belligerents 
involved, it still defers to the model of interstate war when determining what rules 
should apply. This reliance is perhaps most evident in how armed conflict is identified, 
and the process and criteria used to determine if an organisation is considered capable 
of contesting one. This examination will demonstrate that the further a group deviates 
from the “interstate prototype”,5 the more problems they will pose in terms of 
classification and regulation. The intent of this thesis is to go on to explore in later 
chapters how contemporary religious ideology can instigate radical divergences from 
the model of interstate war,6 with the proliferation of such an approach serving as the 
 
5 Sassòli (n 2). 
6 This essential contention is naturally nothing new. Theorists have for instance noted that identity is 
playing an important role in how new conflicts are fought, with such wars often displaying higher 
civilian casualties. Simons notes this with reference to fourth generation war, though stresses the 
complicated nature of this issue, asserting that a new theoretical means of examining war is needed. 
Greg Simons, ‘Fourth Generation Warfare and The Clash of Civilizations’ (2010) 21 Journal of Islamic 
Studies 3, 391; this builds upon the long-held notion that war fought on the basis of religion or ideology 
often exerts more negative effects on those not directly involved in combat. See R. Jackson, ‘Doctrinal 
War: Religion and Ideology in International Conflict’ (2006) 89 Monist 274, 295. 
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motive for addressing the dependence of IHL upon interstate war as a means to 
understand and regulate armed conflict.  
In contending that IHL can change, it is useful to demonstrate that this capacity 
not only exists in theory, but that IHL has in fact already adapted to changes and 
challenges in its history. The laws governing the conduct of armed conflicts have 
proved malleable enough to apply to a vast range of situations, and the conventional 
narrative of international law emphasises the capacity for international law to extend 
and adapt to the types of conflict taking place;7 this being most discernible in the 
extension of the system well beyond its initial application to interstate war to a range 
of situations, most notably non-state armed conflict.8 It is additionally possible to 
specify the apparent ease with which the IHL has adapted to new technologies and 
forms of warfare in the past.9 The claim that IHL is well equipped to respond to 
conflicts involving armed groups like ISIS and others is therefore perhaps well-
founded.10 This thesis, however, adopts a contrary claim regarding the nature of IHL, 
and its capacity to incrementally adapt to new situations. Whilst IHL is in principle 
universal, its language and epistemology are still in many ways orientated around 
interstate war. This is to say that whilst it aspires to be universal, the manner in which 
the addition of non-state or internal armed conflict has been defined is linked to a 
number of assumptions concerning the nature of warfare that have prevailed broadly 
since the system’s current inception in treaties, statute, and customs. In simple terms, 
the understanding of war that is imbued in the IHL is too narrow and too reliant upon 
the example of interstate war to be extended to many modern conflicts involving 
unconventional armed groups, as the case of ISIS and more broadly the “war on terror” 
confirm. 
As already mentioned, a precursor to effectively adapting IHL is, however, an 
adequate understanding of the challenge. There are two barriers that perhaps prevent 
 
7 Laurie Blank and Amos Guiora, ‘Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing the Law of 
Armed Conflict in New Warfare’ (2010) 1 Harvard National Security Journal 45, 51–52. 
8 Rogier Bartels, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and the Notion of State 
Sovereignty’ (2018) 23 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 461, 461–462. 
9 Louise Doswald-Beck, ‘Confronting Complexity and New Technologies: A Need to Return to First 
Principles of International Law’ (2012) 106 Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of 
International Law) 107. 
10 Flexibility has been specified as one of the factors responsible for IHL’s success. See Hannah 
Matthews, ‘The Interaction Between International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian 
Law: Seeking the Most Effective Protection for Civilians in Non-international Armed Conflicts’ (2013) 
17 The International Journal of Human Rights 633, 645. 
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IHL from adapting appropriately to the challenge posed by groups like ISIS. Firstly, 
there is the manner in which IHL defers to the state and interstate war as a means of 
understanding non-state armed groups. Secondly, there is the way in which IHL is 
conventionally disinterested in the motives behind war. The state-derived approach 
for understanding non-state armed groups has its benefits, in that many past armed 
groups have conformed to expectations established in this regard.11 The situation is 
however changing. As groups like ISIS exemplify, many contemporary armed groups 
do not seek to mimic state conduct in the use of force.12 Accordingly, they become 
difficult to classify. Just as worryingly, these groups understand the use of force 
differently, waging a war outside of conventional military bounds. This may call into 
question the capacity of the system to understand what types of restrictions are 
appropriate based upon the terms it has established.    
This chapter sets out to first understand IHL, its purpose, and history. This will 
reveal a number of problems that need be considered when attempting to extend IHL 
beyond its foundations in governing interstate war. In particular, this chapter will 
contest that whilst IHL has proved remarkably flexible, it is yet to dispense with some 
of its foundational assumptions regarding the nature of armed conflict and the nature 
of the non-state groups which are understood as able to contest an armed conflict. 
Accordingly, this chapter contributes to the thesis by defining IHL, the circumstances 
of its origins, and its history. Moreover, this chapter sets out the rationale for 
conducting this thesis; namely that IHL, in its existing form, is difficult to apply in 
conflicts involving “unconventional armed groups”, particularly those motivated upon 
the basis of religious ideology. This chapter, therefore, fulfils a vital function in 
relation to the aims of this thesis and provides the basis for subsequent discussion of 
how contemporary religious violence and the types of organisations committing it fall 
outside of IHL’s understanding of warfare. Consistent with this aim, this chapter will 
first begin by relating where the law comes from, and how it has developed.  
 
 
11 Heike Krieger, ‘International Law and Governance by Armed Groups: Caught in the Legitimacy 
Trap?’ (2018) 12 Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 563, 571. 
12 The globalised form of war fought by ISIS has been described as indicative of a different type of 
warfare, challenging state-centric approaches of the past. See Andreas Krieg and Jean-Marc Rickli, 
‘Surrogate Warfare: The Art of War in the 21st Century?’ (2018) 18 Defence Studies 113, 113–114; 
see additionally David H. Ucko and Thomas A. Marks, ‘Violence in Context: Mapping the Strategies 
and Operational Art of Irregular Warfare’ (2018) 39 Contemporary Security Policy 206. 
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2.2 The evolving purpose behind the regulation of armed conflict 
 
Before delving into the sources and history of IHL, it is perhaps worth noting that the 
laws governing armed conflict are a product of the sentiment that war should be 
regulated, and its adverse impacts should be managed.13 It is, naturally enough, 
possible to arrive at the conclusion that war should be regulated from a number of 
different foundations; religious or natural law-based arguments, rationality, or self-
interest, and perhaps most recently, upon the basis of an ostensibly international shared 
morality, in which humanitarian interests are paramount. Whist in one sense the 
purpose has remained relatively consistent, other aspects of its mandate have altered 
along with the attitudes guiding its interpretation. The early philosophical foundations 
of the laws of armed conflict may have made reference to religion and the interests of 
mankind, with thinkers like Grotius making sophisticated universal arguments rooted 
in natural law.14 These early arguments, whilst concluding that “civilised states” ought 
to show restraint in law, lacked any mechanism to compel them to do so.  Recognising 
this limitation, when seeking to sway states to adopt a more principled approach to the 
use of force, early perspectives on regulating armed conflict were sure to advance 
pragmatic and interest-based arguments for doing so alongside more moralistic 
perspectives.15 Reciprocity represents one such interest-based approach. Reciprocity 
does not represent an appeal to morality, but suggests that nations should follow a 
shared code of laws based upon the benefits such a concession would result in for the 
nation’s own interests.16 Reciprocity, the principle that any limitation on wars should 
be reflected in both belligerents, is in evidence in past thinking on the subject of war.17 
In the absence of any enforcement mechanism, it was deemed reasonable that states – 
 
13 ICRC (n 1). 
14 For instance, Hugo Grotius noted that certain actions undertaken in war violated both Christian 
religious principles and those of humanity itself. See Steven Forde, ‘Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War’ 
(1998) 92 The American Political Science Review 639, 645. 
15 Theorists have concluded that in order to limit war, appeals are better made to the belligerent’s self-
interests rather than morality. See James D. Fearon, ‘Rationalist Explanations for War’ (1995) 49 
International Organization 379; Will H. Moore, ‘Action-Reaction or Rational Expectations? 
Reciprocity and the Domestic-International Conflict Nexus during the “Rhodesia Problem”’ (1995) 39 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 129. 
16 The early proliferation of the laws of war and international law more generally is often connected 
with reciprocity and the beneficial nature of reciprocal arrangements governing warfare. See Sean 
Watts, ‘Reciprocity and the Law of War’ (2009) Harvard International Law Journal 365, 366. 
17 See War Office, Manual of Military Law (HM Stationery Office 1914) 235. 
13 
 
or “civilised states”18 in the language of the era – only show restraint in wars against 
other such civilised states. This gave such states a compelling reason to follow shared 
customs limiting the use of force; their own civilians and soldiers would benefit from 
the restraints that they recognised and observed in relation to opponents. Reciprocity 
naturally means that states are not required to show restraint when contesting wars 
against states or other armed organisations that do not themselves recognise, or are not 
deemed capable of abiding by the shared customs and rules governing war.19 This 
limits any attempt to universally implement a shared system of regulations.   
The limitations of a reciprocity based order were made apparent by the second 
world war; the impact of this event is often specified in relation to the subsequent 
“humanisation” of humanitarian law.20 In many subsequent treaties, it was specified 
that rules should apply not on a reciprocal basis, but instead, that they were 
underpinned with reference to the interests of humanity;21 states and other parties 
being henceforth bound to observe restraint in war irrespective of their opponents’ 
disposition toward regulations in war. This permitted the proliferation of IHL into 
conflicts that would have formerly fallen outside of the shared regulatory framework, 
perhaps most notably in relation to non-state armed groups.22 The humanisation of 
humanitarian law argument is naturally not without its detractors, who note that 
reciprocity still plays an important role in how armed conflict is governed,23 with, for 
instance, states citing the violations committed by non-state parties to justify their own 
breaches.24 Yet, it is difficult to say with certainty to what extent reciprocity continues 
to  influence the development of IHL. 
The key point made here is that IHL in its current iteration ensures that 
humanitarian considerations are paramount. As the situation has changed from a 
reciprocity based order, however, it must be noted that the incentives that belligerents 
 
18 See Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight. Saint Petersburg (29 November/11 December 1868) (St. Petersburg Declaration) Preamble.  
19 Watts (n 16) 367. 
20 Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 The American Journal of 
International Law 239 
21 Ibid 246 
22 Annyssa Bellal and Stuart Casey-Maslen, ‘Enhancing Compliance with International Law by Armed 
Non-state Actors’ (2011) 3 Goettingen Journal of International Law 175, 195. 
23 Whilst international lawyers may in cases accept that international law is no longer reciprocal in 
nature, many realist voices are more sceptical. See Robert O. Keohane, ‘Reciprocity in International 
Relations’ (1986) 40 International Organization 1. 
24 Bellal and Casey-Maslen (n 22) 
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are offered to apply IHL have also shifted.25 For instance, when advocating for change, 
it is important to consider how any modifications to the more tangible aspects of IHL 
may serve or conflict with humanitarian principles. It is additionally worth noting that 
the fundamental purpose behind regulating conflict has in the past shifted. The 
prospect of further evolution is therefore perhaps worth considering.  
2.3 Sources of international law and IHL 
 
IHL in its current iteration did not emerge fully formed. As with international law 
more generally, IHL is a product of a variable law-making process comprising a 
number of sources and processes, with the laws governing the use of force being no 
exception to this trend. International law refers to the body of law contrived with the 
primary purpose of governing interactions between states.26 As such, whilst 
compelling arguments can be made that the system reflects many earlier accords and 
arguments between different territorial entities,27 its formal inception cannot be placed 
before the idea of the nation-state emerged, this being implemented no earlier than the  
seventeenth century.28 Over time, the notion of the state has proliferated globally, and 
states have advanced laws and customs that govern actions across the spectrum of 
interactions in which states participate. International law accordingly encapsulates the 
conduct of hostilities between states, alongside its many other functions.29  
In considering the sources of IHL, many of which are consistent with the 
sources of international law more generally, it is clear IHL is not the product of a single 
treaty or declaration, and nor did it develop all at once. IHL is the product of a long 
process that is still very much ongoing. The sources of international law include 
 
25 Tanisha M. Fazal, Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict 
(Cornell University Press 2018) 38. 
26 L. Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’ (1908) 2 The American 
Journal of International Law 313, 314. 
27 In this regard, aspersions are made to the ancient and medieval world. See J. L. Brierly, Brierly’s Law 
of Nations: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in International Relations (Andrew 
Clapham ed, 7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 1. 
28 Indeed, the Westphalia treaties of 1648 are often identified as the point of origin for the idea of the 
nation state, and by extension, international organisations like the United Nations, and contemporary 
international law. See generally Derek Croxton, ‘The Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the Origins of 
Sovereignty’ (1999) 21 The International History Review 569; some theorists would however, stress 
the reductionist nature of such an approach. See Heinhard Steiger, ‘From the International Law of 
Christianity to the International Law of the World Citizen’ (2001) 3 Journal of the History of 
International Law/Revue d'histoire du droit international 180. 
29 For instance, diplomatic conventions between states, national boundaries, international trade, the law 
of the sea and human rights law, to name but a few of its functions.  
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treaties, customs of an international nature, the so-called general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations, decisions made by national courts, and the opinions 
advanced by scholars.30 In relation to the conduct of hostilities, there is customary law 
– the norms and rules states employ in practice, and are therefore understood to bind 
states generally. There is then treaty law; rules that states have expressed agreement 
with, though these only bind those states that have agreed.31  
 It can be stated that IHL comprises multiple sources, and therefore its 
interpretation is not always straightforward in nature. A good starting point for 
assessing the different forces involved in interpreting what international law might be 
in a situation is naturally the aforementioned statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ); Article 38 of this document provides a survey of the main, or formal 
sources of international law.32 It is additionally worth noting that judicial discussions 
in addition to the opinions of the most qualified scholars can be regarded as 
supplementary to the formal sources specified in the ICJ statute.33  The formal sources 
listed in the ICJ statute are listed in the earlier Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, a League of Nations project.34 The items specified represent a 
good starting point for understanding the sources involved, though are not by any 
means exhaustive; indeed, the rising relevance importance of “soft law” provisions to 
some aspects of international law is perhaps an example of the manner in which 
informal sources of law can exert an influence on decisions.35 It must additionally be 
 
30 Article 38 sets out these sources in the following language and order: “international conventions, 
whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; 
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations; subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law”. See Statute of the International Court of Justice (18 April 1945) 1 UNTS 
993. 
31 Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 12–
13. 
32 “1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are 
submitted to it, shall apply: a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; b. international custom, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law; c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; d. subject to 
the provisions of Article 59, [i.e. that only the parties bound by the decision in any particular case,] 
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law”. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, 
art 38. 
33 Ibid.  
34 League of Nations, Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (16 December 1920), art 
38. 
35 Soft law being defined as “non-legal norms” expressed through resolutions and declarations. Michael 
Bothe, ‘Legal and Non-Legal Norms – A Meaningful Distinction in International Relations?’ (2009) 
11 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 65, 67–68; one example relevant to IHL is the role non-
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stressed that although considered at the inception of the statute, the sources listed in 
the ICJ do not amount to a hierarchy based on the order in which the sources are 
stated.36 With these limitations in mind, it is worth considering how the sources of 
international law interact in general, as well as their specific relevance to this inquiry. 
2.3.1  Treaties and conventions 
 
International conventions might more simply be defined just as easily as “treaties and 
conventions”.37 Such documents are defined relatively comprehensively in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of  Treaties,38 though debate in relation to what distinctions 
exist between different types of treaties continues.39 In relation to the conduct of 
hostilities, the Hague and Geneva conventions are clear examples of relevant 
treaties.40 Further to these more general treaties, it is possible to specify restrictions 
binding the use of specific types of weapons,41 treaties relevant to the status of neutral 
parties,42 and those protecting cultural property.43 As with international law more 
generally, the conduct of hostilities is increasingly legalized, with a substantial body 
of treaty laws now existing where there once was none.44 Whilst the treaty portion of 
international law is now significant, however, it is not exhaustive and there are still 
 
state actors take in law-making. See Yahli Shereshevsky, ‘Back in the Game: International 
Humanitarian Lawmaking by States’ (2019) 37 Berkeley Journal of International Law 63, 76. 
36 Ian Brownlie (n 31). 
37 Andreas Zimmermann and others, The Statute of the International Court of Justice: A Commentary 
(2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 738. 
38 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (23 May 1969) art 2. 
39 For instance, between bilateral and multilateral treaties, and treaties in force and not in force. See 
Zimmermann and others (n 37) 738, 740–746. 
40 Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the Annex thereto: 
Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, The Hague (18 October 1907) Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (12 August 1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (12 August 1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 85; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (12 August 1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 135; 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (12 August 1949) 75 
U.N.T.S. 287; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3;  
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (8 June 1977) 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
41 In lieu of stating the list of treaties, which is extensive, the treaties and the relevant prohibitions are 
set out by the ICRC on a convenient web page. See ICRC, “weapons” (30 November 2011) 
<https://icrc.org/en/document/weapons> accessed 16 January 2020. 
42 Hague Convention V respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War 
on Land, (18 October 1907). 
43 Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (14 May 1954). 
44 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict’ (2011) 22 
European Journal of International Law 219, 219–220. 
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eventualities not explicitly covered by such agreements. It must additionally be 
stressed that treaties are a product of an agreement between states; regarding new 
innovations in the field of armed conflict, the will on the part of states to create new 
treaties cannot be assumed, but instead depends on states deciding a new treaty is 
required. 
2.3.2 Custom 
 
The ICJ lists custom as one of the formal sources of international law.45 In the absence 
of any treaty, it is custom that guides decisions.46 Customary law, commonly defined, 
refers to a “general practice accepted as law”. This is generally determined through 
the presence of two elements, namely the general practice of states and what states 
understand to be the law.47 The material elements required to assert customary law are 
numerous and diverse.48 The opinio juris element, being the more cognitive of the two 
components, is based upon how a practice is understood by states. A customary law 
must demonstrate both elements.49 The formula for determining customary law 
reflected in the ICJ statute is not, however, a commitment to a particular means of 
translating state practice into customary law.50 Indeed, the process has been described 
as unconscious, in contrast to the more deliberate provenance of treaty law.51 Various 
requisite features in the production of customary law can be emphasised as important; 
the duration of a practice,52 its uniformity and general nature,53 and evidence that the 
 
45 “international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”. See ICJ statute, art 38. b 
46 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law. A Treatise, vol 1 (2nd edn, Longmans, Green and Co. 1912) 
5.  
47 Zimmermann and others (n 37) 749–750. 
48 The International Law Commission recorded treaties, decisions of national courts, decisions of 
international tribunals, national legislation, diplomatic correspondence, opinions of national legal 
advisors, and the practice of international organisations. See ILC, ‘Report of the International Law 
Commission to the General Assembly Part 2: Ways and Means of Making the Evidence of Customary 
International Law More Readily Available’ (1950) ILC Doc. A/1316. 
49 Antonio Cassese, International Law (2nd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005) 156. 
50 Zimmermann and others (n 37) 749. 
51 Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (Lawbook Exchange 2003) 308–309. 
52 The duration element, namely that a custom has been around for a while, to now often de-emphasised. 
It is sufficient to say that the prospect of custom arising instantaneously is considered undesirable, with 
a practice needing to have some temporal depth. See Diego Germán Mejía-Lemos, ‘Some 
Considerations Regarding “‘Instant’ International Customary Law”, fifty years later’ (2015) 55 Indian 
Journal of International Law 85, 107–108. 
53 Alternately, “Constant and uniform usage”. See Asylum Case (Columbia/Peru) (judgment) (20 
November 1950) ICJ Rep 1950, 266. 277–278. 
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practice is understood to be obligatory.54 The presence of these factors helps in 
determining if a practice is indicative of customary law. Regarding warfare, it must be 
stressed that customary law is important, this being evidenced by the central role that 
customary law has played since the Second World War, being particularly evident in 
military tribunals, driving the development of the International Committee for the Red 
Cross (ICRC), and initiating the production and development of the treaties considered 
central to the conduct of warfare.55 The ICRC has long been understood to hold a 
special position in this regard, creating and expanding the list of customary laws 
relating to armed conflict.56 As with customary law generally, state practice remains 
central,57 with an immediate controversy being the capacity of states to behave 
appropriately, and signal their recognition of laws in an effective manner.58  
The manner in which customary law arises may be influenced by the progress 
of history, with different interpretive approaches emerging to reflect changes. For 
instance, in contrast to the historical norm in which custom arose gradually based upon 
the behaviour of states, it can be asserted that at the current juncture, custom is more 
often a result of a deductive process in which new custom emerges rapidly, with the 
authoritative statement of rules and obligations taking preference over the established 
practice of states,59 with this being evidenced for instance in the Judgment of the Case 
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua.60 Whilst it 
is possible to be critical of this shift, it must be conceded that the rapid generation of 
custom is perhaps justified based upon the novel situations that often arise from state 
interactions. Now there are extensive treaties in existence, much of what once would 
have been customary is now covered in the treaty portion of IHL.61 Customary law 
 
54 “…the need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective element, is implicit in the very notion 
of the opinio juris sive necessitateis”. See North Sea Continental Shelf Case (Federal Republic of 
Germany/Netherlands) (judgment) ICJ Rep 1969, 44. 
55 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law: 
Volume 1: Rules, vol 1 (Cambridge University Press 2005) xxxi–xxxii. 
56 See Theodor Meron, ‘Revival of Customary Humanitarian Law’ (2005) 99 The American Journal of 
International Law 817.  
57 Prosecutor v. Tadic (judgment) IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) [99]; see also ILC, ‘Draft Conclusions on 
Identification of Customary International Law, with Commentaries’ (2018) ILC Doc A/73/10, 132. 
58 John B. Bellinger and William J. Haynes, ‘A US government response to the International Committee 
of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 89 International Review of 
the Red Cross 443, 444. 
59 Anthea Elizabeth Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A 
Reconciliation’ (2001) 95 The American Journal of International Law 757, 758. 
60 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) (Judgment) (27 
June 1986) ICJ Rep 89 [188–189]. 
61 Ibid. 
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maintains its relevance upon the boundaries of warfare, being particularly salient in 
relation to areas where there are limited treaty provisions, such as some aspects of war 
upon the high seas, as well as in relation to new technologies and approaches to the 
use of force.62 In relation to the actual process for determining the existence and nature 
of customary law, a number of additional factors assist in reaching a decision, though 
it is worth noting that scholars disagree as to the disposition of these sources and the 
methods that need to be utilised.63 In relation to the conduct of hostilities, the notion 
that a shared international morality, or  “elementary considerations of humanity”64 can 
be used to guide judgments and decisions is of particular importance.  
Regarding customary law, generally, it only applies to states, though IHL is 
also applicable to certain non-state groups.65 The role that non-state groups take in the 
extension of customary law is, at the current juncture, far from certain.66 As an 
unconscious process, it can be contended that customary law is already being 
generated in relation to the changing character of non-state armed groups.67 Customary 
law, unlike the more concrete treaty portion, could provide for a more reflexive and 
rapid approach to addressing emerging problems. When a treaty refers to customary 
law, the provisions set out are to be considered binding on all states, whether they 
ratify the treaty or not,68 the exception being if they have dissented from the start of a 
given custom.69 The process for making such judgments is aided by other judgments 
and decisions. As with treaties in general, they bind only the parties involved.70 The 
 
62“The high contracting Parties clearly do not intend that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a 
written undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders. Until a more complete 
code of the laws of war has been issued, the high contracting Parties deem it expedient to declare that, 
in cases not included in the regulations adopted by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain 
under the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usages 
established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of the public 
conscience”. This clause, subsequently known as Martens Clause, has guided the development of new 
rules. See Hague Convention (IV) respecting the laws and customs of war on land, Preamble. 
63 Niels Petersen, ‘Customary Law without Custom – Rules, Principles, and the Role of State Practice 
in International Norm Creation’ (2007) American University International Law Review 275, 276–277. 
64 Considerations of humanity, specified in The Hague Convention 1907; Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. U.S.) (Judgment) (27 June 1986) ICJ Rep 1986, 14, 
[218]. 
65 Should the existence of an armed group be adequately demonstrated? See UN, ‘Report of the 
International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General’, UN Doc no. 
S/2005/60, [172]. 
66 Whilst non-state armed groups may be subject to customary laws under IHL, the role that they play 
in its production is a matter for contention.  
67 Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing 
Grotian Moments (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
68 Brownlie, Principles (n 31) 14–15. 
69 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law (7th edn, Cambridge University Press 2014) 91. 
70 Brownlie, Principles (n 31) 13. 
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states involved may, through reservations, alter how aspects of the treaty are 
interpreted and applied in relation to their state. Treaties are an important source of 
IHL, and additionally can be used to chart the development of IHL over time, 
indicating that the system possesses the capacity to adapt. Treaties can likewise 
become customary law, extending their applicability beyond the states that may have 
formally ratified such agreements. It is, for instance, agreed that the initial Hague and 
Geneva conventions of 1949 have become customary in nature, and therefore apply 
universally to all states.71  
 
2.3.3 General principles of law 
 
General principles as specified as a source of international law encapsulate both the 
general principles of international law and the general principles found in domestic 
legal systems, amounting to a “universal” public opinion.72 It has been described as a 
means of “filling the gaps”73 that might otherwise exist in international public law. 
Regarding armed conflict, general principles have been recognised as existing by the 
ICJ.74 Where discussed, the general principles of IHL are connected to key treaties as 
well as the “elementary considerations of humanity” specified therein.75 Regarding 
innovations to rules of armed conflict, it would accordingly be important to ensure that 
changes are consistent with IHL and its existing customs and treaties, as well as with 
the general principles of international public law more broadly.  
 
2.3.4  Judicial decisions and qualified publicists 
 
As a secondary means of determining the law, the ICJ statute specifies “judicial 
decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists”.76 Judicial 
 
71 See Christopher J. Greenwood, ‘Historical Development and Legal Basis’ in D. Fleck and M. Bothe 
(eds), The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law (2008) 28. 
72 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘A Functional Approach to “General Principles Of International Law”’ (1990) 
11 Michigan Journal of International Law 818, 819. 
73 Michael Wood, ‘Customary International Law and the General Principles of Law Recognized by 
Civilized Nations’ (2019) 21 International Community Law Review 307. 
74 Nicaragua v. U.S. (n 60) [218]. 
75 Rosemary Abi-Saab, ‘The “General Principles” of Humanitarian Law According to the International 
Court of Justice’ (2010) 27 International Review of the Red Cross 367, 371. 
76 ICJ statute art 38.  
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decisions may be selected from both international and domestic courts, not in the same 
manner as primary sources, but as a means of better articulating the existence of laws. 
The ICJ has in the past referred to previous judgments in this manner.77 
The ICJ statute additionally specifies the supplementary role that qualified 
publicists play in the construction of sources. In relation to IHL, the experts in a 
position to comment as “highly qualified publicists” may include military lawyers and 
humanitarian professionals.78 It is perhaps worth considering that today, there are 
substantially more such experts than at any point in the past.  
Consideration of the sources of law relevant to the conduct of armed conflict 
reveals, in particular, a mandate for adapting IHL in the face of challenges arising 
from new forms of warfare and new types of armed conflict. Importantly, the 
suggestion that adjustments and modifications can be carried out in order to ensure the 
system is serving the interests of humanity may prove of use in relation to the 
contention of this thesis. Limitations in terms of the system’s capacity to adapt can 
already be indicated. Treaties, for instance, require significant will on the part of states. 
Any adaptations additionally require that the existence of a problem is recognised.  
Moving forward, however, it is important to examine how IHL has adapted 
and changed over time, and what events, in the past, have been of sufficient impact to 
drive the development or evolution of the system.  
 
2.4 The history of IHL 
 
In order to support the thesis that IHL needs to adapt, it is first required that the 
reasoning behind the prevailing system is understood; perhaps most importantly, it 
must be understood that IHL in the past has recognised a need to change, and reacted 
accordingly. This can perhaps be best appreciated by examining the history of the 
system. An awareness of history also allows for an understanding of how IHL’s 
various sources have interacted in the past, and therefore how they may be relevant in 
relation to current problems. To some extent, IHL represents a continuation of the 
longstanding sentiment that war is not the absence of a legal order, but a separate 
 
77 Mads Andenas and Johann Ruben Leiss, ‘The Systemic Relevance of “Judicial Decisions” in Article 
38 of the ICJ Statute’ (2017) 77 Heidelberg Journal of International Law 907, 909–910. 
78 David Kennedy, Of Law and War (Princeton University Press 2006) 85. 
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one.79 Whilst the laws governing armed conflict today are formally very young,80 they 
are in some aspects related to the laws and customs established first in Europe 
following the construction of the state system.81 There is a tendency to connect the 
origins of current laws governing the conduct of warfare with distant and diverse 
histories, a provenance that would helpfully underpin assertions concerning IHL’s 
universal nature.82 This lineage is however difficult to assert in any concrete manner 
and cannot transcend basic principles and motivations. If the language and framework 
comprising the current system have any discernible provenance, it is perhaps the early 
European laws of nations and scholarship on war and peace that emerged as a reaction 
to the European wars of religion.83 Whilst texts such as Grotius’s sought to define rules 
of conduct, practically speaking, their character was aspirational, with little reflection 
of the actual conduct of states of the time.84 Whilst modern international law has 
naturally developed much since this period of history, this episode bears mention as 
much of the language and thought of this time continues to remain in use today. 
A central early expression of the customs and norms constraining war was set 
out in the Lieber Code, a document circulated throughout the Union army in the 
American civil war under the auspices of general order. This order set out to regulate 
a war between a nation-state and an internal secessionist cause85 has since remained a 
key touchstone for subsequent regulations and customs concerning warfare between 
states.86 Warfare upon land saw a serious move towards formal regulation with the 
first Geneva Convention of 1864, the Convention for the Amelioration of the 
 
79 “A good definition must bring out… that war is a state or condition of affairs, not a mere series of 
acts of force”. See Arnold D. McNair, ‘The Legal Meaning of War, and the Relation of War to 
Reprisals’ (1925) 11 Transactions of the Grotius Society 29, 33. 
80 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 119. 
81 “It may be a matter of some controversy among historians as to when one should date the beginning 
of the modern states-system… Less open to debate, however, is that somehow the idea of such a system 
is historically as well as conceptually linked with that of an international Rule of Law”. See Martti 
Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law 4, 4. 
82 Brierly, Brierly’s Law (n 27). 
83 Mark Weston Janis and others, ‘Religion and International Law’ (1988) 82 Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 195. 
84 See Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace (A.C. Campbell tr, Walter Dunne 1901) XIV; see 
additionally S. Forde, ‘Hugo Grotius on Ethics and War’ (1998) 92 The American Political Science 
Review 639. 
85 Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States, In the Field (1869) 
<https://archive.org/details/governarmies00unitrich/page/n5> accessed 12 December 2018.  
86 Hew Strachan, Sibylle Scheipers and Provider Oxford Leverhulme Programme on the Changing 
Character of War Content, The Changing Character of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2011) 
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Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.87 This realised the beginning of 
regulations protecting those outside of combat, a body subsequently referred to as 
Geneva law.88 These rules proceeded upon a mandate derived from humanitarian 
concerns, rather than being directed at the interests of the nations involved. Unlike the 
Geneva branch of law, seeking primarily to protect those outside of combat, the St 
Petersburg Declaration of 1846 contended with the actual practice of war.89 The 
preamble of this treaty set out how states should behave towards one another in war, 
and additionally presumed to define why states should abide by restrictions: 
 
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating 
as much as possible the calamities of war; That the only legitimate 
object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is 
to weaken the military forces of the enemy; That for this purpose it 
is sufficient to disable the greatest possible number of men; That 
this object would be exceeded by the employment of arms which 
uselessly aggravate the sufferings of disabled men, or render their 
death inevitable; That the employment of such arms would, 
therefore, be contrary to the laws of humanity.90 
 
This statement presumes upon the civilised natures of states, inferring that they should 
target only the military capability of the enemy, and not utilise force in an excessive 
or gratuitous manner. Importantly, this is framed not only as a humanitarian issue but 
also as a matter of efficiency. This principle of military necessity is also considered, 
as is the case subsequently, to be something that states and their agents intrinsically 
understand and are able to apply. This is presumed based upon the parties’ civilised 
nature in this instance, though has alternately been articulated as an exercise in 
 
87 Whilst only ratified by 16 nations, this treaty represents an important starting point. ICRC, Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the 
Field (First Geneva Convention), 12 August 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; the treaty was subsequently revised 
in 1906, 1929 and 1949. 
88 Initially, the laws of Geneva, focusing on the victims of armed conflict, and the laws of The Hague, 
concerning the employment of force in armed conflict, were considered distinct. This bifurcation is no 
longer considered to be useful. See Richard John Erickson, ‘Protocol I: A Merging of the Hague and 
Geneva Law of Armed Conflict’ (1978) Virginia Journal of International Law 557. 
89 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes 
Weight. Saint Petersburg, 11 December 1868. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/declaration1868> 
accessed 24 November 2019. 
90 Ibid. 
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common sense.91 It is additionally worth noting that at this early juncture, non-state 
parties had not yet merited any consideration. 
Following the St Petersburg declaration, a number of failed attempts to expand 
the LOAC emerged in the Brussels Declaration of 1874 and Oxford Manual of 1880.92 
These projects perhaps captured the desire on behalf of the growing international 
community to further regulate armed conflict, and though neither entered into force,  
they did perhaps influence future, more successful efforts. Hague Declarations of 1899 
and Hague Conventions 1907,93  however, did have a binding impact, establishing the 
body then known as the law of The Hague concerning how armed conflicts are 
conducted. An important additional detail to note alongside this progress is the 
growing scope of international law in general, which opened up numerous avenues for 
generating compliance with the regulations applied to armed conflict.94 
The Hague Conventions represented a formalisation of many of the established 
norms that European states had by this time recognised when using force between one 
another.95 Accordingly, the Hague Conventions can be understood as relating to the 
methods used in warfare, the conduct of hostilities, and occupation. Even before being 
codified, many of the regulations decided upon had already been exhibited by states 
representing mutually reciprocal norms of behaviour in war.96 Moreover, these laws 
reflected the contemporary military approach taken by states regarding efficiency and 
expediency in war. For instance, in seeking to strike a balance between military 
necessity and proportionality, the Hague conventions reflected the military science 
principle of economy of force; the manner in which states are inclined to use force in 
the most efficient manner possible.97 It is additionally not without significance that the 
 
91 David Éric, Principes de droit des conflits armés (3rd edn, Bruylant 2002) 921–922. 
92 Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War. Brussels, 27 
August 1874; The Laws of War on Land. Oxford, 9 September 1880. 
93 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations 
Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 18 October 1907; Hague Convention (V) 
Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, 18 October 
1907. 
94 In this sense, failure to abide by the restrictions in warfare could have a number of consequences for 
a state’s inclusion within the wider framework of international law, as well as damaging their status as 
“civilised”. This can be observed in relation to states on the fringes of Europe and indicates that even 
within the absence of an effective framework for punishment, consequences existed. See Henry 
Wheaton, Elements of International Law (3rd edn, rev. and cor. edn, Lea and Blanchard 1846) 17–18. 
95 As Johnson notes, The Hague conventions alluded to an existing, historical body of “consensus and 
practice”. See James Turner Johnson, ‘The Great War and International Law on War’ (2018) 101 
Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 255, 269. 
96 Watts, ‘Reciprocity’  (n 16) 366–367. 
97 Beer, ‘Humanity Considerations’ (n 3) 
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Hague conventions recognised a reciprocal character to the regulations comprising the 
convention; states that were unwilling or unable to apply such rules when using force 
could not expect to benefit from the restraint of their opponents.98 In this sense, the 
huge laws made exclusion a possible price of noncompliance, incentivising 
compliance. Additionally, the Hague convention only contended with interstate 
conflicts,99 leaving states with the option of dispensing with non-state groups, which 
then not only comprised internal rebellions but “uncivilised peoples” not recognised 
as peers within a system of international law.100 As such, the Hague conventions 
recognised clear boundaries limiting their application strictly to nation states. These 
bounds did, however, prove inconsistent with the humanitarian spirit that would come 
to govern further efforts towards regulating armed conflict in future.101 The Hague 
conventions of 1907 contributed some remarkable innovations, for instance requiring 
that states instruct their armies (land forces) in the specifics of the new regulations.102 
Even at this early stage, significant steps had been made to limit the adverse 
implications of armed conflict.  
The inadequacies of the laws regulating the use of force were revealed by the 
experience of the first world war.103 The Geneva conventions of 1929 updated key 
elements of the law, particularly regarding the treatment of prisoners of war and 
civilians.104 Likewise, the Second World War spurred additional revisions and 
expansion, spurring developments to address the inhumane treatment of both those 
taking part in hostilities and those outside of combat.105 Perhaps most importantly, the 
notion of war crimes and crimes against humanity emerged in the Nuremberg and 
 
98 Watts ‘Reciprocity’ (n 16).  
99 Tom Farer, ‘Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of “International Armed 
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104 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
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War (12 August 1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
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Tokyo trials following the Second World War.106 The Geneva conventions of 1949 
likewise revised many protections of civilians and those outside of combat based upon 
the experience of the Second World War. Both world wars can, therefore, be identified 
as the impetus behind the progressive development of both treaty and customary 
changes to IHL, as well as instigating more foundational changes; the aforementioned 
“humanisation” of humanitarian war,107 the UN Charter, and even international 
institutions like the ICJ and ICC which can arguably be connected to the global 
experience of these incredibly costly and destructive interstate armed conflicts. 
It is not without significance that previously, the laws of war only applied to 
inter-state conflict, leaving states a relatively free hand when dispensing with non-
state adversaries.108  The Geneva conventions of 1949 represent the first illustration of 
what can be termed Common Article 3, or armed conflicts of a non-international 
nature,109 the first provisions for conflict not taking place between states. This 
represents a critical development, in that, the focus of the laws of armed conflict fell 
upon the conduct of states against one another. This is far from surprising, given the 
central nature of interstate war in the period in which IHL had existed, up to this point. 
The impact on the laws to regulate hostilities also requires that reference be made to 
the war crimes trials that followed the Second World War.  
Following the Second World War, there was a remarkable change in the nature 
of the conflicts actually taking place, with the vast majority of wars appearing to be 
non-state in nature, with one or more of the belligerents not being a state.110 This surge 
in non-state armed groups is associated with the rise of anti-colonial movements in the 
context of decolonisation.111 Whilst these national liberation movements were nothing 
new,112 at this juncture of history, states and international society saw such armed 
 
106 See Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Legacy of Nuremberg’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice 830. 
107 Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (n 20). 
108 Rogier Bartels, ‘Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: The Historical Evolution of the Legal Divide 
Between International and Non-international Armed Conflicts’ (2009) 91 International Review of the 
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109 Geneva Convention(s) (n 40) art 3.  
110 Thomas Szayna and others, Conflict Trends and Conflict Drivers: An Empirical Assessment of 
Historical Conflict Patterns and Future Conflict Projections (RAND Corporation 2017). 
111 Jessica Whyte, ‘The “Dangerous Concept of the Just War”: Decolonization, Wars of National 
Liberation, and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions’ (2018) 9 Humanity: An 
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groups as legitimate, broadly speaking,113 with previous arrangements in international 
law that assisted in legitimising colonisation now rejected as illegitimate.114 
Additional Protocols I and II115 updated and refined a great many aspects of armed 
conflict, dealing with international and non-international armed conflicts respectively. 
Additional Protocol I dealt with international armed conflicts codifying many existing 
customary rules.116 Critically, it extends the privileges of states partaking in wars to 
certain non-state entities in “exercise of their right of self-determination”.117 
Additional Protocol II develops protections relevant to non-state armed conflict, 
expanding initial provisions found in the Geneva conventions.118 Whilst these 
protections did not initially equal those present in the event of international armed 
conflict, they did significantly enhance the protections available.  
The additional protocols indicate a shift towards normalising and assisting the 
anti-colonial and independence movements in the wake of the Second World War. 
These movements were understood to be legitimate, yet were not initially well 
provisioned in IHL and international law more generally. The eventuality that the 
states and empires presiding over the territories would use unrestrained force against 
such movements – as may have been permitted in the past – was considered 
undesirable.119 Moreover, it is not without consequence that many sought to become 
states, taking their place within the family of nations.120 The point to be made here is 
that IHL was enlisted to legitimise and protect the process of decolonisation, reflecting 
 
113 Noelle Higgins, ‘The Application of International Humanitarian Law to Wars of National Liberation’ 
(2004) Journal of Humanitarian Assistance <http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/files/2011/04/a132.pdf> accessed 
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Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (8 June 1977) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.  
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expanding the notion of combatant status. It afforded certain privileges and freedoms to those providing 
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the UN Charter’s position on the matter.121 There are naturally voices in scholarship 
that are in accord with this suggestion. Mastorodimos, for instance, presents a 
compelling argument that not only was the idea of a national liberation movement 
related to the period of decolonisation,122 but requires the convergence of a number of 
features that, whilst once prevalent in armed groups, are rarely if ever exhibited 
concurrently by armed groups today.123 This may serve to technically confine the idea 
of non-state armed conflict to history.   
The development of IHL has subsequently been driven by international courts 
and military tribunals, as well as state practice in warfare, which can be identified as 
another factor driving IHL forward. Yet, it is possible to suggest that IHL has not 
developed a clear and unambiguous response to react to modern permutations of 
warfare. This contention can be evidenced by examining how practice subsequent to 
the emergence of Common Article 3 (non-state armed conflicts) has served to define 
“armed groups” in a manner that fails to account for the way in which such groups can 
diverge from the state approach to the use of force. As this contention is vital to the 
progress of this thesis, it makes sense to examine these definitions in detail. 
 
2.5 What are armed conflicts and armed groups, and how are they currently 
defined? 
  
This chapter has so far set out how IHL is designed to adapt to changes in the nature 
of warfare, and moreover, through reference to history, how IHL has changed in the 
past. It has been suggested however, that there are aspects of IHL that are intransigent 
or defined in such a manner as to limit the capacity of the system to understand and 
therefore effectively regulate new situations. Based upon the reliance that IHL places 
on interstate war, these limitations are most apparent in how armed groups are defined, 
and the requirements placed upon such groups in relation to waging war. Based upon 
the sources of IHL, it is possible to suggest that whilst IHL was initially orientated 
around states, through the changing definition of armed conflict, it has expanded to 
encapsulate wars involving non-state entities. The circumstances in which this 
 
121 See Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS 16, ch IX, art 55. 
122 Mastorodimos Konstantinos, ‘National Liberation Movements: Still a Valid Concept (With Special 
Reference to International Humanitarian Law)?’ (2015) 17 Oregon Review Of International Law 71. 
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expansion occurred, however, may be considered a basis to question the manner in 
which an armed group is defined, and the thresholds for asserting an armed conflict. 
This being the case, there may be a basis in the interests of humanity to revise IHL. 
Based on the sources and history of IHL it is possible to articulate with reasonable 
clarity a definition of armed conflict and armed group specifying what situations are 
included, and critically what types of situation are excluded. It is worth noting however 
that whilst armed conflict as a term is utilised with frequency, it is never really defined 
in the Geneva conventions or additional protocols, nor has it been clearly defined by 
the UN Security Council (UNSC), a fact that has subsequently been referenced in 
international tribunals.124 Moreover, in situations where armed conflict has been 
recognised, relevant bodies do not set out the means used to reach this conclusion in 
precise terms.125 It would be unfair, however, to suggest that the existence of an armed 
conflict is merely a matter of judgment or preference. Considering non-state armed 
conflicts, there exists a wealth of guidance that can be used to determine if an armed 
conflict is taking place.  
Whilst non-international armed conflict is now covered, there is not much to 
go off of in terms of defining the groups involved.126 Additional Protocol II makes 
reference to “dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under 
responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable 
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this 
Protocol”.127 Critically, this provision also stresses that IHL shall not apply in 
“situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic 
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature”.128 These criteria indicate a number 
of preconceptions concerning the nature of non-state approaches to the use of force 
carried over from interstate war; the nature of the parties being a derivative of state 
militaries, for instance. This additionally initiates a complex line-drawing exercise, 
namely in defining what features a group must display in order to be considered 
capable of waging war.  
 
124 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber 1, 2 September 1998 [606]. 
125 Ibid. 
126 This was effectively stated by the 2016 ICRC commentary. See ICRC, Convention (I) for the 
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 
August 1949. Commentary of 2016 Article 3: Conflicts not of an International Character [384]. 
127 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) 8 June 1977. Art 1.1. 
128 Ibid, art 1.2.  
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The commentary of 1987 lays out the problems that IHL encounters in seeking 
to define “armed conflict” in situations involving non-state parties, or organised armed 
groups. Pragmatically, the commentary sets out how, in seeking to objectively define 
such situations, the drafters decided that it would be preferable to “select a number of 
concrete material elements so that, when these elements are present, the authorities 
concerned could no longer deny the existence of a conflict”.129 These elements, as 
specified, relate to features such as the capacity for organisation and command, control 
of territory, the capability to conduct military operations, and perhaps critically the 
capacity to actually implement the Protocol.130 These features are therefore perhaps 
understood to have a deterministic link with the capacity for an organisation to be 
involved in armed conflict: they are additionally a characteristic displayed by states, 
as well as more “conventional armed groups”, those movements that in the past, sought 
to create or wrest control of a state, and subsequently participate in international 
society.  
Where IHL sources have elaborated upon these criteria, they have frequently 
done so by referring to the state approach to the use of force. In this regard two main 
criteria have guided the subsequent interpretation of Additional Protocol II; 
organisation and intensity.131 These criteria, which must be present in a non-state party 
in order for a non-state armed conflict to be taking place, have generally been 
expressed in a narrow manner that is specific to the state approach to the use of force. 
This was subsequently confirmed by the two ad hoc tribunals, namely, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) – with the Tadić and Akayesu trials both 
respectively suggesting that the hostilities needed to be organised in nature.132 
Building on this foundation, the later Boškoski case went as far as to specify a number 
of features that were directly indicative of the requisite level of organisation to be 
considered “organised”, and therefore capable of waging armed conflict: an 
identifiable command structure, the capacity to carry out military operations, the 
capacity to maintain logistics and recruitment, basics of discipline and order, and the 
 
129 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. Commentary of 1987, 
Material Field of Application [4449–4450]. 
130 Ibid [4459–4470]. 
131 ICRC (n 1) 5. 
132 Prosecutor v. Tadic (judgment) IT-94-1-T (7 May 1997) [562]; Prosecutor v. Akayesu (judgment) 
ICTR-96-4-A (1 June 2001) [620]. 
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capacity to speak with “one voice”.133 The Haradinaj case likewise referred to, 
amongst other factors, the type and calibre of weapons used.134  
An examination of organisation as articulated by the international criminal 
tribunals serves to narrow the meaning of “armed group” considerably. The limitations 
set out in order to distinguish armed groups from criminal enterprises are however not 
perfect in relation to the purpose for which they were contrived. It is possible to 
conceive of or even identify organisations which, whilst capable of waging war, do 
not manifest the features specified in relation to organisation. This assertion may 
specifically be relevant in cases of vigilante action135 or terrorism.136 Such groups are 
differently organised, and may not follow a conventional military hierarchy, instead 
relying on less formal civil society mechanisms for decision-making, or as is the case 
with terrorist networks, flattening command structures in order to better adapt to their 
operating environment. 
The second of the specified features is intensity, specifically the notion that 
armed conflict must reach a certain threshold or volume. Intensity, as with 
organisation, is equated with the state approach to using force; jurisprudence serves to 
suggest a supplementary means of identifying an armed group is present. The La 
Tablada incident before the Inter American Court of Human Rights was recognised as 
having reached the threshold required despite being fairly modest in scale, due in part 
to the “Hostile acts undertaken by the attackers, the direct involvement of 
governmental armed forces, and the nature and level of the violence attending the 
events in question”.137 This decides that the determination of armed conflict is partly 
discernible based upon the reaction it provokes, for instance exceeding the capacity of 
 
133 The Prosecutor v Boškoski (Judgment) ICTY IT-04-82-T (10 July 2008) [194–204]. 
134 The criterion of protracted armed violence has therefore been interpreted in practice, including by 
the Tadić Trial Chamber itself, as referring more to the intensity of the armed violence than to its 
duration. Trial Chambers have relied on indicative factors relevant for assessing the “intensity” 
criterion, none of which are, in themselves, essential to establish that the criterion is satisfied. These 
indicative factors include the number, duration and intensity of individual confrontations; the type of 
weapons and other military equipment used; the number and calibre of munitions fired; the number of 
persons and type of forces partaking in the fighting; the number of casualties; the extent of material 
destruction; and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. The involvement of the UN Security 
Council may also be a reflection of the intensity of a conflict. See Haradinaj et al v. Prosecutor, 
(judgment) IT-04-84-T (7 May 1997) [49]. 
135 Brian McQuinn and Fabio Oliva, ‘Analysing and Engaging Non-state Armed Groups in the Field’ 
(UNSSC 1014) 12. 
136 Rogier Bartels, ‘When Do Terrorist Organisations Qualify as “Parties to an Armed Conflict” Under 
International Humanitarian Law?’ (2018) 56 Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre/The 
Military Law and Law of War Review 451. 
137 Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Report Nº 55/97, Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 271 (1997) [155]. 
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police forces to contain.138 The presence of soldiers in relation to a situation is an 
additional indicative factor that an armed conflict is taking place.139  
In relation to non-state armed conflicts, IHL had to contend with a challenge 
in relation to defining armed conflict in situations involving armed groups. It has 
undertaken the perhaps necessary step of setting out objective criteria relevant to this 
process, setting out “concrete material elements”140 that can be used in the procedure. 
The expedience that such a concession provides is clear; there is undoubtedly a need 
for a clear process for differentiating armed groups from criminals and armed conflict 
from disorder and terrorism. The notion that an armed group is required to conform to 
the state archetype is broadly confirmed to be the case, with the criteria established for 
this purpose assessing organisation and intensity with reference to state 
competencies.141  
The ICC has additionally confirmed the importance of the state model. The 
more recent Lubanga case likewise determined that at one point, the Iruri conflict 
could be defined as non-international armed conflict, describing the non-state party as 
having “quasi-state features”.142 The most comprehensive guidance for identifying if 
an organisation is an “armed group” is however to be found in the Boškoski case, 
which serves to identify many physical features that must be present for an 
organisation to be an armed group.143 In terms of identifying these features, the 
requirement can be summarised that the armed group should mirror the state means of 
making war. This is compounded by the Limaj judgment, in which the defence 
assertion that the Kosovo army did not reach sufficient threshold for the organisation 
was rejected based upon the presence of conventional military features within the 
organisation.144  
In setting out concrete material elements to identify armed groups and armed 
conflict, IHL has set out recognisable objective features. In doing so, however, it has 
 
138 Ajuri v IDF Commander HCJ 7019/02; HCJ 7015/02 (3 September 2002), [1–4]; The Prosecutor v 
Boškoski (Judgment) ICTY IT-04-82-T (10 July 2008) [178]. 
139 The Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al. (Judgment) ICTR-98-42-T (24 June 2001) 1 [6156–6157]. 
140 ICRC, ‘Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. Commentary 
of 1987 Material Field Of Application’ (1987) [4449–4450]. 
141 See Tadic Judgment [562]; Prosecutor v. Mucic et al. (Trial Judgment) IT-96-21-T (16 November 
1998) [184]; Limaj Trial Judgement [84]. 
142 The Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo (Pre-Trial Chamber I Decision) ICC601/04601/06 (29 January 
2007) [200]. 
143 The Prosecutor v Boškoski (Judgment) ICTY IT-04-82-T (10 July 2008) [194–204]. 
144 The Prosecutor v. Limaj et al. (Judgment) IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) [90]. 
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overtly relied upon the state approach to warfare to establish these objective 
requirements. As this chapter will now go on to explore, this reliance complicates the 
capacity for the system to adapt, should the nature of conflict deviate drastically from 
the type of warfare described by statute and custom. 
2.6 The changing nature of armed conflict  
 
IHL has changed significantly in the past and maintains the capacity to adapt to new 
challenges moving forward. In order to do so, however, a prerequisite is recognising 
that a change is required. This is not always an easy task, and the further that the actual 
exhibition of armed conflict deviates from the interstate prototype, the more difficult 
it may become to even recognise that a war is taking place, let alone proscribe the 
behaviour of states. This challenge is perhaps best articulated by examining how a 
group like ISIS diverges from the interstate prototype whilst representing a threat 
comparable to organisations that do resemble states in situations of armed conflict.145 
The new approaches pioneered by ISIS and its precursors emphasise the signalling 
function of brutal and indiscriminate acts146 and the utility of targeting civilians in 
preference to government and military targets,147 adopting techniques that, whilst 
often effective in the short term, harm the group’s long term prospects: utilising human 
shields,148 taking hostages149 and employing perfidious behaviour; for instance, hiding 
in culturally significant buildings,150 and failing to distinguish one’s combatants from 
civilians.151 Additionally, many modern conflicts do not follow the model of clear 
 
145 “These apparently different phenomena display deep common patterns that transcend their surface-
level differences”. See Michael Spagat, Neil F. Johnson and Stijn van Weezel, ‘Fundamental Patterns 
and Predictions of Event Size Distributions in Modern Wars and Terrorist Campaigns’ (2018) 13 PLoS 
One e0204639. 
146 See Greg Simons, ‘Brand ISIS: Interactions of the Tangible and Intangible Environments’ (2018) 
17 4 Journal of Political Marketing, 322. 
147 Non-state groups have conventionally deferred to mimicking state capacities and means, not only 
because it is morally preferable to the use of terror but based upon a perception it can be faster and more 
effective. This is often no longer the case. See Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, ‘The Strategy of Protracted 
People's War: Uganda’ (2008) 88 Military Review 4, 7–8. 
148 Joe Inwood, ‘Islamic State Group Using Human Shields in Mosul” (BBC, 3 April 2017) 
<https://bbc.co.uk/news/av/world-middle-east-39475588/islamic-state-group-using-human-shields-in-
mosul> accessed 13 August 2019. 
149 Samuel Oyewole, ‘Boko Haram: Insurgency and the War against Terrorism in the Lake Chad 
Region’ (2015) 39 Strategic Analysis 428, 428–429. 
150 Chad Garland and Zubair Babakarkhail ‘ISIS Fighters Display Less-than-stellar Leapfrogging, 
Martial Arts Skills in Seized Videos’ (Stars and Stripes, 25 April 2018) <https://stripes.com/news/isis-
fighters-display-less-than-stellar-leapfrogging-martial-arts-skills-in-seized-videos-1.523904> accessed 
13 August 2019. 
151 Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) ‘Insurgent Abuses against Afghan 
Civilians’ (December 2008) 5. 
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military confrontations that in the past kept violence relatively segregated from 
civilian populations. Instead of a battlefield confrontation, the majority of killing may 
take place at roadblocks, or in homes.152 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), mines, 
and other passive weapon systems may do the majority of the killing.153 State forces 
may not put up much of a fight, either because they are ill-equipped or poorly 
motivated.154 Wars may not be fought by professional soldiers, but by rank amateurs, 
who may lack any tactical aptitude, and therefore are not capable of the logistical 
expertise required to maintain the impetus needed for high tempo modern 
warfighting.155 in 2014 the Islamic State was able to overrun Mosul, Iraq with a force 
that was both militarily and numerically inferior to the defending regime forces.156 
This was largely due to the fragmented military and civil infrastructure of the Iraqi 
regime;157 Boko Haram, another unconventionally organised armed group, has been 
able to benefit from the endemic corruption plaguing the Nigerian military, scoring 
victories against state troops who are unable to fulfil their function.158 The damage 
caused by many clandestine networks has additionally been sufficient for states to 
begin to consider if terrorist networks can engage in armed conflict.159 These 
circumstances demonstrate that a non-state belligerent does not need to be particularly 
well equipped or organised. This becomes even more apparent when the non-state 
belligerent chooses not to focus their attention on removing state forces but directly 
attacks civilians; armed groups that focus on such “soft targets” only need to be 
marginally better equipped and organised than the civilians it targets.160  
 
152 Human Rights Watch, ‘US Checkpoints Continue to Kill’ (3 May 2005) 
<https://hrw.org/news/2005/05/03/iraq-us-checkpoints-continue-kill> accessed 13 August 2019. 
153 For instance, it has been reported to US congress that 45% of US casualties are now caused by 
Improvised Explosive Devices. See Congressional Research Service, ‘Recent Trends in Active-Duty 
Military Deaths’ (20 May 2019) <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/IF10899.pdf> accessed 15 August 
2019. 
154 This is a marked tendency of “local forces” through much of the “war on terror”, with many proving 
ill-equipped or poorly motivated. See Daniel L. Byman, ‘Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and 
the War on Terrorism’ (2006) 31 International Security 79.  
155 Ibid 91–92. 
156 Mosul, a city approaching a population of 2 million, defended by 30,000 soldiers and an equal 
number of federal police fell to around 1,500 ISIS fighters.  
157 Ranj Alaaldin, Sectarianism, Governance, and Iraq's Future (Brookings Analysis Paper 2018) 1. 
158 John Campbell, ‘Boko Haram Overruns Outgunned Nigerian Military Base’ (Council on Foreign 
Relations 2018) <https://cfr.org/blog/boko-haram-overruns-outgunned-nigerian-military-base> 
accessed 30 July 2019. 
159 Bartels (n 108).  
160 Joel Achenbach, ‘Experts: Terrorists Learning from One Another and Going After Soft Targets 
(Washington Post 2015) <https://washingtonpost.com/gdpr-
consent/?destination=%2fnational%2fhealth-science%2fexperts-terrorists-learning-from-one-another-
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The type of conflicts taking place today poses just as much of a threat as the 
more conventional conflicts that took place in the past. Confusingly, however, the type 
of war fought by a group like ISIS is not a strict military contest of the variety IHL 
anticipates. The changing nature of war does not automatically translate into a need to 
alter IHL. Indeed, it can be contested that not there nothing “new” in the fundamental 
nature of conflicts identified as in this way, with the constituent themes associated 
with the term already well established by use.161 It is additionally possible to suggest 
that IHL is capable of adapting to the differences presented; indeed, it has already done 
so, addressing many of the new technologies and methods used by belligerents.162 Yet, 
the idea of new wars indicates that the nature of the challenge may run deeper than 
can be anticipated by states and international law. The nature of the fundamental 
difference in the case of new wars is often articulated vaguely; a shift from war’s 
“ideology to identity”,163 a resurgence of doctrinal war,164 or a shift from interstate 
war to “war amongst the people”.165 These trends have led many scholars to conclude 
that there is a thematic break between the type of war that prevails today and wars of 
the past. Terms such as new wars, post-Clausewitzian war and fourth generation war 
have emerged alongside new wars as terms to describe this shift.166 The understanding 
of such “new wars” is still very much in its infancy. As no approach has yet won out, 
there is still an absence of knowledge as to how states can go about conclusively 
ending such wars in a humane manner.  
As this new form of war has unfolded, lawyers have begun to see problems 
emerging; for instance, the challenge of getting some non-state armed groups to 
comply with IHL.167 New wars approaches have been referenced by scholars seeking 
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673ae92ddd2b_story.html%3f&utm_term=.36e778b69304> accessed 1 August 2019. 
161 Berta Jasiukenaite, ‘The Conception of the “New Wars”: A Question of Validity’ (2011) 9 
Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review 25, 36. 
162 It has, for instance, been expressed that IHL is sufficiently flexible to adapt to new challenges. See 
Eric Pomes, ‘Technological Innovations and International Humanitarian Law: Challenges and Tensions 
(International Relations)’ (2017) 46 Polish Political Science Yearbook 205. 
163 Mary Kaldor, ‘In Defence of New Wars’ (2013) 2 Stability: International Journal of Security and 
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to determine the direction that IHL should take in order to overcome the challenges 
presented by new unconventional opponents. The new wars thesis has been used to 
support innovations ranging from the instigation of a new category of armed conflict168 
through to more modest adjustments to specific aspects of IHL.169 It is possible to 
suggest however that identifying the appropriate course of action in relation to new 
wars is difficult, due in part to the transitory and ephemeral way in which the new 
wars thesis is presented; whilst new wars approaches recognise that the characteristics 
of war have changed, this alone does not assist in defining an appropriate response as 
to how IHL should adapt. 
To go into more detail, new wars can be summarised as armed conflicts that 
cannot be subjected to the rational calculus that generally prevails in relation to 
interstate conflict and many previous iterations of non-state armed conflict.170 Many 
of the new wars’ approaches emphasise the variable nature of the actors involved, as 
well as the influence of globalisation.171 A particular trend that can be identified is the 
aims pursued by armed groups in new wars; they do not seek to become states, taking 
their place in the “family of nations” in the manner of many liberation movements and 
rebel groups of the past. This naturally poses an issue concerning compliance but has 
some deeper implications in terms of how such groups are organised, what type of 
equipment and personnel they use, and what they consider represents loss and defeat.  
All these factors complicate conventional assessments as to the type of actions that are 
permissible for states to undertake.  
There is naturally some more tangible evidence that IHL is not best serving the 
conduct of armed conflict, particularly in relation to situations of non-state armed 
conflict. The ICRC, though resistant to any major changes to IHL, has suggested that 
the character of war is changing, with this reflected by the increasing number of 
 
168 See Tamás Hoffmann, ‘Squaring the Circle? – International Humanitarian Law and Transnational 
Armed Conflicts’ in Michael J. Matheson and Djamchid Momtaz (eds), Rules and Institutions of 
International Humanitarian Law Put to the Test of Recent Armed Conflicts (Les Regles et Institutions 
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Armed Conflict’ (2017) 19 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 2016 3–5. 
170 In the past “provisions of international law for the protection of civilians fitted well with the 
organizational rationality of the military apparatus”. Herfried Münkler, The New Wars (Polity Press 
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of warfare. James D. Morrow, ‘The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in 
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civilians harmed relative to the number of combatants killed.172 The decline in the 
overall volume of deaths in warfare is somewhat offset by the identity of the victims 
as civilians, with some reports suggesting that today the ratio may be as high as 9:1.173  
Based on the available evidence, scholars have suggested similar numbers,174  and 
similarly, high figures have additionally appeared in UN publications,175 with 
independent reports likewise stressing impacts on civilians.176 Analysis of the conflict 
in Afghanistan conducted by the Human Rights Commission suggests that even in the 
context of an ongoing conflict, civilian casualties have risen in relation to combatant 
deaths, with non-government forces being the perpetrator in the majority of cases.177 
Many of these casualties many be considered indirect by the conventional rationale of 
military engagements, yet it is likely that the organisations perpetrating these killings 
in some way equate these killings with armed struggle. That said, there is evidence to 
suggest that the killing of civilians can be recognised as formally playing a direct role 
in hostilities, should a sufficient nexus between the act and the conflict exist.178 
Additionally, it can be stressed that killing civilians is not merely seen as collateral 
damage, but the result of explicit targeting, often to produce a media effect,179 or 
alternately, such killing is justified by the aims an organisation pursues; in the case of 
ISIS, this may be in furtherance of their religiously articulated goals. It is, however, 
undoubtedly the case that the killing of civilians is being used by contemporary armed 
groups to produce strategic level advantages and bypass more conventional 
approaches to armed conflict.  
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The most critical argument for revising IHL is perhaps the need to 
unambiguously condemn and deter the types of behaviour that are currently 
manifesting in the strategies used by new, unconventional armed groups. As IHL is 
currently orientated around the goal of limiting the adverse impacts of war, it is worth 
considering how current trends in warfare may translate to a mandate to change IHL. 
Whilst this is an intuitive approach to take, it is important to consider how such a 
contention may be framed within the existing language and framework of IHL.  
 
2.7 Can IHL adapt to groups like ISIS? What challenges exist? 
 
It is possible to suggest that IHL is capable of change. This is unequivocally 
demonstrated by the sources of IHL, with treaties and custom having expanded and 
altered the disposition of the system over time. These sources, which are stated in the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice,180 stress the changing nature of war and 
the capacity for the rules governing warfare to adapt. The history of IHL also bears 
testament to this capacity to change, so long as the international community is 
incentivised to produce the required laws and customs. The desire to improve the 
protection of humans in wars has, unfortunately often followed the illustration of the 
existing law’s inadequacy to do so in dramatic fashion.181 There are however some 
changes, or transformations, that IHL is not capable of undertaking; or, at least, not 
without titanic effort. For instance, it would prove difficult to alter the principles that 
underpin the interpretation and development of the system.182 Additionally, IHL has 
adopted a clear trajectory regarding its approach to non-state armed conflict, in which 
the protections available draw ever closer to those available in interstate wars.183 
Reacting to the notion that unconventional armed groups not only fight and organise 
differently, but that this may merit different protections than those present in relation 
to more conventional non-state armed conflicts could foreseeably entail, pushes IHL 
beyond the concessions it is equipped to make in relation to the changing nature of 
war.  
 
180 Statute of the International Court of Justice (n 30). 
181 Meron (n 20). 
182 Indeed, these principles are to be considered “indivisible”. See The Lancet, ‘Examining 
Humanitarian Principles in Changing Warfare’ (2018) 391 The Lancet 631. 
183 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 48. 
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When asking what changes IHL could make in order to better address new 
wars, a question must first be posed: can IHL adapt to such threats within the same 
terms that it has applied to past changes? If not, what new forms of change might be 
required, and how might these changes be facilitated? These questions are naturally 
very complicated. This chapter suggests that the type of war and the understanding of 
force present in groups like ISIS inverts many of the assumptions IHL relies upon, 
particularly those derived from interstate war. The exact changes required to ensure 
that adequate humanitarian protections exist when such groups are fought, however, 
cannot be readily defined in the absence of an understanding of how such conflicts 
function. In short, determining the manner in which IHL needs to change – if indeed 
this is the case – requires an understanding of the manner in which current wars are 
different. Accordingly, it would be beneficial to gain a more complete understanding 
of groups like ISIS and how they fight before presuming to assert the changes needed 
to ensure that humanitarian protections exist when such groups are fought. 
 IHL has changed in the past and would be capable of changing again in the 
future. Should the precise changes necessary be determined, these changes would 
require that the will to alter IHL is present. For instance, the treaty portion of IHL has 
grown, with the volume of available statute having developed significantly since the 
inception of the system.184 This growth has reflected a recognition on the part of states 
that a change was needed. This expanding statute has additionally extended the remit 
of situations covered, which, alongside an appreciation of the history of IHL, suggests 
that this transition has occurred in order to better realise humanitarian protections as 
war shifted from a state enterprise to one often fought between states and other kinds 
of armed actor.185 Today, in contrast, problems with the implementation of IHL are 
more readily equated with a lack of enforcement, rather than the need for new laws.186 
This suggests that the will needed to undergo change may not be present, with state 
being content to proceed with the system as it stands.  
Many of the changes that have been proposed to better adapt IHL to the type 
of conflict taking place today would require the support of a new treaty to effectively 
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accomplish.187 Recognising this has taken place in the past, the generation of new 
statute or serious changes to the substance of existing treaties does however require 
serious will on behalf of a significant proportion of the international community.188 
These transitions have however resulted from the need to adapt being recognised, often 
after the need for revisions has been eloquently demonstrated by a sizable conflict. It 
is questionable if at the current juncture, sufficient will exists to generate new statute 
in relation to new types of conflict. Additionally, any universal or multilateral 
agreement on new types of warfare would almost surely represent a generational 
undertaking, taking time to draft and implement.189 It may prove expedient to consider 
more timely approaches to adapting IHL. 
 The construction of new statute is not the sole option for changing IHL. The 
capacity to evolve is likewise borne out by the customary elements of IHL, which have 
expanded significantly, as well as clearly adapting to new technologies and types of 
war.190 It can be contended that in relation to new types of armed group, customary 
international law is already undergoing a transition in relation to ISIS specifically.191 
The customary approach is perhaps more viable than requiring new treaties, yet also 
has its limitations. States are just as confused as everybody else when it comes to the 
expedient use of force in new wars and can be expected to misinterpret their 
obligations in complex situations. Moreover, it is perhaps premature to suggest that 
states have arrived at any general practice or approach to current transnational and 
unconventional armed conflicts.192  
 To summarise, IHL is in theory capable of adapting to new types of armed 
conflict, even those as divergent as those of ISIS. Theoretically, it is possible to issue 
new statute to bring IHL into line with the nature of modern conflict. Alternately, a 
coherent set of customs could arise from the concerted action of states against groups 
like ISIS, with these actions serving to extend the principles of IHL into such 
scenarios. However, these adaptations, whilst theoretically possible, require that not 
only is the changing nature of armed conflict understood, but that the will to recognise 
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Faculty Publications 1. 
192 Sassòli (n 2). 
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and implement changes is present. Of these two barriers, it is perhaps more appropriate 
to commence with the first. Understanding what causes groups like ISIS to challenge 
IHL, as well as the nature of this challenge, is a necessary component of producing a 
solution. To relate this back to IHL, it is appropriate to specifically understand how an 
organisation like ISIS diverges from IHL’s current means of defining an armed group, 
and how the type of war that states are required to fight against a group like ISIS may 
fall outside of the definition of armed conflict that IHL curates.  
 
2.8 The interests of Humanity; a mandate for change? 
 
Throughout this chapter, numerous allusions have been made to the 
importance of humanitarian principles, and their importance in the development of 
IHL in the modern era. When constructing an argument that change is required, it is 
perhaps advisable to determine that the system as it stands is not best disposed to 
ensure that adequate humanitarian protections exist, and why this is the case. To be 
more precise, amidst the general principles of international law, considerations of 
humanity may be extended in order to guide judgments and decisions, as well as 
serving as a mandate to change the rules;193 the instigation of IHL itself perhaps being 
based upon this consideration,194 with its subsequent change being guided somewhat 
by these values.195 The Martens clause sets out the manner in which, in the absence of 
a clear and complete set of rules, it is possible to defer to humanitarian considerations 
and the public conscience in order to determine the most suitable course of action.196 
Any new rules governing warfare must conform with the general disposition of the 
international community,197 and naturally, it is important that any such deference to 
the principles of humanity does not conflict with existing laws or customs.198 
 
193 Brownlie, Principles (n 31) 27. 
194 See Council of the European Union ‘Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union 
on the Occasion of the 150th Anniversary of the Battle of Solferino’ (24 June 2009) 1. 
195 ICJ, Nicaragua v. U.S. (Decision of 27 June 1986) 14.  
196 See Preamble, 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (n 
40). 
197 A number of legal scholars have expressed the sentiment that deference to core rules or core values 
of the international community is vital in determining these considerations and identifying new 
customary laws. See Antonio Cassese, Cassese's International Criminal Law (Paola Gaeta and others 
eds, 3rd edn, rev. Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, Laurel Baig, Mary Fan, Christopher Gosnell and Alex 
Whiting (Oxford University Press 2013) 122; Meron (n 20). 
198 Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Specificities of Humanitarian Law’ in Studies and Essays on International 
Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour of Jean Pictet (ICRC 1984) 265. 
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International criminal law has specified state practice and opinio juris as important for 
determining new norms and customs,199 this is arguably quite a fraught process, with 
different normative frameworks existing in relation to humanitarian values.200 
Moreover, the possibility that such concerns may be distorted by especially powerful 
state may be considered.201  
In relation to the issues identified in this study, there is both the absence of any 
existing rules or customs relating to the problem and a clear mandate to respond to 
adverse trends in armed conflict; explicitly, the specific targeting of civilians. It is 
desirable that, in the interests of humanity, the framework applied to govern conflicts 
involving such groups is defined clearly, and that it is appropriate to the nature of the 
situation. At this juncture of the thesis, it is not possible to determine precisely what 
response is justified, or to what extent IHL needs to be revised. It is difficult to gauge 
what state practice may be towards groups like ISIS, or unconventional armed groups 
may be, or what the international community may consider being a justifiable 
response. A critical issue is the monolithic approach IHL maintains towards armed 
groups; this approach makes it difficult to articulate how armed groups, particularly 
religious armed groups, may merit a distinctive legal framework. This, moving 
forward, is a critical issue with which to engage.  
 
2.9 Conclusion 
 
Grotius, often considered one of the earlier founders of international law,202 was not 
overly concerned with armed groups and non-state parties to armed conflict. Had he 
been, he may have wrestled with similar challenges to those faced by today’s 
international lawyers in relation to organised armed groups; namely how to define 
them objectively and decide a standardised means for determining their presence. He 
 
199 Rwamakuba v The Prosecutor (Decision Joint Criminal Enterprise to the Crimes of Genocide) ICTR-
98-44-AR72.4 (22 October 2004) [15]; see also Claus Kreß, ‘War Crimes Committed in Non-
International Armed Conflict and the Emerging System of International Criminal Justice’ (2001) 30 
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 5. 
200 Bergit Schlütter, Developments in Customary International Law: Theory and the Practice of the 
International Court of Justice and the International ad hoc Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia, vol 62 (Martinus Nijhoff 2010) 45–46. 
201 M. John-Hopkins, The Rule of Law in Crisis and Conflict Grey Zones: Regulating the Use of Force 
in a Global Information Environment (Routledge 2017) 151. 
202 See generally, Anne Orford, Florian Hoffmann and Martine Julia Van Ittersum, Hugo Grotius: The 
Making of a Founding Father of International Law (Oxford University Press 2016). 
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would have undoubtedly included some of the descriptive elements that exist today; 
suggesting that such groups must have distinctive hierarchies and leaders, array 
themselves in uniforms, and be equipped to offer battle in a manner in accordance with 
the customs of the age. Regarding this last point, Grotius, being conversant in the 
military science of the age, may have specified the number of pike and horse an 
organisation must possess, or specified a requirement that they field muskets and 
cannon, this being the civilized approach to conflict at the time. He may, as is the case 
with modern IHL, additionally specified further features which would no doubt have 
assisted the princes and sovereigns of his age to differentiate armed groups from 
internal rebellions not meriting such regulations. A generation later, many of these 
credentials may have become useless as the face of warfare changed. Likewise, it is 
doubtful that any criteria Grotius may have hypothetically established would have 
been much use beyond the bounds of Europe, where warfare was fundamentally 
different. Subsequent international lawyers would have been faced with the challenge 
of separating the temporal and local factors identified by Grotius from those with more 
universal salience, as well as perhaps updating and expanding the definition of armed 
groups to reflect examples from their own era.  
International law has committed itself to the same imprudence that has been 
unfairly attributed to Grotius above. In striving to establish a common and objective 
understanding of armed groups, extensive deference has been given to state approach 
to warfare. This is implied by the initial manifestation of the term in the Geneva 
conventions, carried through in the additional protocols, and confirmed by military 
tribunals and international justice. The current approach to conventional armed groups 
arose in response to a historical epoch in which armed groups reflected state practice, 
with additional conformity arising through the nature of “national liberation” 
movements. More egregiously, however, IHL additionally assumes that armed groups 
always reflect the state in their approach to force, and even pursue the same objectives. 
This chapter has briefly set out how these assumptions are currently subject to 
challenge, and, how these challenges may translate to a mandate to adjust IHL in order 
to better reflect the interests of humanity in conflicts involving armed groups that do 
not fit the material elements preserved in IHL.  
Moving forward, the question of determining the nature of the challenge in 
precise terms remains. An understanding of unconventional armed groups can be used 
to better understand what appropriate adjustments might work. Based upon the 
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contention of this thesis that ISIS is the most successful and prolific example of an 
unconventional armed group, this study will move forward to understand 
contemporary religious ideology, and how it causes inculcated groups to exhibit erratic 
approaches to the use of force. These alterations translate to a challenge to regulating 
the use of force, and can, therefore, assist in later developing a possible way forward.  
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3 Identifying a General Definition of Religious Conflict 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, it was implied that one of the key factors driving the changing 
nature of the contemporary conflict is religion. Specifically, it is often the case that a 
non-state group, upon adopting a religious identity, begins to display a proclivity for 
directly targeting civilians, and perhaps adopts a system of organisation and command 
in keeping with its ideological identity. Additionally, due to the manner in which such 
groups then understand the use of force, they may require the states contesting them 
to fight in a manner that likewise causes more adverse impacts to be directed towards 
civilians, with this in turn perhaps necessitating that IHL is examined. It has been 
additionally suggested that in order for IHL to appropriately adapt to this new reality 
in how force is used, a comprehensive understanding of such groups and how they 
diverge from more conventional armed groups is essential. As these trends clearly 
pose a threat to the welfare of both civilians and combatants, there is a basis to explore 
possible approaches to revising IHL. the immediate  
  Whilst a specific framework for differentiating religious approaches to the use 
of force is absent from international law, religious or holy war is a well-established 
concept. As a phenomenon, however, it is most commonly understood as historical in 
nature. Where it does emerge in the contemporary discussion, it is often rapidly 
suggested that it represents a fundamental misinterpretation of the faith in question.1 
Whilst war is not entirely the exclusive preserve of states, the contemporary 
understanding of warfare emphasises state involvement; states make war, and war 
makes states.2 The relationship between war and statehood is inherent in international 
legal thought on the subject of both statehood and war.3 International criminal law has 
in past examples required “state like features” in order to find individuals in leadership 
 
1 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (University Presses Marketing 2004) 1. 
2 Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’ in Peter Evans, Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press 1985) 
169–191. 
3 In the classical era, only states would have had the legal features required to be recognised as capable 
of waging war. Vassal state insurgents, where recognised, needed to express a range of state-like 
competencies in order to achieve even limited recognition in armed conflict. See generally Lassa 
Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (2018, 3rd edn, Longmans 1920). 
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positions guilty of war crimes.4 Any mechanisms for preventing and adjudicating the 
conduct of war are again tied to the notion of statehood; this being visible, in part from 
the lack of discernible means of getting some non-state groups to comply to any 
standards in armed conflict.5 As adopting a religious ideology can change how armed 
groups organise, it is worth considering if the alterations imposed challenge 
international law’s state-centric means of knowing and regulating armed conflicts.  
The focus International law places on state war is perhaps justifiable, given 
past trends. However, the omission of an understanding of the distinctive nature of 
religious warfare may have adverse consequences in terms of appropriately 
understanding contemporary conflicts. There is a basis to suggest that in relation to 
today’s unconventional armed groups, a desire to resume a religious approach to 
violence is apparent.6 This trend may very well be connected with the shortfall in 
humanitarian protections that often occurs in contemporary conflicts. There is a reason 
to suggest the practice of waging a war when undertaken by some forms of interest 
groups, is different enough to challenge IHL’s assumptions regarding the use of force.7 
This somewhat questions the extant condition in which the capacity to exercise force 
is linked with legitimacy and statehood, a theme that will be explored in subsequent 
chapters. For the moment, it is possible to suggest that an understanding of religious 
war cannot be extracted from IHL. 
The foremost intention of this chapter is to demonstrate the existence of two 
different frameworks, or institutions of organised violence. First, this chapter 
addresses the existence of the institution of war: the framework of state violence that 
has evolved from predominantly Judeo-Christian origins into a universal system of 
law and norms that govern when and how states may use violence.8 This form of 
warfare can be aligned with IHL’s current understanding of armed conflict, 
specifically, the manner in which it understands interstate war. Second, this chapter 
 
4 Kadic v Karadžić (USA, Opinion of 2nd Circuit re: Subject Matter Jurisdiction) Docket Nos 94-9035, 
-9069 (13 October 1995). 
5 See M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed 
Conflict by Non-State Actors’ (2008) 98 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973–) 711, 
715. 
6 Jeni Mitchell, ‘The Contradictory Effects of Ideology on Jihadist War-Fighting: The Bosnia 
Precedent’ (2008) 31 Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 808, 809–810. 
7 Nicolas Lamp, ‘Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The “New War” Challenge to 
International Humanitarian Law’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 225, 247. 
8 Harold J. Berman, ‘Religious Foundations of Law in the West: An Historical Perspective’ (1983) 1 
Journal of Law and Religion 3, 3–4. 
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postulates a parallel institution of organised violence: the framework of “holy war”. 
This separate framework will subsequently serve as a means to understand 
unconventional armed groups of a religious character. The aim is to accordingly 
specify some typical or general features that differentiate this form of war from armed 
conflict as conventionally understood, with these factors subsequently explored in 
relation to contemporary conflict, and the challenges facing the application of 
appropriate humanitarian protections in such instances. Most notably, this chapter will 
establish that under some circumstances, religion can impose imperatives that override 
any generally recognised restrictions on the use of force, exacerbating the adverse 
impacts of organised violence. The notion that the two are fundamentally separate and 
that both may operate today, diverges from the prevailing consensus of both religious 
and legal scholarship; in contemporary discussion of the history of international law, 
the religion is often specified as the source of today’s laws and norms,9 with scholars 
connecting the IHL and its principles to religious values,10 which have ultimately 
developed and delivered today’s system of regulation. This chapter does not contest 
the contribution of religious thought to today’s international system of law. Today’s 
legal prohibitions on violence within a state on state context can be easily connected 
to earlier religious principles;11 yet, the contribution that religious morality has made 
to restraining war is accompanied by a second approach, with religious war standing 
in contrast to the more mainstream, moderating influence attributed to faith-based 
approaches. The relevance of the more belligerent role that religion can play today is 
indicated by the manner in which religious ideology sometimes overrides both 
international law and national interest.12 As such, religions contribution to warfare has 
a dual nature.  
 
9 Yoram Dinstein, ‘International Law as a Primitive Legal System’ (1986) 19 New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 1, 17. 
10 Whilst the origins of today’s prohibitions on conflict can be traced back to ancient Aristotelian ideas, 
evolution through the Christian experience ultimately generated the concept of Bellum Justum as the 
theoretical underpinning of international regulations on war. See Gregory M. Reichberg, ‘Just War 
Theory, History of’ in International Encyclopedia of Ethics (Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2013) 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee358>.  
11 David M. Mednicoff, ‘Humane wars? International Law, Just War Theory and Contemporary Armed 
Humanitarian Intervention’ (2006) 2 Law, Culture and the Humanities 373, 379. 
12 This will be discussed with reference to each region specifically in the course of this chapter, and 
more generally thought this thesis with reference to the Islamic tradition. For the moment, it is sufficient 
to say that in the majority of cases, religion is far older than the nation and the international system at 
large, and accordingly can be articulated as a supranational form of organisation that under some 
circumstances supplants any state based allegiance.  
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In order to demonstrate the dualistic nature of war in religious thought, 
Christianity, Islam, and Judaism are to be surveyed,13 with the intention of proving the 
existence of a holy war in the theological evolution of each tradition. This examination 
is by no means exhaustive but simply seeks to articulate the existence of a system of 
organised violence in which the body of faith is required to exert itself fully in the 
pursuit of a soteriological goal or end state. This separate theological pillar of violence 
serves as an explanatory framework in later chapters, where contemporary religious 
violence is analysed on the basis of the characteristics identified here. Limited 
reference will also be made to the continuing relevance of holy war in all three 
traditions, in order to fully articulate the importance of understanding religion as a 
mobilising force today.  
3.2 The institution of war; the role of religion  
 
The use of violence today is subject to restrictions, both normative and explicit, that 
are considered concrete by states. The foundational assumption inherent in the 
international system is that war and peace represent distinct divisions, an approach 
that is maintained in contemporary international legal institutions,14 though this 
distinction is perhaps gradually dissolving.15 The United Nations charter restricts the 
institution of war severely; legitimate recourse to violence is restricted to a handful of 
situations.16 Violence, as observed by a number of different scholars, is gradually 
declining; the laws generated to restrict armed conflict are undoubtedly part of the 
reason for this decline.17 In order to explain the role of law in this decline and its 
continuing utility in today’s relatively peaceful conditions,18 it must be recognised that 
war, as it is currently defined, does not represent the absolute negation of systems of 
 
13 Judaism, Christianity and Islam; though explicit focus will be on Rabbinic Judaism, Catholicism, and 
Sunni Islam. 
14 International Law Commision, ‘Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of 
its Sixty-second Session’ (2011) II Part Two Yearbook of the International Law Commission 170, 214–
217. 
15 Kenneth Watkin, Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary 
Conflict (Oxford University Press 2016) 33–34. 
16 Stephen C. Neff, War and the Law of Nations: A General History (Cambridge University Press 2005) 
315. 
17 Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War (Allen Lane 
2017) 334–335. 
18 Scholars generally agree that violence is declining, though this is heavily dependent on how precisely 
violence is defined and understood. See Dean Falk and Charles Hildebolt, ‘Annual War Deaths in 
Small-Scale Versus State Societies Scale with Population Size Rather than Violence’ (2017) 58 Current 
Anthropology 805. 
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law in favour of a condition of unrestricted chaos. This has long been the case, with 
conflict usually governed by laws, or at least norms of behaviour in some way, even 
if these only comprise the mutual norms of the respective combatants.19 Today, the 
regulatory environment is far more developed than in previous eras. Layers of 
regulation have made war exceptional, as it is prohibitively costly to engage in, from 
both tangible and normative perspectives.20 For instance, IHL serves to govern how 
wars are conducted for humanitarian reasons, and from which the notion of war crimes 
has emerged.21 These may be discernible characteristics constraining the conduct of 
the war, or “armed conflict” as a regulated system, rather than simply the absence of 
peace.  
First, it is necessary to posit that there is a relationship between religion and 
international law. Such a relationship is often obfuscated. Not only is religion out of 
favour, with more scientific approaches to law in ascendance,22 but the distinctly 
Christian provenance of the system is also considered a barrier to the 
“universalisation” of international law as it spreads to non-Christian regions. 
However, religion and its scriptures pervade everything, with the law being no 
exception. This can first be discerned through the prevalence of systems of religion in 
human society, which is sufficient for observers to conclude that religion is an 
instinctive feature of the human mind.23 Historically, codes of law and conduct have 
been dependent on religious assertions; on this basis, it is possible to conclude that 
there exists a psychological value to religion.24 The inseparability of religion and 
morality has translated into the evolution of codes of law.25 Even western legal 
systems, now ostensibly disconnected from faith, were intimately associated with 
religion insofar as the connection was taken to be factual well into the twentieth 
century.26 Whilst limitations on war and armed conflict exist across cultures and 
 
19 Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws of War (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2000) 2. 
20 John J. Weltman, World Politics and the Evolution of War (Johns Hopkins University Press 1995) 
201. 
21 Antonio Cassese, Cassese's International Criminal Law (Paola Gaeta and others eds, 3rd edn revised 
by Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, Laurel Baig, Mary Fan, Christopher Gosnell and Alex Whiting, 
Oxford University Press 2013) 63–66. 
22 See Anne Orford, ‘Scientific Reason and the Discipline of International Law’ (2014) 25 European 
Journal Of International Law 369. 
23 Patrick Fairbairn, The Typology of Scripture (Kregel Publications 1854) 425–426. 
24 William N. Schoenfeld, Religion and Human Behavior (Authors Cooperative 1993) 129–134. 
25 Paul Lehmann, ‘The Metaphorical Reciprocity Between Theology and Law (Law, Metaphor, and 
Theology: A Frances Lewis Law Center Colloquium)’ (1985) 3 The Journal of Law and Religion 179. 
26 Berman (n 8) 3–4. 
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epochs, the foundation of war as a separate legal institution has a distinctly religious 
origin. In the contemporary era, however, Dinstein explains that despite these origins, 
modern-day international law is devoid of religious content.27  
A number of claims are made by different moral and intellectual traditions, 
each trying to prove that they are the origin of today’s regulatory framework.28 Whilst 
it is true that the essential pattern and morality of regulated armed conflict have been 
exhibited across a number of cultures at different times, the notion that these privileges 
extended beyond one’s own religion, culture, or ethnic group are rarely present. 
Moreover, where moderation against an alien enemy is suggested, this moderation is 
often based on an economic or tactical imperative.29 The universality of today’s system 
for regulating hostility, therefore, separates it from many more limited systems that 
have existed in the past.  
Partly because of these competing claims, the precise provenance of today’s 
regulated form of warfare is difficult to assert comprehensively. A credible argument 
can, however, be made that the emergence of the current system of war can be traced 
back to the principles established by Grotius in the sixteenth century.30 Basing the 
conduct of states on grounds not overly reliant upon faith, but on natural rights 
liberalism,31 this philosophy of conflict gave every state the right to use violence in 
defence of its interests and survival. The reciprocal articulation of rights that follows 
ascribes moral agency to the individual and permitted the evolution of sovereign states 
capable of recognising one another. This represented a distinctive approach at the time 
Grotius was operating.32 He did not, for instance, limit his code of law to Christians 
like himself, but allotted to all peoples the inherent right to address wrongs inflicted 
on them, irrespective of religious origin.33 This ultimately translated to states taking 
on rational personalities, and they could accordingly be relied upon to produce 
 
27 Dinstein (n 9) 17. 
28 Hathaway and Shapiro (n 17). 
29 As Posner contends, “rules of war” are not so much rooted in morality as pragmatic limitations that 
benefit both sides. See E.A. Posner, ‘Human Rights, the Laws of War, and Reciprocity’ (2012) 6 Law 
and Ethics of Human Rights 147.  
30 Hedley Bull, ‘Hugo Grotius and International Relations’ in Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury and 
Adam Roberts (eds), The Importance of Grotius in the Study of International Relations (Clarendon 
Press 1990) 76. 
31 Ibid 79. 
32 For discussion of Grotius as a founding quantity in international law see John D. Haskell, ‘Hugo 
Grotius in the Contemporary Memory of International Law: Secularism, Liberalism, and the Politics of 
Restatement and Denial’ (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 269. 
33 Hathaway and Shapiro (n 17) 22. 
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violence in their own defence. Each state therefore only had to examine their own 
interests to discern how another would react to provocation or attack. In his works, 
Grotius described how reciprocal arrangements between different belligerents had 
gradually solidified into a code of regulation.34 Defection from the then prevailing 
customs of law by a belligerent was then further framed by consequences, not the least 
of which would be the loss of that belligerent’s own privileges.35 Whilst not yet 
comparable to today’s widely-accepted body of international law, the foundational 
principle of the system described by Grotius – that of states recognising the reciprocal 
character of violent interaction and capable of comprehending each other on the basis 
of shared rationality – provided the basis for later elaborations and developments. 
The aim of armed conflict may succinctly be summarised as the need to 
dominate one’s opponent, often to expand one’s own territory.36 The essential right to 
do this was maintained well into the twentieth century.37 Whilst the central utility of 
force was maintained, a system of customs and enforcement mechanisms solidified 
over time. For instance, by the twentieth century, Kelsen still saw fit to characterise 
international law as “primitive”, though nevertheless well-placed to issue justice. 
Individual states could act unilaterally, to enforce what amounted to a shared order.38 
The need for what amounted to “equilibrium between the cruel necessities of war and 
humanitarian ideals”39 was ultimately realised in both The Hague and Geneva 
Conventions, alongside the collective responsibility to ensure that the now-established 
customs of armed conflict be maintained.  
Today, the notion of sovereign states being capable of interaction on equitable 
terms is largely taken as a fact; this, in turn, has permitted the accumulation of more 
restrictive customs in the domain of state armed conflict, and the formal solidification 
of these customs in a range of widely-accepted treaties. Once it is understood that 
states are the only entity permitted to engage in mass acts of violence, it may be 
 
34 See Hugo Grotius, The Rights Of War And Peace (A.C. Campbell trans., Walter Dunne 1901) XIV. 
35 Hathaway and Shapiro (n 17) 22. 
36 Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Beatrice Heuser, Michael Howard and Peter Paret eds, abridged 
edition/abridged with an introduction and notes by Beatrice Heuser, Oxford University Press 2008).  
37 For instance, as defined by Oppenheim; ‘war is a contention between states for the purpose of 
overpowering one another […]. As long as war exists, subjugation will be recognised.’ In Oppenheim 
(n 3) 369. 
38 Hans Kelsen, The Legal Process and International Order (Hans Kelsen ed, Constable & Co. 1935) 
11. 
39 Josef L. Kunz, ‘The Chaotic Status of the Laws of War and the Urgent Necessity for Their Revision’ 
(2017) 45 American Journal of International Law 37, 59. 
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possible to reduce incidences of violence by limiting the instances in which states may 
legitimately use force. As a result, war has become increasingly constrained. Whilst 
maintaining its original intent as a moral framework for violence, serious restrictions 
as to the use of force have served to curtail the utility of state violence in all but the 
most exceptional of circumstances.40  
There are, however, worrying trends that suggest that addressing states as 
unitary actors are not sufficient. Violence en masse is increasingly exhibited by non-
state, terrorist, and illegitimate territorial authorities.41 This introduces an argument in 
favour of a deeper examination into the precise structure and purpose of prevailing 
restrictions on violence. It is possible to posit that, based upon prevailing conditions, 
religion plays an increasing role in both the initiation and conduct of armed hostility. 
This can be evidenced in the threat posed by the phenomenon of religious terrorism 
and violence.42 Additionally, religious justifications frequently emerge as pretexts for 
attacks on the world order,43 emphasising the role of religion as a means for 
organisation and mobilisation.  
It is possible to say that the regulations surrounding armed conflict have 
coalesced around a number of essential characteristics ascribed to belligerents. The 
subtraction of these characteristics represents a challenge to the application of the 
norms and rules that depend upon the presence of these features. Religious conflicts 
do not conform to many of the assumptions that are made in relation to armed conflict 
today; they are a product of different motives, are fought in a different manner than 
“state” warfare is, and are fought by organisations that coalesce around religious 
authority, rather than the state.44 These variations are supremely relevant to 
contemporary patterns of violence.  
Defining “holy war” has proved to be an immensely contentious task, 
historically at least. Historians have sought to demonstrate that religious justifications 
for combat serve only as an outward pretext for economic or geopolitical 
 
40 Hathaway and Shapiro (n 17) 334–335. 
41 Falk and Hildebolt (n 18). 
42 For example, UNSC has acknowledged the threat posed by religious orientate groups. See UNSC 
Statement 13172 (22 January 2018) UN doc SC/13172. 
43 Considering the broad spread of religious thought underpinning contemporary terrorism, it is possible 
to suggest that religion represents one of the central mobilising factors behind modern day violence. 
See Rogers Brubaker, ‘Religious Dimensions of Political Conflict and Violence’ (2015) 33 Sociological 
Theory 1. 
44 M. Van Creveld, Transformation of War (Free Press 2009) 130–135. 
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imperatives,45 a suggestion that is prevalent today.46 This may well be the case, but it 
is discernible that a war fought based on religious reasons demonstrates unique 
features that are seldom exhibited outside of a holy war. First, it subverts the interstate 
element of the post-Grotian international system; religions are seldom completely 
contiguous with state boundaries. Second, the war is not fought against a known 
quantity. In a state context, a war is fought against another state; its objectives and 
intentions are readily discernible, as, on a basic level, the belligerents reflect one 
another in their core needs. In a religious war, an adversary is, by necessity, 
unknowable; terms like heretic, heathen, or infidel are invoked to this effect. Finally, 
religion as motivation is absolute. It is difficult to advance peace when operating under 
a presumably divine imperative; surrender and defeat can be sins of a cardinal nature.  
Based on the above features, it is possible to move away from the rudimentary 
definition of a holy war as simply a war fought for religious purposes.47 The nature of 
religious war is distinctive, not only in terms of its purpose but also in terms of how it 
is fought. In western traditions, the existence of religious war was essential in 
generating the European state system, serving as an example of the type of conflict 
that needed to be avoided in future international interaction.48 Religious warfare was 
supplanted by interstate conflict, which seemed, by comparison, the more reasonable 
alternative.49 Subsequently, holy war as a framework for violence has become 
unpopular across cultures, due in part to the proliferation of the state system, and the 
largely ineffectual nature of holy war within this system.50 As a result, there is not 
much in the way of the consideration of holy war as an independent institution of 
violence. However, since the mid-twentieth century, religion has once again begun to 
emerge as an influential factor, both within the state framework and as a transnational, 
 
45 Mark Konnert, Early Modern Europe: The Age of Religious War, 1559–1715 (University of Toronto 
Press 2008) 12.  
46 Bart Schuurman, ‘Clausewitz and the "New Wars" scholars (Carl von Clausewitz) (Essay)’ (2010) 
40 Parameters 89, 92. 
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cross-boundary phenomenon.51 Due to the relative absence of overtly religious 
conflict from contemporary violent interactions, it is crucial to go back some distance 
in order to understand the key differences that merit discussion. Yet, understanding 
the distinctive nature of religious conflict is crucial if modern permutations of this 
approach to violence are to be understood. Accordingly, this chapter will now seek out 
a basis for asserting a generalised means of understanding religious conflict, or holy 
war, by looking to scripture and history. 
 
3.3 Early religious conflict  
 
It is possible to omit more rudimentary understandings of religious violence from a 
serious analysis of the development of the holy war concept, which is arguably most 
relevant to monotheistic traditions.52 However, briefly discussing what war entailed 
prior to this gives some insight into the incentive for developing separate institutions 
of conflict, as well as indicating the capacity for the classification of warfare to alter 
over time. Whilst it would be beyond the scope of this thesis to comprehensively 
discuss the role of religion in ancient warfare, a brief, focused examination serves to 
reveal the drastically different understandings of violence during the period between 
3300 BC and 50 AD and the inseparability of faith from organised conflict. As a 
second component, this examination reveals the irrationality inherent in this approach 
to warfare. It is naturally difficult to articulate the role of religion in early warfare 
when the evidence available is so limited. There are, however, some means accessible 
to construct a reasonable facsimile of the role religion played in ancient, pre-
monotheistic warfare. First, we can examine the role of religion in the context most 
relevant to the development of later legal doctrines of conflict, namely the Middle and 
Near East. Not only is this geographical region relevant to the growth of monotheism, 
and ultimately the development of contemporary doctrines for religious conflict, but 
it is additionally the location of the earliest recorded conflicts of mankind.53  
As Cooper notes, it is possible to form an understanding of both war and peace 
based on royal inscriptions and other archaeological evidence that has been preserved 
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from this era.54 For instance, the Annals of Thutmosis III, dating from the fifteenth 
century BC, go into extensive detail as to how a battle in this period unfolded, and 
how leaders understood the role of warfare.55 Relatively extensive Cuneiform texts 
detailing Babylonian events suggest that gods were understood as ordering their 
respective civilisations into battle.56 Whilst these do not represent documents 
comparable to the religious literature or records of later civilisations, they are 
sufficient to indicate the general features of warfare during this period, and the central 
nature of religion to armed conflict through early history. The condition of conflict 
during this time period is succinctly summarised by Bradford;57 whether Egyptian, 
Assyrian, or Sumerian, the cultures of the time all bore some similar general features 
in their disposition to warfare. They distinguished themselves on the basis of worship, 
took an organised approach to conflict, and had clear civil and military hierarchies.58 
They did not assimilate the people they conquered into their religion, and therefore 
only dominated any empire they may have created by force for as long as they had the 
power to do so.59 Yet, even based on the available evidence, it would be erroneous to 
simply state region as the root cause of violence in this period, however fearsome and 
warlike early religions may have seemed.60 It is most likely that competition drove 
violence during this time, or at least represented an underlying cause of conflict.61 Yet, 
this created a need for the social communities of the time to develop rules and laws 
that encouraged the use of violence in order to ensure their survival. Given the absence 
of developed taxonomies of race or nationality during this period,62 as well as the 
eponymous role religion played, it can be suggested that it was faith that served this 
role. Naturally, discussing violence during this period requires generalisation and 
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inference based upon extremely sparse written records. Additionally, the time period 
is expansive, numerous cultures came and went, and societies evolved dramatically; 
yet there is some basis to assert broad patterns in terms of the role religion played in 
war as being fairly stable for much of early human history based upon the information 
available. 
Scholars drawing on available evidence have related a number of key themes 
to warfare in this period. The first theme is theocracy. In the absence of the modern 
idea of the state, all forms of allegiance were religious in nature. Institutions of 
kingship existed, and the role of an earthly leader invariably took on the position of a 
battle leader, as evidenced in Sumerian, Egyptian, and Assyrian cultures.63 However, 
a king or chief was never the absolute ruler. The “apex” of such ancient communities 
was the national god, of whom the earthy ruler was merely a tenant; the god was the 
“source and soul of the body politic”.64 Treaties were struck between gods, not kings; 
wars were declared against a god or the followers of a god.65 Based on the role of 
religion in warfare, the conduct of the war had many supernatural connotations.66 
These early civilisations additionally subscribed to theomachy, the struggle between 
gods, which was aligned with earthly war, conquest, and political struggles in a 
number of cultures, including the cultures of the Hurrians, Babylonians, and 
Assyrians.67 Gods, or their earthly proxies, decided when to go to war, with their 
human followers divining their courses of action through omens and superstitions.68 
Ancient religions did not assert that their god or pantheon was the only one in 
existence, only that theirs were the best.69 This approach was articulated in many early 
cultures, for instance, Babylonian and Assyrian recorded history suggest this to be the 
case. As the armies of these early civilizations set forth to war, they envisioned that 
their gods were waging war above them, overcoming their deistic rivals.70 The 
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presence of a god in an earthly sense was demonstrated not just by the presence of 
worshippers, but through cultural artefacts, idols, and temples. Desecration of these 
sites was an important aspect of any conflict. Destruction of a neighbour’s sculpture 
or idol was sufficient to provoke war.71 These features suggest that a people’s presence 
in an area, access to resources and the importance of a particular location or geography 
was often understood, at least in part through the presence of these religious artefacts, 
a primitive forerunner of today’s understanding of territoriality. 
Conflict prior to the development of monotheism was therefore highly 
ritualised, bore supernatural connotations, and was ultimately sacramental for the 
communities involved. The inclusion of religion meant that wars were not conducted 
in accordance with direct human agency; the army of a tribe or empire operated under 
a divine imperative, which not only permitted but frequently required that 
neighbouring tribes and religions be expunged. As a result of these features, the war 
was frequently irrational, fought for supernatural reasons that did not serve the long-
term interests of any empire or group. This is evidenced in the repeated and rapid 
expansion and collapse of such societies throughout the period.  
 
3.4 Judaism  
 
Like many religious traditions, it is possible to observe Jewish scholars tracing the 
lineage of modern-day international prohibitions on war back to their primary 
scripture.72 Early tribal Israelites initially did not diverge much from other ancient 
cultures discussed in the prior section.73 Over time, however, a distinctive Jewish 
approach to conflict did arise, ultimately dividing religious war from non-religious 
war within the tradition.74 The acknowledgement that religion was not the driving 
force behind all conflicts represents an important distinction that is critical to both the 
Jewish faith and the further development of the Abrahamic tradition found in 
Christianity and Islam. In this manner, the depiction of armed conflict found in Jewish 
scripture is foundational for both the institution of war and the understanding of 
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religious war ensconced in other Abrahamic religions, which draw on the Jewish 
conception in order to produce their own rationales for religious violence.75  
In the Torah and Tanakh which together are both religious texts and written 
history,76 a number of wars are recorded. The distinct military focus found in several 
books of the text is often connected to the Jewish experience of conflict during the 
time that the books were compiled.77 Whilst it would be premature to declare the Old 
Testament, or Tanakh, as the first articulation of contemporary just war theory, it 
vaguely conforms to the approach in that it sets limitations on when to fight, and how 
to fight.78 For example, rules constrain who is permitted not to fight. Cowards are 
excused on the basis that they would do more harm than good,79 as are those who are 
occupied with new agricultural or construction projects. New families are also 
permitted to opt-out of any violent activity.80 These rules have been interpreted either 
as the first moral safeguards that mitigate individual involvement in the war or 
alternatively, as a recognition of the need for the Israelites to secure an economic and 
demographic future.81 Regardless, the exceptions specified in Jewish scripture provide 
an initial foundation for later discussions of how wars should be fought.  
Critically, the rules laid out in Deuteronomy suggest two different approaches 
to war. The first of these two approaches are considered relatively progressive for the 
era.82 In the first sense, an army of Israelites may offer peace in return for subjugation. 
Should this be refused, and should the enemy engage in battle, then all men are to be 
killed, but women, children, and property can be taken as spoils. This code applies to 
cities outside of the land selected for the Israelites by God.83 As for other cases, a war 
within the sacred region of Israel was far more destructive. God would step in to either 
indicate enemy tribes for destruction, usually in order to take possession of the sacred 
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land of Israel.84 On the occasion that such a war was declared, the required response 
was the eradication of the target tribe – not just the people, but livestock and all 
property as well. Only precious metals could be taken as spoils, and even then only 
after ritual purification had been completed.85 The destruction of these peoples is 
predicated on the notion that should they be allowed to exist, even as slaves, they may 
contaminate the Israelites with their foreign religious traditions, which was 
undesirable.86 God indicated that seven tribes of Canaan were to be exterminated by 
the Israelites in this manner,87 making this type of war far from exceptional in early 
Jewish history.  
Wars that were not commanded by good and outside of Israel were additionally 
initiated during this period and were successful on at least one occasion.88 On the 
occasion that war went against God’s will, however, the Israelites were subject to 
divine punishment.89 In the Old Testament, it is not the force of the Israelites that 
decided the outcome, but God who ultimately determined if a battle was won90 or 
lost.91 Based on the text, non-religious wars – those during which looting was 
permitted – were rare as compared to those initiated by God.92 Critically, as Fine 
argues, there is little to suggest that the rules and moral codes of the Torah concerning 
warfare are binding upon the Jewish people in perpetuity, but only in the very specific 
temporal and situational context of the period.93 Whilst this may well be the case, 
subsequent generations have drawn upon the text’s depiction of war and produced 
variations of its content.  
The early history of the Israelites was subject to extensive interpretation. Later 
generations of the Jewish faith generated key bodies of scholarship and secondary 
scripture, containing developments and expansions on the themes established in the 
Torah. The Talmud represents an authoritative interpretation that expands on the key 
themes of early Hebrew scripture, though it is perceived in Judaism as a “reference 
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point” rather than an immutable statement.94 By the time the Talmud was compiled, 
the Israelites no longer had a nation, detaching any further discussion from any civic 
reality. Accordingly, much of their consideration of warfare does not represent an 
operational code of law, but can instead be considered “messianic speculation”.95  
It is perhaps worth noting that when the Talmud was compiled, a number of 
“holy wars” had been started by the Israelites, with largely disastrous consequences.96 
The notion of a returning messiah that would bring holy conflict was present in Jewish 
discourse and was a powerful motivating factor for the ill-advised armed forays of the 
Jewish people throughout the first century AD.97 There were several attempts made at 
the time to “hasten” this eventuality, with this in turn leading to a series of disastrous 
revolts against the imperial power of Rome.98 Later reflections on these events can be 
understood as a powerful motivation for scholars to discourage the hastening of the 
Messiah’s return and invoking any religious wars; such wars having almost causes the 
eradication of the Jewish faith. Indeed, there is little discussion of the topic of war in 
any scripture or rabbinic discussion incorporated into the Jewish faith, possibly as a 
consequence of this history, and partly due to the lack of any armed Jewish nation 
during this period.99 
In this sparse body of scholarship, Maimonides’ discussion of the laws of war 
represents the pre-eminent classical Jewish text on the law of war.100 In part of his 
multidisciplinary work, he devotes some discussion to conflict, and differentiates holy 
war from other forms of violence perpetrated by the state.101 The “Mitzvah war” is 
defined in Maimonides’ writing in relation to Jewish history, explicitly citing it in the 
context of the wars prescribed against the tribes of Canaan or the tribe of Amalek.102 
This would be in line with the wider argument limiting holy war to its historical setting 
if he did not include the clause that to defend oneself against persecution also qualifies 
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as Mitzvah.103 This type of violence was strictly the only type that the king was 
supposed to engage in. Other elective wars may be fought, though spiritual approval 
must be gained prior to engaging in war. Such wars are considered discretionary.104  
In the Mitzvah war, Maimonides is explicit that no soul is to be left alive.105 In 
a war of discretion, the population may be spared, though only if they submit to 
humiliating subjugation and pay tribute.106 He further elucidates the circumstances 
under which individuals may be permitted to avoid war, though, again, these laws only 
apply to discretionary war.107 Every man must fight in a Mitzvah war.108 A cursory 
reading of Maimonides on The Laws of Kings and Their Wars suggests that two 
distinctive forms of warfare exist: the highly permissive Mitzvah war (a variation of 
the theme of holy war), and the restricted war of discretion, which is governed by 
emergent constraints, such as requiring council approval, not mobilising the entirety 
of the adult male population, and permitting the option of not eradicating the enemy. 
Both varieties of war covered by the book are not acceptable by contemporary 
standards, though of the two, the Mitzvah war is clearly the worst. Stern recognises an 
important mitigating factor in Maimonides’ understanding of war by noting that all 
his depictions of warfare are heavily associated with Maimonides’ vision of an 
idealised, messianic world state.109 That is to say, he confined any discussion of war 
to a state existing after the emergence of the next Jewish messiah.110 Thus, the actual 
initiation of such a war was only possible, should prohibitively exclusive conditions 
be met.  
Whilst the interpretation offered by Maimonides is perhaps the most 
influential, Nachmanides, another classical rabbinic scholar, opposes Maimonides on 
a key issue. He includes the conquest – or re-conquest – of Israel as a timeless, divine 
pronouncement.111 The notion that re-conquering the land of Israel has a special status 
as a commanded Mitzvah war is of limited, though continuing influence,112 and serves 
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to demonstrate the prospect of Mitzvah war in the modern era. In relation to 
contemporary trends, the importance of this perspective cannot be understated.  
A historical reading of scripture suggests that the rules on warfare are related 
to a particular period of Jewish history, and therefore confined in application to the 
situation and time period known as the Tanakh. During this time, the instigation of a 
religious war was solely God’s prerogative and was relatively specific in terms of 
when and where these wars were to be fought. This approach is apparent in much of 
the rabbinic discussion of war.113 Talmudic scholars generally recognised that rulers 
could not be restrained from fighting to enhance their power and prestige, and 
accordingly accommodated this eventuality.114 Yet, in relation to the less restricted 
Mitzvah war, as Firestone puts it, the institution of holy war in rabbinic discussions 
was defined in such a manner as to make it impossible to apply without God’s reversal 
of their condition.115 In mainstream understandings of Jewish war, all religious 
pronouncements are therefore relegated to the far distant messianic condition.  
By means of a postscript to classical Jewish discussion of war, the realisation 
of a Jewish state brings with it the possibility of Jewish holy warfare once again 
becoming incarnate. It is possible to argue that scripture, in particular, was invoked in 
the prologue of the Israeli state; aspects of its location naturally resonated with the 
stories and prophesies of the Jewish faith.116 Early fundamentalist movements 
associated with the foundation of the Israeli state included religious notions of war; 
for instance, equating the Palestinian inhabitants of the territory with the long-absent 
Amalekites, a tribe who bear an undissolved holy injunction.117 More generally, 
however, the influence of Jewish law on the Israeli state is more limited. Whilst Israel 
has adopted some of the laws established in rabbinic tradition, it ostensibly does not 
seek to embody the Mishpat Ivri, or traditional Jewish law, which is considered 
subordinate to the British civil tradition in Israeli public life.118 It is possible to posit a 
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similar relationship between notions of war found in the rabbinic tradition and the 
written history of the Tanakh, and modern-day Israel’s disposition to war.  
To survey Israeli Defense Force (IDF) doctrine, tradition is clearly influential 
in modern-day armed conflict; yet, it is listed as subordinate in influence to both 
Israel’s democratic principles and modern-day humanitarian concerns.119 Whilst the 
laws of the rabbinic period and the notion of holy war found in the Torah are not 
overtly applied by Israel, this history still wields influence over how modern-day Israel 
conducts its business.120 The historical comparison has been cemented in the modern-
day Israeli discourse, with the disposition and behaviour of neighbours aiding in 
constructing a comparison.121 Whilst it is possible to conclude that, in real terms, the 
Jewish Code of Law has been functionally eliminated,122 its proclivity to re-emerge in 
fringe nationalist activity and its soft, though profound influence on aspects of the 
contemporary Israeli image, is sufficient to add credence to Firestone’s call for 
vigilance against a return of the historic Jewish norms of “Holy War”.123 Accordingly, 
in seeking out a typical description to affix to contemporary religious conflict, Jewish 
approaches are well worth consideration.  
Some indication as to the contemporary relevance of Jewish holy war can be 
first determined by looking at the influence that religious imperatives have had in 
relation to the Israel-Palestine conflict. this is challenging, as it requires separating the 
more secular Zionistic belief system from Jewish religious zealotry, distinct 
approaches that may convergent some key issues.124 Yet not only is the existence of 
Israel rooted in a religious imperative,125 but there have additionally been localised 
instances in which the allegiance of some Jewish Israelis to the Israeli state is 
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superseded by the differing manner in which they interpret the axioms of their faith.126 
A notable example of this is the assassination of minister Yitzhak Rabin by an 
orthodox zealot for his role in the Oslo accords,127 an event interpreted by some Israelis 
to be the surrender of divinely granted territory by the state.128 This action was stated 
by some rabbinic authorities as having rendered Rabin subject to the “din rodef ” and 
din Moser129 in the eyes of some orthodox hard-liners- a term evoked to denote a traitor 
to the Jewish peoples, an individual slated for death.130 This is consistent with what 
can be understood as a trend in contemporary religious extremism; resurrecting lapsed 
terms from previous permutations of religious law, and applying them permissively to 
modern situations. This event is also associated with a massacre of Muslims 
undertaken by an off duty IDF officer seeking to overturn the accords.131 
The mandate of the Israeli state would, in the eyes of some, be abolished should 
it fail to appropriately curate the lands bestowed on the Jewish people by god. 
Accordingly, any normalisation of relations or concession made by the Israeli state to 
its neighbours or the Palestinian population is not only negotiation with foreign powers 
and cultural outsiders but between the Israeli state and the Jewish faith of its citizens 
as a supranational institution that can in some cases override the government’s 
mandate and authority.132 This process is difficult for a liberal state to engage in with 
any degree of success.  
Within modern Jewish discussion, some modern permutations are seeking to 
equate the current condition of the Jewish people with historical instances in which 
permissive understandings of the use of force have been present are well underway. 
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The Kings Torah (Torat Hamelech)133 a contentious modern interpretation of Jewish 
laws on warfare and represents an attempt to effectively roll back the restrictions 
placed on the conduct of war and the killing of non-Jews that emerged in the Talmudic 
period.134 Likewise, there remains in the Israeli settlement movement a propensity to 
label neighbouring Arabs, Palestinians and anti- Semites as latter-day Amalekites.135 
These ideological perspectives provide modern-day Jewish terrorist and extremists 
with a means of justifying the use of extreme violence.  
The Israeli state is mindful of its need to compete with other authorities and 
organisation in terms of Jewish legitimacy, for instance attempting to regain control 
of the Jewish discourse,136 Unfortunately, due to both demographic realities and the 
often precarious position of the Jewish population in general,137 it is unlikely that 
modern approaches to Jewish holy war will disappear anytime soon.  
 
 
3.5 Christianity 
 
Christian approaches to conflict are undoubtedly influenced by the Jewish tradition, 
though they also have classical influences.138 Whilst the Christian tradition of violence 
is intimately linked with the development of just war and the modern state system,139 
it has additionally fostered distinct approaches to conflict that are rooted in the same 
theology and superstitions as the earlier Jewish approach. Unlike the Jewish tradition, 
the development of the many Christian approaches to war coincided with the existence 
of numerous Christian states and empires which were presided over by an external 
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religious authority of immense power and influence. This provided a context that is 
significantly different from the Jewish example. The existence of multiple Christian 
political realities was perhaps more conducive to legislate upon the subject of armed 
violence; as Fine suggests, Christians expressed three distinctive approaches to the use 
of violence: pacifism, just war, and the crusade.140  
From a purely scriptural perspective, it is difficult to determine any disposition 
towards violence, as Christianity does not exhibit an overabundance of bellicose 
sentiments in its primary scripture. The tenor of the New Testament of the Bible is 
largely pacifistic; Christ’s exhortations to love one’s enemy provide an example of 
this disposition.141 Moreover, this tone serves to nullify much of the more bellicose 
Old Testament.142 Submission in the face of oppression is frequently emphasised.143 
In the gospels, the story of Jesus reflects a prophet who frequently chooses the more 
non-violent course of action, and additionally frequently exhorts his followers to 
behave in a nonviolent way. However, there are also instances of violence appearing 
in the New Testament,144 though none of these examples really fit the definition of 
war.  
The primary Jewish scripture, or the Old Testament (Torah), also features as a 
foundational, first component of the Christian Bible. The contrast between these texts 
is marked. As previously discussed, the Old Testament is distinctly martial, whilst the 
New Testament is quite the opposite, and today, there is still an extensive discussion 
as to how best to reconcile this difference.145 On balance, however, the Bible 
constructs the central figure of the Christian faith as markedly benign, countermanding 
the warlike the prescription and edicts contained in the Old Testament. Constructing 
any recourse to violence within the Christian tradition is therefore challenging, though, 
as history demonstrates, not insurmountably so. The problem of reconciling a pacifist 
prophet with the temporal utility of violence is a key aspect of later discussion.  
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In line with Jesus’ example, pacifism was widely exhibited by the early 
Christian community and served to shape the identity of Christians. This is evidenced 
in the pantheon of saints and martyrs that the early church accumulated, many of 
whom sought to emulate their prophet.146 In accounts of the early Christians, they are 
commonly recorded as following Jesus’ example in terms of his crucifixion, with 
numerous early Christians choosing to die – though not fight – for their faith.147 This 
is additionally evidenced in discussions in the early Christian community. For 
instance, Irenaeus, an early Christian scholar, stressed the importance of not fighting 
in the Christian religion.148 Hippolytus further presented that even a Christian soldier 
should not kill, as God alone has the prerogative to end a human life.149 Prohibitions 
against violence are characteristic of early Christian records,150 reflecting the self-
image of the early Christian community.  
As Hardon argues, however, pacifism was only really exhibited in small 
monastic communities and was not imposed on the wider lay community of 
Christians.151 Moreover, an assessment of events taking place in the early Christian 
community presents a population readily inclined to use violence in the furtherance of 
its aims. Nixey, for instance, indicates a different narrative alongside the orthodox 
depiction of Christian martyrs. Drawing on key events and statements by early 
Christian bishops and leaders, she suggests that the early Christian community rapidly 
developed an alternative approach that permitted the use of violence. Smashing idols 
and temples, killing pagans, and burning people alive characterised these early 
Christians’ behaviour.152 To indicate an example of one such event, Nixey discusses 
the burning of Hypatia, a female scholar, by the early Christian community.153 This 
violence is framed by the assumption that despite ostensibly being a nonviolent cult, 
the female scholar in question represented a supernatural threat to the wellbeing of the 
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emergent Christian community.154 The early experience of the Christian community, 
as understood by Nixey, suggests that spreading any religion to an audience that 
already has its own superstitions and faith without recourse to violence is naturally 
difficult. Whilst early Christian evangelists did experience some success with 
nonviolent methods,155 the utility of violence is reflected early on in the destruction of 
pagan cultural property, immolation of non-Christian priests and collective violence 
against pagan holdouts within Roman society.156 This was justified with reference to 
a distinctive moral framework that did not compromise the ostensible pacifism of the 
early Christian movement.157 These first waves of Christian violence demonstrate a 
divine imperative; they were directly fighting the devil by destroying his icons and 
killing witches or pagans possessed with his spirit.158 This afforded Christians a 
mechanism to concurrently maintain and overcome their pacifist stance.159 Whilst 
these early struggles cannot be characterised as war, they indicate the foundation of 
the demonic other that would be invoked in the later “holy war” frame.160 
Just war theory can be considered the second approach to the violence 
generated within the Christian tradition,161 following upon the heels of pacifism. By 
the third century, Christians had all but abandoned pacifism as an approach 
completely, allying themselves with the Roman Empire.162 During this period, it is 
impossible to separate the Christian experience from the Roman imperial one. 
Christian society was therefore no longer simply a faith-based community. This 
conjoining is represented in further doctrines of conflict; just war theory is not a 
wholly Christian innovation, but has a classical Hellenic provenance, with discussions 
of just war appearing in the works of Aristotle much earlier.163 Once classical 
approaches were incorporated into the Christian community, the resulting doctrine of 
just war theory created a coherent basis for Christian kings and emperors to utilise 
violence. This doctrine was the first soundly discussed alternative to pacifism within 
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the Christian tradition. Around the same time during the fourth century, Christians 
were persecuting the last pagan holdouts on the Roman Empire; St. Ambrose 
effectively melded the Roman approach to duty in a war with the Christian tradition, 
arguing that it was positive to defend the empire against threats that would destroy 
Rome, and by extension, Christianity.164 This justification for the use of violence was 
further developed by a range of church doctors.  
Following St. Ambrose, in the fifth century, Augustine, who was heavily 
influenced by the Old Testament,165 contended that it was just to punish transgressions 
as this was ultimately to the benefit of the transgressor. There were, therefore, definite 
situations when fighting was obeying the will of God.166 Augustine further contended 
that there was no inherent sin in dispensing death, though a just soldier would hold 
himself above the potential sin associated with violence to instead fight with just 
intention.167 Augustine’s essential justification for war in the Christian tradition is 
accompanied by the essential definition of a just war, namely that a just war is one that 
avenges injuries.168 As Russell explains, the precise reading of this phrase has been 
subject to multiple interpretations over time.169 Fine suggests that the key value of 
Augustine’s contribution to just war is to be found in his proscriptions regarding how 
war is to be conducted; in Augustinian thought, Christian proscriptions serve to limit 
the extent of violence to the minimum amount needed.170 
Aquinas further developed the notion of just war. Working much later in the 
thirteenth century, he was able to comment in detail and further refine the essential 
approach into the doctrine that is recognisable in the modern commentary on just war 
theory. In a passage of the Summa Theologica, Aquinas concisely summarises the 
requirements for a just war. It must possess the three elements of just authority, just 
cause, and right intention.171 Alternately, these proscriptions may be understood to 
mean that only princes (leaders) have the authority to decide when it is appropriate to 
fight the war, not the common man. The enemy must be deserving of violence, and 
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the soldiers involved must be righteous in their intent and conduct.172 Many of these 
proscriptions remain recognisable today.  
Through successive generations of Christian development, the essential 
Christian inclination towards peace found in the New Testament has been modified, 
not putting an end to war, but instead realising it as a separate moral condition, which 
requires careful justification. The just war theory to some extent maintains this 
inclination and represents a religiously orientated attempt to impose civility on war for 
the common good. This represented a progressive effort, with a number of different 
scholars applying extensive reasoning in order to develop the doctrine. Just war is a 
major conceptual contribution to later restrictions on war. In contrast, it is possible to 
illustrate the notion of the crusade as a third and final approach to conflict within the 
classical Christian approach to violence, namely that of the “crusade”. The theology 
behind crusade is most coherently expressed in the writing of St. Bernard. It is worth 
noting that unlike Aquinas and Augustine, St. Bernard, though lauded for his other 
contributions to theology,173 is not recognised as a progenitor of modern approaches 
to armed conflict. Whilst Christians were not operating from a pacifist foundation 
during St. Bernard’s time, his articulation of Crusade bears some similar features to 
earlier justifications of violence in that it creates parity between the spiritual and 
earthly battle in a manner that the first Christian iconoclasts would recognise. 
Accordingly, it may be documented as a battle against what a King describes as the 
demonic other.174 As it was described at the time: 
 
YOU cannot but know that we live in a period of chastisement and 
ruin; the enemy of mankind has caused the breath of corruption to 
fly over all regions; we behold nothing but unpunished wickedness. 
The laws of men or the laws of religion have no longer sufficient 
power to check depravity of manners and the triumph of the wicked. 
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The demon of heresy has taken possession of the chair of truth, and 
God has sent forth His malediction upon His sanctuary.175 
 
St. Bernard’s exhortation can be noted as violating the just cause element, undoing the 
moral restraint on war through an enthusiasm for quashing the restraints 
conventionally imposed during the period.176 As Russell puts it, St. Bernard presumed 
that a righteous cause always produces a favourable result, irrespective of the method 
used in its pursuit.177 St. Bernard’s logic perhaps reflects the ultimate in 
consequentialist reasoning, abstracted far beyond the earthly reckoning of value to 
encapsulate the possibility of a supernaturally evil adversary. In the event of Crusade, 
Christians committed not killing, but malicide, the destruction of evil.178 
As St. Bernard explains, the Crusades were not waged against an earthly 
opponent, but instead represented an opportunity for Christians to continue the battle 
against the devil in the earthly realm, to strive against demonic influence threatening 
the existence of the Christian world.179 Whilst this could easily be dismissed as 
hyperbole, the nature of the distinction was not lost on Christians of the period, with 
the spiritual nature of the conflict enhancing its appeal.180 The law that bound conflict 
against earthly opponents was loosed; the responsibility to fight was incumbent on all 
of Christendom.181  
Whilst today the Crusades represented an immensely powerful call to violence 
in the medieval Christian mind. Whilst the term ‘the Crusades’ explicitly refers to 
external campaigns between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, more generally, the 
doctrine of crusade or holy war served to motivate a number of wars, both internal and 
external, across the next five centuries.182 Protestant nations began to emerge, 
defending and propagating the faith which increasingly involved waging war within 
 
175 Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, ‘Why Another Crusade?’ (1145) <http://bartleby.com/268/7/4.html> 
accessed 4 August 2018. 
176 Anthony Coates, ‘Is the Independent Application of jus in bello the Way to Limit War?’ in David 
Rodin and Henry Shue (eds), Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers (Oxford 
University Press 2008) 189–190. 
177 Russell (n 168) 27. 
178 Ibid 37. 
179 Bernard of Clairvaux, In Praise of the New Knighthood (Conrad Greenia tr, Cistercian Publications 
1977). 
180 Fine (n 32) 103. 
181 Clairvaux (n 175). 
182 See generally Christopher Tyerman, God's War: A New History of the Crusades (Penguin 2007). 
72 
 
Europe, bringing violence into close proximity with a religious bloc of equivalent 
power.183 To summarise their historical impact, these wars rapidly became incredibly 
destructive. The proximity and similar capacities of belligerents led to long wars that 
not only disrupted normal state interactions but depleted populations and the economic 
capacities of the nations involved.184 This effectively brings us to the emergence of 
the Grotian system of international relations and the Westphalian system of laws and 
norms. The treaties following the thirty years of war represent a fairly blunt 
confrontation between the notion of holy war in the Christian tradition and the 
emergent doctrine of universal natural law, with Grotius’ vision gaining subsequent 
prominence.185 Thereafter, the Christian tradition of organised violence aligned with 
the institution of war discussed earlier in this chapter.  
The acknowledgement that Europe was not comprised of the two religious 
blocs, Roman and Protestant, but of multiple polities was foundational in removing 
the power of Christian religious authorities and thus ending religion as a motivation 
for violence.186 The nature of the theological motivations that previously existed did 
not allow opposing sides to construct any mandate or basis for peace. The religions’ 
imperative to maintain the faith required complete victory, namely the immolation or 
submission of the opposing country or group. If states and princes are sovereign and 
independent, then it is natural to presume that they are equal. It became natural to 
develop a doctrine of inalienable rights and duties to attribute to states.187 As with the 
Jewish faith, it is possible to suggest that the Christian faith’s approach to holy war 
became burdensome, causing it to be functionally eliminated.  
Having focused upon the Catholic experience thus far, it is of interest to note 
the continuing influence of pacifism in the wider Christian tradition in relation to 
revivalists and schismatics that have emerged throughout Christian history. In such 
instances, it is possible to observe that, upon their inception, many Christian “heresies” 
or sects sought to reassert the prophetic example, adopting pacifism within their belief 
structure. This serves to illustrate the importance of pacifism to the Christian tradition, 
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as well as the instability of the doctrine. Pacifist movements, could however easily be 
denounced as heretics, and crushed, which historically was the fate of such 
movements.188 This essential disposition towards violent activity is visible in the 
reasoning of notable protestant reformers. For instance, Martin Luther was critical of 
the use of violence, particularly against other Christians.189 As an interesting 
counterpoint to the doctrine of the crusade, Luther initially saw Islamic forces 
threatening the borders of Christendom as a divine scourge, come to destroy the 
unworthy,190 and suggested that prayer alone would be enough to safeguard the true 
believer.191 The flaws of this doctrine in the context of medieval Europe, were, 
however, sufficiently apparent to the secular Protestant leaders of Europe, who saw 
that Protestantism rapidly evolved a comparable disposition to war to the Catholics. 
Luther was naturally critical of these developments, disparaging Protestants who 
fought back.192 It is possible to conclude that the pacifist inclinations ostensibly 
intrinsic to the Christian faith can only be expressed in a limited way under specific 
circumstances.  
In summary, Christianity has had a complex and varied relationship with 
violence that is particularly evident in its distinct doctrine of Crusade; holy war or war 
fought for a religious purpose. Whilst initially pacifistic, Christian doctrine did not 
serve as a barrier to developing a framework for war waged from religious purposes 
that is relatively distinctive. The capacity to wield violence for the sake of religion 
was, however, effectively confiscated from Christian peoples by the proliferation of 
the state system. 
There are however indications that the Christian approach to holy war could 
be resurrected in a more contemporary setting. Christianity is currently subject to 
profound suppression and persecution,193 with this driving the mobilisation of many 
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Christian minorities.194 These militias, though often founded because the state has 
failed to protect Christian communities, ultimately compromise the states monopoly 
over the use of force.195 Moreover, in some cases of protracted ethnoreligious conflict, 
Christian extremism, as with the more established Islamic extremism, has developed 
into terrorism.196  
 In addition to factors that could drive a return to a more bellicose 
understanding of holy war by Christians in minority, there is the destabilising effect 
that globalisation is having on the populations of Christian majority countries.197 There 
is a basis to suggest that the state system is not serving the native population of  
Christian west as well as it used to, particularly in contending with globalisation;198 
For instance this is observable in the rise of nationalism, that is often along Christian 
lines as well as ethnic, as the populations of such nations attempt to preserve their 
cultural distinctiveness.199 Accordingly, it is not too untoward to suggest that the 
lapsed Christian understanding of holy war could be revived as part of a wider anti-
globalist struggle.    
 
3.6 Islam  
 
Having analysed both Christianity and Judaism, it is now logical to assess the Islamic 
tradition to determine if a separate doctrine of holy war exists within this tradition. On 
the basis of the available evidence, it is possible to advance the notion that the Islamic 
faith is a potential source of violence. This is not to say that it espouses more violent 
axioms by nature than either Christianity or Judaism,200 only that Islam generates a 
very different understanding of how divine law applies to the world. As the Islamic 
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faith is all-encapsulating, it is therefore perhaps more difficult to distinguish any 
approach to war completely devoid of religious motivation within the tradition.201 On 
this basis, it may be thought of as resembling a more primordial approach to violent 
conduct. However, it is sufficiently distinct from both its progenitors and earlier 
religious notions to merit more detailed discussion. For one, there is a more diverse 
array of perspectives visible in the Islamic faith, with many different interpretations 
as to what religious war is, emerging within the tradition.202 The persistence of the 
Islamic notion of war well into the modern age in both the imagination of state 
militaries203 and terrorist groups204 also calls for an investigation. Accordingly, it is 
appropriate to explore the origins of the approach to warfare contained in Islamic 
tradition, which diverged somewhat from the general understanding of tribal warfare 
found on the Arab peninsula during the seventh century.205 It is also worth mentioning 
that in its early history, the Islamic faith was seen as heretical by both Christians and 
Jews.206 This background is an important consideration in understanding the 
development of organised violence in the Islamic tradition.  
The Quran, as the primary religious text, covers the early development of a 
doctrine of conflict in the Islamic tradition in addition to the central tenets of the 
Islamic faith. It is commonly divided into two periods of revelation: The Meccan and 
Medinan. The majority of the Quranic sources advocating the use of violence – the 
“sword verses” – fall later, which has consequences in terms of how they are 
interpreted.207 Calls for violence in the text are apparently directed against disbelievers 
and idolaters.208 However, there are also verses that place restrictions on warfare.209 A 
purely exoteric reading, however, does not necessarily reveal the correct reading of 
war in the Quran, with different forms and methods necessary for a correct 
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interpretation.210 Whilst this the exoteric meaning is not the formally correct reading, 
it is of immense importance to both how the Quran is understood by Revivalist 
movements, and critically by external, non-Islamic observers.  
Whilst jihad is used in different contexts in the Quran, it is possible to discern 
dual themes within the revelation, with the initial Mecca phase being more spiritual, 
whereas, in later Medinan revelations, the term encapsulates violence in addition to 
earlier meanings.211 As Firestone notes, the context of Islam is fairly violent; not only 
did the Arabian peninsula relatively have scarce resources, but it was also afflicted by 
intense clan-based violence.212 This formed the background for the subsequent raids 
and conquests undertaken by Muhammad, which are recorded in the Quran. Modern 
commentators are well apprised of the context and prevailing conditions in their 
interpretive framework.213 As with the Jewish faith, this understanding of context 
could serve in restraining the use of religious violence. An argument that emerges 
from this acknowledgement is that Muhammad lived in a context so alien to the 
modern condition that it would, therefore, be unfair to examine him from a perspective 
informed by modern standards of civics and warfare.214 However, critically, 
mainstream Islamic understanding does not confine the actions of Muhammad to a 
historical condition; instead, Muhammad is taken to represent an example of human 
infallibility. His actions are meant to inform the behaviour of Muslims indefinitely, 
and therefore cannot be muted in the same manner as secular figures. It can be 
determined however that Muhammad took radical steps in relation to internal warfare, 
forbidding the traditional Ghazwahs,215 which the Arab tribes of the time were 
accustomed to embark upon. Muhammad turned their activities outwards, permitting 
raids to be conducted against non-Muslims, and on occasion leading such raids in 
person. Allegiance to God, or his prophet, effectively surpassed the previously binding 
notion of tribal allegiance. This rapidly allowed for the traditional notion of tribal 
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raiding to transform into what ultimately became a total declaration of war against all 
non-Muslims in defiance of any previously existing clan or familial bonds.216  
It is, to some extent, possible to account for the variable notions of religious 
violence by considering the context that was constructed around these events, a step 
reputedly grounded in the Quran itself.217 This historiography commonly frames 
recourse to violence during the prophetic era as an uncomfortable necessity, the last 
resort in the face of abuses by polytheists and Jews.218 The importance of context in 
relation to notions of violence has conventionally been attained in the formal, scholarly 
approach to the faith, by a distinct class of scholars (ulema), utilising a scientific 
approach to the Quran,219 which to some extent has stabilised the manner in which the 
prophetic era is framed in the classical construction of Jihad. Problems do, however, 
begin to emerge when sects of the faith instead seek to present the prophetic era in an 
ahistorical manner.  
Despite formalism being historically imposed in the way recourse to violence 
in the Islamic faith is understood, there have been recurrent arguments throughout 
Islamic history as to the meaning of the word jihad. Whilst it does not have a singular 
meaning, the use of the term in reference to violence in both the Quran and Hadith 
translated to the use of the term in relation to military endeavours throughout the 
classical period.220 Jihad is associated with struggle and is used to refer to conflicts 
between Muslims and Meccan polytheists.221 In subsequent legal interpretations, jihad 
served as a means of uniting Muslims and mobilising them in order to solidify 
power.222 Jihad is frequently understood to denote war fought against infidels,223 
though this is not the word’s only meaning.224 The discussion of holy war within the 
Islamic context is therefore reflected in the use of the word jihad, though this is not 
the word’s exclusive meaning. 
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The Quran has given rise to a number of distinct approaches to warfare; 
different approaches are frequently criticised as being selective in terms of which 
verses or periods they emphasise.225 Additionally, the Hadith sources seem to support 
both peaceful and warlike interpretations.226 Speaking generally, Islam began in the 
context of violent expansion once the initial Islamic caliphate was consolidated. 
However, it became apparent that the domain of Islam would not experience seamless 
expansion. This necessitated the production of a doctrine that permitted stable 
relations with the non-Muslim world. Crafting this initial Islamic international legal 
system required the addition of reasoning to build upon the content of primary 
religious sources and cover emergent problems in the early Islamic community. 
Classical interpretations of Islamic warfare stress the essential division of the world 
into the house of war and the house of Islam.227 This distinction is stressed in the 
emergent system of Islamic international or imperial law. Within the house of war, 
further distinctions are drawn between the people of the book and the polytheists. The 
ultimate aim of the Islamic state is to dominate the house of war via jihad.228 Bernard 
Lewis estimates that the classical goal of jihad was to expand the domain of the Islamic 
state until it was accepted by the entire world. A temporary truce could be made if it 
benefited Muslims, though ultimately no permanent peace was possible prior to the 
achievement of this ultimate goal.229 The persistence of this goal would no doubt cause 
a condition of bad faith between the Islamic state and any external force they should 
encounter. 
As this chapter has already stated, however, there are multiple constructions of 
warfare within the classical period. Al Farabi, for instance, discusses the use of war in 
an offensive sense, justified on the basis of bringing Islamic virtue to the disbeliever 
and thereby improving their personal existence. Violence is ultimately necessary, as 
not everyone is susceptible to reason, and therefore force must be utilised. War is 
essentially rooted in this limitation, as well as the need to compel a portion of the 
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population not susceptible to persuasion to obey the law by force.230 In at least one 
contemporary analysis, however, al Farabi is seen as diverging from the prevailing 
view of jihad. He dismisses the existence of absolute evil231 and advances the notion 
that there are therefore no fit targets for jihad, as it is unthinkable that there would be 
an entire enemy city in which all individuals are morally derelict enough to justify 
such an extreme war.232 Whatever the conclusion with relation to jihad, al Farabi 
sought to use the classical influence of Plato and Aristotle to reinterpret the core texts 
of Islam for the benefit of his society, 233 introducing some classical influences.  
Speaking generally, the prophet Muhammad could  be construed as imposing 
restraint on warfare, discernable through his pronouncements and actions.234 Indeed, 
it is possible to suggest that violence is expressly forbidden in Islam, except in the case 
where the situation is morally elevated in the faiths estimation; expanding the Dar-al-
Islam. In this case, scholars contended it was not only good to fight, but leaders should 
ensure that the community did so at least once a year.235 Al Shaybani built on this 
theme, suggesting in an initial articulation of international Islamic law that it is 
desirable, though not necessary, that disbelievers be offered a chance to convert prior 
to engaging in hostilities;236 this would, of course, relieve the need for conflict. The 
non-Muslim individual is induced to this condition in that should he surrender, he gets 
the protections to which Muslims are entitled; for instance, getting to keep his 
property.237 Non-Muslim subjugation is also an option, though on far less favourable 
terms.238 In addition to setting out terms for warfare against non-Muslims, al Shaybani 
offers some insight into the formation of a doctrine permitting the use of violence 
against other Muslims. A coherent legal basis for war between Muslims is difficult; 
unlike apostasy (if someone defects from the faith, it is permitted to kill them239), 
rebels accept the faith of Islam but are errant in their allegiance to the Islamic state in 
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some way.240 Talking of the “people of rebellion”, al Shaybani sets out the situations 
in which it is permissible to kill them.241 Rebels, whilst permissible to kill, get 
preferential treatment to that which must be expected by non-Muslims in relation to 
property rights. It is naturally necessary for rebels to be killed for their divisiveness; 
their status as errant Muslims is, however, superior to that of a non-Muslim or apostate. 
In the general discourse the meaning of rebel as well as the permissibility of fighting 
them is a matter of much greater complexity than the rather cut and dry approach of al 
Shaybani, however.242  There is however no doubt that across various examples of 
Muslim imperial code recognition of the essential utility of collective violence to both 
expand the influence of Islam, and critically as a tool for maintaining order within the 
Islamic community. In almost every situation, a Muslim gains preferential treatment 
to that which a disbeliever might expect. In brief, it is possible to suggest that, as a 
rule, Muslims aren’t supposed to fight, unless it is in pursuit of Jihad. Coping with the 
need to fight within the Muslim community, therefore, became a central challenge for 
early Muslims. A solution was produced, though a normative boundary existed 
between those that expressed allegiance to Islam on the battlefield and those who 
didn’t. Having gained an understanding of the essential Islamic understanding of 
conflict, it is possible to set out how the application of conflict by the faith is limited. 
To briefly apply a frame of historical reference, the notion of a global Islamic leader 
in the Sunni tradition is relatively meaningful until the collapse of the Ottoman 
Empire; a last, largely ineffectual jihad was declared in the early twentieth century.243 
Yet, the loss of a polar Islamic leader has far-reaching consequences in terms of 
invoking jihad in the meaning of holy war. There is a reasonable basis to assert, 
however, that the declaration of jihad is privileged in the same way as modern 
conventional war is, in that only the correct authority may declare it. Today the 
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consensus is that it is a state.244 Historically it would have been the Caliph.245 This 
serves as an eliminatory factor that would constrain the conduct of the holy war, given 
that the state system has proliferated globally. Second, the spiritual meaning of jihad 
has been emphasized in mainstream Islamic thought, over the more classical 
association with actual physical warfare, with an abject denial that it has ever carried 
violent connotations exhibited in a few fringe documents.246 Jihad, after all, has 
multiple meanings; increasingly, the more liberal notion of internal jihad has been 
highlighted in Islamic thought.247  
More aggressive and permissive understandings of jihad are present 
throughout different periods of Islamic history, many of which have been replicated 
in the current era. Ibn Taymiyyah’s majmū’ al-fatāwā is frequently cited by ISIS,248 
and the scholar has been held up as one of the most prominent influences on the 
philosophy of Salafi jihadism.249 Ibn Taymiyyah lived in a period where the Islamic 
world was faced with possible destruction at the hands of the Mongol empire; 
additionally, his lifetime was characterised by normalisation of relations between 
Muslim empires and Christians; Ibn Taymiyyah was extremely critical of those he saw 
as responsible for these trends.250 He sought a return of the Muslim world as a solution 
to the issues of his era, to its point of origin, and this provides a key touchstone for 
contemporary jihadi thought. The aforementioned fatwa he created was intended to 
make clear that despite professing to be Muslim, the Mongols (occasionally tartars) 
were not Muslim, and it was therefore imperative that they were killed.251 Ibn 
Taymiyyah frequently experienced difficulties ranging from scholarly disagreements, 
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through to censorship and imprisonment. Such events may be taken as indicative that 
his ideas did not meet with widespread support during his own lifetime.252 
Ibn Taymiyyah set out a vision of what an Islamic polis should look like. He 
emphasises the importance of obedience to a strong central leadership as a key facet 
of any functioning society, Islamic or otherwise.253 Central to his thought was the 
revival of Islamic influence on government institutions; a phenomenon that had in his 
view diminished. He sought to reassert Islam as a source of legal and government 
functions. In his vision, the only proper government was one in which the Sharia 
reigned as the sole source of law. Failure to respect Sharia in this manner rendered an 
individual an infidel, and therefore removed the protections associated with the 
Ummah. Jihad, in Ibn Taymiyyah’s thought, is said to advantage the individual in both 
life and death.254 As well as being unreservedly in favour of jihad, he sets out 
immensely permissive terms for when and how it may be used. For instance, he sets 
out that it is permissible to fight against a rebellious group, even if they are spiritually 
consistent with Islamic teachings.255 This, along with his aversion to non-Muslims, 
has been characterised as a key interpretation of Jihad of immense utility to modern 
terror groups.256 
The emergence of more bellicose and permissive understandings of Jihad – of 
which ibn Taymiyyah is by no means exceptional – may be partly understood in the 
flexibility of Islamic scripture; the Sunna is the subject of a number of distinct 
approaches, on the one hand, in the traditional Islamic “schools” progressively 
produced. A critical recognition is that ibn Taymiyyah’s line of thinking, whilst 
bearing many of the hallmarks of classical thinking, was considered to be heterodox 
even in his own time;257 he figured as an outsider to the traditional formal methods of 
analysis and interpretation employed by his contemporary theorists. The relevance of 
this detail is important to understanding how post-imperial Islamic thinking may echo 
his reasoning. 
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It is worth mentioning, as with the Christian tradition, that many longstanding 
schisms have emerged through the religion’s history. Shia tradition has to some extent 
diverged from the articulation of jihad by Sunni theorists. Shia Muslims have a similar 
though distinct understanding of religious violence. The most apparent is the relative 
absence of the term jihad from much of the discourse on warfare in the Shia tradition. 
Whilst the term itself is lesser-used in the Shia lexicon, some theorists would suggest 
that the understanding of religiosity violence found in Shia doctrines is extremely 
similar, particularly when used to refer to defensive jihad 258 The evident meaning of 
jihad as a term as utilised in Shia discourse is linked with internal self-improvement, 
though in its practical, external meaning, Jihad, in the Shia understanding, is confined 
to the final war that will be carried out under the auspices of the Mahdi, who will re-
emerge and wage a war to bring true justice to the world.259 This to some extent mimics 
the Jewish contemporary understanding of holy war, yet this claim of limiting jihad to 
a far-off messianic state is to some extent mitigated by the clear affinity for religious 
violence exhibited in the rhetoric of key Shia actors to this day.260 Accordingly, it is 
possible to conclude that whilst the linguistic use of the term jihad is absent from Shia 
language, the understanding of religious violence is extremely similar in the Shia 
tradition. Whist this would logically suggest that “jihad” should be absent from 
modern Shia discussion, this is  far from the case. The first indication of changing 
notions of Jihad was the Iran-Iraq war. Whist, consistent with its defensive meaning 
permitted within Shia Islam, it was declared by the ayatollah to be a defensive jihad, 
as the tides of war shifted Iranian leadership quickly altered their understanding of 
jihad to cover aggressive action.261 More recently the Iranian Shia authorities have 
demonstrated a propensity for invoking jihad on more apocalyptic grounds, invoking 
the return of the Mahdi and the coming end of the world.262 as such, Jihad has been 
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invoked by Iranian religious authorities on several occasions, demonstrating that an 
understanding of jihad in the Shia tradition is still relevant today.  
 The Muslim approach to organised violence is somewhat different from those 
found in Christianity and Judaism. Moreover, it has proved possible to survey only a 
narrow range of perspectives upon the term jihad, which itself is difficult to define in 
an ecumenical sense. The analysis conducted is sufficient to suggest that there are 
many different perspectives upon the use of force within the faith. A key perspective 
to introduce is the often radical difference between formal, scholarly approaches to 
the subject of warfare in the Islamic tradition and those arrived at by more radical 
thinkers, who often disregard the existence of context with regard to the prophetic 
example and the scripture of the faith. Authority has additionally played an important 
role in restricting the recourse to violence in Islamic history, with the monopoly of 
interpretation residing with a narrow literate class. These factors are worthy of 
consideration in relation to more contemporary iterations of religious warfare. 
 
 
3.7 Holy war contrasted with “armed conflict” 
 
To return to the initial assertion of this chapter, it was postulated that there are at least 
two separate institutions of war. Secular war, or the type that international lawyers 
have grown accustomed to regulating, and religious, or holy war. This study is 
therefore in a better position to diagnose why religious war may be challenging to 
regulate, in contrast to the state-orientated variety. First, religious war is not 
conventionally rational. In all of the traditions surveyed, human agency is disregarded 
in favor of divine imperatives. IHL, it has been speculated, is partly reliant upon the 
rationality of belligerents.263 Moreover, rational actor theory has proved an important 
approach in relation to adapting international law.264 Accordingly, this represents a 
foundational challenge to the common sense application of IHL. An additional 
difference worthy of noting is that in the traditions of Christianity and Judaism, wars 
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with a religious aim are less restrictive than those fought with non-religious aims in 
mind. Additionally, religious conflicts must be fought, even if fighting harms the 
direct interests of the religious community. In Islam, it is possible to suggest that the 
waging of jihad has additionally not always served the interests of the faithful. Another 
difference is that religious wars are not generally waged by states. The Jewish system 
is best described as a tribe in the most atavistic sense, in which people and religion are 
synonymous. In the Christian tradition, holy war has been presided over by 
supranational faith groupings, who had the authority to direct the various provinces, 
or later, feudal lords and kings of Christendom. The notion of a domain of Islam, or 
caliphate presiding over all Muslims is additionally a challenge to the modern state 
system.  
Ultimately, warfare the service of religious ideology is more difficult to 
understand without constructing a cosmology of violence concerning the faith in 
question. Whilst this chapter hasn’t gone into sufficient depth to accomplish such a 
feat, it is possible to discern some general trends that serve to question some of the 
“common sense” assumptions made by IHL.265 This makes the construction of rules 
and laws a far more difficult process. Naturally, all religions generally conform to a 
few similar features, in that they are disposed to survival and desire the maximization 
of their influence, though this concession to rationality is mitigated by the supernatural 
assumptions inherent in its theology.  
It is appropriate to assert the relevance of the institution of these historical 
approaches to holy war onto modern-day conflict. It would appear that in all three 
traditions, steps were taken by scholars of each faith to restrain notions of religious 
violence. In the Jewish tradition, holy war was relegated to the messianic condition 
sometime in the future. Christians effectively outlawed it, placing the state above the 
church in matters of violence. In Islam, the loss of the caliphate means that there 
should be no authority capable of declaring a religious war; moreover, the 
reconstitution of jihad as a term contributes to the declining applicability of violent 
struggle in the maintenance of the faith. A close examination of history would no doubt 
suggest that religious war in each religion’s classical conception of holy war is a relic 
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of the past. One feature that must be emphasized, however, is the threat of the re-
emergence of religious conflict based upon revivalist or non-formal approaches.  
As Reuven Firestone, a rabbi whose work has proved pivotal in this chapter 
states, in his own tradition such a re-emergence is not beyond possibility. As this 
chapter has shown, the prevailing rabbinic consensus is that the classical Jewish laws 
of war are confined to a far-off messianic future, and in real terms, modern-day Jews 
fight as a state (Israel), the cleverly preserved loophole created by Nachmanides 
ensuring that the possibility of a contemporary milhemet mitzvah exists.266 
Contemporary western adventures in the Middle East are often framed as latter-day 
crusades by occidentalists such as Qutb, who would frame the entire experience of 
western imperialism as one long crusade.267 Yet, observers may note that if this is so, 
it is certainly an unenthusiastic one when the rhetoric of scholars like St. Bernard is 
considered. There is then the resurgence occurring within the Islamic tradition; it is 
possible to suggest that there are numerous voices calling for a confrontation between 
Islam and “the west”. There is a serious basis to assert that religious warfare is far 
from extinct, and there is therefore a basis to consider how to go about regulating 
conflicts with a religious character.  
3.8 Conclusion  
 
A brief examination into the distinct histories of the religious and secular conflict 
suggests that when war is fought on the basis of religion, it establishes a range of 
distinctive features that may serve to differentiate it from secular warfare. Religious 
warfare is divinely ordained, making it difficult to regulate. It is not a purely military 
contest but may target a group’s general presence in the area or even contest a group’s 
very existence, seeking the eradication of the targeted population. The participants in 
religious warfare are often affiliated in a manner that is difficult to equate with the 
states and non-state groups of today. This suggests that religious conflict – if a 
resurgence of such an approach today could be asserted clearly – might represent a 
multidirectional and complex challenge to international law in general and specifically 
IHL in application.  
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 A key takeaway from this chapter is that whilst, in one sense les extrèmes se 
touchent, in that all religions have a history of “holy warfare” that can be resurrected 
by extremists today, the religions covered in this chapter have radically different 
histories and approaches to the use of force. This means that there is a possibility that 
organizations mobilized by extreme interpretations of Christianity or Judaism may be 
radically different from those mobilized by Islamic extremism, though it is probably 
the case that any of the three would pose a challenge to international law and the 
regulations comprising IHL. Indeed, it is possible to suggest that unconventional 
armed groups or for that matter states inculcated with religious ideology of any kind 
could be challenging from a legal perspective. Naturally, the challenge facing IHL is 
not however to regulate the many religious wars of the past. The utility in establishing 
characteristics typical of the holy wars of the past is the manner in which the 
characteristics correlate with many of the problems encountered in more contemporary 
situations. Accordingly, it is possible to ask: what aspects of religious conflict is the 
law capable of considering today? What aspects of historic religious wars may 
contemporary armed groups seek to emulate, if aiming to enhance their effectiveness 
and durability? How might these adaptations challenge IHL, given the assumptions 
inherent in its understanding of armed conflict? 
An examination of religious conflict serves to frame the nature of the problem 
at hand; how the law understands armed conflict. IHL reflects a viable approach to 
regulating armed conflict, so long as a range of narrowly defined values are present. 
In order to address any resurgence of past religious approaches to warfare, IHL needs 
to account for the multiple variables that differentiate religious wars from the state 
archetype of warfare it has conventionally confronted. In this regard, it can be 
suggested that rapid and decisive revisions are called for; as direct state on state 
confrontations have declined, other forms of conflict have begun to make up the 
difference. Conflicts with an overt religious component are undoubtedly playing a 
prominent role in this change.  Based upon prevalence alone, only the Islamic tradition 
would really merit examination in detail as a contemporary phenomenon. To confine 
the institution of a modern holy war solely to the Islamic tradition would, however, be 
an injustice. Not so long ago, the use of Islam as a doctrine of violence would have 
been considered unlikely in what appeared to be the rapidly secularizing region of the 
Middle East. Classical imaginings of jihad, by all rights, should be inaccessible to 
modern-day Islamist terrorists; only the legitimate head of the Islamic community 
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should have such power,268 and the prevailing consensus suggests religious war under 
the code of jihad should not be functionally possible. Yet, the Islamic view of warfare 
mutated under the colonial experience, evolving from the battle code of the caliphates 
to produce prescriptions that today serve modern terrorists.269 Contemporary actors 
have shown an extraordinary ability to modify and assemble a code of religious 
warfare that shows sufficient obedience to classical codes to gain appeal and is 
significantly pragmatic to be wielded by non-state terrorists and extremist groups.  
The focus of this study is in accordance with the thesis title, is on modern 
permutations jihadism, particularly in reference to the Islamic derived approaches 
mobilizing unconventional armed groups in the context of the war on terror. Therefore, 
moving forward, the correct approach is therefore to focus on Jihad, understanding 
what exactly the term means when used by groups like al Qaeda and ISIS. This first 
requires an understanding of what the use of force in the Islamic content may have 
meant initially in more detail. 
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4  Features of Islamic Authority  
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
In the previous chapter, three major world religions have been analysed to determine 
their respective dispositions to a peculiar form of violence: holy, or religious war.  
Historically, each of these major world religions had access to a doctrine of armed 
conflict that was independent of secular authorities and operated outside of 
conventional limitations or restrictions. In this chapter, the circumstances that make 
an understanding of religious conflict relevant to the application of International 
humanitarian law (IHL) today will be demonstrated. A range of factors have, however, 
arranged matters in such a way as to ensure, in the mainstream at least, that the type 
of “holy war” discussed in the last chapter is today largely theoretical, its decline 
coinciding with the emergence of the contemporary state system. Due to this absence, 
it is difficult to specify a distinctive approach to war with a religious content within 
IHL,1 or international law more broadly. The United Nations (UN), for instance, has 
issued statements suggesting that religious conflicts are produced by other issues such 
as economic or geopolitical reasons, therefore not being a direct result of religion 
itself.2 In this regard, religion can be seen as serving the same essential purpose today 
as in the past, namely justifying conflict.3 The current estimation of religious conflict 
in this regard does not concede that wars fought by religious interest groups, or based 
upon religious objectives, require different regulation. This is at odds with the manner 
in which religious interest groups have historically understood their wars to be 
governed; by different, distinctive sets of rules. This thesis, however, suggests that 
based upon the capacity for religion to modify the behaviour of armed groups, in 
particular, a more nuanced approach is merited. 
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2In the UN’s estimation, a conflict may appear to be religious, though it is probably the case that religion 
is merely serving as a pretext for other sources of grievance. See UNSC, ‘Religious Conflicts Normally 
Product of Political or Geostrategic Manipulation, Proxies for Other Antagonisms’ (25 June 2018) 
SG/SM/19104-SC/13393. 
3 Robert Jackson, ‘Doctrinal War: Religion and Ideology in International Conflict’ (2006) 89 The 
Monist 274, 274. 
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Despite the practical limitations that serve to prevent faiths from going to war 
in the manner so prevalent in the past, there is a basis to suggest that today, a number 
of armed groups are mobilised by religion, with faith serving as part of the motive 
behind violent insurrection, revolution, and terrorism.4 Therefore, understanding the 
doctrines of religiously-justified war in relation to modern conflicts is critical.5 This 
assessment is compounded by the visibly Islamic characteristics displayed by groups 
such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and Boko Haram.6 Each group clearly takes on the identifiers 
of a traditionalist Islamic movement to the fullest extent pragmatic in the modern era.7 
Whilst this does not suggest that religion is by necessity the underlying source of these 
groups and their violence, it is reasonable to assert that in assuming the Islamic 
identity, such groups will defer to established Islamic norms concerning warfare and 
organisation, or at the very least, seek to appear to do so. Accordingly, it makes sense 
to consider how recourse to violence upon religious grounds is understood today, with 
a particular need to emphasise the Islamic tradition.  
This thesis has so far asserted that religious wars have some fundamental differences 
when compared to wars fought for secular purposes. This does not, however, mean 
that religious wars are the same today as they were previously. As this chapter will 
explore, the capacity to instigate and wage a religious war or jihad is not, as in the 
past, curated by definable Islamic leaders and religious authorities. It can be asserted 
 
4 It must be stressed that the links between religion and violence are far from clear. See Mark 
Juergensmeyer, ‘Does Religion Cause Terrorism?’ in James R. Lewis (ed), The Cambridge Companion 
to Religion and Terrorism (Cambridge University Press 2017) 
<https://cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-religion-and-terrorism/does-religion-
cause-terrorism/66647499C9CEDCE3044230DDB89702E4> accessed 3 April 2019; it is additionally 
possible to specify a range of other causes in relation to historical conflicts that are overtly religious. 
See generally, Kalevi J. Holsti, Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648–1989 
(Cambridge University Press 1991); it is also possible to suggest that religion can be a driver of violence 
under the correct circumstances. See Paul K. Davis and others, Social Science for Counterterrorism: 
Putting the Pieces Together (Rand Corp 2009). 
5 Identifying the manner in which religion is influencing or driving conflict, for instance, opens up 
avenues for prevention. See Tom Mills and David Miller, ‘Religion, Radicalization and the Causes of 
Terrorism’ in James R. Lewis (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Religion and Terrorism (Cambridge 
University Press 2017) <https://cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-companion-to-religion-and-
terrorism/religion-radicalization-and-the-causes-of-
terrorism/672F630409C1268D6CF830087C579582> accessed 4 April 2019. 
6 These movements have all professed an Islamic motive as the driving force behind their violent 
activity. See ‘Why We Hate You and Why We Fight You’, Dabiq issue 15 (Al Hayat Media 2016) 30–
33; Mallam Sanni Umaru [interim Boko Haram comd], ‘Boko Haram Ressurects, Declares Total Jihad’ 
Vanguard (August 2009) <https://vanguardngr.com/2009/08/boko-haram-ressurects-declares-total-
jihad/> accessed 6 August 2018.  
7 Contemporary jihadists’ proto-states and terrorist groups have naturally adopted modern weapons. 
Whilst such a decision may seem natural, previous historical movements have derived authenticity from 
reliance upon the weapons and tactics used by the prophet of the faith. See Kim Searcy, The Formation 
of the Sudanese Mahdist State: Ceremony and Symbols of Authority: 1882–1898 (Brill 2010) 57–58. 
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that traditional positions of Islamic leaders, jurists, and laity have lost much of the 
power they wielded in the past, or at least that their role has changed. Instead, the 
capacity to declare and wage a religious war on behalf of an imagined Islamic global 
community is often assumed by groups and individuals who, in formal terms, lack 
many of the credentials that have been previously required to do so, depending upon 
how the relevant scripture and jurisprudence is interpreted.8  
This chapter moves forward to explore the historical importance of a range of 
generalised Islamic institutions and concepts. Much focus is to be placed upon Islamic 
leadership, the formal body of Islamic scholars, and the notion of the universal Islamic 
community. This is based upon a recognition that these organs were critical in 
sustaining the requisite formalism of Islamic law, as well as balancing and restraining 
the mechanisms created to dispense violence, internally and externally. Additionally, 
these institutions have been present in the majority of Islamic systems of governance 
to varying extents, in some cases maintaining relevance into the present.9 The decline 
of these institutions is, therefore, a key factor to be analysed in order to better situate 
the emergence of Islamic thought that now underpins modern-day neo-jihadist actors.  
 
4.2 Classical Islamic authority and its relevance to contemporary 
unconventional armed groups  
 
In relation to many contemporary unconventional armed groups, it is possible to 
observe an aspiration to assume the legitimacy gained by showing a commitment to 
classical Islamic institutions and principles.10 Indeed, adherence to the extremist 
interpretation of Islamic law and jurisprudence is an important aspect of competition 
between many of these groups, with the more successful groups generally 
demonstrating greater deference to these concepts.11 In regard to organisations like 
 
8 It naturally must be stressed that a range of scholars have set out to question the capacity for groups 
like ISIS to declare jihad. Many would see this ability confined to “legitimate” Islamic jurists, or even 
rulers of Islamic nation states. See Muhammad Munir, ‘Who Can Declare Jihad?’ (2012) Vol. XII. 
Research Papers, Human Rights Conflict Prevention Centre (HRCPC) 1279. 
9 Referring to the Ulema or learned scholars, Umma the universal Islamic community, and the presence 
of a hierarchical leadership structure.  
10 Marco Longobardo, ‘The Self-Proclaimed Statehood of the Islamic State between 2014 and 2017 and 
International Law’ (2017) 33 Anuario Español de Derecho Internacional 205, 212. 
11 Several scholars have suggested that groups demonstrating a more extreme commitment to the 
creation of an Islamic governance structure and the waging of global jihad often out-compete groups 
that entertain different ideologies, or do not demonstrate the same commitment. See Richard Sosis and 
Candace S. Alcorta, ‘Militants and Martyrs; Evolutionary Perspectives on Religion and Terrorism’ in 
Raphael Sagarin and Terrence Taylor (eds), Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous 
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ISIS assuming the authority to instruct and command Muslims, they have explicitly 
specified the inability or unwillingness of contemporary permutations of Islamic 
institutions, as well as Islamic national leaders, to fulfil what they present as their 
essential functions.12 This serves as a basis to advance arguments for assuming the 
authority ostensibly abandoned by more traditional institutions. 
The appeal of unconventional armed groups utilising an Islamic identity is to 
an extent a product of the degeneration of traditional Islamic institutions, and their 
capacity to fulfil certain functions specified in classical Islamic law. These institutions 
historically served to maintain monopolies over the production and implementation of 
Islamic law, and just as importantly, adopted a formal methodological approach to 
Islamic sources and traditions when addressing new problems.13 This division of 
responsibility served to limit and constrain the instigation of jihad throughout the 
Islamic imperial age. Today, however, the diminishing influence of these 
establishments has allowed new thinkers to assume the authority of these foundations 
and imbue the shared language of Islamic law with new meanings. These new 
meanings profoundly alter how recourse to violence is understood in the contemporary 
context, which itself is predicated upon ahistorical articulations of how Islam as a total 
system should function.14  
Ultimately, the understanding of Islamic law and governance in neo-jihadist 
thought can be asserted as a departure from classical Islamic reasoning, and situated 
within the existing framework of twentieth-century ideologies. This may be asserted 
upon the basis of history, the presence of similar ideas and maxims within the works 
of key theorists, and most particularly, the structural conformity of neo-jihadist 
thought with Marxism and fascism, most notably in its adoption of a dialectical 
 
World (London University of California Press 2008) 105–108; see additionally Victor Asal and R. Karl 
Rethemeyer, ‘The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks’ 
(2008) 70 The Journal of Politics 437. 
12 ISIS is critical of Islamic governments and scholarly institutions, seeing them as “traitors”. See 
Rumiyah, issue 3 (Al Hayat Media Centre 2017).  
13 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam – Custodians of Change (Princeton 
University Press 2010) 19. 
14 As Robert notes, much of what is termed in this study as “neo-jihadist” thinking is dependent upon 
the invention of new traditions by a range of thinkers. No Islamic state as such has ever existed, and the 
link between state and region has been contested many times. Accordingly, it has been necessary for 
modern thinkers to “invent” a religious state that serves their purposes rather than restore any historical 
examples of Islamic governance – a process undertaken readily by both states and terrorist groups. See 
Nicholas P. Roberts, Political Islam and the Invention of Tradition (New Academia Publishing LLC 
2015) 166–167. 
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model.15 A secondary critical acknowledgement will be the maintenance of many of 
the symbols and terminology of both the Qur’anic period and the imperial law of 
Islam, invoked to add credence to this hybridised system. This chapter will 
consequently serve as a basis to later assert that the concept of jihad has been 
reinterpreted outside of the classical framework of Islamic jurisprudence, leading to a 
doctrine of contemporary religious conflict.  
In the overall course of this thesis, it will be suggested that international law, 
and in particular IHL, needs to be mindful of the capacity for religious interest groups 
to not only engage in armed conflict, but to do so in a manner that challenges many 
assumptions concerning the nature of armed conflict as it is currently understood. 
There is therefore a need to understand the nature of these groups. This chapter seeks 
to contribute by generating a more comprehensive understanding of the need to adapt 
the law, specifically examining changes to how unconventional armed groups 
congregate, based upon an assumed religious authority. It is first important to 
understand the responsibilities vested in conventional Islamic institutions. This is 
important, as the perception that these institutions are no longer present, or competent 
in pursuing their essential mission, permits other less established actors to present 
themselves as alternatives.  
 
4.2.1 Islamic international law; the divisions of the world 
 
The first matter of importance is the alternative vision of the world that is often 
extracted from the Islamic faith and forms the assumption underpinning the practice 
of Islamic international law (Siyar), namely the division of the world into two parts, 
or abodes.16 The different abodes  reflect the territory in which the Sharia as the sole 
source of law prevails, and that in which it does not; Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb.17 
It may be understood to represent fundamentally a distinction between Muslim and 
non-Muslim peoples, and was rooted in the assumption that one day everyone would 
 
15 The term “Islamofascism” has been coined to refer to this phenomenon. See generally Tamir Bar-
On, ‘'Islamofascism': Four Competing Discourses on the Islamism-Fascism Comparison’ (2018) 7 
Fascism 241. 
16 Mousa Abou Ramadan, ‘Muslim Jurist's Criteria for the Division of the World into Dar al Harb and 
Dar al Islam’ in Martti Koskenniemi, Paolo Amorosa and Mónica García-Salmones Rovira (eds), 
International Law and Religion: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Oxford University Press 
2017) 220. 
17 Shiraz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea (Oxford University Press 2016) 85. 
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be Muslim, and is, therefore, defined as a Muslim form of imperialism.18 In some 
articulations of Islamic law, the Muslim world, or Dar al-Islam, is permitted, and 
indeed required, to expand into the non-Muslim world.19 Naturally, this depiction of 
classic Islamic international law is contested today.20  
In contrast to many contemporary perspectives, in early Islam, it was believed 
that the territory of Islam would spread inexorably to consume the known world.21 As 
history progressed, however, Islamic scholars had to revise their disposition towards 
non-Muslim groups, and Muslim leaders came to recognise the difficulty involved in 
perpetually expanding their demesnes.22 It was therefore expedient to draw upon 
scriptural examples to mitigate the injunctions requiring consistent expansion. As 
Karsh notes with regard to early Islamic history, both Muhammad and his successors 
maintained an essential dichotomist world view of Muslims and disbelievers, which 
had not yet been subordinated to Islamic control, yet the prophet was capable of 
employing tactical pragmatism, occasionally aligning with non-Muslims when this 
would further his aims.23 This same pragmatism towards non-Muslim peoples was 
subsequently adopted by the various Islamic empires and kingdoms of history,24 who 
likewise recognised a need to compromise with a complex reality. As Badr puts it, the 
Islamic imperial age, or expansionist age, was characterised by the belief that Islam 
would eventually consume the entire world. The disposition of the Muslim world 
 
18 Ramadan (n 16) 220. 
19 Manoucher Parvin and Maurie Sommer, ‘Dar al-Islam: The Evolution of Muslim Territoriality and 
its Implications for Conflict Resolution in the Middle East’ (1980) 11 International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 1, 3–7. 
20 For instance, it has been asserted by Ahmad that the divisions of the world are represented as a 
statement of territoriality and an assertion of borders. Ahmad does however recognise that many 
temporal and special imperatives that should have applied strictly to the initial Muslim expansion across 
the Arabian Peninsula continued to feature in Islamic thought, lending the divisions of the world an 
expansionist character not intended to be present. See Muhammad Mushtaq Ahmad, ‘The Notions of 
Dār al-Ḥarb and Dār al-Islām in Islamic Jurisprudence with Special Reference to the Ḥanafī School’ 
(2008) 47 Islamic Studies 5. 
21 This is ostensibly rooted in Islamic scripture. See Sahih Bukhari, Volume 1 Book 8 Hadith No. 387 
<https://muflihun.com/bukhari/8/387> accessed 4 August 2018. 
22 Ovamir Anjum, ‘Governance in Classical Islamic Thought’ Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of 
Religion (2017) 
<https://oxfordre.com/religion/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199340378.001.0001/acrefore-
9780199340378-e-513.> accessed 20 May 2019. 
23 Ephraim Karsh, Islamic Imperialism: A History (2nd edn, Yale University Press 2013) 66. 
24 This is discussed in detail by Halperin, who notes historical examples in which professed exclusivist 
religions have been forced to coexist by circumstances. See Charles J. Halperin, ‘The Ideology of 
Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier’ (1984) 26 Comparative Studies 
in Society and History 442. 
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toward non-Muslims was, therefore, to make war until this goal had been realised.25 
Peace was to become an exceptional condition and could not, for instance, exceed ten 
years, in line with the prophetic example.26 As subsequent Islamic scholarship came 
to recognise, the need for constant war against non-Muslim peoples could be mitigated 
by other passages and sayings that suggest nonviolent contact with the non-believer is 
to be a continuous reality. In pursuit of this conclusion, scripture emphasising peace27 
and trade28 were emphasised in Islamic legal discourse. This, along with the worldly 
pragmatism of Islamic leaders, made the proposed constant conflict unviable.  
Whilst it can be contested that scripture can serve to mollify any aggressive 
interpretation of Islamic duties, it is possible to specify periods and instances in which 
the injunction to expand was not constrained. Early articulations of Islamic imperial 
law draw a clear distinction between the Islamic world and the world beyond the reach 
of Islam, with this distinction based upon the territory in which the Sharia is 
maintained as the sole source of law.29 Practically, however, over time this divide 
proved to be permeable, with the various non-Muslim enclaves present in the Islamic 
world30 indicative of early pragmatism in approaching this division. It has since 
remained customary to understand the world as divided into these categories within 
the study of Islamic law, though the precise understanding of the nature of this division 
has changed. More practically, examples include where those from within the house 
of Islam collaborated with disbelievers against other Muslims, as well as periods in 
history where intra-Muslim animosity was sufficient to overwhelm unity, even in the 
face of Christian reconquests.31 The distinction of the house of war and house of Islam 
are critiqued by Faroqhi, who goes as far as to suggest that such a strict dichotomy is 
not useful in understanding historical Islamic conduct with non-Muslim states, with 
relationships being far more complex.32 Given the variation in how these terms have 
 
25 Gamal M. Badr, ‘A Survey of Islamic International Law’ (1982) 76 Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 56, 56. 
26 Ibid 56–57. 
27 Timur Kuran, The Long Divergence (Princeton University Press 2012) 45. 
28 Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Pirenne and Muhammad’ (1948) 23 Speculum 165, 168. 
29 Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Shaybani, Kitab al-Siyar al-Saghir (Mahmood Ahmad Ghazi tr, Islamic 
Research Group 1998) 130. 
30 Referring to the Hanafi construction of these divisions, which permitted the use of Christian and 
druse governors within the “domain of Islam”. See Ramadan (n 16) 225. 
31 Carole Hillenbrand, The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives (Routledge 2000) 82. 
32 Suraiya Faroqhi, The Ottoman Empire and the World Around It (I.B Tauris 2005) 3. 
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been understood in Islamic history, such a nuanced view is more appropriate than the 
strict definitions that each term might suggest.  
As is often the case, and by no means exclusive to the Islamic world, any 
pragmatic moderation undertaken by authoritative scholars and leaders may be 
interpreted differently by extreme, or orthodox actors. For instance, any pragmatic 
arrangements may be derided as decadent, cowardly, or degenerate by more extreme 
voices.33 As the rather bellicose understanding of the division of the world has fallen 
out of favour with Islamic leaders and scholars, some more heterodox and fringe 
groups have sought to attain legitimacy by undoing the fragmentation of the Dar al-
Islam, and attacking the Dar al-Harb,34 responsibilities that once aligned with Islamic 
leaders. Examining the contemporary use of this doctrine by modern jihadist 
extremists emphasises the reversion to the division of the world, with some variations 
upon the theme; it is possible to present the modern revival of the divisions of the 
world as a justification for violence, as well as to lend credence when addressing 
Islamic populations.35 Whilst the understanding of the way these distinctions function 
has modified over time, groups like ISIS have developed a prohibitively high threshold 
for inclusion in the domain of Islam, which serves to exclude and permit violence 
against much of the global Muslim population in addition to non-Muslims. This 
depiction stands in contrast to the “mainstream” of contemporary Islamic thought36 
and is at odds with its articulation as presented for much of Muslim history.37 
It is important to remember that the divisions of the world still expressed today 
are fundamentally packaged with the understanding of Islamic law generated in the 
Islamic imperial age, and therefore represent a classical interpretation of the in-group 
preference that is clearly apparent in the Quran. Practically, the divisions of the world 
found in imperial Islamic law (siyar) may have been developed by lawmakers with 
reference to the basic tenets of Islam; it is significantly subject to both “historical 
circumstances” and “judicial speculation” in order to consider it flexible as a legal 
product,38 unlike more intransient areas of Islamic law that have been better insulated 
 
33 Maher, for instance notes the persistence of such arguments in relation to today’s Islamic nations. 
See Maher (n 17) 84–85. 
34 Ibid 85. 
35 Mohamed Badar and Masaki Nagata, ‘Modern Extremist Groups and the Division of the World: A 
Critique from Islamic Perspective’ (2017) 31 Arab Law Quarterly 305. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Onder Bakircioglu, Islam and Warfare: Context and Compatibility with International Law 
(Routledge 2014) 118–119. 
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from the vagaries of history. In discussing contemporary attitudes towards the 
divisions of the world – a position which al-Dawoody laments that western 
commentary often does not account for39 –it is possible to observe that a number of 
scholars have sought to realign the divisions of the world to an identity more in 
keeping with the prevailing system of international law. Munir goes as far as to suggest 
that international law is rooted to some extent in the imperial law of which the division 
of the world is central.40 It is undoubtedly the case, however, that contemporary 
Islamists have sought to demonstrate a commitment to the most extreme 
interpretations of classical Islamic law possible. Whilst this commitment might be 
thought of as complex and multidimensional, it may be simplified by thinking of it as 
a wish to demonstrate adherence to Islamic international law, and to Islamic 
governance. 
 
4.2.2 Islamic governance; rule by God  
 
Contemporary Islamists are dismissive of modern national governments who “usurp 
God’s authority”,41, with this serving as the basis for offering up alternative political 
arrangements.42 Whilst ruling in accordance with religious proscriptions has long been 
a preoccupation of Islamic societies, the notion of divine sovereignty has additionally 
served as the basis for establishing a utopian construction of what an Islamic society 
should look like.43 Such utopias are naturally unachievable, and the failure of modern 
states to achieve such conditions are specified by groups like ISIS as a basis for 
action.44 In this regard, contemporary terrorist and armed groups present themselves 
as striving for tawhid, or rule by God. 
Whilst the caliph, emirs, sultans, and kings of the classical era had an 
immensely important role, they did not, by virtue of their control of the population, 
 
39 Ahmed Al-Dawoody, Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 
98. 
40 Muhammad Munir, ‘Who Can Declare Jihad?’ (2012) 12 Research Papers, Human Rights Conflict 
Prevention Centre 1279, 1292–1293. 
41 Syed Qutb, Milestones (Islamic Book Service 2006) 8. 
42 Maher, for instance notes the importance of Tawhid in Salafi thought, in which doctrinal purity and 
the realisation of a reductive notion of “rule by god” are emphasised. See Maher (n 17) 145.  
43 Andrew F. March, ‘Genealogies of Sovereignty in Islamic Political Theology’ (2013) 80 Social 
Research 293, 235. 
44 See Samantha Mahood and Halim Rane, ‘Islamist Narratives in ISIS Recruitment Propaganda’ (2017) 
23 The Journal of International Communication 15. 
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generate authority or have any inherent authority. God was to maintain his ultimate 
sovereignty over the Islamic community, or, as Hallaq puts it, “literally everything”.45 
An important distinction in classic divisions of Islamic government, the physical 
leader was the proxy of divine rule.46 This distinction was not extraordinary, echoing 
the vicarious understanding leadership of many earlier cultures.47 Through the 
enforcement of the Sharia, the leader was responsible for ensuring God’s rule was 
realised; making sure that all law-making passed through the revelation of the Quran 
and the example of the Sunna, to ensure that the Ummah was living according to God’s 
will. 
 
“At the head of Islamic community is God Himself, and His rule 
over His people is immediate and direct, without any intermediary. 
Even Muhammad is not the head of this community of equals. Islam 
is the direct government of Allah…”48 
 
Put simply, it was, therefore, the responsibility of leaders at every level in the imperial 
system or state hierarchy to ensure that the Sharia was sufficiently incarnate to 
overwhelm any personal or manufactured considerations of law and justice. The 
notion of man’s rule over man has long troubled Islamic leadership. An alternative 
system of law that has been manufactured may be capable of producing a more 
prosperous, more comfortable, or more stable social reality. It would not, however, be 
the rule of God; this being grounds for the ends of such a state project. Should the 
caliph or another leader fail to ensure that law-making and legal decisions passed 
through the Sharia, this would be grounds for his supersession,49 on the grounds he 
was permitting man to legislate above God’s revealed law. 
  Achieving Tawhid, or rule by God, is by no means a simple exercise. In the 
classical era, ensuring rule by God was heavily dependent upon the division of power, 
in that such a division made it difficult for individual leaders to enact their own will 
 
45 Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State: Islam, Politics, and Modernity's Moral Predicament (Columbia 
University Press 2013) 50. 
46 Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam 
(Cambridge University Press 1986) 40–42. 
47 T. Fish, ‘War and Religion in Ancient Mesopotama’ (1939) 23 Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 
387, 391–292. 
48 A. Ezzati, The Spread of Islam: The Contributing Factors (4th edn, Islamic College for Advanced 
Studies Press 2002) 134.  
49 Vernie Liebl, ‘The Caliphate’ (2009) 45 Middle Eastern Studies 373, 374–378. 
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without deference to Islamic principles. It is therefore incumbent on such a leader to 
satisfy a critical majority of the Ummah and ulema that he is sufficiently capable of 
ensuring that God rules over man. When a leader falls short, the preferred mechanisms, 
historically speaking, have been an assassination, violent uprisings, schisms, and 
revolts.50 Scholars considering what Islamic law prescribes in such situations are 
usually more circumspect, however, with discussion as to whether it is incumbent 
upon Muslims to rebel against an inadequate leader, considering amongst other 
dynamics, the chance of success.51 Rebellion and disobedience can prove costly and 
are not solutions to be taken lightly, with some scholars stressing that to live under the 
rule of a tyrant, rather than risk the chaos that may follow such acts, is preferable.52  
Being insufficiently Islamic has additionally acted as a cause in cases where 
Muslims have gone to war. One such example is Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), 
famously using the failure of Mongol rulers to implement Sharia to galvanise Mamluk 
opinion against the Muslim-headed Golden Horde.53 This indicates that being 
insufficiently Islamic may also serve as a pretext for inter-Muslim violence. 
Unsurprisingly, this line of reasoning is favoured by modern neo-jihadist thinkers.54 
The central nature of Sharia to achieving tawhid has given rise to some interesting 
examples of cultural dissonance; a key example would be the late Ottoman Tanzimat 
reforms that borrowed heavily from, amongst other sources, the French constitution. 
This inclusion of western ideas of democracy and constitutionalism in late Ottoman 
reforms was carefully packaged as the re-acquisition of Muslim knowledge that had 
been stolen from the Islamic world.55 This serves to illustrate a need, as Lewis puts it, 
to ensure that any progress is veiled in the “sanctified past”.56 It additionally illustrates 
 
50 A chronology of these events is included as an appendix in Karen Armstrong’s short history. See 
Karen Armstrong, Islam: A Short History ( The Modern Library 2002). 
51 Khaled Abou El Fadl, Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law (Cambridge University Press 2001) 
317. 
52 John L. Esposito and John Obert Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford University Press 1996) 42–43. 
53 Ibn Taymiyyah, The Religious and Moral Doctrine of Jihad (Maktabah Al Ansaar Publications 2001) 
10. 
54 Bar-On (n 15) 248. 
55 Whilst the Tanzimat reforms are largely associated with dismissal of religious obscurantism and 
modernisation, it was still a necessity to engage with religious shareholders in such a manner. See Carter 
V. Findley, Turkey, Islam, Nationalism, and Modernity: A History, 1789–2007 (Yale University Press 
2010) 104–108; Abdelilah Belkeziz, The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought (I.B Tauris 2009) 20.  
56 ‘As so often happens, the first appearance of heterodox ideas in an authoritarian society is known 
only from refutations and condemnations; where positive responses appear, they are sporadic and 
furtive, and, in Islamic societies especially, assume traditional disguise of a return to the sanctified 
past’. See Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2002) 
72–73. 
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the role of scholars and leaders in laundering innovations so as to balance progress 
and tradition.  
The imperative to demonstrate rule by God remains in modern discourse. This 
prospect has been subject to commentary by western scholars, who have noted the 
utilisation of such argumentation, as well as its capacity to serve in local and regional 
political rivalries, with different shareholders seeking to demonstrate their adherence 
to Islamic values over one another.57 Naturally, different interpretations of what God’s 
law actually is have emerged; there has for instance been a resurgence to an ostensibly 
“pure” understanding of rule by God that strives to restore a very reductive and 
ahistorical understanding of tawhid to Islamic societies.58 Different interpretations of 
what a society governed by God should look like means that differences in opinion on 
different governments and leaders may exist. Accusing a ruler of permitting the 
infiltration of western values and institutions remains a requisite prelude to violent 
rebellion or action; Faraj, for instance, stresses the importance of asserting “rule of 
God” in the Middle East as a primary and foundational step.59 The strategy of utilising 
obscurantism in order to discredit Muslim regimes, or to serve as a locum for 
discontent in the non-Muslim world is a well-established strategy. 
In the contemporary environment, arguments in favour of a return to the rule 
of God are to some extent buoyed by the failure of more secular attempts at legislating 
the Middle East. The “rule by man” offered by the late Muslim imperialists, 
subsequent colonists, and successive dictators experimented with noxious Marxist and 
nationalist approaches to imposing order.60 Ensuring the primacy of God’s rule today 
is fraught with difficulties that have served to exacerbate this process. The temporal 
and cultural context in which the exemplary communities resided grows ever more 
distant. Nevertheless, the assertion that a given ruler or regime are not ensuring rule 
by Sharia, and therefore God, has become a key mechanism in the process of “Islamic 
 
57 Cornell, for instance, notes some of the benefits that accompany being the most orthodox Islamist 
actor in a region. See Svante Cornell, ‘Taliban Afghanistan: A True Islamic State’ in Brenda Shaffer 
(ed), The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (Belfer Center for Science and International 
Affairs 2006). 
58 Maher (n 17) 145. 
59 Reiterating the perspective that the Islamic world must do away with “hypocrite” secular leaders. See 
Mohammad Abdus Salam Faraj, The Absent Obligation (Vision Printing 2000) 64. 
60 This theme is usually identified in relation to Sayyid Qutb and the later Muslim Brotherhood. See 
Hendrik Hansen and Peter Kainz, ‘Radical Islamism and Totalitarian Ideology: A Comparison of 
Sayyid Qutb's Islamism with Marxism and National Socialism’ (2007) 8 Totalitarian Movements and 
Political Religions 55. 
101 
 
outbidding”61 engaged in by fringe Salafist and jihadist movements. These puritanical 
elements, who are prohibitively precise in their image of what God’s rule should 
resemble, accept no compromise with modernity whatsoever; whilst such groups may 
be equally incapable, if not worse, at realising anything approximating tawhid, this 
fact does not interfere with the process.  
 
4.3  Classical Islamic institutions; the Ulema, the Ummah, and the Caliph 
 
This chapter has so far sought to suggest that in relation to Islamic international law 
and Islamic governance, Islamic leaders have historically been bound to fulfil certain 
functions. By presenting an ahistorical utopian vision of these functions, it is possible 
for reformists, ideologies, and revolutionaries to suggest that these functions are not 
being fulfilled. Accordingly, terrorist actors and unconventional armed groups assert 
that they are capable of realising these features.62 This is naturally, however, a 
competitive process with a range of political movements and violent organisations 
seeking to derive legitimacy in this manner. As already mentioned, there are some key 
differences between how unconventional armed groups utilising Islam understand 
Islamic jurisprudence, and how it was understood and operationalised throughout 
much of Islamic history. Nevertheless, it is important to understand upon what basis 
today’s unconventional armed groups have been able to assume the authority that was 
conventionally vested in Islamic systems of governance.  
The manifestation of jihad as a rationale for contemporary armed violence 
must be understood within a structural context. In order to arrive at a contemporary 
definition, it is essential to identify the individuals and institutions who were 
historically responsible for defining Islamic warfare in a given context or occurrence; 
who was duty bound to participate within an instance of jihad; and who was in charge 
of planning, organising, and declaring a cessation of hostilities. The subsequent 
decline of these checks and balances is a central contributing factor to the emergence 
of contemporary Islamic thought on the subject of collective violence.  
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Although Islam may be readily associated with a number of polities and 
empires across the history of the religion, Islamic law (Sharia) primarily addresses 
individuals,63 not groups. It is individuals who are understood be held accountable for 
their own deeds after death, and therefore they have a responsibility to ensure that the 
proper rules and rituals of the faith are observed.64 Yet the realisation of an Islamic 
lifestyle has frequently been understood to require certain restrictions to exist, imposed 
by a central hierarchy upon a population.65 At least as much as other religions, and 
perhaps to a greater extent, conforming to the expectations of the Islamic faith has 
required an Islamic community under the control of a leader responsible for 
maintaining Sharia in public life. This, in turn, required scholars responsible for 
determining how the law should be applied within a specific context, whilst 
maintaining its Islamic character.66 The basis for maintaining the Islamic lifestyle 
outside of this framework has been questioned by numerous theorists.67 In this sense, 
Islamic law in a practical sense has, for much of history, been a product of institutions 
that together served to ensure the implementation of Sharia at the collective level. 
This inclination towards centralised organisation and leadership has resulted 
in a range of organised Islamic communities and polities throughout history.68 
Distinctive means of political organisation and governance have been exhibited across 
time,69 as well as exhibiting changes based upon culture and geography.70 This 
approach maintained a reciprocal relationship between Islamic-revealed scripture and 
several key institutions. These key institutions included a professional scholarly class 
(ulema) responsible for appointing judges and interpreting the law; the Ummah, or 
Islamic lay community; and a secular hierarchy of leaders (caliphs, 
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sultans/kings/emirs, etc.) who were responsible for ensuring the implementation of 
Islamic law. These institutions interacted to ensure the realisation of “Islamic 
governance”.71 Whilst titles may have altered, or the precise relationship between 
these institutions evolved, the existence of these three quantities is present in the vast 
majority of organised Islamic systems of governance.  
The classical Islamic governance structure that these institutions comprised 
served to impose, to a degree at least, separation of powers, and accountability of those 
in authority.72 More importantly, this governance structure imposed a formalism on 
the interpretation and application of the law.73 A number of codes of law (Usul al-fiqh) 
were subsequently produced and applied in a range of political contexts. Nevertheless, 
the essential relationship between the Muslim population, the scholars, and the rulers 
was maintained. The differences between various classical schools were indicative of 
the adaptations to diverse cultural and geographical realities, or the discrepancies in 
how the various sources of Islamic law were applied and understood.  
The formality of this arrangement afforded a degree of stability in how both 
personal and collective duties were interpreted. For the purposes of this study, this 
topic is relevant to the already discussed notion of religious war (jihad). In Sunni 
Islam, the Islamic variation on the holy war was eventually rendered progressively 
inaccessible by this institutional formality; only leaders of communities were 
supposed to have the authority to declare jihad.74 Moreover, the formal interpretations 
proffered by institutionally established Islamic scholars regarding jihad have served 
to modulate how injunctions towards religious violence in the Quran and Sunnah are 
framed, for example, the manner in which jihad was understood as both a collective 
and individual responsibility.75 
In the contemporary situation, these key institutions have been incapable of 
maintaining their authority over the global Islamic population. Consequently, new 
theorists and practitioners have presented new approaches to the Islamic “law of war”, 
that, as this study will explore, rival the most permissive articulations of jihad from 
Islamic history. Building upon the essential thesis that Islamic systems of governance 
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have proved to be incompatible with the prevailing state system76 and that traditional 
institutions have suffered as a result,77 the exploration of both the historic importance 
of these institutions and the consequences of their decline is meaningful. This 
assessment serves to illustrate how new interpretations of jihad have emerged and 
subsequently coalesced into contemporary terrorist and extremist movements. 
Perhaps the most relevant alteration in the context of this thesis is the decline 
of the ulema in Islamic life. This largely informal designation referred to the scholars 
who traditionally discussed the application of Sharia in different contexts.78 
Conventionally, such scholars were formally educated and afforded status and 
significant authority within the framework of Islamic civilisation. Although the 
precise nature of this arrangement has varied immensely throughout the centuries of 
Islamic history,79 its role in relation to the wider Islamic Ummah and Islamic 
leadership remained relatively stable until comparatively recently. Such institutions 
persist today, and whilst still influential, their role is now significantly different to that 
which had prevailed for much of Islamic history.  
Entry into the ulema has traditionally been predicated upon a professional 
career path, acquired through study within a madrassa or under an established scholar, 
or other similar institutions of Islamic education. The formality of this accreditation is 
usually maintained through accreditation; an ijaza – authorisation or credential – 
would be secured after an acceptable standard had been reached by a candidate.80 
These institutions were not exclusively schools of law; the ulema studied a range of 
subjects related to science and civics.81 The importance of this institution is made most 
apparent in providing stability and formality to the interpretation of the law and the 
governance of Islamic communities.82 Moreover, the institution traditionally played a 
role in stabilising the application of the law by more tangible authorities such as emirs, 
caliphs, and sultans, issuing guidance and ensuring the smooth transfer of power,83 as 
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well as holding such leaders to account in exceptional instances.84 The result was a 
largely transactional exchange between the ulema and various leaders, with the ulema 
providing the caliph with a degree of legitimacy in return for the influence of law, 
appointments, and political accommodations.85 
The ulema does not constitute a formally ordained clergy and does not by 
necessity hold licences or official appointments, but may be better understood as an 
informal scholarly class.86 The historical role of the ulema in Islamic societies would 
suggest that their power is more comprehensive than that of a priest in the Christian 
tradition, for instance.87 Traditionally, as a scholarly legal class, the ulema maintained 
a type of financial independence, operating as merchants and living off endowments, 
and even collecting taxes on their own behalf.88  
This informality has traditionally permitted flexibility; although the different 
schools of Sunni Islam establish thresholds for individuals who may be considered to 
be authoritative in legal matters, this distinction was not prescriptive, and the 
independence of the ulema has allowed them to adapt to different political realities 
and cultural norms.89 As Hallaq suggests, in the classical Islamic legal tradition, legal 
scholars had a clear position in the hierarchy of Muslim societies, and a well-defined 
role in establishing how the law was interpreted and applied in different contexts.90 
Hallaq argues that this role allowed for the stable interpretation of key sources of law, 
whilst affording flexibility in light of the different customs and peoples to which the 
Sharia was applied.91 The ulema therefore provided inertial stability to how an Islamic 
government operated, whilst driving the adaptation of Sharia to different contexts and 
emerging problems.  
More recently, the role of the ulema has been subject to decline, a process that 
continues to date. This decline is not mono-dimensional, as several processes conspire 
to deconstruct the authority and undermine the influence of the ulema. For instance, 
in Indonesia, the increasing “rationality” of citizens and the upsurge of secular 
 
84 Shmuel Bar, ‘The Implications of the Caliphate’ (2016) 35 Comparative Strategy 1, 2. 
85 Wael B. Hallaq, Sharīʿa: Theory, Practice, Transformations (Cambridge University Press 2009) 133; 
Mohammed Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam – Religion and Politics in the Muslim World 
(University of Michigan Press 2009) 5. 
86 Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam – Custodians of Change (n 13) 9. 
87 Ibid 9. 
88 Kuran (n 27)49. 
89 Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam – Custodians of Change (n 13) 97. 
90 Hallaq (n 45)133. 
91 Hallaq (n 45) 53. 
106 
 
nationalism are specified as forces that progressively undermine the ulema;92 
alternately, the postulation is that past compromise and accommodation with secular 
authorities has discouraged all ulema engagements above the local level.93 In the case 
of Saudi Arabia, Bligh suggests that the traditional ulema have declined in the 
kingdom for several reasons, specifying conservatism and failure to adapt; at the same 
time, the ulema’s subordination to the house of Saud is responsible for their failing 
influence over law, matters of policy, and the population in general.94 These studies 
serve to suggest that there are a number of complex ongoing processes that together 
have served to alter the position of ulema in Muslim culture and society.  
Several more general factors also serve to undermine both the authority and 
influence of these organisations that have conventionally come to comprise the ulema. 
Traditional scholarly organisations have been obliged to take a position on 
controversial and divisive topics such as the U.S. presence in the Middle East.95 In 
some cases, the decision of these traditional scholarly organisations has run contrary 
to the expectations of the wider Islamic community, sparked extensive criticism, and 
effectively discredited some organisations in the eyes of influential Muslims.96 The 
co-option of several long-standing institutions into the architecture of modern states 
has to an extent irrevocably tethered them to oppressive regimes, which has since 
served as the basis for criticism. State-funded ulema is readily discredited by more 
radical organisations as “puppet mullahs who use their religion for making dollars”.97 
Additionally, radical organisations such as the Muslim Brotherhood have been 
consistent in their condemnation of venerable Islamic institutions such as the al-Azhar, 
considering the latter entirely submissive to the government of Egypt.98 
Alternatively, the ulema still plays an important role in many nations with 
Muslim forms of governance. The Dar al-Ifta, despite ostensibly being an organ of the 
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Egyptian government, offers rulings through the Islamic world.99 In addition, Islamic 
universities such as the aforementioned al-Azhar may be considered modern core 
institutions of the ulema. Indeed, Egyptian Islamic institutions have even been 
identified as the “centre of gravity” of the modern-day Sunni ulema.100 The Deobandi 
madrasas of Pakistan may also be regarded as representative of the resilient ulema.101 
These vestiges have been accordingly presented as key shareholders in the fight 
against extremism and terrorism. 
The persisting influence of the ulema as an institution is most apparent, not in 
the Sunni tradition, but in the Shia counterpart. The Iranian “Islamic revolution” was 
led principally and later entirely co-opted by the Shia ulema.102 Elsewhere, however, 
the ulema has not been the means of expressing revolutionary sentiment. Green 
suggests that amongst other historical factors, the ulema has traditionally taken on 
various roles in different societies.103 In contrast, the Sunni sphere has witnessed the 
ulema either ossifying into association with the architecture of a particular state, or 
waning in influence due to competition to alternative sources of law and morality. 
From an external perspective, the intellectual capacity and ideological 
disposition of the global ulema might have been modified through the extensive 
patronage and funding emanating from the conservative Gulf States, which has served 
to alter the disposition of Islamic scholars worldwide.104 Such funding is often 
accompanied by certain curricula and ideological axioms as part of the bargain. The 
extent of such funding is arguably of sufficient scope as to fundamentally alter the 
overall consensus of the global scholarly community; indeed, learned Muslims 
contending with neo-jihadist groups have commented on the evident paucity of 
moderate scholars to resist the rise of radicalism.105 
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Based on the preceding factors, the ability to generate Islamic laws and rules 
is unlikely to ever reside solely with the learned scholars of the formal schools again; 
literacy and the mass production of key texts have rendered jurists liable to questioning 
since the colonial era. Literacy allowed for both Islamic scripture and jurisprudential 
sources to be accessed independently of the formal indoctrination of the schools. The 
scripture is now accessible in many languages in mass-produced, widely available 
printed volumes. This represents a key contributory factor to the emerging tradition of 
neo-jihadist thinking. 
Unlike other faiths, the Islamic community gained political power from the 
outset; a political component to Muslim identity is therefore naturally present. The 
term Ummah may be understood as referring to a sense of community between 
Muslims. The basis for this affiliation is to maintain the faith;106 with the institutions 
of the Sharia and jihad relating to this purpose, in that they were both conceived as 
expressions of this function.107 The term Ummah has transcended the original 
monolithic Islamic state, and centuries later, the end of a unitary Islamic community 
in any political sense. Whilst today the term best equates to an in-group identifier 
common to Muslims, in addition to its common usage, there is a basis to assert a 
number of distinctive understandings of the term. These new meanings range from the 
pluralistic through to the purist, to the prohibitively exclusive. Its relevance to this 
study is that contemporary theorists often stress a need for awakening, restoration, or 
revival of the Ummah, referencing previous political manifestations of the community 
of the faithful under this term. This opportunity to reframe the term Ummah has 
naturally served modern-day groups seeking to invoke a more violent usage of the 
term.  
Religions generally seek to differentiate themselves from wider populations. 
Their means of doing so are generally different from those of a race-based, tribal, or 
nationalistic ideology. The Islamic faith is no different in this regard, with the notion 
of a distinct Islamic community articulated in the Quran.108 This designation refers to 
a unitary religious community that is intended to supersede and unify individuals 
above previous tribal affiliations.109 Its efficacy in this regard is most apparent in the 
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foundation of the religion, in which the pre-Islamic tradition of incessant raiding was 
dissolved, with the Arab tribes putting aside longstanding enmities upon entering the 
fold of Islam. 
The Ummah was a key factor in the subsequent Arab conquests, in which Arab 
tribes set aside their enmity in favour of unification under the auspices of Islam.110 As 
the political reality of the Muslim community changed, and the Islamic world 
dominated new populations, the legal understanding of the Ummah developed in 
Muslim societies. Membership in the Ummah provided legal privileges that were not 
afforded to outsiders;111 through the classical period, the notion of Islamic oneness 
transcending any more pragmatic political arrangements was to some extent 
maintained as a broader unit of affiliation.112 Indeed, the notion of a Sunni Ummah 
remained politically meaningful, at least in a limited sense, until the abolition of the 
caliphate.113 
Naturally, the actual composition of the Ummah has been subject to extensive 
reinterpretations through the different ages of Islamic history. The idealised notion of 
the Ummah has frequently clashed with political realities, and its application in a 
political-legal sense has correspondingly been altered. After the death of the prophet 
Muhammad, schisms and heterodoxies immediately began to emerge; the early 
Kajarite/Khawarji sect represented the first of what would be many differences in 
opinion as to how best to understand the composition of the Islamic community.114 
The Sunni–Shia schism is again to a certain extent rooted in such a disagreement; in 
this case, the conflict first related to the need for submission to a single leader.115 These 
early splits and fissures have since been compounded by numerous long-standing 
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intra-Muslim conflicts that pose serious questions as to how the Ummah is to be 
understood.116 
The notion of Islamic oneness or an Islamic community has become difficult 
to assert in the traditional political sense, now that nationality has taken on meaning 
through the construction of borders and nations. Additionally, the central coordination 
of the Ummah in a political sense is no longer possible due to the dissolution of the 
caliph position; it is difficult to find a sole individual or institution capable of effective 
control over the sum total of Sunni Muslims. Accordingly, it has diminished in 
meaning to a cultural unit of ritual significance. Based on this evolution, it is perhaps 
fair to suggest that the concept of Ummah in contemporary Islamic thought is rather 
wide-ranging. On the one hand, pluralist reformers seek to extend the notion of 
community indefinitely, equitable with the biblical articulation of “neighbour”.117 
Alternately, both traditionalist and radical interpretations of the term prevail; for 
instance, the notion of the Ummah represents the group united by the Islamic belief 
system, although to some extent this notion has to be reconciled with the prevailing 
reality of national citizenship.118 By contrast, groups such as ISIS have chosen to direct 
the global dissatisfaction of the Muslim community towards reforming a global 
Ummah as a political unit, whilst recognising that in order to do so, they must destroy 
aspects of the state system.  
Naturally, in asserting a concrete, politicised understanding of the Ummah, the 
contemporary jihadist approach must contest the reality that currently prevails, namely 
that Muslim identity is not a sole hybridised Ummah.119 In this contemporary 
condition, Muslim identity and allegiance is permeated by other national and cultural 
realities. The means of reasserting the lapsed political content of the term, as Hassan 
asserts, is via the selective retrieval of doctrine.120 In the case of modern terrorist and 
extremist veins of thought, it is possible to draw upon aspects of scripture and history 
that conform to their stated aims. As such aims suggest, it is additionally a necessity 
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that the Ummah itself be purified of foreign influences, invoking the mechanism of 
takfir to fulfil this purpose. This is rooted in an assessment that the Ummah itself may 
degenerate into a community of disbelief, and require purging of the Muslims that 
have permitted this encroachment.121 In selecting those to be purged, adherence to 
tawhid is to be used as a determining factor,122 though it is likely he utilises this in a 
vague spiritual sense, rather than giving it a specific technical meaning. At its most 
permissive, Ummah can relate to all those that foster a relationship with God in a 
monotheistic sense, resulting in a far more pluralistic definition of who comprises the 
“in group community”. 
In modern pan-Islamic discourse, the Ummah as a commonwealth or nation is 
frequently articulated.123 This task is of immense complexity now that the community 
of the faithful has undergone the aforementioned fragmentation. Accordingly, groups 
such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim Brotherhood have sought not only to revive the 
lapsed political understanding of the Ummah, but through their methods of doing so, 
drawn upon some very contemporary ideas that are suited to the task. Küntzel suggests 
that modern Muslim Brotherhood interpretations of the Ummah are not directly 
comparable with western notions of citizenship, but more comprehensively align with 
the proto-fascist concept of Volk.124 Patterson additionally makes this connection in 
this case by drawing upon Maududi’s articulation of the Ummah.125 Subsequently, the 
concept articulation in radical jihadi thinking can be likened to the Nazi Völkisch 
movement. Although the lack of delineation in the Ummah on the basis of race is 
frequently mentioned,126 the substitution of religion for ethnicity as the dividing 
principle enables this comparison to proceed. 
Marxism has also left an indelible mark on how modern jihadists and Islamists 
understand and articulate the Ummah in their thinking. Drawing upon the Marxist 
concept of class interaction, some attempts to envision the Ummah bear a likeness to 
the notion of an oppressed class; this construction has melded with modern-day 
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jihadist thinking, with jihadist “elites” adopting the role of revolutionaries.127 Qutb’s 
understanding of the struggle between “Islam” and “the west[ern]” societies has also 
been juxtaposed with the struggle between Marxism and capitalism.128 This notion is 
highly visible when considering how contemporary Islamist structures address 
themselves to global audiences. For instance, after the Islamic revolution in Iran, a 
brief yet vigorous attempt was made to export the revolution across the Middle East 
as a liberation movement.129 Neo-Ottoman pretentions in modern-day Turkish politics 
also suggest an attempt to once again unify the Sunni world under Turkic auspices.130 
This trend is, however, most apparent in non-state groups; the “transnational 
pretentions” inherent in such a variety of global Islamism has drawn comparisons with 
other total ideologies such as the aforementioned Marxism and Nazism. 
Put simply, a classical or imperial age understanding of the Ummah cannot by 
necessity be ascribed to contemporary understandings of the Ummah, particularly 
those of neo-jihadist theorists. Whilst it still roughly equates to the sum total of 
Muslims, the relationship between Muslims and centralised power, to each other, and 
relative to other imagined collectives (notably the west) has mutated. A frequent 
contention is that an extensive reference to Islamic sources is required to understand 
the phenomenon of contemporary jihadist violence, particularly when considering 
how the current understanding of Islamic governance contributes to modern-day 
jihadism.131 However, today’s jihadi operatives and scholars are not by necessity 
cognisant of the ideological frameworks in which they participate, examining Islamic 
history through a lens occluded by modernity and diverse influences.  The current 
interpretations of this term do not lend themselves well to generalisation,132 which 
itself is perhaps, in turn, a consequence of the intellectual as well as physical 
fragmentation resulting from the trauma of the last few centuries.  
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Similarly, to the vast majority of political and religious systems that have existed, for 
much of history Sunni Islam was hierarchical presided over by a spiritual and temporal 
leader named the Caliph. Generally in Islam , The ideal leader in a civic sense is 
expected to reflect the virtues of the prophet Muhammad.133 The rationale behind 
having a leader like the caliph extends to implementing a social condition that 
embodies the teachings of Islam.134 This approach is apparently constructed so as to 
ensure God’s sovereignty through the implementation of Sharia in the particular 
communal context over which a leader vicariously presides.135 The previous chapter 
stressed that the elimination of the Islamic doctrines of holy war is at least partly the 
result of vesting in leaders the authority to declare jihad. Although individual Muslims 
maintain a duty to apply Sharia in their own lives, submission to a leader of some form 
is considered to be important. The significance of leadership is repeatedly emphasised 
in scriptural sources. The passages of the Quran136 and various types of hadith may be 
invoked to recognise the central importance of obedience to leaders. Accordingly, 
medieval fiqh highlighted the importance of obeying sultans and kings.137  
The exact form and title assumed, and the relationship between the leader and 
the general population, have naturally changed through different contexts. After the 
death of the prophet, the initial model of leadership was to simply carry over the 
authority vested in the prophets into a successor.138 The position of caliph fulfilled this 
role, with the stewardship of the Islamic community, the Ummah, passing to a single 
individual, who assumed the obligation of overseeing the application of Islamic law.139 
The fragmentation of the global Islamic community, as well as the geographical and 
cultural realities following the Arab conquests, imposed some administrative divisions 
throughout the Islamic world. Sultans, kings, and emirs became interlocutors between 
a remote caliph and the distinct communities of Muslims. Confrontations between 
“true” Islamic leaders and civil movements with insufficiently Islamic leaders 
abounded; assassinations and coups, justified by an ostensible failure to adhere to 
Sharia or Islamic rules and norms more generally , occasionally occurred.140 
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Failure of a leader to rule by Sharia meant to participate in disbelief.141 The 
meaning of disbelief in current Islamic conservative thought, is naturally nebulous and 
expansive.142 This notion has translated through to modern-day jihadist thinking, with 
profound consequences for leaders who have permitted non-Islamic rule to take hold. 
Today, state leaders of the historically Islamic world find themselves in a difficult 
position of having to adapt to prevailing circumstances, whilst also showing deference 
towards tawhid. The need to market natural resources, acquire wealth, and ensure 
security forces act in concert with non-Islamic states invites labels such as taghut143 
and pharaoh,144 which adversely affect the leader to whom they are applied. The 
critical consideration is that should leaders fail to fulfil their duty to uphold Islamic 
law, the overwhelming consensus for much of history is that they should be 
overthrown.145 This is naturally a critical consideration.  
The preceding stipulation functions not only as a mandate for violence against 
regional leaders, but also as an indication that the post of a legitimate Islamic leader 
is often vacant. The “empty throne” problem has triggered interesting variations of the 
theme of a universal Islamic leader. The lack of a caliph has elicited speculation as to 
whether or how the institution can be restored.146 Additionally, in many state contexts, 
the question of whether or not the population lives under Islamic rule or whether the 
government of a state is sufficiently Islamic has been subject to extensive debate, as 
well as translating into more kinetic forms of expression.  
To continue this line of reasoning, should those in positions of authority fail in 
their appointed duties, or if such leaders are absent, then the authority to act may 
devolve to those lower in the hierarchy of a given community, and ultimately, to the 
individual.147 To provide an example, the leader of an Islamic community traditionally 
had the privilege of declaring jihad.148 The reciprocal relationship between the 
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revealed laws, the leader, and the community was relatively straightforward and is 
advanced in varying ways by many scholars. Several scholars go as far as saying that 
only a leader may declare jihad. Should this relationship deteriorate, an outsider 
movement may possibly assume the legitimacy, and therefore the authority once 
vested in the leader. 
 
 
4.4  Implications of classical Islamic law and institutions regarding 
unconventional armed groups  
 
This chapter has sought to build upon the central contention of this thesis, namely that 
the adoption of a religious ideology can have a deterministic influence upon the nature 
of an armed group or actor. When considering contemporary terrorist and non-state 
groups professing the Islamic faith, there exists a temptation to consider their use of 
scripture and examples from Islamic history as little more than an exercise in 
obscurantism. Based on this chapter, it is possible to suggest that a number of 
transitions have taken place that permits such groups to present themselves as the 
inheritors of the authority once vested in Islamic polities. This has in part been aided 
by the decline in the capacity of more longstanding Islamic institutions. The 
examination of the evolution of key institutions concepts in the last few centuries 
reveals that the classical understanding of these bodies has been significantly 
undermined by the progress of history. Coming to terms with the prevailing state 
system has entailed drastic alterations that involved the weakening of the traditional 
structures of allegiance and law. To some extent, this situation accounts for the manner 
in which new theories on and approaches to jihad have emerged. 
It is not without significance that the course of events unfolding in relation to 
today’s unconventional armed groups of which ISIS is emblematic echo earlier 
heterodox and rebel movements. For instance, numerous movements took advantage 
of the weakening Ottoman caliphate, one of which resulted in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.149 The perceived adoption of European mechanisms of governance, the 
absence of enforcement of Sharia laws, and the pressures of modernisation were 
sufficient grounds for asserting that the Ottoman masters were not providing the 
 
149 Perceived westernisation and reform motivated a number of rebellions throughout the Ottoman 
Empire. See Belkeziz (n 55) 19. 
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required framework for the realisation of Islamic existence. Mirroring the Wahhabi 
War that occurred years earlier150 was an event in which, under the house of Saud, the 
Ikhwan made a bloody mess of the Arabian Peninsula, establishing a new orthodox 
emirate on behalf of the new Saudi state.151 The brutal acts committed by this group 
gained their imperative from Islamic scripture; the teachings of al-Wahhab permitted 
the use of jihad against other Muslims.152 This approach was justified by the aim of 
recreating the social condition that prevailed in the early Islamic community. By 
appearing insufficiently Islamic, the Ottoman Empire allowed the conceptual space 
for various movements, both theologically grounded and behind charismatic 
individuals, to supplant their previously strong authority. 
To return to the example of the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud used the Islamic scripture as 
the basis for exerting political control beyond what he was, by custom, authorised to 
do. Wahhabism, as a strand of Islamic revivalism, was the “script” that matched his 
aspirations, in that it required believers to spread their message by both persuasion and 
compulsion if need be.153 Using this ideology, Saud effectively united what would 
previously have been squabbling Bedouin tribes into a cohesive band of fighters who 
would obey his instructions, as long as such instructions were divinely ordained. 
Buoyed by the movement, they became “[l]iteralists in matters of the faith, [and] the 
Ikhwan believed that jihad knew no rest and no boundaries”,154 deeming that killing 
all who stood against them and did not share their views was a moral duty, as was the 
more traditional raid and pillage – a massive escalation from the small-scale ghazwas 
of previous generations.  
This historical event demonstrates the possibility of motivating armed 
resistance through appeal to Islam as a supranational authority or as an alternative to 
existing forms of governance when authority is deemed to be insufficiently Islamic. 
By the time of the Ottoman Empire’s dissolution, the notion of a caliphate was largely 
vestigial, with the caliph position being chiefly ceremonial. After its inevitable 
dissolution, the Islamic world in the most general sense underwent numerous 
progressive traumas. To a large extent, these traumas caused the disintegration, or at 
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least deterioration, of both the institution of the caliph and several other institutions 
that provided the essential structure and formality to the theory and practice of Islamic 
law and governance. The fragmentation of the Ummah, the supersession of emirs and 
other Islamic leaders, and the disruption of the ulema may be considered today to be 
significantly in excess of the circumstances that permitted the Ikhwan to emerge. 
 Returning to the essential point, classical Islamic ideas of governance are 
extremely difficult, if not impossible to assert in today’s global landscape. This 
essential point established by the impossibility of asserting such a structure155 has been 
elaborated upon in this chapter from an institutional standpoint. This dissolution of the 
Islamic governance and the forces responsible for initiating its demise has exerted a 
definite influence upon new theorists who would subsequently recraft classical notions 
of Islamic statehood, governance, and law. The new ideological project of neo-
jihadism is one such reinterpretation, yet it is troubling in that it has reconstructed 
aspects of the Islamic faith along the lines of pathological twentieth-century ideologies 
and is of sufficient importance to discuss in the next chapter. For instance, it is worth 
considering in detail these changes and their relevance to armed conflict and other 
forms of collective violence. For instance, as noted by Zulfiqar,156 there exist both 
collective duties and individual duties in relation to Islamic law. Whilst Jihad was 
initially understood as a collective duty, it has more recently been understood as 
individually obligated, a fairly drastic transition in the context of Islamic 
jurisprudence.157 Part of this transition can, as has been attempted in this chapter, be 
linked to the loss or alteration of many of the historical institutions that have, for much 
of the history of the religion, curated and expressed jihad as a collective duty.  
 
4.5 The importance of Takfir. 
 
Jihad is one thing, yet killing Muslims within the context of the Islamic faith is even 
more carefully curated than waging war against non-Muslims.158 Yet there are 
certainly precedents for overcoming these limitations, permitting Muslims to be 
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identified as the target of jihad.159  The process for rendering a Muslim permissible to 
kill is named takfir;160 not only does invoking takfir remove an individual or group 
from the umma and its’s attendant privileges, but is often understood as being attended 
by an injunction for their death.161 Killing Muslims en masse is sometimes deemed 
important in the modem era, often forming a component of the strategy used by armed 
groups and terrorists.162 An awareness of these precedents and the purported basis 
scripture is important, as contemporary movements and organisations seek 
justification by equating the situation in which they find themselves with past 
situations in which Muslims resorted to disenfranchising and killing other professed 
Muslims.163 Such instances have necessitated the production of mechanisms that either 
permit the use of violence against self-professed Muslims or outlaw Muslims on the 
basis of their failure to conform to certain expectations.  The works of  Ibn Taymiyyah 
remains a key touchstone in this regard.164 Other scholars discussed the variable 
mechanisms by which individuals from the privileges afforded by membership of the 
Ummah would be excluded based on the behaviour of affiliation, with an analysis of 
takfir. Whilst the invocation of takfir is stressed by most classic and modern thinkers, 
as a grave matter,165 it is not entirely absent from modern Islamic discourse. 
 
The modern extremist use of takfir is generally as an internal purity mechanism, to 
eject individuals from the faith that they see as subverting Islam.166  Whilst modern 
jihadists rigorously defend their right to use takfir as a means to justify the killing of 
Muslims, most Islamic scholars are highly critical of this approach. As Badar et al 
note, however, the approach taken by groups like ISIS today is heterogeneous and is 
resisted by the vast majority of Islamic scholarly institutions, these having recognised 
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that not only is the current usage of takfir inconstant with Islamic law, but additionally 
noting the damaging impact it has on Muslims at large.167 
 As a brief postscript to the discussion of Takfir, it is work noting the history 
of takfirist sects in Islam. A common contention in relation to takfirist groups today is 
that they are Khajarites;168 a detested sect of Islam dating back to the first fitnah.169  
There is additionally a basis to suggest that today’s neo jihadist armed groups can be 
equated with many examples of Islamic rebellion that were likewise designated as 
such. It is common practice to denounce radical groups, particularly those that kill or 
oppress Muslims as kajarites.170 Of course, those levelling accusations at today's 
kajarites need to be mindful of the nature of the term. Based upon its historical usage, 
to invoke such an accusation is not just a mere epithet, but an injunction against the 
individual accused. for instance, scholars branding modern-day sects as kajarites are 
not only denouncing them but compelling themselves and other Muslims to go forth 
and kill them.171 Much like the term Amalekite in the Jewish tradition,172 the use of 
such a term is a call to action and imposes an obligation.  
The theological progenitors of today’s jihadist unconventional armed groups 
permitted jihad to be used against other Muslims, but only in very specific 
circumstances- when for example,  (in the case of an adversary) they have accepted 
Islam, but a short time later expressed their enmity towards Islam.173 As the movement 
evolved it rapidly dispensed with such qualms eventually applying to takfir en 
masse.174 The relevance of takfir to today’s terrorists and unconventional armed 
groups will be demonstrated in further chapters. For the moment, it is sufficient to say 
that numerous Islamic groups have lost the support of their associated population by 
Killing Muslims.175 Takfir, if appropriately utilised, can be used to place Muslims 
outside of the fold of Islam, and therefore permit them to be killed. It is important to 
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understand both jihadi and takfiri inclinations present in earlier movements in order to 
better understand today’s armed groups.176 As the next chapter will demonstrate, a 
preoccupation of many neo jihadist theorists is marketing the idea of killing Muslims 
with the same alacrity of non-Muslims to a mass audience.  
 
4.6  Conclusion 
 
Whilst today it is difficult to think of religion of a supranational form of authority and 
law, the Islamic example demonstrates that this has been the case. In the past, the 
authority invested in Islamic systems of governance depended upon their adhering to 
the proscriptions of Islamic international law and Islamic governance. It can be 
contended that today, having recognised the fundamentally different context in which 
they find themselves, many Muslim leaders choose to realise these functions in 
different ways, more appropriate to the prevailing international system and global 
reality. These changes, however, are not universally accepted, provoking political 
opposition, terrorism, and the emergence of organised armed opposition.  
In relation to the present thesis, the changes that have occurred to the 
institutions in which Islamic law have been vested are relevant from two different 
angles. First, it suggests the relevance of religion in terms of understanding modern 
conflict. Second, it is suggested that there are typical features of religious conflict that 
differentiate it from armed conflict more generally. It is important to distinguish the 
different aims and organisational features taken on by organisations seeking to restore 
“legitimate” Islamic governance. IHL has been conventionally connected to a highly 
specific form of organised state violence that is difficult to equate with previous 
instances in which war has been waged for religious purposes, and this poses a 
potential challenge.  
This chapter has made allusions to instances in which a perceived failure on 
the part of Muslim authorities has resulted in the emergence of movements seeking to 
overthrow leaders and governments. The argument that follows is that contemporary 
unconventional armed groups represent a contemporary iteration of this approach. The 
veracity of this assertion will be addressed next.  
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5  Religious Conflict as a Contemporary Phenomenon  
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
 
The traditional framework of Islam consisted not only of a system of social norms and 
law but political powers and rules capable of modulating and restraining how this law 
and code of morality was applied.1 Yet, as contended in the last chapter, this system 
has largely dissolved. This current chapter will address what happens when modern 
armed groups and political movements seek to secure for themselves the authority 
once vested in Islamic leaders and systems of governance. As will be set out in this 
chapter these new individuals and organisations have sought to show deference to 
classical Islam, whilst also being seen to reject modernity the state system and in 
particular western influences, they have produced an approach to the use of force that 
is at once anachronistic and at home in a globalised world. This modern context has 
resulted in the inclusion of non-Islamic thought, notably the inculcation of traditional 
Islamic symbols and institutions with concepts drawn from very non-Muslim sources, 
most notably from fascism and communism.2 Visibly, however, the established 
lexicon has changed little, the rationale for religious violence connected with the 
Islamic tradition being underpinned by the extensive use of primary scripture and the 
works of certain classical scholars.3 This ideological approach, termed neo-jihadism, 
necessitates the organisations mobilised by this ideology peruse certain aims and 
utilising methods that are generally deemed to be impermissible. This as this chapter 
will explore, suggests a causal relationship between neo jihadist ideology and the 
negative trends observed in relation to contemporary warfare  
This chapter will identify neo jihadism and its role in contemporary religious 
conflict so as to better understand the threat with which International humanitarian 
law (IHL) must contend. The intention is to determine some typical features of this 
approach to armed conflict that differentiate it from armed conflict as understood by 
IHL. Due to the examples available, as well as the general focus of this study, the 
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emphasis will be on contemporary interpretations extracted from the Islamic context. 
Naturally, this represents a critical limitation when later determining typical features 
for wider application. Generating an understanding of contemporary religious conflict 
in the Islamic perspective –or neo-jihadism as it will be termed– is, however, sufficient 
to articulate some of the more general challenges that IHL must confront if it is to 
ensure appropriate protections are applied in modern conflicts.  
 Understanding the basis for contemporary religious conflict is a complex 
exercise. Despite clear deference to the past, depicting this wider movement as simply 
revisionist in scope cannot be considered entirely reflective of reality, notwithstanding 
visible concessions in this regard. Referring to contemporary jihadist theorists, several 
novel strategies and approaches to Islamic law couched within their published works 
may be presented. Adaptations and innovations have occurred at the ideological, 
strategic, and tactical levels to amend both the Quranic and classical legal 
interpretations of holy war and produce a religious code of law that is better adapted 
to contend with the prevailing international system, as well as the opportunities 
provided in terms of insurgency and media-orientated terrorism. 
This does not, however, mean that the new form of Islam as a “political 
religion”4 conforms to the traditional, classical concept of Islamic governance and law. 
Changes to the manner in which the religious or ideological component is interpreted 
may, in turn, serve as a basis for differentiating contemporary religious conflict from 
religious conflict of the past. Accordingly, it is useful to accumulate an understanding 
of the religious ideology in question, as this will dictate aspects of how the groups 
inculcated with it are organised, how they emerge, and ultimately how they use armed 
force, altering the aims and methods relevant to the conduct of hostility. 
 
5.2 The Islamic revival and its relevance to today’s unconventional armed 
groups and terrorists  
 
It is possible to postulate that the emergence of contemporary religious conflict in the 
Islamic context is due to the appearance and subsequent rejection of a variety of 
political Islam. Thinkers like Maududi, al-Banna and Qutb reacted to what could be 
 
4 In the manner described by Voegelin. See Eric Voegelin, ‘The Political Religions’ in Manfred 
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construed as the encroachment of western ideologies into the domain of the Islamic 
world.5 Not only anti-colonial, but this generation of Islamic scholar was also sceptical 
of indigenous Islamic institutions and new governments that they saw as having been 
corrupted by the influence that had diffused from the west.6 As a solution, such 
thinkers would go on to propose a return to a constructed utopian past that was as 
much a solution defined as the opposite of western modernity as it was conjured from 
scripture and history.7 This new, revolutionary form of Islamism was entirely detached 
from history and based around an immutable dialectic between the world of disbelief 
and the realm of the true believers.8 These thinkers subsequently exerted immense 
influence upon organisations like Al Qaeda, ISIS9 and others that would subsequently 
explore the deployment of this theory. Today’s theorists have proved adept at utilising 
the gap created by the degeneration of traditional institutions to present the Islamic 
world as undergoing a period of crisis.10 This, in turn, permitted the authority vested 
in these institutions to be assumed by any organisation or individual that is capable of 
convincingly demonstrating the appropriate religious credentials. The result of this 
disintegration is that more established claims to religious legal authority have been 
forced to compete with a range of both radical and reformist claimants who have 
pioneered new definitions for these long-standing terms.  
The determination of the exact form of governance prescribed in Islamic law 
is a monumental task. Nevertheless, many thinkers have proclaimed that they possess 
the knowledge and means to implement a correct form of Islamic authority. Following 
the model of the early Muslims, the caliphate is idealised by the prominent thinker al-
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Mawardi,11 and restoration is the ultimate aim of many organisations.12 Realising this 
goal today is however considered an insurmountable challenge by many. In the book 
The Impossible State, Hallaq suggests the impossibility of a contemporary “Islamic 
state” as such; reconciling the western concept of statehood and the notion of the 
Islamic community as it has been historically understood is impossible.13 Hallaq’s 
essential point is that the implementation of Islamic systems nowadays is impossible. 
The prevailing state system permits no compromise with the traditional mechanisms 
of Islamic governance.  
In a similar vein, Hussin suggests the “unmaking of Islamic law”14 in the 
colonial experience, drawing attention to the divide between the coloniser and the local 
Islamic elite. Hussin argues that the ensuing crisis that this situation caused initiated 
the decline of Islamic law as it was subordinated to western colonial legal systems.15 
Significant focus is placed on the rise of western European powers and subsequent 
colonisation of much of the Islamic world. The nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
witnessed an additional component: the decline and collapse of the Islamic imperial 
regime. This experience was similarly damaging to the notions of an Islamic universal 
state and the divine mandate of Islam to expand. The experience involved exposure to 
western liberal legal systems and nationalist ideas. The Islamic world later 
encountered both Marxist and fascist ideas, incorporating them into governance and 
legal systems.16  
The essential thesis that follows is that conventional Islamic law dissolved 
following the colonial experience, and Islamic law is incompatible with or at least 
seriously challenged by the modern system of public international law and the state 
system. The notions of the Ummah, ulema, and caliph, or emir have indeed undergone 
a weakening since the classical era. A historical parallel may be drawn between the 
declining influence of Islamic institutions from the twentieth century onwards and the 
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Catholic church’s sixteenth-century experience, in which different interpretations of 
the faith arising from a translated scripture challenged the foundations of Christendom. 
This comparison is made by Ayoob.17 As with the earlier Christian examples, the 
process now unfolding in the Islamic world has permitted other institutions to arise 
and acquire the authority once vested in these declining establishments. Current 
Islamic extremists are not reformers in the vein of Luther to give a parallel Christian 
example, but rather embody a counter-reformation. A central objection is that 
traditional authoritative jurists had incrementally changed not only the law governing 
Muslims but the Sharia itself, adapting and reconciling it to reflect the prevailing 
circumstances of the era. This adaptation or innovation has seen the wellspring of all 
the ills that have afflicted the Muslim community through the centuries, subsequently 
cascading to corrupt Islamic leaders and swathes of the laity.  
As Henzel notes, almost all contemporary radical Islamic thinkers linked with 
contemporary terrorism are outsiders.18 Considering the degeneration of Islamic 
governance and scholarship discussed in the previous chapter, the success of these 
outsider perspectives is relatively easy to understand. Conventional Islamic 
institutions have not fared well, and a range of practitioner-theorists have emerged to 
take advantage of the apparent vacuum, pointing to the decline of Islamic systems of 
law and governance to present a mandate for violent action. This gulf in 
“authoritative” governance and juristic guidance has prompted the development of a 
range of radical and reformist interpretations. The weakening of traditional Islamic 
institutions has facilitated the emergence of a vast array of interpretations and 
heterodoxies, some of which are not violent in nature. This loss of formality has 
permitted the solidification of a radical puritanism, alternately identified as Salafism, 
Salafi-jihadism, Wahhabism and Islamic revivalism.19 Groups subscribing to this 
approach display a focus on the re-establishment of an Islamic state20 and a desire to 
return to an imagined past in which the Muslim community was free of non-Muslim 
influences, articulated as Bid’ah (innovation) and Shirk (idolatry).21 The precise 
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standards to assert this purity are naturally difficult to define. This intent to return to 
the imagined purity of the early Muslim community as a solution to modern-day 
problems has resonated with groups such as the Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Muslim 
Brotherhood.22 These organisations are supported globally, and widespread backing 
for the notion of a unitary Islamic state is additionally exhibited outside of an 
organised framework.23 This aspect serves to illustrate the importance of this narrative. 
Attempts have been made to distinguish different organisations on the basis of 
their disposition to violence.24 However, this taxonomy is far from clear-cut.25 Many 
such groups pursue multiple avenues of spreading their ideology and bringing about 
their vision. For instance, groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood may be preoccupied 
with a range of nonviolent strategies that nonetheless aim to undermine the governance 
of a nation, whilst concurrently waging violent jihad, particularly in situations where 
their goals are achievable by such strategies.26 Moreover, groups that ostensibly began 
peacefully thinking dawah alone would be sufficient to achieve their objective have 
historically transitioned to violence under the frame of jihad as a result of either 
disappointment or suppression.27 
Consistent with the rejection of modernisation and innovation, Salafi groups 
seek to compound the collapse of the key institutions of the pre-modern Islamic world 
through criticising the vestiges of these institutions. The brand of revivalism in which 
such scholars represent an element is not the outcome of formal Islamic reasoning in 
one of the formal schools of Sunni Islam.28 Instead, new approaches have been 
prepared that result in an overall lack of coherence among various scholars, given that 
no structure is imposed upon the acquisition of scholarly knowledge, or with regard to 
the interpretation of texts. This premise does not mean that such radicals are ignorant 
of the source scripture or hadith; they merely depart from the traditional means of 
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interpreting these texts. How drastically the usage and understanding of Islamic 
terminology and scripture have diverged from its classical understanding is difficult 
to determine. 
To explore one example of contemporary literature, the Quran is frequently 
cited in the latest presentations of jihadist literature. For instance, the last issue of 
Rummya contained frequent references derived from the Quran in discussing vassal 
operations in the Philippines and the disposition of the media towards them: 
 
“With regard to the taughut of the Philippines, “Duterte”, his soul 
has enticed him in that regard and he thought that he could 
extinguish the light of Allah with his words, but Allah spoke the truth 
when He said, “They want to extinguish the light of Allah with their 
mouths, but Allah refuses except to perfect His light, although the 
disbelievers dislike it” (At-Tawbah 32). Ever since the people of this 
land embraced Islam, the disbelievers have not ceased planning to 
wage war against them for so much as a single day.”29 
 
This passage may not be entirely reflective of the approach of the movement 
in general. Nevertheless, it illustrates the manner by which frequent references to the 
verses of the Quran contribute to supporting the immediate goals of the organisation. 
Additionally, among the regularly cited references are various types of hadith such as 
Abu Dawud,30 al-Bukhari31 and Abu Hurairah.32 This represents a visible affinity for 
scripture. The link between modern-day Islamic religious extremism and Islamic 
scripture is also apparent in official reactions. The interpretation of modern 
organisations and theorists is often dismissed as errant or decadent. Indeed, groups 
such as Al Qaeda and ISIS are often criticized on the basis of selectively exploiting 
the Quran and other texts.33 In the works of neo-jihadist literature, scripture is utilised 
in a reflexive manner. The practice of invoking scripture without the subsequent 
discussion of authority and potential interpretation has been characterised as “hadith 
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hurling”.34 This visibly authentic, yet ultimately ephemeral use of the scripture invites 
parallels with earlier long-standing al-hadith inclinations. 
Although many jihadist theorists are clearly focused on the scripture, they are 
not entirely dismissive of scholarly predecessors who have adopted similar positions. 
A number of scholars, often those considered heterodox in their own lifetime, are 
invoked as routine. Ibn Taymiyyah and al-Wahhab are frequently cited as fellow 
travellers by jihadist scholars.35 
Finally, modern-day jihadist thinkers have demonstrated an indigenous, independent 
ability to develop laws and pronouncements of their own. Jihadist thinkers, at first 
glance, may therefore appear sufficiently authentic to an Islamic audience through the 
visible adoption of Quranic and classical symbols and terminology. However, it is 
naturally possible to cast doubts on the consistency of meaning between the classical 
connotations and interpretations of these artefacts and their contemporary 
understanding in jihadist awareness.  
If not purely Islamic, then what? To illustrate an example, the Islamic 
foundation of the ideology of ISIS is made explicit through their own self-perception, 
as expressed in key publications: 
 
“Amirul-Mu’minin said: ‘O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world 
today has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no 
third camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of 
kufr (disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the 
mujahideen everywhere, and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, 
their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of 
kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by 
the Jews.”36 
 
The adoption of a non-normative standpoint on whether ISIS is, in fact, 
Islamic, reveals a key factor.37 Their frequent use of raw scripture, religious language, 
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and appeals to faith demonstrate a critical delineation in their ideology into two 
groups: an inner group of the faithful and a secondary group of outsiders. This 
delineation dictates the rights and forms of treatment of each group.38 The use of this 
division denotes an awareness of traditional Islamic culture and law. Additionally, 
overt hostility towards almost everyone is clearly evidenced in ISIS’s own 
publications: they incite individuals to either join ISIS or otherwise to be regarded as 
enemies.39 This delineation is additionally framed within the established terminology 
that is visibly connected with the political thinking of long-standing Islamic scholars.  
It must be accepted that ISIS have an awareness of Islamic scripture, expressed 
though their use of appropriate terminology. Additionally, however, the influence of 
fascist, proto-fascist, and Marxist lexicons are discernible in the thinking of neo-
jihadist scholars.40 The inclusion of such language and associated concepts may be 
attributable to the decline of traditional Islamic institutions that customarily imposed 
formality on how reasoning was conducted. Historically, such institutions would have 
limited the ingress of such un-Islamic terminology and concepts. The fusion of these 
concepts with the vocabulary of traditional Islamic legalism has produced an 
alternative, more practical understanding of Islamic law that can be communicated 
easily. Neo-jihadist groups have proved to be particularly competent in usurping the 
positions of a conventional Islamic polity. Groups central to this study have 
demonstrated their adeptness in saturating the global discourse through action-centred 
propaganda,41 exhibiting sufficient knowledge of Islamic scripture to discredit other 
groups and approaches, and linking their aims with the disparate grievances and 
disillusions of the global Islamic community.42 These groups capitalise on the classical 
interpretations of Islamic symbolism, for instance, drawing upon the authoritative 
classical understanding of the term jihad and adapting the understanding of key 
Islamic institutions. This approach has allowed them to reconstruct the concept of an 
Islamic state and assume authority over Islamic institutions in a unitary political sense. 
The effort is expended to connect this reimagining to scripture and classical thought, 
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for instance, the longstanding term of takfir sees widespread use when designating 
vast swathes of the Muslim population that do not conform precisely to a given group’s 
expectations.43 
The new, less formal Islamic intellectual landscape has proven beneficial to 
jihadist thinkers such as al-Banna, Qutb, Faraj, al-Zarqawi, and bin Laden. These 
individuals proved to be capable of offsetting their lack of formal qualifications with 
zeal and charisma, as well as the ability to draw upon and direct the widespread 
dissatisfaction of the population. They have been able to outmanoeuvre the still 
influential Islamic schools of jurisprudence through saturation and visceral appeal. 
This strikes a contrast to long-standing religious institutions, many of which have 
struggled to gauge the desires and direction of the global Muslim population, whilst 
failing to appear presentable to an increasingly vigilant non-Muslim world. In contrast, 
such jihadist thinkers have given voice to the widespread dissatisfaction of many 
Muslims around the globe, and more importantly, offered the group a way out of their 
malaise and decline. 
Neo-jihadist theorists have naturally developed several approaches to justify 
the emergence of jihad in the modern age; they demonstrate an affinity for the 
“troublemakers” of the classical era, or those holding heterodox views. Additionally, 
positions within the classical jurisprudence that conform to their opinions are readily 
invoked as a means of adding credence to their axioms and behaviours. This premise 
suggests that although classical Islamic law is reflexively utilised by modern Islamic 
scholars, an undeniable break in tradition is evident. The scripture and classical texts 
exist as resources and are drawn upon selectively. Modern terrorism changes this 
equation, in that multiple routes to access violence in a political and instrumental sense 
exist. The removal of state’s ability to restrict religious life, new technologies, mass 
migration, interconnectivity, and globalisation all have yet unqualified impacts. 
Defining armed conflict is accordingly subject to increasing complexity.44 Consistent 
with this principle, different thinkers across the last generation have sought various 
means of asserting authority over the Islamic world, most notably in relation to jihad. 
The idealised past that Islamists identified as a destination was increasingly crafted as 
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an opposing reflection of the ideological forces they encountered through colonialism, 
secularisation, and nationalism.45 
 
5.3  Identifying contemporary religious conflict in the works of key theorists  
 
There is a basis to suggest that a prevalent strain on contemporary religious conflict is 
linked to the emergence of political Islam. The subsequent failure to implement a 
current political arrangement based upon an imagined past led to a fracture in which 
neo-jihadism, an approach permitting and indeed requiring violence and sacrifice in 
pursuit of this vision, emerged. The challenge posed to IHL was not deliberately 
contrived by the new groups that developed but arose in reaction to the assumptions 
held by states and international legal authorities concerning the use of force.  
Unconventional armed groups engaging in contemporary religious conflict 
share some aims with both states and more conventional armed groups. Naturally 
enough, they wish to survive and expand their influence. In addition, however, they 
must make an unambiguous commitment to the religious philosophy upon which their 
very existence is predicated. In relation to groups involved in the “war on terror.” By 
looking at key theorists, it is possible to determine not only the nature of this challenge; 
why the aims imposed by neo-jihadism cannot be realised politically, why groups 
inculcated with this ideology are challenging to confront, and how such groups have 
developed to take advantage of international legal boundaries.  
 
5.3.1  Hassan al-Banna 
 
Mid-twentieth century Egypt was characterised by a growing sentiment of frustration 
regarding British imperialism, and dissatisfaction regarding the class divisions brought 
about by successive attempts at modernisation.46 This proved to be sufficient grounds 
for organised resistance movements to emerge. The Muslim Brotherhood, dating to 
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1928, was the result of the work of a school teacher, Hassan al-Banna.47 At a time 
when the average Egyptian would have experienced intense feelings of dislocation and 
loss of purpose, al-Banna proved competent in utilising the prevailing sentiment and 
activism as a means of offsetting his lack of formal theological credentials; instead of 
taking the established scholarly route, he developed influence through direct activism 
and engagement, founding the Muslim Brotherhood for this purpose.  
Al-Banna was critical of governments administering in the Middle East, 
generally on the basis of being insufficiently Islamic. He posited that a return to 
Islamic values and law would bring about an improvement in the lives of ordinary 
Egyptian Muslims.48 In his estimation, these Islamic values existed in the distant past, 
before western influence had taken hold. He was additionally critical of the incumbent 
Egyptian government for failing to achieve Islamic rule by expelling foreign 
influences and thereby providing an example of an Islamic utopia that would be 
successively imitated across the Middle East.49 In On Jihad, al-Banna is critical of 
later generations of Islamic scholars for failing to uphold the tradition of jihad.50 He 
does approve of practitioner theorists who implemented jihad, such as Ibn Taymiyyah 
and al-Wahhab.51 He dismisses the supersession of jihad in its bellicose meaning with 
more spiritual definitions, suggesting that the arguments for such a definition are both 
weak in their scriptural provenance, and diversionary; correct interpretations, he 
argues, would never dismiss the vital importance of violent jihad; to solve the crisis, 
he suggested that the distinction between politics and religion be removed.52 By 
deconstructing this western distinction, al-Banna’s vision has Islam permeating every 
aspect of society.53 He wanted to free the “Islamic Fatherland” from “foreign 
domination”.54 He further articulates that until an Islamic nation arises from this 
fatherland, the Muslims of today are living in sin.55 Al-Banna persistently referred to 
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the need for sacrifice and struggle in pursuit of his Islamic utopia.56 He stresses that 
those who are called to fight and do not do so will die in sin,57 though his notion of 
fighting also extends to speech against a non-Islamic leader.58 It is possible to construe 
this as an embrace of peaceful means, though it is also entirely possible that he 
considered the nature of such speech to be violence of a sort; conflations between 
speech and violence have represented a common theme in subsequent Islamist 
thinking.59  
Al-Banna, in a general sense, defined the apparent goal of later jihadist thinkers 
and additionally cemented the importance of violence and sacrifice into the realisation 
of an Islamic system, which has largely been a consistent feature in the reasoning of 
subsequent theorists. Al-Banna also marks the introduction of extreme fascist ideas 
into the jihadist discourse. His affinity for both Mussolini and Hitler is expressed in 
his desire to develop the Brotherhood along the lines of the Nazi SS.60 Küntzel 
discusses the nexus between national socialism and the early Muslim Brotherhood, 
noting this relationship as key in transferring anti-Semitic assumptions into the wider 
Islamist discourse, a component previously absent from al-Banna’s theology.61  
In defining a clear objective, al-Banna laid a foundation for future thinkers to 
imitate. His fantastic notion of a future Islamic fatherland additionally served as the 
basis for justifying extreme action to be taken against those barring its realisation. 
Whilst he did not predict what this would look like in precise terms, the clear goal of 
Islam at every level of society is recognised as a specific characteristic of this future 
system of law and governance.62 In order to bring this about, he sought to wrest the 
ability to craft Islamic laws from the traditional schools of Islamic jurisprudence.63 As 
has been noted, he himself was far from the model of a traditional Islamic scholar or 
intellectual.64 This represents a key contribution to neo-jihadist thought, in that formal 
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and established jurists can be easily dismissed on the basis of their failure and 
complicity with the colonial suppression of Islam. There is, however, scope to suggest 
that in determining both the goals and the means of his ideology, he integrated some 
of the concepts prevalent in his temporal landscape, whilst professing both an idealised 
vision of the Islamic world that could be, as well as its antithesis in the ominous 
universal enemy, the west: 
 
“From this, we see that the Muslim makes His life as an endowment 
for His mission, so that he may gain the next world as a reward for 
his exertion and efforts in this life. Hence, the Muslim, who has 
spread the word of Allah, was a guide and teacher adorned with 
enlightenment, guidance, compassion, and benevolence. Thus the 
civilized spread of Islam was one of preparing (for the future), of 
guiding, and teaching. Can this be compared with what Western 
imperialism is doing at this present time?”65 
 
Al-Banna’s universal Muslim state is set against “the west”, or western “imperialism” 
– an ill-defined quantity that in his understanding was the foremost item challenging 
the realisation of his Islamic fatherland. Yet, this confrontation is often more 
permeable than he would initially present. Not only did he profess admiration for 
fascism and integrate some of its axioms, but was also at times affectionate towards 
indigenous patriotism, especially if it could be directed against the west. His aims must 
be understood within the context of his goal of improving life in Egypt66 and was 
arguably pragmatic in approaching this goal, going as far as to incorporate fascist 
modes of thinking.  
 
5.3.2  Sayyid Qutb  
 
Whilst al-Banna established many themes that remain relevant in subsequent neo-
jihadi thought, it was perhaps Qutb who really condensed the incipient principles of 
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modern-day jihadism into the first workable manifesto. Qutb again has little affinity 
for the progressive development of Islamic jurisprudence, the leaders of his day, and 
the condition of the global Islamic lay population by the vestiges of the traditional 
Islamic institutions. Like al-Banna, Qutb, a fellow Egyptian, was highly critical of the 
Islamic authorities of his era.67 Building on al-Banna’s theories, Qutb developed a 
mechanism to dismiss conventional Islamic institutions of Egypt, this being perhaps 
his most important contribution. His elaboration of the term jahiliyyah is a condition 
understood to refer to man’s dominion over man,68 a term of immense salience to 
Islamic audiences.69 Reversing this condition represented a central rationale for Qutb's 
works. 
Qutb criticises what he saw as the lack of ambition that the religious authorities 
of his day displayed. Jihad, he argued, was a permanent condition. He contended that 
the reversal of the condition of jahiliyyah, was foremost in the interests of mankind; 
humans must be liberated from their own rule, and the divine law of Sharia restored.  
Simply put, Qutb advanced the notion that Islam, employed in a holistic sense, 
was the solution to all of mankind’s problems.70 he set forth a potential solution to 
reverse mankind’s slide into corruption and depravity – what he considered to be the 
natural conclusion of the western philosophies characterising his age.71 Qutb stated 
that Islam was the only system that could furnish mankind with solutions to arrest the 
decline.72 He was dismissive of the western renaissance and the scientific progress that 
accompanied it.73 It is possible, therefore, to suggest that Qutb goes into a little more 
detail than al-Banna in terms of why and how the west is bad, though in a more general 
sense it conforms with his basic understanding that the west is the general opposite of 
the Islamic world.  
Accounting for the subsequent failure of the nominally Muslim world to usher 
in its own era of progress, he attacks the state of Islam as expressed by current rulers; 
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he cites how the false laws on customs that are not of Islamic origin which have built 
up, impede Muslim progress.74 This corruption of Islamic values has been progressive. 
In line with this assessment, the first generation of Muslims are the best, with those 
nearest the prophet being preferable, though as generations passed, the community 
drifted away.75 For Qutb, the condition of jahiliyyah today was to be considered 
insidious, often masquerading as Islam.76 This identifies Christian, democratic, and 
communist societies; inclusive of Arab nationalist and Arab socialist regimes on the 
basis that they never asserted Islamic rule in totality, a deficiency linked to the 
subsequent failure of these approaches.77 Qutb effectively brands the true Islamic 
community as extinct, largely based on the failure of self-identifying Muslims to 
solely follow Sharia and Islamic scripture, and maintain the legacy of earlier 
generations, concluding that it is necessary to revise concepts of society, and 
leadership78 in order to restore an Islamic community. In this regard, he expressed a 
willingness to use physical power and jihad against the jahali systems.79 Furthermore, 
Qutb is dismissive of the Islamic thinkers who think that Islam only allows a defensive 
war; Qutb takes a more consequentialist stance, expressing how the nature of Islam’s 
superiority requires the offensive to be taken in order to remove injustice from the 
earth.80 
Qutb represents an important step in modern jihadist thought for a number of 
reasons. First, in representing that the western-derived solutions were universally 
inadequate for human needs. Islam, Qutb naturally concludes, is the solution, though 
in its modern form it has become weighed down with un-Islamic attributes. Modern 
Muslims must, therefore, reinvent the pure Islamic community that Muhammad gifted 
to the first generations of Muslims. Just as the earliest Muslims cut themselves off 
from the culture that had come before, Qutb encourages the same. These essential 
axioms have since emerged persistently in neo-jihadist thought.  
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5.3.3 Mohammad Abdus Salam Faraj 
 
Faraj represents a more active progression of Qutb’s ideas, along with the addition of 
Ibn Taymiyyah’s reasoning. Faraj dedicates himself to attempting to operationalise his 
concept of jihad, drawing on scripture when justifying his more practical suggestions. 
Faraj refers extensively to Ibn Taymiyyah, concurring that jihad was an obligation for 
Muslims.81 In examining Egypt, he concluded that as Sharia was not implemented 
Muslims were not safe, and as a result he is adamant about the utility of force in 
restoring Islam – “But there is no doubt that the tyrants of this earth will only be 
removed by the might of the sword”.82 It is, therefore, the duty of Muslims to assist in 
performing this feat. Drawing on scripture, Faraj concludes that the implication of 
Sharia is incumbent on Muslims to work towards; as this can only be completed in an 
Islamic state, Muslims must also work to establish one.  
His reasoning behind the construction of an Islamic state is that Muslims can 
only be truly free under a condition of Sharia. This condition is predicated on the 
existence of an Islamic state – one that ensures Sharia is applied correctly. Faraj 
reiterates how Muslim rulers are in fact not Muslim rulers, but have, due to the 
infiltration of foreign values, become tyrants (taghut).83 This is functionally similar to 
Qutb’s articulation of jahiliyyah. 
One of the key difficulties faced by historical scholars was determining when 
it was appropriate to kill or wage war against professed Muslims. In constructing a 
path to the use of force against other Muslims, the history of the Khawarij is invoked 
by Faraj, to stress the precedent by which other Muslims needed to be fought.84 Faraj 
names two types of threat to be confronted; the near, and the far enemy. The near and 
far enemies of his era express the need to focus on the near enemy first, building a 
strong state Islamic in name and function, capable of combatting the “infidels”, 
indicating Israel as a target once this state had been constructed.85 This bifurcation is 
both pragmatic and rooted in the differing notions of the need to reconstruct the 
Islamic world – removing traitors and heretics – before striking at the outsider.  
 
81 Mohammad Abdus Salam Faraj, The Absent Obligation (Vision Printing 2000) 99. 
82 Ibid 14. 
83 Ibid 14. 
84 Ibid 33. 
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138 
 
 Faraj ultimately expresses that through jihad, Islam would rule the world; yet, 
whilst Faraj is repetitive in his exertions that all Muslims must fight, he draws on the 
Quran to demonstrate how ultimately Allah would intervene to bring victory.86 In 
terms of conduct in war, Faraj suggests a number of novel approaches ranging from 
night attacks, martyrdom, deception, and rather quaintly, destroying the enemy’s fruit 
trees.87 This demonstrates an inclination towards practical applications of violence. 
The influence of Qutb is clear in Faraj’s writings, though he is far more specific in the 
form that jihad should take, dismissing accretions suggesting the spiritual nature of 
jihad, and emphasising it in the form of combat.  
These ideas took on a viral appeal, with his definitions of the near and the far enemy 
remaining influential in jihadist thinking.88 Faraj’s works also took on an instructive 
quality for Egypt’s jihadist movements, eventually influencing key figures like Al 
Qaeda’s future head, Zawahiri.89 Faraj advanced contemporary jihadist thinking on 
two fronts. First, he simultaneously relegated jihadists to a group struggling against 
incumbent national regimes, who focused on Islamising countries – an aggressive 
strategy recognising the reality of a delineated Middle East. Second, he placed jihad 
at the heart of what it is to be Muslim – an active Muslim striving to overcome the 
state of jahiliyyah. Anything else made one a Muslim in name only, and therefore part 
of the problem. Hegghammer notes that, as time has passed, the distinction between 
near and far enemies has eroded somewhat, with traditionally far enemy groups like 
Al Qaeda having gradually refocused on the Muslim world, more frequently 
employing takfirist rhetoric.90  
Taken together, al-Banna, Qutb, and Faraj all participate in a unitary strand of 
contemporary jihadist thinking; the construction of a “core doctrine” of Jihadi 
ideology, that sets the parameters of thinking about Islam and the west. Subsequently, 
the core concepts of the approach have been developed and ultimately operationalised, 
both as a mass movement, but also as an individual duty to dispense violence. The 
validity of this understanding of violence is predicated upon the relatively stable 
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idealised understandings of the west and the Islamic community. Efforts are made to 
align these ideals with the longstanding divisions of the world located in imperial 
Islamic law, with the appropriate terminology apparent in the works of these scholars. 
Subsequently, different approaches to understanding how to implement the ideal 
Islamic system of governance has depended upon the theorist in question. 
  
5.3.4  Abul A’la Maududi 
 
Maududi (Abul A’la Maududi, or Syed Abul A’la Maududi Chishti) is a scholar of the 
Indian subcontinent, whose work parallels much of the thinking discussed in relation 
to Egyptian revivalist thinkers. Maududi’s attempt to revive the political aspect of 
Islam as a means of offsetting the threat he perceived as emanating from the “west,” 
is most apparent in the nationalist and socialist trends visible in the political discourse 
of his day.91 Like his Egyptian counterparts, he emphasised activism as a means of 
achieving his aims, as well as demonstrably influencing the politics of the nation of 
Pakistan.92 It is perhaps fair to say that Maududi enjoyed significantly more success 
in interfacing with the government and politics of his nation than his Egyptian 
counterparts, winning significant concessions for his ideas and movement within the 
context of the prevailing social framework. This may be a result of the very different 
setting in which Maududi practised, with greater opportunities afforded by the 
partition of India along religious lines.93 Much of his writing was devoted to ensuring 
that the new nation of Pakistan became realised as an Islamic state.  
In surveying his writings, it is clear that Maududi was not drawn to more 
esoteric or reason-based approaches to scripture, but instead emphasised reading the 
text in a literal manner. This notion of reading scripture at first glance was borne out 
by his articulation of both Islamic law and governance within his proposed Islamic 
state. Whilst he suggests that reading should be shallow, his approach is different from 
what may be identified as traditionalist readings and interpretations, though he 
presents his interpretation of scripture as a rediscovery of original interpretations.94 In 
 
91 Elisa Giunchi, ‘The Political Thought of Abul A'lā Mawdūdī’ (1994) 59 Il Politico 347, 348. 
92 Zohair Husain, ‘Maulana Sayyid Abul A'La Maududi: An Appraisal of His Thought and Political 
Influence’ (1986) 9 South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 61, 61–62. 
93 Whilst Maududi was not in support of partition, the event served to enhance the thinker’s platform. 
See Lerman Eran, ‘Mawdudi's Concept of Islam’ (1981) 17 Middle Eastern Studies 492, 495. 
94 In discussing Islamic terms such as deen (religion, creed,) rabb (master, lord) ibdah (obedience) and 
ilah (god) he for instance suggests that the truth of such terms was known to the early Arabs, but has 
140 
 
setting out how the “Islamic state” is unique from other forms of organisation and 
governance, Maududi advanced the absence of any nationalistic sentiment,95 echoing 
other revivalist scholars who considered nationalism a western innovation. He called 
the Islamic state an “ideological state”, one in which Islam permeated every aspect of 
life.96 To address the ominous “west” Maududi emphasised the need for the holistic 
development of Islamic society in order to challenge the dominance of “godless 
systems of state and law”.97 By way of comparison, he draws on the French and 
Russian revolutions, and devotes some focus to the provenance of the Nazi system, 
noting that the emergence of fascism would not have been possible had it not been for 
the conspiracy of historical factors and the philosophies of Hegel, Fichte, Goethe, 
Nietzsche, and ultimately Hitler, which served to instigate the conditions required for 
revolution.98 He concludes that in the same manner, the example of Muhammad 
should permeate all aspects of Islamic cultural and social life prior to the Islamic 
revolution being instigated.99 This stresses the foundational nature of revivalist-
Islamist thinking in relation to later violence and political efforts. It also serves to 
explain the grassroots approach Maududi initially took.  
Whilst Maududi aspired to “pure Islam”, the vision of Islamic statehood he 
presented has been contested as being heavily influenced by the experience of the 
colonial system. From an anthropological position Ahmad, for instance, suggests that 
having observed the manner in which colonial law presided over the Indian population, 
Maududi sought to fuse the modern state with Islamic principles.100 This is borne out 
by the lexicon adopted by Maududi, for instance conceptualising Muslims as a 
movement or party.101 In discussing Maududi, there is a marked tendency to discuss 
aspects of this thought as the “invention of tradition”, meaning the generation of new 
ideas that have subsequently been assumed to be longstanding Islamic concepts.102 
 
been obscured by subtle changes across the centuries. See Abul A’la Mawdudi, Four Basic Terms (Abu 
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resemblance to the creation of Israel as a Jewish state. He contends that Maududi aimed to create an 
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The successful integration of Maududi’s thoughts into the ideology of contemporary 
violent Islamist movements as well as the Pakistani state. The reinvention and 
reinterpretation of the political order presented as inherent in Islam by Maududi have 
subsequently become the hallmark of contemporary Islamism.103  
Maududi and Qutb are often presented as interchangeable when it comes to 
their essential ideology of Islamic statehood.104 This is not without significance, 
especially with regards to establishing typical features. Maududi, unlike his Egyptian 
counterparts, however, found himself far more involved in statecraft, and accordingly 
effected direct change not just in civil society, but in the judiciary and government of 
the Pakistani state.105 Subsequently, the influence of Maududi and the organisation he 
sired (Jamaat-e-Islami) waned in influence as the social realities of the modern state 
caused the ruling elite to sideline Islamists.106 His influence on fringe groups and 
extremists, however, has persisted.107 The utility of considering Maududi is perhaps 
the extent to which parallels may be drawn between his thought and the approach of 
Egyptian revivalists, assisting in establishing typical features of the contemporary 
approach. Maududi also exemplifies the different manner in which the neo-jihadist 
approach can play out, should civil society and government behave more 
submissively. 
 
5.3.5  Osama bin Laden 
 
One of the most prominent practitioner-theologists of the twenty-first century is 
naturally Osama bin Laden. Whilst remembered as an organiser, planner, and 
figurehead of the group Al Qaeda,108 he evidences a distinct approach to justifying 
violent action that is rhetorically more rooted in the institutions of the classical Islamic 
era, or at least, his personal understanding of how Islamic law and jihad interacted in 
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this period.109 Bin Laden’s theology exists within the same framework established by 
earlier theorists, though with some key variations on the central themes, the most 
notable of which is an inclination towards classical modes of organisation. First, he is 
more respectful towards incumbent Islamic institutions than many subsequent 
thinkers. Referring to the persistent ulema, he notes “[t]hey kept from it the distortion 
of the stupid, the plagiarism of the liars, the interpretation of the ignorant and the 
dilution of the profligate tyrants”.110 In acknowledging this, however, he is dismissive 
of the modern ulema, suggesting that they have become corrupt, and have permitted 
distortions to occur. In relation to a particular scholar, he mentions specifically how 
this individual permitted usury, failed to condemn a Muslim leader for wearing a cross, 
criticised the issuing of fatwahs that permitted western involvement in the first Gulf 
War, and issued a fatwah encouraging peace with “the Jewish enemy”. These, to name 
but a few infractions, were indicative to bin Laden of corruption, and collusion with 
tyrants and the enemies of God.111 His willingness to salvage these institutions rather 
than place them forever outside the fold of Islam represents a pragmatism not present 
in the thought of many subsequent thinkers, and even the jihadist organisations with 
which his name has become intertwined.112 
Bin Laden persists in the essential understanding of the present condition, and 
the influence of the west upon Islam as established by the earlier theorists of the 
Egyptian school. Rhetorically, Bin Laden makes a critical contribution, however, in 
his vision of how to restore Islam to its rightful place. Unlike al-Banna, Qutb, or Faraj, 
bin Laden seeks to co-opt for himself Islamic authority within the bounds of classical 
Islamic institutions. This has led to a recognition that whilst appearing irrational and 
absurd to western audiences, his ideology has a visceral appeal to some Islamic 
audiences, especially those feeling dislocated or dispossessed by modernity.113 
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Bin Laden emphasised the importance of organisation.114 Consistent with his 
position as a globally recognisable figurehead, bin Laden adopted for himself the title 
of Emir.115 There is evidence in his writings that, to him, this denoted far more than 
the mere sobriquet that western intelligence services frequently assumed it to be. Emir 
is a title bin Laden utilised to denote a “true” leader of the Islamic world, in contrast 
to those he saw as connected to the west.116 This commitment, whilst arguably 
superficial, differentiates his organisation from Islamic leaders with more secular 
titles.  
By accepting the role of Emir in the modern Islamic community, Bin Laden 
was accepting not only an accolade, but also a role in Islamic governance. The title of 
Emir was a critical aspect of how he understood the duty of jihad and his personal 
capacity to wage one against the “west”. As well as being rooted in classical Islamic 
empires and communities, thus gaining resonance with his audience, under specific 
circumstance an emir is afforded the privilege of invoking jihad in the reasoning. 
Accordingly, bin Laden sought to present the incumbent Islamic institutions as 
inadequate or corrupted. For instance, he indicates that today’s Muslim governments 
are in fact, not Muslim, due to their loyalty to the “invader” and further, the scholars 
of Islam have become little more than the “donkeys that carry the book”,117 failing to 
reflect an accurate interpretation of Islam, devoid of western influence. This contrasts 
with his own asceticism, dedication to jihad, and practical commitments – details 
emphasized in his public image. 
Bin Laden was conversant in the specifics as to why Islam had become 
subordinate to the west, particularly in military matters. He mainly explains the 
relative position of the Muslim culture as a consequence of enslavement by “Zionists” 
and “crusaders”..118 This indication of oppression by external forces is, however, 
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compounded by internal elements, mainly infighting, and the emergence of sects he 
sees as heterodox.119 He accordingly stresses a practical, more pragmatic approach to 
jihad that is more grounded in classical Islamic law and theory. Bin Laden’s depiction 
of both the west and Islam is better grounded in history than many approaches that 
come later; bin Laden’s assessment of western material and organisational superiority 
at this juncture serves to modulate what is possible, as well as extend the timeline for 
the realisation of an Islamic state. In his own lifetime, he was against, for instance, 
attempting to install an Islamic state in the Muslim world.120 Bin Laden’s radical 
acceptance of the physical limitations of his organisation and the Islamic world in 
general within the framework of the persistent understanding of Islam and the west 
sets him apart from the subsequent discussion of jihad found in the writings of more 
recent neo-jihadists. By grounding his understanding in history, he is forced to relegate 
the realisation of the actual “Islamic state” to some point in the future.  
In summary, bin Laden is far more conversant with the systems and forms of 
the classical era than many later scholars. He is deliberate in identifying himself as a 
modern-day emir, or battle leader. This permits him to direct jihad for the purpose of 
restoring Islamic governance, whilst he predicates the authority to act in this manner 
upon the degeneration of the ulema and the lack of any “true” Islamic leaders above 
him. He concurrently recognises the need to co-opt existing institutions and state 
systems; this indicates his pragmatism in earthly matters. In bin Laden’s thought, the 
west, and its influence over the Islamic world, require inducement to remove; the west 
does not by its ideal nature contain features that will bring about its own inevitable 
destruction, nor does he emphasise the destruction of the west as God’s prerogative. 
This pragmatism and innovation stand in sharp contrast to many later theorists. 
  
5.3.6  Anwar al-Awlaki 
 
Bin Laden chose to balance his commitment to neo-jihadist ideology with a certain 
degree of pragmatism, which in turn affected his methods and grand strategy. In 
subsequent thinkers’ texts, however, the methods, aims, and timescale have become 
entirely detached from reality, with thinkers emphasising the role that divine 
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intervention will take in defeating the west. The result is an understanding of jihad that 
is less operationally constrained, more permissive, and more constant, whilst being 
extremely difficult to understand.121 Perhaps the most visible theorist in this regard is 
Anwar al-Awlaki. As a US citizen, Awlaki was perhaps closer to the west, having had 
an involvement in the Fort Hood shooting, amongst other key terrorist events taking 
place on American soil.122 Much of his work focuses on encouraging western-based 
Muslims to participate and support the type of jihad exemplified by groups like Al 
Qaeda and ISIS. Constants on the Path of Jihad123 represents an immensely influential 
text of interesting origins.124 Yusuf al-`Uyayri, a jihadist operative in the Soviet-
Afghan war, wrote the text, which was subsequently translated and disseminated by 
the American-Yemeni al-Awlaki, who attached some additions and commentary.125 
The resulting text is an accessible and clear distillation of the neo-jihadist ideology 
and belief system that has proved compelling to western audiences.126  
  The actual content of the text is fairly straightforward as to summarise that 
jihad is to be constant. It has features that must be constantly expressed by Muslims 
until the end of time.127 Unlike bin Laden, he suggests an ahistorical, idealised form 
of jihad that does not participate in any real limitations or constraints.128 It is detached 
from any pragmatic consideration of the situation, the disposition of power and 
military strength, or the reaction forces it opposes. It is constant, with all of its features 
dictated by this central principle. At first glance, the approach advocated by al-Awlaki 
seems comically ill-adapted to confront the state system, devoid, as it is of any 
pragmatism; it does not consider operational realities overmuch, the potential reaction 
of counter-jihadists, nor does it seek to optimise the contribution of each individual 
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convert to the cause. It provides the theological justification for the wresting of 
authority in matters of war, and firmly locates it with the fighters of the jihadist cause: 
 
Also, for our earlier Scholars, whenever they would have a dispute 
over a fatwa, they would send it to the Mujahideen in the frontline; 
they know that they are guided by Allah”.129 
 
Put simply, they elevate the experience of jihadi practitioner above the reason 
of the scholar. This represents a desire to detach modern jihad from any sense of the 
checks or balances that prevailed in the classical eras. Constants represent an 
ideological evolution that is consistent with the means and methods available to 
extreme neo-jihadists.130 Established beliefs of neo-jihadism are framed in such a way 
as to incite every available follower to commit immediate violence against the “west”, 
with no conception of practicality. It is readily discernible that such an interpretation 
not only lends itself to conventional acts of organised violence, but also presents an 
argument for lone wolf attacks and suicide terrorism. Whilst the strategy that may be 
extracted from Constants seems farfetched, the efficacy of such an approach is 
apparent in the high-profile attacks that may be directly linked to the text, most notably 
the aforementioned Fort Hood shooting, and the popularity of his texts throughout the 
Anglosphere.  
Anwar al-Awlaki additionally provides guidance on how it is possible to 
support jihad, suggesting financing, disseminating information online, and 
indoctrinating children as good means of supporting the fight against “disbelief” in his 
publication, 44 ways to support Jihad”.131 The arguments of Anwar al-Awlaki have 
been characterised as “arguments for foot soldiers”132 in that they are not intended to 
be coherent or sophisticated, but simply to motivate individuals to involve themselves 
in jihad. He has been criticised for failing to understand key western insights upon the 
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issue of war.133 Key themes are gods supporting any action undertaken against non-
Muslims,134 and the inevitable nature of victory.135 
It may be contended that the writings of al-Awlaki are given over entirely to 
the spiritual aspects of jihad, in which faith alone is the source of victory, an axiom he 
himself uses,136 and the considerations of strategy, means, and logistics to which 
earlier thinkers showed deference, are ultimately unimportant. Factoring such earthly 
considerations in may even be framed as demonstrative of a lack of faith; as he 
explains, only Allah may determine when victory is achieved; judging according to 
outcome is a form of Kufr, and even if this does not result in defeat on the battlefield 
due to lack of faith, it will result in a form of spiritual defeat.137  
The vision provided by this scholar is not parallel to the grand strategy of bin 
Laden, but instead seeks to motivate widespread Islamic resistance against the 
encroachment of the west. It suggests a vast, decentralised understanding of jihad that 
does not depend on collective action. Victory is to be achieved through dedication 
alone, with little concession made to tactics, strategy, or organisation, with the 
meaning of victory imbued with spiritual connotations in addition to bringing tangible 
defeat to the west. This approach has widespread appeal, serves to inoculate jihadist 
movements against the frequent and humiliating defeats inflicted, and is ideally 
adapted to take advantage of the opportunities for sporadic terrorism and decentralised 
modes of warfare that have characterised recent anti-western violence. It is not hard 
to determine that any group inculcated with such an approach will not be susceptible 
to externally imposed regulations upon the conduct of hostilities, nor will they be 
liable to any convention not imposed by force. This, in addition to the difficulty 
imposed in predicting their actions and behaviours in line with the expectations 
conventionally applied to non-state groups, illustrates the necessity of distinguishing 
contemporary religious conflict from armed conflict more generally.  
 
5.3.7  Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
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By the time the organisation ISIS became a serious contender, the concept of 
neo-jihad was well established to the point of being self-sustaining in the general 
discourse; yet, elaborations conducted by the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 
serves to illustrate the flexibility of the concept, as well as its operationalisation to an 
as yet, unprecedented degree. ISIS from its inception has emphasised skill in rhetoric 
and practical leadership skills above the theological navel-gazing that preoccupied 
many scholars earlier in the revival.138 This is perhaps one reason for their overtaking 
of Al Qaeda, whose leadership has failed to maintain its grip over what was once its 
vassal branch in Iraq.139 Like Al Qaeda, ISIS has embedded its strategy and 
performance in the contemporary Islamic historiography of Salafism; unlike Al 
Qaeda, however, the group has been far less pragmatic, maintaining their commitment 
to mass violence even in the face of destruction.140 Whilst this would seem to be 
counterproductive, representing rejection of the longer term, attrition-driven approach 
favoured by bin Laden’s successors, it has instead resulted in widespread global 
appeal,141 with the organisation drawing massive numbers of émigré Muslim fighters, 
and the pledged allegiance of a range of pre-existing terrorist groups.142  
Baghdadi framed his organisation as a re-enactment of the construction of the 
early Islamic community.143 He places the construction of the Islamic state in Iraq and 
Syria as part of a religious narrative that has played out timelessly; he participates in 
the dualist construction of the west and Islam, as well as the meaning of jihad 
established elsewhere.144 Somewhat quaintly, he specifies not only western military 
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superiority of western and Jewish forces, but the use of sorcery and propaganda by the 
west and their Muslim (Tagut) allies as a threat with which ISIS contends.145 Whilst 
this seems peculiar, the term sorcerer can be considered at least as significant as the 
use of the more familiar Kajarite or Tagut accusation,146 not only from the Islamic 
standpoint,147 but demonstrating that ISIS is to consider their enemies to be 
supernaturally evil, a key element of much older, historical religious understandings 
of warfare.  
In addition to applying the structural ideals common to neo-jihadism, his 
ostensible resurrection of an idealised Islamic state participates more fully in the 
linguistic formalism of Islamic law. First, the manner in which he styled himself; he 
took on a range of antiquated titles as a means of claiming authority over the global 
Islamic community.148 His assumed authority adds credence to his interpretation of 
the Quran to serve as an additional basis through which his depiction of scripture takes 
on a prescriptive character. In addition to adopting the position of sole leader of the 
Islamic community, Baghdadi emphasises the ultimate unity of the Ummah.149 The 
notion of a unitary Ummah is vital to his authority over it, and his instruction to 
fight.150 The membership in the Ummah requires certain behaviour – fighting for 
Islam, and obeying the leader. 
To reinforce his view, Baghdadi aggregates the disparate experiences of the 
global Muslim community as a single experience of unitary oppression, in both east 
and west, in both Muslim lands and outside of the Islamic world. Though this 
humiliation is a result of Muslims betraying the cause of jihad,151 the purpose of his 
Islamic state is to ensure a condition in which Muslims will be free from humiliation 
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146 Naturally al Baghdadi also uses these terms to attack Muslims who do not submit to him. See ibid. 
147 Witchcraft is no small matter in many Islamic countries. Sorcery is illegal in both Nigeria and Saudi 
Arabia, carrying the same penalty as apostasy. See Remke Kruk, ‘Harry Potter in the Gulf: 
Contemporary Islam and the Occult’ (2005) 32 British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 47, 47–48. 
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imposed by external forces.152 As with other theorists, understanding what is meant 
by caliphate in Baghdadi’s thought is important. He recognised that a caliph must be 
conversant in Islamic law, and be descended from the prophet’s own tribe. Baghdadi 
was careful to situate any outlandish actions, such as burning alive, or beheading of 
captives within the precedent of Islamic law and imperial practice. His actual role of 
caliph was largely autocratic, lacking any balances upon his power.153 The elaboration 
of this community proceeds from the recognition of classical Islamic imperialism, and 
linguistically and symbolically, Baghdadi has taken on many of the identifiers 
necessary to be convincing in this regard. He naturally has visibly sought to conform 
with classical Sharia, implementing dark age punishments, economic practices, and 
social policies that would have been at home in the period which he aspires to 
revive;154 a strategy that the other kind of Islamic state has mirrored in the past.  
Baghdadi has, however, been pragmatic in building his Islamic edifice upon 
the foundations of the former Iraqi regime. Viewing ISIS as a fascist movement has 
been attempted; one writer has affixed a specifically Trotskyist analysis of fascism to 
ISIS ideology, constructing a variety of fascism that is ephemerally Islamic 
(Daeshism) as a regional counter-revolution, targeting concessions to socialism and 
liberalism that have occurred in the region.155 To examine the doctrine of Baghdadi, it 
is possible to suggest that he represents a progression on the original themes 
established by the earlier scholars of the Islamic revival. Drawing upon the well-
established notion that there exists a supernaturally evil enemy in “the west,” al-
Baghdadi asks his followers to make sacrifices and undertake actions commensurate 
with this accepted reality. This is in contrast to earlier thinkers, who identified the 
west, Jews and other Muslims in the same manner, yet called for political engagement, 
quietist activism, or sporadic acts of terrorism.  
 
 
152 ‘a day will come when the Muslim will walk everywhere as master, having honour, being revered, 
with his head held high, and his dignity preserved. Anyone who dares to offend him will be disciplined, 
and any hand that reaches out to harm him will be cut off. So let the world know that we are living 
today in a new era’. In Dabiq 12 (Al Hayat Media Centre 2018) 3–3. 
153 He for instance, maintained power to dissolve any council or organising committee. See Yuval 
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5.4  Neo-jihadism; a contemporised example of religious conflict  
 
The culture and ideology of Islamic revivalism and its zenith in groups like ISIS, Al 
Qaeda and others are the results of a complex realignment of Islamic law and theology 
with the type of dialectical thinking that was previously grounded in racial and class-
based ideology. It is possible to conclude that the doctrine of neo-jihadism is the 
product of a single person, time or place, but has been elaborated on, with significant 
variations by a range of different thinkers who have made progressive contributions.  
These interpretations range from the vaguely practical thought, such as bin 
Laden, to the utterly fantastic, in which the introduction of more religious veins of 
thought has resulted in an understanding of the utility of force that is more spiritual in 
nature. Much of this divergence may, however, be accounted for in the different 
objectives of the thinkers in question, or the different positions they occupied within 
the wider movement. Some of the works discussed were intended for the consumption 
of other practitioner thinkers, while many addressed the Islamic population instead, 
with various objectives in mind, ranging from political mobilisation through to the 
instigation of immediate jihad, intended to motivate “lone wolf” terrorism.  
A consistent feature has been how the west and the Islamic world are 
understood to relate to one another. The west is understood to be currently ascendant, 
though insufficiently religious, decadent, and ultimately carrying within its essence its 
own destruction. This is seen as inevitable, and ultimately, a good thing. This 
acknowledged, our neo-jihadist thinkers have sought to reassert the notion of a global 
Islamic community, reacting against the decadence of the institutional jurists and 
oppressive governments of the historically Islamic world, and the interventions of the 
“west”. This parallels the typical nature of religious conflict established in earlier 
chapters, and leads this chapter to its first essential point; that neo-jihadism has many 
parallels with historic incarnations of religious conflict.  
In observing modern-day Islamic groups, their own self-image would suggest 
that since the essential jihadist “pitch” pioneered by Qutb reached the mainstream, 
modern-day Islamist groups have sought to demonstrate their commitment to the 
unadulterated Quran, the early communities of Muslims (Salaf) and a range of 
prominent classical theorists. Maher stresses the importance of the influence of al-
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Wahhabi and Ibn Taymiyyah as key touchstones for modern-day terror scholars.156 
This visibly positions neo-jihadists and their associated movements as revivalist in 
context. Admittedly, the immersion in Islamic scripture and an aspiration to revive a 
lost Islamic golden age appear as barriers to depicting neo-jihadism as a new 
ideological product. It is possible to present these features as superficial, however.  
The thinker-practitioners discussed in the course of this chapter have 
progressively taken on increasing responsibility in achieving this aim. They have 
proved adept in constructing a system of rules and codes that people have found 
compelling enough to fight for and support. In line with this development, this chapter 
has sought to discuss the proposed destination of the Islamic community in the neo-
jihadist imagination, as well as the manner of getting there. The essential conclusion 
is that, like the contemporary institutions and leaders they criticize, they have been 
influenced by some very western ideas. When thinking about the system to which they 
aspire, as well as jihad, Islamic thought has absorbed a sort of Hegelian framework, 
from prolonged contact with western ideologies. This positions neo-Jihadist thought 
within the same epistemological system as earlier ideologies, notably fascism and 
Marxism.  
This is not an argument against the Islamic purity of neo-jihadists. This 
argument is not terribly useful in the context of this study, though there are perhaps 
sufficient grounds to assert that neo-jihadist thought is sufficiently corrupted to wrest 
power from them on theological grounds. Instead, this provides the space to suggest 
that it is possible to think about them as functioning in the same epistemological 
universe as Marxists and Nazis. Neo-jihadi thought introduces a religious essence to 
this framework, though its attempt to reconstitute imperial Islamic distinctions in the 
contemporary state system is more useful in understanding how jihad relates to 
contemporary violence, and moreover, connects the neo-jihadist manner of thinking 
with other ideologically motivated instances of mass violence. It is accurate to 
characterise modern-day Islamic groups as possessing carefully considered beliefs.157 
Due to their ostensible Islamic purity, perhaps those subscribing to these groups are 
not fully cognisant of the precise nature and provenance of these beliefs. This is not to 
say that the religious appearance of the neo-jihadist movement is in any way irrelevant; 
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command of Islamic symbol and language is vital as a mobilising factor, as well as 
serving as a means of contesting one another and more contemporary concepts of 
jihad.  
Western scholars long assumed that a reformation was imminent, in which the 
notions of Sharia and fiqh would not be in any shape laws, but instead, ethical 
guidelines. This would additionally discharge any need to defend one’s faith through 
the force of arms. Yet it has been radicals of the other sort that have taken the initiative. 
Radical scholars, whether associated with a terrorist movement or not, share the same 
goal; the reigniting of the global Islamic state concept.158 Jihadi thinkers like those 
discussed have been the dominant voices framing this counter-reformation. This 
condemnation of authoritative scholars does strike Lutheran parallels; just as the 
Protestant Reformation cast the church in Rome as a corrupted and unnecessary 
intercessor between God and his people, so thinkers have cast the traditional ulema as 
being dedicated to the pursuit of wealth and earthly power, irrevocably tethered to 
corrupt state governments – or, sensationally – the grand Jewish American conspiracy.  
Jurisprudence, in this approach, is devolved to the authority inherent in the 
individual, as personal as his relationship with God, denying any influence from 
political or scholarly authorities. The individual Muslim can choose the interpretation 
of Sharia that conforms with his own. This in a sense permits what Solomon calls the 
“democratisation of Jihad”159 in which the right to interpretation of when to act 
violently in the defence of the faith goes right down to street level.160 The new jihadist 
benefit from the conservative Islam generated by the Gulf states, as well as modern 
mass communications that allow them to saturate the global awareness with their 
revised interpretation, drowning out the voice of more established and moderate 
juristic establishments ill-adapted to having to compete for allegiance.  
 
158 ‘[…] describes neither terrorism nor civil war, but rather a “world-historical” movement of Islamic 
revival. Terrorism in this reality-framework is an expression neither of criminal evil nor of an evil 
vision. Rather, violent radical elements are only a small part of a much broader movement for Islamic 
restoration, or in the traditional sense inherited from late antiquity, of renovatio. Renovatio, or another 
Roman favourite, reparatio, speaks more directly to Islamist visions than words like “revival”, which 
in the western consciousness at least refer more narrowly to simpler religious “awakenings”. For 
Muslims at least, their vision is one of an entire order restored, of not simply religion but of an entire, 
“rightly guided” way of life brought back as it should be. For a generation and more the drive for this 
Islamic restoration has been gathering strength and asserting itself’. See Michael Vlahos, ‘The Muslim 
Renovatio and U.S. Strategy’ (2004) <http://ideasinactiontv.com/tcs_daily/2004/04/the-muslim-
renovatio-and-us-strategy.html> accessed 14 July 2018. 
159 Hussein Solomon, Jihad: A South African Perspective (Sun Media 2013) 20. 
160 Ibid 20. 
154 
 
The twenty-first-century Islamic discourse is to an extent characterised by the 
loss of a longstanding and relatively stable system of thought and governance that 
served to maintain a relationship between the power of law and the faith in a concrete 
manner. Law in Islam is, after all, a sacred activity. Since the decline of the last Sunni 
Islamic empire, the dominant philosophical influence acting upon the Islamic world 
has been purist, conservative, and regressive. Salafism, or its Pakistani fellow traveller 
deobandism, have served to propagate the notion that the Islamic world would do 
better to return to its past. Like Hallaq notes, attempts to assert Islamic law within the 
context of the modern state system are subject to failure and easy to dismiss from a 
classical Islamic standpoint.161 Neo-jihadist thought naturally, therefore, resists the 
state system – a rapid, violent unmaking being the preferred means of dislocating the 
system of states in favour of the universal Islamic state.  
5.5 Examples; how has Neo Jihadist ideology caused unconventional armed 
groups to develop? 
 
“Because organisations that rely on terrorist attacks typically lack the 
strength to employ more legitimate forms of violence leaders must 
formulate a narrative that mobilises follows and has consistent 
elements…without an articulated sense of political purpose, the violence 
is nothing more than murder and redounds against a group or it’s 
cause.”162  
 
Extreme violence, if undertaken without a rationalisation, is often counterproductive 
to the organisation in question, harming their reputation with the population from 
which they wish to elicit support.163 Whist this is stated above with reference to 
terrorism, it undoubtedly remains true with dealing with armed groups. Just as terrorist 
attackers need to justify killing civilians, unconventional armed groups likewise need 
a narrative that backs up their extreme actions; this process has been considered in this 
chapter so far by looking at how subsequent theorists have adapted this is highly 
visible in the context of the war on terror.  Whilst al Qaeda initially drew selectively 
on Islamic history and scripture to produce a mandate justifying mass terrorist attacks 
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against non-Muslims,164 their downfall came following the US occupations of Iraq and 
Afghanistan; al Qaeda managed to kill more Muslims than westerners,165 and failed to 
justify this in a coherent manner, leading to a decline in support.166 This is a familiar 
pattern regarding jihadist groups, who often lose support in this manner.167   ISIS, on 
the other hand, contrived an interpretation of neo jihadism that offers them far more 
options in the use of force, even against professed Muslims,168 with the additional 
benefit of permitting them to embark on territorial and government projects, even 
assuming authority over other extremist groups.169  IHL should therefore take notice 
of  Neo-jihadism. Much like terrorism, it does entail the rejection of norms on the use 
of force, but additionally constitutes a mandate to occupy territory and wage war, 
elevating it beyond the more established threat stemming from terrorist groups.  
In setting out why neo-jihadism correlates with situations in which IHL 
becomes difficult to apply, it is first worth noting that neo jihadism is characterised by 
the rejection of anything it perceives as western or external to Islam.170 This makes 
compliance largely unviable, or at least prohibitively difficult.  Opposing “the west” 
and its interests, originations expressing the neo jihadist approach frequently find 
themselves contending with not only state governments, but some of the most 
dominant military powers in the world.171 It is worth noting that for instance, even 
conventionally equipped militaries when enjoying a massive advantage have not met 
with much success in contending with nations like Israel and America, or western 
interests in general.172  This lesson has been well taken by both states and non-state 
groups, who have begun to understand the futility of attempting a peer level contest 
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along conventional military lines, and have adopted different strategies, as well as 
different ways of looking at the world in order to support these new approaches.173      
When considering unconventional armed groups, it is well worth considering 
where exactly they came from. In many cases, organisations like al Qaeda and ISIS 
owe their initial foothold on the modern battlefield not so much to the appeal of their 
ideology to a mass audience, but as an alternative to conventional military force. Al 
Qaeda is perhaps the most prominent example. In order to frustrate soviet expansion 
in Afghanistan without directly engaging the Soviets, the US clandestinely funded and 
equipped a range of Islamist organisations.174 Out of this conflict, both the Taliban al 
Qaeda emerged.175 Likewise, what later became ISIS is ultimately rooted in Saddam’s 
Iraqi “return to faith campaign”, which owes its existence to the Iraqi conventional 
military failure to offer any meaningful resistance in the Gulf war of 1991.176 It is 
frequently contended that in Syria, Assad actually cultivated armed Islamist groups as 
controlled opposition, relying upon them behaving in such a brutal and irrational 
manner as to galvanise support for his regime, which would seem reasonable by 
comparison.177  As Ravenscroft suggests, such individuals are highly committed, and 
therefore perfectly disposed to undertake acts of terrorism and unrestrained 
violence.178 There is, therefore, a basis to suggest that religious fanatics are useful to 
keep around, if only because they can do things that normal people are unwilling to 
do. As a willingness to kill civilians is a composite element of these additional 
functions, it is not untoward to suggest that the conflicts in which they are involved 
may generate high civilian casualty numbers. 
Put simply, neo jihadist groups are capable of using force in a manner that state 
militaries find themselves unable or unwilling to approximate. This is partly because 
they lack the practical and legal restraints to which most states and non-state groups 
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are generally subject,179 but additionally as their ideology dictates that relegating the 
use of force to the conventional military contest in nether required or desirable.180  
States were perhaps the first to recognise the value of such groups, generally using 
them to either offset their conventional weakness181 or to achieve functions that 
conventional militaries generally do not undertake.182 In this sense today’s Islamic 
unconventional armed groups owe their origins to the utility of their approach to the 
use of force; they can do things that states are generally unwilling to do. It is therefore 
not untoward to suggest that the direct targeting of civilians by these groups is far from 
irrational, but either serves a key role in their wider strategy or is a product of their 
unique position.183 Regardless, the approach taken by these groups clearly goes some 
way to offsetting the weakness and lack of organisation characteristic of an 
unconventional armed group.  In order to benefit from these advantages, however, it 
is vital that they are justified. As this chapter will now layout, in the context of the war 
on terror, this is not as difficult as one may think. Indeed, by examining the evolution 
of Neo-Jihadism as practically employed, it is possible to suggest that the doctrine has 
proven sufficiently flexible to shift from a doctrine permitting terrorist attacks against 
“the west,” to one that serves to justify the adverse battlefield behaviour of groups like 
ISIS.  
In terms of practical examples that groups inoculated with neo-jihadist 
ideology explicitly target civilians or at least fail to respect the status of, it is possible 
to specify the number of examples. Al Qaeda encapsulates a number of civilian centric 
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strategies in it’s the term ‘jihad’ notably terrorism, assassination and kidnapping.184 It 
has in the past gone to lengths to justify the inclusion of these strategies, citing aspects 
of Islamic law and scripture in order to justify these extreme measures.185 
Unsurprisingly, this willingness to consider killing civilians has bled through into 
battlefield the battlefield, with this ultimately resulting in higher civilian casualties, in 
many cases directly due to their willingness to kill civilians.186 That said, there is a 
basis to suggest that al Qaeda has remained more circumspect when it comes to the 
killing of Muslims,187 with this restraint echoing their ultimate strategy of instigating 
a united Muslim reaction against the west.188   
ISIS has compounded the trend established by earlier movements through its 
enhanced focus on takfir. The adoption of this doctrine not only permitted the 
organisation to actively kill Muslims, but do so without eroding their support.189 
Whilst a common trend that ruins throughout the development of neo jihadism is that 
it is permissible to kill Muslims under certain circumstances, under ISIS the doctrine 
has evolved to make the killing of Muslims not only permissible conduct, but 
behaviour to be encouraged.190  This permits them to engage in more permissive 
strategies, in particular, killing shia civilians and attacking non-compliant Sunni 
communities.191  these strategies permit ISIS to do things that not only are beyond the 
inclination of states and conventional armed groups, but that had previously been 
disdained by other neo jihadists. This innovation was essential to ISIS as it entered its 
territorial phase, in which far more Muslims than non-Muslims were killed. 
Classifying these casualties as Kufr helped them maintain a veneer of religious 
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legitimacy.192  Moreover, their adoption of the “caliphate”  motif was central in their 
adoption of the structure of law and governance they subsequently used to justify and 
engage in the mass killing of civilians and other individuals outside of combat.193 As 
ISIS has chosen to stress the imminence of the apocalypse and the inevitability of 
victory,194 ISIS is not focused on uniting the Islamic world against western hegemony 
in line with bin Laden’s vision. Instead, it has billed itself as the scourge of the Islamic 
world, Purifying the ummah immediately before the hour.  
There are many other less central examples that further demonstrate the link 
between the addition of neo jihadist ideology and higher civilian casualties. For 
instance, in a number of African states domestically orientated Islamic faith is being 
displaced by name brand neo jihadism,195 imported by groups like al Qaeda aid ISIS.196 
This has frequently resulted in an escalation; for instance across western Africa, 
longstanding conflicts over land use involving the predominantly Muslim Fulani 
herdsmen have recently escalated, with imported Salafi-jihadist ideology serving to 
link-local grievances to a global struggle, thereby mobilising the local Islamic 
population to greater violence.197 As the approach spreads from the context in which 
it arose, neo jihadist ideology can play a role in causing similar movements to emerge 
in other regions.198  
Finally, it is worth mentioning the additional challenge that the spread of neo 
jihadist ideology levels. It has long been contended by sociology That ideology has an 
influence over how the organisations mobilised by and organise themselves. In 
relation to neo jihadism, it is worth noting that this ideology entails the rejection of the 
nation-state approach to both organisation and the use of force.  Additionally, the salifi 
focus embedded in neo jihadist thought necessitates that historical Islamic modes of 
organising and waging war are shown a degree of deference. As ISIS’s adoption of 
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the caliphate model demonstrated, the understanding of Islamic history such groups 
have is anachronistic, as well as being somewhat dictated by the nature of modern 
conflict. As such, it is difficult to even arrive at a stable understanding of what such 
groups are, organisationally speaking. It can, therefore, be stated with a degree of 
certainty that groups mobilised by neo jihadist ideology are unlikely to resemble 
states, or for that matter, any type of organised armed group to which international 
public law is accustomed to deal with.   
In summation, groups mobilised by neo-jihadist ideology reject all aspects of 
the international system of laws and norms, and moreover, seek to visually 
differentiate themselves from the archetype of the nation-state as far as possible. This 
rejection is apparent in their denunciation of the generally accepted limitations and 
customs comprising IHL. Neo jihadist groups have rediscovered the utility of an 
unrestrained approach to the use of force, and are therefore incentivised to actively 
target civilians and undertake other actions that are generally understood to be 
forbidden. Moreover, this rejection of the state system alters such groups organise, as 
they seek to restore an imagined past, pre-modern form of social arrangement, and 
additionally evade international law, given the distinctive social arrangements to 
which this anachronistic approach gives rise. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has argued that neo-jihadism is a variety of what may be termed 
contemporary religious conflict. This is a permutation of religious conflict with some 
elaborations that reflect a more contemporary setting. A central assertion is that 
organisations adopting this disposition to the use of force will represent a greater 
challenge to IHL than states or more conventional non-state groups.  
In summation, Neo jihadism has assisted in forming “unconventional armed 
groups,” groups in this thesis understood to challenge IHL’s assumptions as to what 
an armed group is. Firstly, it adopts a separate proto legal framework that defines itself 
partly as a rejection of international law and its norms concerning warfare. secondly, 
it emphasises extreme commitment, with the groups willing to go further in pursuit of 
Jihad generally ascendant over those with any checks or limitations whatsoever.  Most 
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importantly, it is disconnected from any past formally delineated body of scholars or 
jurists. This permits it to develop reflexively in the hands of practitioner theorists.  This 
is apparent by the manner in which the neo jihadist movement has evolved in the minds 
of key thinkers, with a general trend being a move from political engagement, through 
to sporadic acts of terrorism, to calling for the deaths of everyone outside of whatever 
movement or organisation a particular theorist is associated with. This is challenging 
for IHL, in that it frustrates any possibility of imposing restrictions on groups 
inculcated with Neo jihadist ideology. Moreover, these trends are compounded when 
the evolution of armed groups in the war on terror is outlined. At this point, it is 
possible to suggest that this study has made substantial progress in outlining what 
contemporary religious violence is, and why it is so challenging to confront. This goes 
some way to resolving one of the critical considerations identified at the outset of this 
study; namely the difficulty in developing an effective framework for regulating 
armed conflicts when the nature of a conflict is not understood. Having identified how 
and why such conflicts are deferent form both states and more conventional armed 
groups, a better basis for contesting possible changes now exists.  Moving forward, it 
is appropriate to consider how international law should adapt to his challenge, to 
determine what adjustments may be appropriate in the next chapter, it will be 
contended that a central challenge is differentiating these organisations from both 
states and conventional non-state groups, and determining how to classify them in 
international public law. 
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6 Defining ISIS and other Unconventional Armed Groups 
and their Position in International Public Law  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Whilst this thesis focuses explicitly upon the implications of an organisation like ISIS 
from the perspective of international humanitarian law (IHL), there is a need to 
consider some of the wider aspects of the organisation; in this case, the more general 
position such an organisation occupies in public international law. This is based upon 
an awareness of the importance of legal subjectivity, and the implications of attributing 
personality to organisations and groups.1 Today, public international law positions the 
state as the primary actor,2 enjoying full legal personality. Other forms of legal 
personality are arguably derived from states, who determine when and how legal 
personality is recognised.3 There are several challenges in fitting a group like ISIS into 
the existing legal framework. First, whilst it is “state-like”, it is rejected by the UN 
and other states, and indeed itself has no aspiration to be a state, at least in the formal 
legal sense. Additionally, it is something of a dynamic organisation, difficult to impose 
any description or fixed characteristics. These factors differentiate it from existing 
forms of legal personality. This chapter sets out to determine what form of legal 
personality, if any, can reasonably be used to describe the organisation, contesting 
both exiting terms, as well as more novel ones proposed in relation to the group. 
The aim of this chapter will be accomplished by first drawing upon the 
understanding of ISIS’s ideology developed in the course of this thesis. Based upon 
ideology and aims, it is possible to equate ISIS with a number of Islamic “states”, 
movements, and rebellions throughout history.4 This thesis has additionally sought to 
 
1 The subjectivity of an organisation or institution, once determined, carries a range of consequences. 
See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2008) 675-
699. 
2 Ibid. 
3 For instance, as is the case with international organisations. See generally Clarence Wilfred Jenks, 
‘The Legal Personality of International Organizations’ in Fleur Johns (ed), International Legal 
Personality (Routledge 2017). 
4 ISIS has been aligned with a number of historical organisations. The Ikhwan of Saudi Arabia Simon 
Mabon and Grant Helm, ‘Da’ish, the Ikhwan and Lessons from History’ (Foreign Policy Centre 2016) 
<http://css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/658e36f5-fb4a-47f6-a6d1-
6a77ea5c37ff/pdf> accessed 13 January 2019; the Mahdist uprising, Anthony Celso, ‘The Islamic State 
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foster an understanding of the “universal state”, and the relevance of such an 
organisation to contemporary problems. Accordingly, this chapter will examine how 
similar movements were described in the past; from the point of view of international 
law, this requires looking back some distance, when movements similar to ISIS 
populated international relations. Whilst the reaction of early European international 
law to similar problems is both undesirable and likely impossible under today’s 
international law, the notion of an “uncivilised state” as a means of understanding 
organisations possessing territory but deemed impossible to include in a shared legal 
framework, represents an interesting starting point for analysis.  
I will then briefly assess the relevant features of ISIS, before examining it in 
the context of determining legal personality. Under the prevailing international legal 
system, it has proved a challenge to reconcile ISIS’s real, concrete conformity with 
the objective standards for statehood, and the characteristics that make it both 
undesirable, and by some lines of reasoning, impossible to define in accordance with 
the available varieties of international legal personality.  
Moving forward, this chapter will suggest that international law is currently 
undergoing a change, with a new approach to classifying ISIS and similar groups 
emerging within the context of the war on terror. Whilst this is an ongoing process, it 
is possible to observe that the approach states and international organisations have 
taken towards armed groups in the war on terror differentiates “terrorist” organisations 
with a territorial component from existing forms of legal personality. Ultimately, this 
chapter will suggest that a revised form of legal personality that can be equated with 
that of an “uncivilised state” is being synthesised and used to define groups of this 
kind. This, in turn, has implications for the treatment of the groups and their 
constituent individuals, as well as dictating aspects of how states and international 
organisations respond.  
The chapter will then draw upon one of the fundamental contentions of this 
thesis, namely that in groups like ISIS, it is possible to observe an aspiration to found 
a “universal state”. The challenge ahead is understanding where such an institution fits 
in a system of international public law built around nation states. At the current 
juncture, international law is not equipped to recognise such an institution or its 
 
(IS) and the Sudanese “Mahdiyyah”: A Comparative Analysis of Two Failed Apocalyptic Jihadist 
States’ (2018) 4 International Journal of Political Science; and even, on behalf of Islamic scholarship, 
the early Kharijite sect Muhammad Al-Yaqoubi, Refuting ISIS (2nd edn, Sacred Knowledge 2016). 
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implications for a state-centric system of international public law. This assessment can 
be based upon the specific case of ISIS, namely, an acknowledgement that ISIS has 
state-like features, and even characteristics usually reserved for states, yet, it is 
excluded from statehood. Whilst there have been many concessions in terms of the 
organisation’s aptitude, based upon the manner in which the organisation and its 
affiliated individuals are understood, and indeed treated, it is possible to contend that 
it is impossible to align ISIS with statehood, or for that matter, any other currently 
recognised understanding of legal personality.  
The core thesis of this chapter is that ISIS and similar groups, in terms of both 
its expressed aims and its actual existence, conforms to that of a “universal state”. 
Whilst international law is not currently equipped to articulate the features of such a 
state, it is of significance that in past iterations of international law, such institutions 
were considered external to international law, and excluded. As a second critical 
consideration, it is possible to observe that in the context of the war on terror, with 
reference to the notion of the ISIS “proto-state”, a number of legal distinctions have 
already been made that functionally differentiate the group from other existing legal 
categories. It is, therefore, possible to support an argument that within the war on 
terror, a new form of legal personality for non-state groups like ISIS is emerging.  
 
6.2 The contemporary universal state, and the gaps and boundaries that make 
it possible  
 
If organisations like Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and ISIS were easy to destroy, and 
international law was equipped with appropriate implements to do so, they would not 
exist for long. In this regard, it is worth considering what may be an unbreakable rule 
for the purposes of international law and regulation. In assembling an international 
system comprising laws, norms, borders, and courts, it effectively calls into existence 
an organisation capable of exploiting the borders, boundaries, and loopholes inherent 
within it. Naturally, this may not be technically true, and those with a mind to do so 
may look back and trace a path of evolution by which the characteristics of modern 
terror groups have developed over time, or been co-opted from other organisations, 
gradually producing the type of actor we see today. Regardless of the precise origins, 
it is possible to consider the emergence of a group like ISIS as a product of the gaps 
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and blind spots that exist in a system of sovereign states and the system of international 
public law governing them. 
This chapter suggests two details relevant to the discussion of the legal 
personality of transnational terrorist actors in possession of the territory. First, that 
they represent a threat to the current system of international law, a threat that would 
be compounded should such organisations be recognised as states, proto-states, or 
aligned with any other identity that would see them afforded rights derivative of those 
afforded to states, or set them on the path of statehood. Second, it is useful to consider 
the international legal system in line with other organisations and institutions on the 
world stage, namely that its chief objective is its own survival and perpetuation. 
International law is to some extent voluntary.5 Moreover, international law should not 
act to deprive states of the capacity to act in their own self-interest.6 These fundamental 
factors are important to keep in mind when considering the possibility of attributing 
personality to such organisations.  
It is possible to list a number of loopholes in international public law that make 
contemporary terrorist groups like ISIS possible. First at the system level, it is possible 
to suggest that understanding the world to exist primarily of a tapestry of sovereign 
states can be exploited; by operating across borders, non-state actors can insulate 
themselves to some extent from reprisal at the hands of any state it wrongs.7 The 
advantage is given to the transnational actor, with the most durable criminal and 
terrorist groups keeping this in mind.  
Then, there is the legal understanding of force. The right to use force of a 
certain scale is a privilege of states,8 as with Weber’s suggestion that a state is “a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of 
physical force within a given territory”.9 Yet the downward proliferation of 
 
5 It is difficult to determine why exactly states obey international laws. See Michael Payne, ‘The Basis 
of Law in Hart's “The Concept of Law”’ (1978) 9 The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11. 
6 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press 
2005) 3. 
7 William Lind and others, ‘The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation’ in Aaron Karp, 
Regina Karp and Terry Terriff (eds), Global Insurgency and the Future of Armed Conflict: Debating 
Fourth-Generation Warfare (Routledge 2007) 19. 
8 Conquest is effectively illegal, for as much as it is worth. See International Law Commission of the 
UN, ‘Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States’, [December 1949], Article XI; see additionally 
Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War (Allen Lane 
2017). 
9 See Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (Hans Heinrich Gerth and C. Wright Mills 
(eds), Milton Park 2009) 78. 
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technology10 and the disruptive influence of globalisation means that even a fly-by-
night terrorist organisation can strike at the heart of a state.11 ISIS has proved capable 
of equalling and exceeding the capacities of states, effectively conquering territory.12 
Whilst conquest is no longer a legal means of acquiring a state,13 it is enough to suggest 
that the type of force once seen as the preserve of states can be co-opted by terrorists 
and other marginal actors. In its understanding of armed attack and self-defence, 
international law preserves the use of force for states; accordingly, recognising the 
capacity for terrorist groups to undertake such an attack requires careful forethought; 
can we afford the right for states to defend themselves without recognising terrorist 
groups as belligerents, combatants or a version thereof, with the rights and privileges 
international law has carefully curated? 
There is then the question of population. Individuals are considered to 
constitute states, and states, to some extent, derive their legitimacy from their 
population, in addition to possessing territory.14 Is it sufficient to acquire such 
population and territory by terror, and maintain order in the same manner? Even where 
it is the case, it may prove difficult to demonstrate to any reasonable degree that the 
possession of a population by an organisation like ISIS was the result of terror, at least 
to any reasonable objective standard.15  
What is a terrorist group? It is defined as an organisation without legitimacy; 
yet, one that has been able to conquer territory, administer it, and displace the de jure 
governments of an area.16 The legal understanding of such facts is currently 
inconsistent with the possibility that such a group can do these things without being 
afforded at least a few rights and privileges. The fundamental uniting problem is that 
in the notion of statehood, we inextricably link the concepts of legitimacy and 
capability; it is extraordinarily difficult under the current system of international law 
 
10 Sometimes called “downward migration” of capability. See Aaron Karp, ‘The Changing Ownership 
of War: States, Insurgencies and Technology’ (2009) 30 Contemporary Security Policy 375. 
11 The World Trade Centre attack of 2001 remains a key example in this regard, exceeding the capacity 
of many state militaries in terms of accomplishing destruction. See Derek Jinks, ‘September 11 and the 
Laws of War’ (2003) 28 The Yale Journal of International Law 1, 2–5. 
12 Charles C. Caris and Samuel Reynolds, ISIS Governance in Syria (Middle East Security Report 2014) 
4. 
13 International Law Commission of the UN, ‘Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States’ 
(December 1949) Art XI. 
14 See generally, Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (12 December 1933). 
15 The scale of this challenge can to some extent be understood through looking at a parallel debate 
framing the Nazi regime. See Robert Gellately, ‘Rethinking the Nazi Terror System: A 
Historiographical Analysis’ (1991) 14 German Studies Review 23.  
16 See Caris and Reynolds (n 12). 
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to recognise that the first exists without attributing the second. This is to an extent 
made apparent in legal thinking on the matters of statehood,17 and the legitimate use 
of force.18 Whilst international lawyers may contend that legitimacy is a product of 
institutions,19 it may be stated that it is to some extent a product of power.20 More 
indirectly, legitimacy may, in the context of state-building, be considered a product of 
services delivered to citizens.21 At the current juncture, there is a need to recognise 
that an organisation (ISIS) has achieved state powers and been the most prominent 
service provider in a given territory. Concurrently, there is a recognition that it must 
be excluded from the status (statehood) that is inextricably linked to the capacity to 
marshal military force and govern the territory.  
Effectiveness is, by most metrics, an important test of statehood,22 yet even a despotic 
regime may be effective, as long as it lasts.23 In analysing a terrorist group that has 
demonstrated state competencies, a dilemma is apparent; either accept that should a 
terrorist group achieve the trappings of statehood, it is granted the rights and the 
privileges of a state, and duties that come with it, or concede that whatever state-like 
features such a group may accrue, its fundamental nature and manner of achieving 
such features forever render it beyond the pale, incapable of becoming a state or 
gaining any form of legitimacy. 
Finally, and not without merit, is the consideration as to whether or not a 
rebellion or insurrection intends to form a state. International authorities have in the 
past assumed this characteristic to be inherent in any roughly organised movement 
under arms, irrespective of their expressed aims or behaviour.24 It is difficult when 
 
17 For instance, the Montevideo criteria as set down do not burden the reader overmuch with limitations 
as to how the criteria for statehood are attained.  
18 In Chapter 5 it is contended that the application of IHL in the case of a NIAC is partially related to 
the competence of the parties involved.  
19 Miles Kahler, ‘Legitimacy, Humanitarian Intervention, and International Institutions’ (2010) 10 
Politics, Philosophy & Economics 20. 
20 See Robert I. Rotberg, ‘The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and 
Repair’ in Robert I. Rotberg (ed), When States Fail: Causes And Consequences (Princeton University 
Press 2004). 
21 Ruby Dagher, ‘Legitimacy and Post-conflict State-building: the Undervalued Role of Performance 
Legitimacy’ (2018) 18 Conflict, Security & Development 85. 
22 Crawford, it being the “dominant general principle”. James Crawford, The Creation of States in 
International Law (2nd edn, Clarendon 2006) 98. 
23 Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, paperback re-issue 2012 (Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 137.  
24 For instance, in referring to a range of conflicts that are little more than banditry, in which the rebel 
group in question has no desire to take over the state with which they contend, they are nonetheless 
aligned with liberation movements of the past. See Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Africa’s Forever Wars: Why the 
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preoccupied with past examples to conceive of armed groups finding chaos and 
destruction as sufficient reward, or as is the case within the war on terror, aspiring to 
unmake the notion of a system of sovereign nation-states entirely.  
Importantly, accepting such organisations as states, or on the path to statehood, 
would run contrary to the interests of many states, and indeed the system of 
international law itself. If one is willing to acknowledge the nature of the problem, 
then it is possible to explore the possibility of understanding an organisation like ISIS 
as an organisation with the capacities of a state, but without any of its legitimacy, or 
indeed any of its sovereignty. This suggests the pursuit of a third path, namely, to 
reveal some legal manner by which to concede that a territorial organisation can do 
the things a state does, whilst remaining illegitimate due to the nature of its 
provenance. In paying attention to the past iterations of international law, it is possible 
to suggest that such an arrangement was previously present.  
 
6.2.1 Conceptual discussion; non-state groups in a world of states  
 
International law has previously gone about recognising the capacity for some 
varieties of “states” to perform functions such as occupying territory and governing a 
population, whilst concurrently forcing them to exist outside the fold of international 
law, not a party to any privileges or rights. Understanding the manner in which this 
was accomplished involves examining some of the more uncomfortable assumptions 
found in the works of early international legal scholars: 
 
“Les conditions sociales et politiques dans lesquelles vivent les 
peuples musulmans et les peuplades païennes et sauvages, rendent 
impossible t’application du droit international aux rapports avec 
ces nations barbares ou à moitié civilisées. Les relations 
internationales reposent sur ridée de la communauté que ton ne peut 
imaginer sans la solidarité des intérêts et l'analogie des tendances 
entre les nations. Tes pays musulmans se dirigent exclusivement 
 
Continent's Conflicts Never End.’ (Foreign Policy 2010) 
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/11/africas-forever-wars/> accessed 11 December 2018. 
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diaprés le Coran qui est hostile et intolérante l'égard de tous les 
peuples pratiquant d'autres religions.”25 
 
A critical problem from the perspective of a system of international law is deciding 
which organisations are considered legitimate, and therefore capable of being 
incorporated into a system of shared behaviour and values, and which are to be 
excluded. The above quote suggests that historically, possession of territory alone is 
not nearly enough to merit peer inclusion, sovereignty, or other privileges. Thus, the 
system of public international law common to European nations preserved a means to 
not recognise “states”, that whilst objectively similar to those accepted by the system, 
were deemed undesirable to include. It may be contended that the early system of 
regulation common to European nations was based on a shared set of religio-cultural 
values. Whilst it can be argued that this is no longer the case, it may be suggested that 
statehood is not simply a question of possessing territory, whatever additional 
standards are imposed.  
 The notion that a shared system of law between nations requires a deeper basis 
for existence than the mere possession of territory is longstanding. For much of human 
history, it has proved difficult to pinpoint and define the quality that permitted 
different peoples to abide by a shared system of laws.26 This is reflected in the rather 
exclusory understanding of statehood found in some early treaties. Such treaties were 
presented as a congress between “civilised nations”.27 It may be suggested that 
“civility” was a defining factor in the early public international law of Europe; 
“uncivilised” nations were not allowed entrance into any shared legal system.28 Early 
 
25 (Tr.) ‘The social and political conditions in which the Muslim peoples, pagan peoples and savages 
live make it impossible to apply international law to relations with these barbarous, part-civilised 
nations. International relations rest on the links of the community that one cannot imagine without the 
solidarity of interests and the analogy of preferences between nations. The Muslim nations are guided 
exclusively by the Quran, which is hostile and intolerant to all peoples practicing other religions’. Fedor 
Fedorovich Martens, Traité de Droit International (Chevalier-Marescq 1883) 239. 
26 It is reasonable to ask why any state bothers to obey international law at all, when the incentives to 
do so may contradict the immediate interests of a state. See generally Koh Harold Hongju, ‘Why Do 
Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599. 
27 The St Petersburg declaration for instance is limited in application to “civilised nations”. General 
principles of law recognized by civilised nations is preserved in customary law. The statute of the ICJ, 
Article 38 additionally uses the language “civilised nations”. 
28 It is contested for instance that the inclusion of “civilised” in the early terminology was specifically 
excluded due in part to the lack of a shared heritage and Christian values. See Ted van Baarda, ‘The 
Moral Dimension of Asymmetrical Warfare: An Introduction’ in Ted van Baarda and Richard Verweij 
(eds), The Moral Dimension of Asymmetrical Warfare: Counter-terrorism, Democratic Values and 
Military Ethics (Martinus Nijhoff 2009) 5–6. 
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international legal thinking was characterised by a curious balance between the 
acknowledgement of a universal natural law common to all peoples, and the exclusion 
of the full participation of non-western nations, often on the basis of race or religion.29 
It must naturally be stressed that nineteenth-century scholars populated a 
different international landscape to that which we inhabit today. The notion that 
treaties and compacts could exist between peoples of different cultures had been 
challenged numerous times in history.30 This trend was visible in the creation of the 
“Muslim peoples” specified by Martens,31 who, in his understanding, had been known 
to utilise a rationale for conflict that was understood by the non-Muslim west as 
immutable.32 This perception of the Muslim world and its limited capacity to enter 
shared international public law was common among scholars and statesmen of the 
period, and functionally similar arguments were employed to exclude all non-western 
nations. The notion of an “uncivilised state” that functionally served the same purpose 
as a civilised one, but lacked the capacity to enter into a legal system, limited the 
attribution of a legal personality to a small number of nations of a common heritage 
and faith. This distinction was of great importance, in that the laws of warfare were 
not generally understood to apply in cases of war with an uncivilised nation, save at 
the digression of the commander.33 In addition, there were a number of more subtle 
negative implications.34 Where treaties and compacts did exist between civilised and 
non-civilised nations, European states would have understood this as a result of their 
military superiority and capacity to police the behaviour of the “uncivilised” parties.35 
There is naturally disagreement as to whether this was really the case, with 
Crawford indicating the recognition of a sort granted to a range of African and Asian 
powers to dispute the division of the world into civilised and uncivilised nations and 
 
29 Martens, whilst dismissive of non-civilised peoples, does recognise a shared awareness of natural 
law. See Martens (n 25); Lorimer likewise embraces this perspective though more on the basis of race 
than religion, mentioning progressive and non-progressive races. See James Lorimer, The Institutes of 
the Law of Nations: A Treatise of the Jural Relations of Separate Political Communities, vol 1 (W. 
Blackwood and Sons 1883) 101–102. 
30 Whilst many such treaties have been struck, many can be specified that have been rapidly broken. 
31 Martens (n 25) 239. 
32 The characteristic example of this being the first barbary war and the treaty of Tripoli. See J.E.G. de 
Montmorency, ‘The Barbary States in International Law’ (1918) 4 Transactions of the Grotius Society 
87. 
33 Whilst this position may have been contested at the level of scholarship, it is overly apparent in 
guidance issued to troops. See War Office, Manual of Military Law (HM Sationery Ofice 1914 ) 235. 
34 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Idea of European International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of 
International Law 315. 
35 Jens Bartelson, War in International Thought (Cambridge University Press 2017) 174. 
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peoples.36 Koskenniemi, on the other hand, suggests that the civilised/non-civilised 
distinction formed an important division in the legal thinking of the colonial period.37 
Admittedly, much of this debate surrounds the deprivation of territory in pursuit of 
colonies, not the imperative to exclude actors who would threaten the integrity of the 
shared legal system. 
The exclusion of nations considered uncivilised by the west, and Islamic 
nations, in particular, did not hold. As scholars have noted, the Ottoman Empire was 
an early participant in the concert of Europe. This serves to demonstrate that at the 
time, European nations and the Ottoman empire were satisfied with each other’s 
capacity to abide by conventions, treaties, and standards of armed conflict, and respect 
the integrity of borders: 
 
Overall, Ottoman treaty-making practices reveal that the Ottomans 
not only modified Islamic international law to justify their 
diplomatic and legal relations with the European states but also 
adopted some principles of European customary law. The Ottomans 
abandoned an essential provision of Islamic international law – 
namely, that of perpetual war and temporary truces with the non-
Muslim world. The Ottomans’ engagement in multilateral 
negotiations as an alternative to unilateral dictation of peace terms, 
their adoption of European customary law principles, their 
willingness to ratify peace treaties without time limits and their 
establishment of formal alliances with non-Muslim states 
demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire was not a traditional Islamic 
state that isolated itself from European affairs; rather, by this time 
it was an active actor in European politics.38 
 
The integration of non-Christian nations into a shared system of international public 
law cannot be understated, as it had profound implications for the future. It also 
 
36 Crawford (n 22) 258–266. 
37 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press 2006) 152. 
38 See ‘The Emergence of the Idea of “International Law” in the Ottoman Empire before the Treaty of 
Paris (1856)’ (2014) 50 Middle Eastern Studies 233. 
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indicates the rationale behind the exclusion of non-Christians. Indeed, the Ottomans, 
upon entering into a shared system of international law with European nations, quickly 
found themselves in conflict with a number of self-proclaimed “Islamic states” and 
rebellions. These entities universally identified all other political arrangements as 
infidels and invoked the same perpetual war that Western legal scholars had earlier 
documented, though this time, against other Muslims.39  
It is difficult to distinguish the extent to which the apparent rejection of non-
Christian states was rooted in prejudice, though racial and cultural bias undeniably 
formed a potent component of this division.40 Yet, to some extent, this divide reflected 
the existence of a range of religious and cultural institutions whose existence made a 
shared system of international public law impossible. It is no doubt of some utility to 
critically examine the western elements of international law41 and the role the notion 
of uncivilised states and peoples played in colonialism and manifest destiny.42 It is 
equally important to understand what such a delineation was seen as accomplishing; 
what practical end excluding the majority of peoples from a shared system of law was 
understood to have achieved by Europeans. It is possible the limitation of a shared 
system of international public law for Christian nations was specifically aimed at 
excluding more archaic forms of political arrangement that were not capable of 
recognising borders and entering into treaties. In the Islamic case, this may be best 
related to encounters that European states had with a range of Caliphs, Emirs and 
Mahdi’s who made the case that the Islamic world must be in a state of perpetual war 
with non-Muslims. Whilst such arrangements did not characterise all interaction 
between Islam and the west, it is not unreasonable to question the capacity for western 
nations in this period to distinguish between the multiple different permutations of 
Islamic societies that have existed throughout history. As Western states lacked the 
 
39 See for instance the Mahdist uprising that declared all Turks to be “infidels”. Lidwien Kapteijns, 
‘Mahdist Faith and the Legitimation of Popular Revolt in Western Sudan’ (1985) 55 Africa: Journal of 
the International African Institute 390; or the Ikhwan rebellion represents another example, see Sami 
Zubaida, ‘Sectarian Violence as Jihad’ in Elisabeth Kendall and Ewan Stein (eds), Twenty-first Century 
Jihad: Law, Society and Military Action (I.B Tauris, 2015) 143. 
40 There are certainly arguments to be made in this regard. See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Race, Hierarchy 
and International Law: Lorimer’s Legal Science’ (2016) 27 European Journal Of International Law 
415. 
41 Bartelson (n 35) 181–182. 
42 Antony Anghie, ‘The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Postcolonial Realities’ (2006) 27 
Third World Quarterly 739, 737–738. 
173 
 
ability to distinguish between “civilised” and “uncivilised” non-Christian nations, 
expediency dictated the exclusion of them all. 
Historically, a nation’s capacity to comply with public international law43 was 
related to a shared religio-cultural shibboleth. This permitted the establishment of 
behavioural conventions, ultimately forming a system of international law.44 Groups 
not sharing these attributes were excluded.45 It was not initially presumed that a system 
of organised states would ever exist outside of Europe.46 There have naturally been 
some changes as the capacity of international public law has developed, and the early 
emphasis on expediency has given way to more developed means of assessing the 
presence of a legal personality and the capacity to comply. Modern public international 
law does not assess whether or not a nation should be included on the same basis as 
earlier permutations of the system. Rather, it has a significantly broader application. It 
can be suggested that this is because a nation’s capacity to enter into agreements of 
this nature is no longer predicated on the basis of a shared culture or religion, but upon 
the presence of objective criteria and recognition by other states as peer 
organisations.47 It is on this basis that a shared public international law has been able 
to proliferate around the world. To dismiss outright the powerful normative 
implications of the word “civilised”,48 it is possible to determine a transition. If 
“civility” can be defined as the feature of a state that allows it to enter into public 
international law and subsequently abide by it, then in contemporary public 
international law, this capacity is not, at least in general, qualified by a shared culture 
or history, nor denied on the basis of race, religion, or ideology, as it was in the age of 
“civilised nations”. This has been made possible by a fundamental change in how 
statehood, or full legal personality, is understood. This transition may be related in 
part to the notion of “liberal” and “non-liberal” states, which has replaced the previous 
 
43 Though based upon these limitations, European International Law may be a more appropriate term.  
44 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law (3d edn, rev and cor edn, Lea and Blanchard 1846) 
15–16. 
45 This is undoubtedly the position of legal scholars at the time. See John Westlake, Chapters on the 
Principles of International Law (Cambridge University Press 1894) 143.  
46 Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in International Politics 
(Cambridge University Press 2004) 128. 
47 Whilst there are multiple prominent theories as to how statehood is achieved, as well as many 
marginal cases that challenge the notion of typical paths to statehood, it is possible to conclude that 
emulating a certain culture or configuration is not requisite. Indeed, it is generally possible to specify a 
range of objective features common to all states that have a causal link with the status of statehood.  
48 There is plenty of discussion of the term “civilised” that limits the meaning of the term to its modern 
normative implications. Xavier Mathieu, ‘The Dynamics of “Civilised” Sovereignty: Colonial Frontiers 
and Performative Discourses of Civilisation and Savagery’ (2018) 32 International Relations 468. 
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distinction between Christian and non-Christian.49 Whilst still exclusive, the notion of 
liberal states’ participation in international law divests itself of many of the “subjective 
beliefs not demonstrable by reason”50 upon which pre-liberal notions of international 
order depended. Recognition as a legitimate state is now ascribed either based on the 
presence of certain features or possibly, upon the acquiescence of other states.51 The 
precise formula for achieving statehood is naturally variable based upon historical 
circumstances and geopolitical context, but it can be suggested that a rough guide has 
been established with relative clarity based on convention. The objective criteria 
specified by the Montevideo convention have been proved suitable by a variety of 
political arrangements of disparate origins.52 The majority of these states have 
demonstrated their capacity to enter into international agreements and comply with all 
aspects of international law; whether or not the Montevideo criteria have a 
deterministic relationship with this capacity is an interesting question to contest.  
Nevertheless, the inclusive approach to statehood currently used presents a 
problem. Statehood is not based on any normative quality; this opens up the possibility 
of questionable arrangements being recognised. Moreover, once statehood is achieved, 
states are difficult to unmake; incompetent states, failed states, and pariah states still 
benefit from sovereignty.53 Whilst the contemporary state system is by most metrics 
the preferable one, a relative disadvantage is its inability to exclude bad actors at will. 
Moreover, the borders and populations of states have proved difficult to revise based 
on changing notions of nationality; whilst it has been stressed that establishing new 
 
49 ‘The very idea of a division between liberal and non-liberal States may prove distasteful to many. It 
is likely to recall 19th century distinctions between 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' States, rewrapped in the 
rhetoric of Western political values and institutions. Such distinctions summon images of an exclusive 
club created by the powerful to justify their dominion over the weak. Whether a liberal/non-liberal 
distinction is used or abused for similar purposes depends on the normative system developed to govern 
a world of liberal and non-liberal States. Exclusionary norms are unlikely to be effective in regulating 
that world’. A.M Slaughter, ‘International Law in a World of Liberal States’ (1995) 6 European Journal 
of International Law 503, 506. 
50 Koskenniemi, 2006 (n 37). 
51 The so-called declaratory theory of statehood is dependent on possessing a range of criteria, not 
dependent on the recognition of other states. The contrasting constitutive theory places inclusion at the 
digression of existing states. See Hugh Lauterpacht, ‘Recognition of States in International Law’ (1944) 
53 Yale Law Journal 385, 386–387. 
52 The UN records 193 diplomatically recognised states. See UN, “member states” (un.org) 
<https://un.org/depts/dhl/unms/whatisms.shtml> accessed 23 January 2019. 
53 As Holsti notes, once a state is recognised, this prevents the recognition of any would be states within 
their territory. Holsti (n 46) 131–132; moreover, statehood cannot be rescinded on purely normative 
grounds, though a rough state may be subject to a range of sanctions and restraints. See Thomas H. 
Henriksen, ‘The Rise and Decline of Rogue States’ (2001) 54 Journal of International Affairs 349. 
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states is not out of the question, this is now problematic given the fragmentation 
initiating new states causes.54  
There are a number of points of contention that may suggest that the state has 
had its moment at the centre of international law. There are abundant critiques that 
suggest that the spread of the state system is rooted in colonial expansion.55 Growing 
discomfort with the state is visible in various pan-continental movements, regional 
unions, and imperial revivals. There is then the notion that the state is being made 
increasingly irrelevant by globalisation.56 Many see the imposition of borders as a 
hindrance. There is, for instance, general dissatisfaction with the lines drawn following 
the dissolution of imperial institutions.57 It is frequently contended that borders were 
drawn without due deference to ethnic, religious, and cultural divides.  
This brings the discussion to the problem at hand. In relation to ISIS and 
similar groups of an unconventional nature, there has been extensive speculation as to 
whether or not it is technically appropriate they be ascribed the status of a state.58 ISIS 
has played a key role in developing this discussion, a consequence of the group’s 
geographical presence and rudimentary provision of government in Iraq and Syria, 
which many observers have reacted to with surprise, this not fitting the assumed model 
of a terrorist group.59 Whatever the material reality of the group, inclusion of such an 
organisation in the “family of nations” would perhaps be taken by many as an 
indication of the limitations of the international system. ISIS would not welcome such 
a step either, given their self-identification and critiques of the state system. At the 
current juncture, it can be suggested that the world lacks a clear means of 
distinguishing a group like ISIS from states, whilst concurrently recognising that such 
 
54 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and 
Peacekeeping: Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to the Statement Adopted by the Summit 
Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1 (1992) UN Doc A/47/277-S/24111 [17]. 
55 Epifanio San Juan, ‘Nation-State, Postcolonial Theory, and Global Violence’ (2002) 46 Social 
Analysis: The International Journal of Social and Cultural Practice 11; Gordon L. Anderson, ‘The Idea 
of the Nation-state is an Obstacle to Peace’ (2006) 23 International Journal on World Peace 75. 
56 Whilst globalisation is not simply the negation of state sovereignty, the changing global situation is 
exerting a transformative effect. See Eric C. Ip, ‘Globalization and the Future of the Law of the 
Sovereign State’ (2010) 8 International Journal of Constitutional Law 636.  
57 Raffaella A. Del Sarto, ‘Contentious Borders in the Middle East and North Africa: Context and 
Concepts’ (2017) 93 International Affairs 767.  
58 Whilst there has yet been no authoritative assertion that ISIS represented a state, its real characteristics 
have been sufficient to merit examination. See Marco Longobardo, ‘The Self-Proclaimed Statehood of 
the Islamic State Between 2014 and 2017 and International Law’ (2017) 33 Anuario Español de 
Derecho Internacional 205. 
59 In terms of methods, objectives and means of action. See generally Michael Weiss and Hassan 
Hassan, ISIS: Inside The Army Of Terror (Regan Arts 2015). 
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an entity has capacities that are well in excess of those conventionally attributed to 
non-state groups. Additionally, based upon the commitment of ISIS to the notion of a 
“universal state”, it may prove necessary to mitigate or alter the rights and privileges 
of the organisation, its constituent individuals and affiliates, if not outright outlaw it 
in the manner of an “uncivilised nation”. 
Why look back to previous, more exclusive understandings of legal 
personality? In times of challenge, international law has often sought to discern the 
way forward by examining the past.60 In a sense, ISIS represents a new manifestation 
of a perennial problem. Today, it is not desirable that one equates ISIS with the notion 
of uncivilised or half-civilised states that existed in the past; it is also optimistic to 
believe that an institution like ISIS can develop into an archetypical liberal state. It is 
important to acknowledge that in the past; early systems of international law identified 
the existence of organisations like ISIS. Accordingly, the legal system lacks a means 
of designating a group that has, in many dimensions, the capacity of a state, yet needs 
to not only be excluded from participation in international law, but to be actively 
confronted.  
There are multiple possibilities for moving forward. One option is to identify 
ISIS as a state. This would be considered by many as undesirable, although it would 
enhance the possibilities of addressing the organisation through mechanisms such as 
International Criminal Law (ICL) and IHL, which can be effectively applied to states. 
Alternatively, ISIS could be recognised with some partial form of legal personality, 
sufficient to create criminal liability and to allow states to wage war against it. Such 
an arrangement would be consistent with previous instances, where such an 
acknowledgement has been made in order to attribute criminal responsibility to an 
entity, or the individuals comprising one. Additionally, ISIS could simply be 
considered a collection of individuals with no inherent collective nature. Ultimately, 
this chapter seeks to explore the extent to which an organisation of ISIS’s nature may 
be subject to international law, making specific reference to an emerging legal 
framework in the context of the “war on terror”. 
 
60 Most fields of international law make use of past judgments. For example, see Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project, Judgment ICJ report (1777) (Separate Opinion Of Vice-President Weeramantry) <https://icj-
cij.org/files/case-related/92/092-19970925-JUD-01-03-EN.pdf> accessed 14 January 2019 96; it is 
additionally of benefit to specify the manner in which international legal scholarship is pivoting to 
acknowledge different international legal histories and events typically excluded from contemporary 
international legal consideration. See Ignacio De La Rasilla Del Moral, ‘The Shifting Origins of 
International Law’ (2015) 28 Leiden journal of International law 419, 424-426. 
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This chapter suggests a range of key values that need to be incorporated into 
the discussion of ISIS’s legal personality. Based on the organisation’s self-perception, 
stated aims, and ideology, there is a need to consider alternative political arrangements 
that are not formally recognised. In particular, its stated identity as a “caliphate” 
suggests its aspiration for a more archaic, pre-state arrangement. It contains the notion 
of a universal state purported to preside over more than a geographically contiguous 
people contained to a modest swathe of territory, but all adherents of a faith, 
irrespective of their location. Such a universal state is impossible to reconcile with the 
existence of distinct nation-states presiding over territory and defined populations.  
Whilst at the current juncture, there is no concrete legal means of 
understanding ISIS’ legal personality, it is not unreasonable to suggest the within the 
context of the war on terror, a new understanding of legal personality is emerging to 
describe such groups. Through an examination of the status of ISIS as an organisation 
and the manner in which it is contended with, it is possible to suggest that both states 
and international organisations have made progress towards reconciling the 
organisational and ideological peculiarities of similar entities given their de facto 
resemblance to a state. The manner in which these features are reconciled suggests an 
understanding of legal personality that is functionally comparable to the notion of an 
“uncivilised state”, as articulated in early European international law.  
 
6.2.2 ISIS and other unconventional armed groups: a challenge in a world of states 
 
In examining the adversaries that states confront in what is often referred to as the war 
on terror, it is not untoward to suggest that terrorist organisations in this conflict have 
developed into challenging organisations to classify. For instance, the striking success 
of ISIS in overwhelming states carries worrying implications. From 2013 onwards, 
the organisation proved itself capable of overwhelming the militaries of Iraq and Syria 
on the battlefield, banishing state civil control and governance from a significant 
swathe of territory, and running it in line with its own vision.61 This proved sufficient 
for some to express that ISIS broke with the wider jihadist movement, as no previous 
movement had actually founded a state.62 However, ISIS did not petition the UN and 
 
61 Weiss and Hassan (n 59). 
62 Longobardo (n 58) 206. 
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other states for recognition. It does not address the governments of Iraq and Syria in 
order to formalise their administration of a new autonomous region. It has not asked 
for their borders to be recognised. Instead, ISIS envisions an ever-expanding sphere 
of influence.63 It can be contended that this disregard is perhaps based upon ISIS’ 
recognition of their own abhorrence in the eyes of the UN64 and anticipation that any 
conventional diplomatic requests would be rebuffed. 
A deeper examination suggests that ISIS did not desire inclusion, this being 
inconsistent with their stated aims. Instead, ISIS has behaved in a manner consistent 
with their expressed identity as a “caliphate” or universal Islamic community, 
retracing the path of rebellion taken by previous messianic movements. The group has 
made a range of statements professing their rule over all “true” Muslims.65 Its motto 
of “remaining and expanding”66 professes not a desire to participate in a society of 
nations, but to negate one. Moreover, the group has achieved a dominant role in 
partnerships with a range of other violent jihadist groups.67 Much energy has been 
expended by the group in proving themselves to be Islamic in nature, marshalling a 
range of scholarly arguments for this purpose. Rather than seeking recognition and a 
place within a family of nations, ISIS has sought out a different framework of 
legitimacy, and moreover, experienced some success in doing so. Based on the way 
ISIS presents themselves, it is possible to suggest that it identifies with the notion of a 
“universal state” made explicit by their repeated references to themselves as a 
caliphate, and their leaders as caliphs. The revival of a Muslim “universal state”, or 
caliphate, has been extensively explored by Islamic revivalist scholars.  
It is important to differentiate ISIS as an Islamic universal state from the notion 
of an Islamic nation-state.68 Whilst one might expect to operate within a system of 
states, as demonstrated by the many Islamic nations that already exist, the other has 
historically proved incapable of being included. Additionally, the implications of 
 
63 For Instance, “remaining and expanding” See Dabiq, 5 (Al Hayat Media Center 2015) 22. 
64 The UN issued several unambiguous condemnations of ISIS that may indeed be interpreted as making 
it impossible, or at least illegal to recognise ISIS. 
65 Dabiq 1 (Al Hayat Media Center 2014) 11. 
66 Dabiq, 5 (Al Hayat Media Center 2015) 22. 
67 US Department of State, State Department Terrorist Designations of ISIS Affiliates and Senior 
Leaders (2018). 
68 As Maher suggests, the distinction between caliphate and statehood is important. See Maher, (n 19) 
4–5. 
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permitting a “universal state” to function in a state-centric system are profound.69 Such 
an entity may well be capable of governing a population and holding territory, 
irrespective of whatever state-like features it accrues. However, it is unlikely that it 
would ever be possible to address such an organisation through conventional means, 
or impose any legal expectations upon it, save by force. Nor can the organisation easily 
revise its goals in line with statehood, as such a step would require abandoning the 
very principles upon which it has founded its legitimacy in the minds of its adherents.70  
It remains paramount to consider where exactly ISIS fits in the international legal 
system. There are individuals that should be prosecuted and matters of armed conflict 
that need to be resolved. Assigning ISIS statehood or any legal personality associated 
with statehood may have ramifications in relation to how and when states use armed 
force and may affect the aftermath of the organisation. Some acknowledgement of 
their collective nature is required in order to acknowledge their capacity to commit 
“state crimes”, as well as wage war. One approach would be to simply exclude ISIS 
from possessing any legal personality, state or otherwise, or modify its legal 
personality based on the argument that the group has exhibited an abhorrent nature. 
The disjunction between ISIS’s achievement of state capacities and rejection of its 
statehood on the basis of objectionable nature brings back the idea of the half-civilised 
or “uncivilised nations”. If ISIS is to be ascribed a modified or synthesised legal 
personality, this would perhaps be better justified in objective terms.  
 
6.3 The ideology of unconventional armed groups (ISIS) 
 
Why even mention ideology? States, it should be conceded, do not emerge out of 
nowhere but coalesce around some form of identity. As Tilley suggests, control over 
territory is simply the starting point for a state, to be followed by the construction of 
state apparatus, finally leading to the production of “political identity”.71 In relation to 
 
69 Supranational forms of authority have been specified as potential destabilising factors. As a religious 
institution, the “universal state” compounds many of these processes.  
70 ISIS has built its foundations around perpetual war against everyone. If it was to recognise borders 
and a fixed population, it would lose its sole claim to legitimacy as a caliphate. It has been suggested 
that such organisations are driven to make bad policy decisions in order to maintain ideological purity 
and to attract support from a wider population. See Brynjar Lia, ‘Understanding Jihadi Proto-States’ 
(2015) 9 Perspectives on Terrorism 31.  
71 See Anna Leander, ‘Wars and the Un-making of States: Taking Tilly Seriously in the Contemporary 
World’ in Stefano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (eds), Copenhagen Peace Research: Conceptual 
Innovations and Contemporary Security Analysis (Routledge 2003); see also Charles Tilly, ‘War 
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ISIS, and arguably, other jihadist groups, this process has been somewhat backwards 
– a globalist, religious identity looking for a political arrangement and grounding in 
the occupation of territory. It is important to understand that the state-building projects 
undertaken by groups like ISIS depend on the authority of the identity which is 
assumed by becoming an emirate or caliphate in the Islamic tradition, and to what 
extent their behaviour is thereby dictated by the manner in which they and their 
followers understand these terms.  
The material facts related to ISIS can be presented in such a way as to indicate 
it was state-like,72 or at least presented as though the group were on the path to 
statehood in a manner that is consistent with a range of insurrections and separatist 
movements that have unfolded before.73 However, the simple material facts of the 
situation obscure the full picture. A critical factor to consider is how ISIS see 
themselves and relate this identity to the international system. An organisation with 
several precursors across Islamic history, ISIS draw upon the thinking of a well-
established and prolific sectarian approach to faith, and its perspective on the 
international system of law can be considered as deriving from this approach. This 
attitude towards the Islamic faith is characterised by a rejection of everything that is 
un-Islamic; this relates to both institutions of a western origin and additionally, any 
un-Islamic “innovations” that have been developed within the imagined Islamic world. 
Heuristically, ISIS is anchored in a contrived understanding of early Islamic history, 
which it is striving to restore. This would take any demesnes under ISIS back to a 
period before the state system, during which political arrangements were 
fundamentally different.  
       Religion as a rationale for war, violence, and atrocity has a long history across 
many faiths.74 Islam is no exception, serving as the ideological justification for a 
number of conflicts both in the past and more recently. The Islamic Foundation of 
 
Making and State Making as Organized Crime’ in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda 
Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge University Press 1985) 181–184. 
72 UNSC (S/2018/770) ‘Seventh Report of the Secretary-General on the Threat Posed by ISIL (Da’esh) 
to International Peace and Security and the Range of United Nations Efforts in Support of Member 
States in Countering the Threat’ (16 August 2018) <https://undocs.org/en/S/2018/770> accessed 12 
January 2019. 
73 Whilst it is possible to present ISIS as abhorrent, brutality alone is not enough to exclude the 
organisation, and it is possible to specify a number of independence struggles that parallel the group’s 
rise to power. 
74 See Chapters 2, 3. 
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ISIS’ ideology and their self-perception are made explicit in key publications. The 
following is an excerpt from one of their publications: 
 
 Amirul-Mu’minin said: ‘O Ummah of Islam, indeed the world today 
has been divided into two camps and two trenches, with no third 
camp present: The camp of Islam and faith, and the camp of kufr 
(disbelief) and hypocrisy – the camp of the Muslims and the 
mujahidin everywhere, and the camp of the Jews, the crusaders, 
their allies, and with them the rest of the nations and religions of 
kufr, all being led by America and Russia, and being mobilized by 
the Jews.’75 
 
Whilst many Islamic schools would argue that strict rules exist to prevent exactly the 
type of behaviour that ISIS engage in,76 ISIS scholars have been able to justify the 
methods it employs, arguing that certain scenarios allow for the tenets cited to be 
overridden based on need, authority, or the identity of the victim.77 In light of the aims 
of this study, the extent to which ISIS may be characterised as a legitimate expression 
of the caliphate is less important than demonstrating that they themselves believe it to 
be the case, with this identity subsequently dictating their actions and disposition 
towards those outside the group. 
The concept of an “Islamic state” as a universal state was once prevalent, though it has 
been lesser used since the nineteenth century.78 Nevertheless, the concept has proved 
resilient, with a range of groups advocating for the restoration of such a state.79 
Accordingly, ISIS and their precursors have recognised a need to disassemble and 
undermine existing nation-states, and by extension, the laws governing them. The 
most comprehensive account of ISIS’ system-building can be gleaned from the 
Islamist publication, The Management of Savagery. In summary, this document 
 
75 Dabiq 1 (Al Hayat Media Center 2014) 10. 
76 Shawki Allam, ‘The Ideological Battle’ <http://dar-
alifta.org/BIMG/The%20Ideological%20Battle%20(2).pdf> accessed 9 November 2016. 
77 Rumiyah 2 (Al Hayat Media Center 2016) 22–25. 
78 The Ottoman caliphate is ostensibly the last example of a Sunni Muslim “caliphate” though several 
more recent pretenders to the title can be specified.  
79 Hizb ut-Tahrir, ‘Hizb ut-Tahrir; Definition’ (Hizb ut-Tahrir) <http://hizb-ut-
tahrir.org/index.php/EN/def> accessed 18 November 2016. 
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reflects an acute awareness of the situation prevailing in the Middle East. As the name 
suggests, ISIS’ essential strategy is to institute a condition of “savagery”80 by 
destroying existing civic services and security provided in the region before 
embarking on a campaign of violence. Under these circumstances, even the inferior 
services that the contemporary “Islamic state” is capable of offering constitutes 
governance. More importantly, this strategy suggests that ISIS as a universal state 
recognises itself as being in active competition with nation states.  
One study demonstrates how structurally, the ISIS administration resembles the 
structure of classical Islamic examples of states, and moreover, that it may have 
developed a better system than had previously existed in the region.81 Unsurprisingly, 
however, based on ISIS’ actions against non-Sunni Muslims and those it perceives as 
un-Islamic, the organisation has been universally condemned. Islamic scholars have 
constructed refutations demonstrating how ISIS is not Islamic.82 On the other hand, 
many works have also emerged seeking to demonstrate the compatibility between 
Islam and the international order, emphasising Islam’s inherent peacefulness.83 As for 
ISIS, it clearly advocates an Islamic system of governance. Since ISIS is an Islamic 
revivalist organisation rooted in the Middle East, it makes sense that it does not set out 
to construct a nation-state, nor does it intend to remould Middle Eastern states along 
ethnic-nationalistic lines. This is unsurprising given the memorable failures of pan-
Arabism and ba’athisim.84 In the construction of a restoration, ISIS have chosen to 
resort to religion as a unifying force.85 
It is possible to align ISIS with the manner in which the “Islamic state” or 
nation was described by western statesmen and lawyers according to early European 
international law. It embodies the features western observers specified as a universal 
feature of “Islamic peoples”, which precluded inclusion in any shared system of 
international law. First, ISIS reject the state system and the system of international law 
 
80 Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage Through Which the Umma 
Will Pass (William McCants tr, John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies Harvard University 2006). 
81 Mara Reevkin, The Legal Foundations of the Islamic State (The Brookings Institution 2016). 
82 Shawki Allam, ‘The Ideological Battle’ <http://dar-
alifta.org/BIMG/The%20Ideological%20Battle%20(2).pdf> accessed 9 November 2016. 
83 Gary Boums Sayed Khatab, Democracy in Islam (Routledge 2007). 
84 Fred Halliday, ‘The Perils of Community: Reason and Unreason in Nationalist Ideology’ (2000) 6 
Nations and Nationalism 153.  
85 Monica Duffy Toft, ‘Getting Religion?: The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War’ (2007) 31 
International Security 97. 
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governing the state system. Islamic nation-states do exist;86 ISIS however, do not 
aspire to be an Islamic nation-state, nor does it feel that existing nations of this nature 
should exist. Islam, ISIS argues, is inconsistent with statehood, and the Islamic nation-
state is considered an abomination in jihadist doctrine. This rejection extends to all 
nation-states; the only legitimate political form is believed to be ruled by God, 
officiated by Islamic rulers on earth. According to this interpretation, the potential for 
a universal state to recognise and enter into relations with states is not possible. This 
again serves to align ISIS with the type of organisation that existed prior to the state 
system or that existed in parallel to it. According to ISIS, the nation-state, is a western 
innovation. To the extent that an entity’s aspiration to be a state or to align with any 
form of legal personality is important, there serves a basis for excluding or modifying 
the legal personality attributed to ISIS. 
Second, there is the rejection of peace. The Islamic State exists in a constant 
state of war, and, if it wishes to remain consistent with its ideology, can never reliably 
enter into any treaty or cease-fire. Palabiyik suggests that key merit of the Ottoman 
empire was its abandonment of the concept that Islam must engage in continuous war 
and temporary peace towards all peoples of a non-Islamic character.87 Naturally, it 
would not have been productive to include a nation openly expressing such a belief 
within a shared system of international public law. This rejection of peace has 
profound implications for the end of hostilities. This implication applies even to the 
individual terrorist or henchman, whose words cannot be trusted, even if the 
organisation’s leadership were defeated or forced to dissolve. This approach is perhaps 
borne out in battlefield perfidy of ISIS, and the frequent failure of radicalisation 
programmes. Most profoundly, this approach suggests that relations can never be 
normalised with the entity. The implications of this distinctive feature of the 
organisation should be reflected in how legal personality is attributed to it as an 
organisation. 
Defining any destructive twenty-first century organisation such as ISIS is not 
an easy exercise. The group represents a significantly challenging entity for 
international lawyers to grasp and confront.88 First, ISIS sees itself as a religious state 
 
86 The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) includes 57 nations. 
87 Palabiyik (n 38). 
88 ‘[I]nternational law does not adequately address the activities of IS, because several legal and 
practical issues hinder its application”. See Holli Edwards, ‘Does International Law Apply to the 
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outside of a system of sovereign states.89 That is to say that the group recognises no 
other legitimate form of political arrangement except their own.90 More generally, the 
type of political arrangement that it advances as an alternative to the nation-state is 
appropriately described as a religiously-orientated, universal state. Historians 
examining the history of international law may note that the initiation of the European 
state system and subsequent European system of international law is to some extent 
rooted in the negation of competing religious “universal states” albeit of the Christian 
variety.91 As discussed earlier, the western understanding of the Islamic “universal 
state” can be specified as the basis by which all Islamic peoples found themselves 
excluded from early European international law.  
The success ISIS has achieved in realising a “universal state” indicates an 
additional source of stress placed upon a state-centric system of public law. The 
capacity for individuals of disparate nationalities to identify with ISIS on religious 
grounds suggests an inversion of the conventional political arrangement of the state. 
It suggests a backward movement to pre-state political arrangements that prevailed 
prior to the state-centric system of public international law.  
6.3.1 International legal personality and unconventional armed groups  
 
It is important to reflect on the identity of unconventional armed groups like ISIS from 
an international legal perspective in order to determine its position in armed conflict, 
as well as its position more broadly. Not only has it been established that legal 
personality, or statehood, plays a role in determining the system of law that prevails 
in armed conflict, but also that it has important implications in terms of criminal 
liability. There is then the relevance of legal personality to issues of compliance. In 
short, legal personality has profound ramifications for unconventional armed groups, 
 
Islamic State? Towards a More Comprehensive Legal Response to International Terrorism’ (2017) 1 
Strategic Security Analysis. 
89 Maher’s discussion illustrates the resistance to the concept of the nation-state within jihadist thinking. 
In the nation state it is impossible to fully implement the Sharia, and therefore all such arrangements 
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and could potentially influence the future trajectory of groups like ISIS, and the 
regions that have hosted such groups. 
Like any new potential subject of international law, there is a range of different 
perspectives as to how best to understand the group. An important consideration is that 
at this juncture, the debate outside of law has been extremely broad, with a vast array 
of potential designations presented by governments and scholars. Then, there is the 
group’s self-image to consider, along with the position it purports to occupy within 
Islamic theology.92 This has bled into the very naming process of the group, with 
varying names such as Daesh, ISIS, ISIL, and the Islamic State all being used, each 
carrying varying normative93 and even legal meaning.94  
The naming problem is indicative of a wide range of more extensive 
difficulties, many of which impact the potential subjectivity of the group in 
international law. At this juncture, there are a number of authoritative histories that 
chart ISIS through the period of its existence.95 The group has, by most estimations, 
passed through a number of phases, with its territorial presence, strategy, and 
organisation varying throughout these phases.96 The group could be formally 
described in a different manner depending on the moment in history. The problem 
identified already is that despite the inclusion of the term “state” in many of the 
group’s titles, ISIS does not consider itself to be one in any technical sense, and indeed, 
dismisses any potential for inclusion in an international system. The group’s vision is 
in part an expression of messianic sentiment,97 which, in part, is a derivative of many 
themes of the wider Islamic revival movement.98 The extensive propaganda circulated 
by the group99 provides extensive details as to how it intends to reach this goal, and 
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the exceptional actions permitted to achieve it.100 Whilst its aims and intent have 
proved appealing enough to recruit many to their cause, it precludes any acceptance 
by the international community or any other form of legal normalisation outside of 
armed conflict. 
From an organisational standpoint, the group is complex in nature.101 For much 
of the group’s history, it was presided over by a single leader, an emir,102 and later a 
caliph,103 who headed the expansion of the bureaucracy that co-opted many aspects of 
former regimes,104 providing services intended to supplant those of the nominal state 
of the territory occupied by the group.105 Whilst in the short term, ISIS proved adept 
at recreating basic civil functions, their governance and judicial bodies could, at best, 
be described as theatrical extortion and extreme brutality serving to maintain the 
appearance of order.106 Now, ISIS’ state-building project has largely disintegrated.107 
In spite of this reversal, its mission of remaining and expanding has gone unaltered, 
although this mission is pursued somewhat more subtly. In the absence of a clear 
heartland and leader, followers of the ISIS world vision, of a “worldwide caliphate”, 
operate with relative autonomy. The group operates not only in Iraq and Syria but also 
in Yemen,108 Khorasan (Pakistan/Afghanistan),109 West Africa,110 Algeria, South East 
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Asia, the Sinai of Egypt, and Libya.111 It has a more token presence in Lebanon, 
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and motivates terrorist attacks of variable impact across the 
globe. Most worryingly of all, it has demonstrated an ability to aggregate longstanding 
grievances or local disagreements in which Sunni Muslims participate in their single 
organisation. The territorial provinces of ISIS are therefore more than remnants, but 
may represent a greater threat than the territorial proto-state phase did. Moreover, 
many observers have stressed that the group may re-emerge, either in one of its 
provinces or even in its former heartland. Today, ISIS is recognised as a “covert global 
network”,112 further complicating matters. In summary, the history of the group, their 
means of organisation and their wholesale rejection of any inclusion within the 
international system make determining the legal nature of the group difficult.  
Whilst in the broader discussion, ISIS has been difficult to define, from an 
international legal standpoint, the question can be simplified. A formal approach to 
the group would see ISIS placed into one of a number of potential categories. 
Performing this examination is required in order to determine whether ISIS have any 
responsibilities under international law. This involves discussion of the concept of 
international legal personality in order for people to understand the type of subjectivity 
ISIS may have and the concept from which rights and obligations are recognised.113  
 
6.3.2 ISIS as individuals under international law  
 
Perhaps the most unsatisfying conclusion with regard to the question of ISIS and legal 
subjectivity would be that, despite an apparently shared collective identity, their 
constituents remain individuals. Whilst this is a permissible means of defining 
personality,114 this could perhaps be taken as an acknowledgement of the law’s 
inability to otherwise understand the collective nature of the group.  
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This is not a complete admission of the shortcomings of international law, 
however. Individuals, after all, have accumulated substantial rights and obligations, 
most notably through human rights law and international criminal law. Individuals can 
break international criminal law,115 and additionally, benefit from human rights. The 
advantage of the individual approach to ISIS is that it does not preclude the law from 
aggregating them under certain circumstances; for instance, individuals can be 
understood as congregating in a militia, or a terrorist cell, where appropriate thresholds 
are achieved. This is consistent with the approach of considering the ISIS movement 
in detail,116 considering different provinces to be disaggregated, and dealing with the 
problem of global terrorism, the ISIS proto-state and other territories as separate 
phenomena. This approach is not without its proponents, who stress the need to apply 
existing thresholds and standards to the threat posed by ISIS.117 Additionally, a 
terrorist group or movement is not a cohesive entity in the same manner as a state, 
lacking the “bright line” that distinguishes a terrorist from civilians.118  
There are, however, disadvantages that come with seeing ISIS members solely 
as individuals. It serves to somewhat obfuscate the collective nature of the group. It 
would, for instance, render it difficult for western nations to connect acts of terrorism 
committed domestically with wider organisations in the manner that the US119 and 
France120 have found expedient. In terms of bringing individuals to justice, there is 
little hope. Whilst addressing crimes such as genocide would fall under the essential 
mandate of the ICC,121 which has recognised the seriousness of the crimes being 
committed by ISIS, it contends that the basis for proceeding is simply not present.122 
Any ad hoc solution is also rendered remote, as it would be dependent on the security 
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council’s referral.123 There also exists the possibility that realising ISIS members as 
individual persons cannot take place without considering whether there are any special 
legal conditions that negate any of the rights and privileges conventionally enjoyed by 
individuals. If terrorists are declared to be beyond the law, a condition related to 
outlawry, or Hostis humani generis,124 a term previously used in relation to torturers, 
pirates, and slavers,125 would impose upon states a duty to extradite or prosecute 
terrorist individuals.126 However, many states may prove unable or unwilling to do so. 
The US and others have raised questions as to the legal personality of some 
individuals, demonstrating a willingness to disregard individual rights under the law 
based upon their status as terrorists,127 or alternately as “unlawful combatants”.128 
These individuals are said to exist within a legal gap between lawful combatant and 
civilian,129 and therefore inhabit what has been termed a legal “black hole”.130 This 
perspective has been used to advocate for enhanced interrogation,131 detention132 and 
targeted killing133 to variable success. However, there is vociferous opposition to the 
view that ISIS individuals are unlawful combatants and inhabit such a legal gap.134 
The discussion surrounding terrorists as individuals raises the question as to whether 
 
123 See Julian Veintimilla, ‘Islamic Law and War Crimes Trials: the Possibility and Challenges of a War 
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an association with ISIS is a sufficient basis for individuals to fall within a spectrum 
ranging between terrorist and “unlawful combatant”. Their status as individuals under 
the law could be modified based on their professed allegiance or some action they 
have committed. Regardless of the legal facts, it is important to note the aspersions 
cast upon the status of ISIS affiliates and fighters by other states as a component of 
any status they are granted.  
 
6.4  ISIS statehood  
 
The group ISIS both controlled territory and administered it in a manner not entirely 
dissimilar to that of a state government.135 To speak plainly, ISIS was never going to 
be a state, and take its place in the “family of nations” subject to law, as with other 
states.136 This was made apparent in the group’s own visceral rejection of the state 
system,137 as well as the reluctance of existing states to afford it anything approaching 
legitimacy.138 Nevertheless, it is important to juxtapose ISIS with theories of statehood 
to discern how it falls short of most previous iterations of states. International criminal 
justice has often depended upon an organisation being a state or displaying a state-like 
a nexus,139 whereas ISIS is denied state status.140 
Statehood would be convenient for a number of reasons. First, the use of armed 
force against the group simply requires that a reference is made to the UN charter for 
this to qualify as self-defence.141 Again, this has ramifications in terms of how such a 
war should be fought. Qualifying ISIS as a state prevents the emergence of 
complicated legal questions. There is sufficient conceptual space to permit scholars 
and others to reasonably discuss the potential for statehood in the context of ISIS. The 
process for determining whether an organisation is a state is not a matter of universal 
consensus, and there are a number of potential approaches. This exercise first requires 
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a legal definition of statehood. Based upon legal discussions, two approaches stand 
out, namely the declaratory and the constitutive approaches.142 The constitutive 
approach confines attribution of statehood to states that are recognised by other states 
as possessing legal personality. Groups like ISIS do not exist because states do not 
consent to their existence. Alternately, the attribution of legal personality has, to some 
extent, often been reliant on an entity in some way being accepted by international 
society, with states granting institutional rights and obligations.143  
As ISIS has not been recognised as a peer by states, the only possible 
interpretation may be arrived at by examining whether ISIS is a state based upon it 
having achieved certain objective features according to the declaratory theory.144 
Despite arguments that were made for ISIS’ statehood, key dissenting factors have 
emerged.145 It is commonly held that states need to, in some way, acquiesce to the 
existence of a new state.146 In this regard, it can be suggested that recognising ISIS as 
a state is rendered impossible by the position affirmed by the UNSC that ISIS/ISIL 
and its affiliates represent a “global and unprecedented threat to international peace 
and security”.147 Such unambiguous statements naturally preclude any states from 
recognising ISIS. 
The declaratory theory effectively renders statehood a matter of historical fact, 
not judgment. No other party gets a say in the matter. Whilst there is no universally 
recognised legal test, some guidance is available. The Montevideo criteria stress the 
need for a permanent population, defined borders, established governance, and the 
capacity to enter into relations with foreign governments.148 Should these criteria be 
met by a group like ISIS, then the implications for the war on terror and global security 
would be significant. It is possible to indicate that at one point, ISIS aspired to many 
of the trappings of declarative statehood in their rudimentary systems of 
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governance.149 Additionally, whilst ISIS never considered themselves to be a state in 
the formal sense, it is possible to indicate other situations in which the intent to found 
a state was disregarded.150 It is therefore perhaps worth exploring ISIS in relation to 
the declaratory theory of statehood. 
 
6.4.1 ISIS as a declaratory state 
 
Verifying whether ISIS ever possessed the features commonly equated with the 
existence of a state is by no means an easy task. Whilst ISIS claimed to have many 
governmental structures and a defined territorial area of control, it is difficult to 
determine with any degree of accuracy what was really taking place. The UN did 
recognise ISIS as employing a rough-cut version of governance.151 Likewise, state 
militaries factored in ISIS’ governance into their assessments.152 Other testaments to 
the efficacy of ISIS’ civil structures are discernible from reports on their crimes, which 
acknowledge a complex system for dispersing slaves and committing other crimes of 
an international character.153  
It is naturally possible to indicate documents that reflect rules and laws.154 For 
example, ISIS issued laws, encapsulating aspects of daily life, criminal justice, and 
punishments.155 Additionally, ISIS provided basic civic services in several key 
areas.156 The group identified and recruited specialists from former regimes, as well 
as from the global Muslim population, bringing in professionals from around the 
world.157  
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It is difficult to determine whether this government was ever effective. It was 
never sustainable, funded as it was on gold and plunder, and its basic economy faltered 
the minute its outward expansion was checked, resulting in the collapse of its civic 
functions.158 As for the possession of territory, whilst ISIS directly controlled key 
supply routes and population centres, it simply terrorised and extorted compliance by 
exploiting tribal and clan structures throughout much of their territory. Even at its 
peak, it is possible to suggest that in real terms, ISIS did not meet the criteria specified 
by the Montevideo convention. Their control was never assured, and their capacity for 
governance was limited. Even if ISIS wanted to become a state, it is likely that the 
circumstances of their origins and the reality of the situation would have forever 
prevented them from doing so. Alternately, the picture of the Islamic State presented 
in its own publications suggests that it implemented a system of government. 
If the lack of acceptance by the wider international society is not taken as an 
insurmountable obstacle to statehood, it may be the case that for a period, the group 
constituted a state. If one is willing to interpret the Montevideo criteria in a flexible 
way, there is some basis to suggest that it conforms, in a basic sense, to the definition 
of a state.159 Whether or not this was the case in formal legal terms, it is important to 
note that not only was ISIS able to displace existing states, it was also able to impose 
an alternative framework of order.  
 
6.4.2 Other approaches to statehood 
 
Whilst there are orthodox approaches to statehood, history and law both open up 
different paths and means for understanding the process for achieving statehood, 
which may be of more utility in the case of ISIS. International law acknowledges a 
range of routes by which a people can remove themselves from an existing state, 
should they be sufficiently oppressed.160 International law now makes provisions for 
peoples to manifest their destinies, seceding from an existing state to determine their 
own future,161 a right rooted in the post-colonial proliferation of states. Such a move 
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remains permissible, should a people be subject to foreign oppression or a racist 
regime.  
First, ISIS purports to represent all Sunni Muslims. Regarding ISIS as the exclusive 
manifestation of Sunni Muslims’ will is not accurate. Moreover, the region is not under 
foreign occupation. It can be contended that generally, a people need to be prevented 
from realising their identity within the context of whatever state already exists.162 
There was nothing to prevent the Sunni population from pursuing their identity within 
the framework of states that already existed. There are some grounds to suggest that 
ISIS could be considered a state for the purposes of international criminal liability. 
Kadic v Karadžić, for instance, addressed a government-like organisation maintaining 
territorial control.163 The Bosnian–Serb Republic was sufficiently state-like to 
attribute command authority to its leadership. This republic established that liability 
exists “whether a person (within the organization) purporting to wield official power 
has exceeded internationally recognized standards of civilized conduct, not whether 
statehood in all its formal aspects exists”.164 In a sense, ISIS could be designated as a 
de facto state165 as it is factually a state, if devoid of the wider legal foundations for 
statehood.  
It is possible to place ISIS under the definition, advanced by Pegg, of a de facto 
state, which would suggest that ISIS is a product of an Islamist survival strategy;166 
this, taken with the inability of the de jure or sovereign states of the region to exercise 
control over the territory. The position that elements of ISIS constitute a de facto state 
is advocated for by Özpek, who suggests that its state-like features have strengthened 
in response to competition with other jihadist groups.167 The accumulation of state-
like features is heavily associated with its military effectiveness when compared to 
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other similar movements. It competes with the states of Iraq and Syria.168 Critically, 
this discussion cannot be held separate to the organisation’s own self-image. The 
group never considered itself to be a state in the strict legal meaning of the term, nor 
could it accept such a designation and remain consistent with its position in the context 
of its own ideology.169 This seemingly blocks the inclusion of ISIS in any of the 
definitions that would constitute “established legal persons”.170 The group has never 
sought “full constitutional independence and widespread recognition as a sovereign 
state”,171 a feature that is implicit in the definition of a de facto state. Moreover, the 
absence of the aspiration to be a state distinguishes it from the Kadic v Karadžić case. 
The ICC provides additional indications that move away from the state-centric 
approach, whilst stressing the need to apply crimes against humanity in circumstances 
where there is organisation of some form. The situation in Kenya demonstrates a move 
away from more conventional concepts of state organisation, and a willingness to 
embrace a more functional understanding when considering the organisational 
requirement:  
 
“The Chamber opines that the formal nature of a group and the level of its 
organization should not be the defining criterion. Instead, as others have 
convincingly put forward, a distinction should be drawn on whether a group 
has the capability to perform acts which infringe on basic human values.”172  
 
Although this definition was contested, and the charges in this situation ultimately 
withdrawn, this emphasis of capability over formal identification could conceivably 
apply to ISIS based on its organisational capability.  
The criteria do not represent universal legal standards for statehood and are 
little more than useful forms of guidance. As Kelsen suggests, statehood must be 
considered at the juncture of theory and practice; in real terms, a state is only a state 
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insofar as other nations choose to treat it as such.173 In terms of partial personality, 
non-state groups participating as belligerents in an armed conflict have a degree of 
subjectivity in international law, specifically in terms of IHL. Before discussing non-
state armed groups and their subjectivity, it is necessary to discuss what they are. 
Conventionally, a non-state armed group was aligned with decolonisation and 
liberation movements, although this term may also refer to insurgencies and other 
conflicts not linked to these specific ends.174 The following describes these non-state 
groups:  
 
“These entities all have some degree of effective control of territory 
through military means and are acknowledged as persons with 
whom the international community can engage with on the 
international plane. These entities are highly organized (e.g., they 
might even adopt internal ‘legislation’) and often resemble 
states.”175 
 
There are, it must be conceded, many factors that conflict with the consideration of 
ISIS as a non-state armed group. First, terrorist groups, largely speaking, are not 
considered parties in IHL.176 Second, ISIS has already been attributed a range of 
characteristics that are not generally associated with conventional non-state groups, 
many of which have been mentioned in the course of this chapter.  
A key acknowledgement is that today, non-state entities are more present in 
international law than in the past: 
 
“The subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily 
identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their 
nature depends upon the needs of the community. Throughout its 
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history, the development of international law has been influenced by 
the requirements of international life, and the progressive increase 
in the collective activities of States has already given rise to 
instances of action upon the international plane by certain entities 
which are not States”.177 
 
Full legal personality is attributed to states. Other organisations have historically 
existed with partial rights or responsibilities. Examples include free cities, as specified 
in earlier permutations of international law,178 governments in exile, non-state armed 
groups in IHL, transnational corporations, and international organisations. Crawford, 
for instance, discusses the “transnational” aptitude of people to organise in such a way 
as to escape the capacity for states to regulate them, referring explicitly to transitional 
corporations in this regard.179 The group ISIS could represent such an entity, albeit 
working to a very different end.  
One of the key attributes of “non-state” actors in the international legal system 
is the limitation of these actors in certain fields of the international legal system.180 
Although ISIS may have a limited status because of states’ need to wage war and 
attribute criminal liability, this still represents a limited form of personality. Cronin 
suggests “proto-state” as a term of utility in the case of ISIS, and notes that ISIS 
seemingly has no desire to win legitimacy to rule over the Sunni population.181 The 
proto-state, as a term, has become prevalent in both the language of international 
lawyers and scholars examining ISIS. In the context of the war on terror, ISIS are 
joined by al-Shabab, the al-Nusra front, the Taleban, and Boko Haram, who were all 
described as proto-states at some point during their existence.182 Proto-statehood has 
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also been used to describe a vast range of armed groups that control territory and 
exercise, to a limited extent, administration over both territory and population.183 It is 
possible to suggest that its current usage with regard to groups within the context of 
the war on terror needs to be differentiated from its more general usage.  
Historically, the proto-state was understood to refer to a precursor; a term of art 
used to describe the juncture in which an insurrection or rebellion had taken over a 
territory and begun to administer it, but not yet formed a nation state, or been defeated 
by the de jure power of a territory.184 In the context of the war on terror and ISIS, such 
a progression cannot be assumed; not only is it blocked from achieving the status of a 
state, but it has effectively bypassed defeat. In the terrorist, or jihadist context, the 
proto-state is often conceptualised as an attempt to outbid other terrorist groups.185 
This makes the construction of the proto-state an effort to impress and draw the 
support of other jihadists, not accumulate the capacity to become a state.  
Typically, a proto-state would be based around the rejection of a specific state’s 
authority to rule over a people or group, who would secede and seek to form their own 
state. This characteristic is modified in the case of ISIS, and has been variably absent 
in the range of other proto-states that pledged allegiance to the group;186 they instead 
reject the authority of the entire international system, and accordingly, do not wish to 
create a state. If one goes as far as to entertain its mythology, then one must have 
conceded that its long-term aspirations are indeed limited, given that once certain 
messianic criteria are met by the organisation, the world must end.187 
In using the word proto-state to conceptualise a territorial jihadist organisation, 
it is possible to confuse the manner in which the term has been used in the past with 
its present use. A caliphate need not achieve de facto control over the world’s entire 
Muslim population; indeed, if one excludes the very early days of the Islamic faith, 
then no unitary organisation can profess to have ever achieved as much. More 
importantly, it is critical to grasp that no matter the disposition of Islamic scholars, 
ISIS and its constituent individuals understand the project as a caliphate. Whatever the 
position of the scholars, the use of the term caliphate is sufficient for ISIS to shield 
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itself from the meaning of any reprimand, and remove itself from any normal moral 
context. It is enough to demand the allegiance of every identified Muslim, and enough 
for some to listen. ISIS understand themselves as a universal state and therefore 
behave as if this were so.  
As already mentioned in the course of this chapter, ISIS is just one of many 
organisations that have congregated around the same mission. Moreover, more often 
than not, the focus of this messianic fury has been other Muslim states and peoples. 
Whilst the question as to whether ISIS represent the caliphate is a matter for 
theological debate, it is possible to suggest that they themselves imagine this to be the 
case and behave accordingly.  
 
6.5 The war on terror; is a new form of personality applicable to 
unconventional armed groups being synthesised? 
 
Suggesting that the war on terror comprises a new approach in international law is 
nothing short of controversial. It does, however, indicate that the understanding of 
non-state groups and terrorist organisations within the “war on terror” is different to 
the manner in which similar groups and organisations may be treated outside of this 
campaign. Whilst as yet, no authoritative acknowledgment of this difference is 
apparent, state practice indicates that in the context of the war on terror, there is a need 
to modify international law. This is apparent in the way organisations like the Taliban, 
Al Qaeda, and ISIS are treated. Whilst it is not yet possible to conclude that a new 
form of personality derivative of statehood has emerged, the innovations undertaken 
by states in relation to such groups is not without importance. 
 
6.5.1 The Taliban and Al Qaeda; an intermediate case?  
 
Prior to engaging with the current state of the war on terror, it is important to consider 
how it began. Examination of early US approaches to the war on terror can reveal a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the enemy. The misleadingly titled “strategy for 
combating terrorism” is focused upon the destruction of leadership and material 
support. Thus, the opening of the war on terror was preoccupied with engaging and 
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destroying the enemy. To be clear, Al Qaeda did not resemble a state. The Taliban, 
the organisation harbouring them, did.188 
Prior to 2001, the Taliban had held power over much of Afghanistan for at 
least four years, even being recognised by a handful of states.189 There is evidence to 
suggest that the Taliban possessed the capacity to institute governance.190 It was 
additionally anti-western, Islamic in character, and was actively harbouring Al Qaeda, 
an international terrorist group. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, therefore, 
represented to the US a promising target for military force. The position of the Taliban, 
it is contended, is significantly different from that of later organisations within the 
context of the war on terror. Having earlier achieved de facto control of the majority 
of the nation, they demanded recognition from other states, and represented 
themselves as the sole legitimate government of the territory.191 The Taliban did not 
commit an armed attack against the US. The group did, however, make clear that they 
would continue to shelter Al Qaeda, following the 9/11 attacks.192 
In reconciling the Taliban with the imperative to use force against them, a 
number of labels have been invoked. Following the attacks of 2001, the US 
immediately sought to identify the Taliban as a legitimate target in pursuit of self-
defence.193 There was then the manner in which the Taliban chose to fight, in a manner 
that by international standards, was not considered by the US to be consistent with the 
customs of war.194 International lawyers have stressed that there was a legal basis for 
differentiating the Taliban from their guests, however, based upon their de facto 
control of a territory.195 This line of reasoning is most apparent in the resistance to the 
US assertion that the Taliban were not entitled to prisoner of war status.196 That this 
assessment having  been made primarily upon the affiliation of the Taliban with a 
transnational terrorist organisation. 
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Their early ideological origins dictated more modest aims than those it specified later; 
more transnational varieties of global jihadism, at least in their earlier incarnations. 
The potent influence of Pashtun tribalism, in which most Taliban themselves 
participated, imposed geographical, racial limitations upon their jihadist struggle, 
limiting their sphere of interest to an area traditionally dominated by Pashtuns; 
Afghanistan and regions of neighbouring Pakistan.197 Unlike its partner organisation 
Al Qaeda, and later ISIS, this limited its activity to a particular geography. In this 
regard, it is possible to suggest that the Taliban represent an intermediate case; 
somewhere between a movement aspiring to the legitimacy of a member of the 
international community, and one supporting a messianic future. As Kepel suggests, 
whilst the Taliban’s Deobandi tradition shares a literalist approach to scripture and 
jihad, it differs from more globally-orientated Jihadi-Salafists insomuch as it is 
focused inward upon a particular people and nation.198 
What stopped the Taliban from becoming realised as an Islamic nation-state? 
Disregarding the war on terror in Afghanistan would certainly obscure one of the 
major factors behind the group’s ill fortunes, though it is important to note the failure 
of the Taliban project to gain traction prior to the war on terror. It is possible to suggest 
that part of the reason for their failure to be recognised in spite of their de facto control 
of Afghanistan is due to the manner in which they sought to reconcile their 
nationalistic identity with their jihadist ideology. Unfortunately, this did not prove to 
be a stable arrangement. It is possible to observe friction between the two identities – 
Sharia and Pashtun nationalism – a fundamental contradiction.199 Domestically, it has 
been suggested that the nationalist impulse arising from Pashtun identity was 
overwhelmed by the global, Salafist brand of jihad expressed by Al Qaeda and its 
leadership, who wielded increasing influence over the Taliban through access to global 
funding and support,200 in an event that could be interpreted as an instance of religious 
outbidding,201 or more compellingly, simple economics. The stresses of this 
contradiction are also evident in terms of the Taliban’s initial pursuit of statehood. 
Even having achieved a position close to dominating the Afghan state, recognition 
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was limited to a handful of other Islam-orientated nations.202 As the history of the 
Taliban demonstrates, its internal pursuit of Islamism/jihadist legitimacy proved 
incongruent with its external goals of international legal recognition stemming from 
its nationalist identity elements. A number of statements criticising the oppression and 
brutality of its regime were issued,203 with this likely accounting for its limited 
recognition. Looking back, the Taliban may be conceived as an expression of state 
force, namely that of Pakistan. Whilst this has been alleged multiple times by NGOs204 
and elements of the US security services,205 an authoritative recognition of this would 
not be expedient for geopolitical reasons. 
They have also been conceptualised as “suicidal” in that their ideology and 
belief system consistently cause them to make decisions that undermine their future 
capacity to govern,206 with this, in turn, jeopardising any progress towards statehood. 
Their initial legitimacy, founded on stamping out corruption and lawlessness, soon 
gave way to a spiral of religiouslyorientated oppression and violence, that soon 
eliminated any legitimacy they may have derived from the population.207 This 
oppression drew vocal criticism. Likewise, their commitment to jihadist goals caused 
them to invite and harbour elements of a transnational terrorist network, the then pre-
eminent Al Qaeda. These links, dating back to the Soviet invasion, drew international 
attention following the 9/11 attacks, and formed the rationale behind the US-led 
invasion that toppled the regime. 
Prior to 2001, whilst recognised as a threat to peace and security, the UNSC 
repeatedly stressed the option of working with the Taliban and others in order to better 
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the security and human rights situation.208 The narrative changed following the US 
invasion, with the Taliban identified as harbouring Al Qaeda leadership elements, 
justifying their destruction as a political and military force in the region. After the US 
invasion, the group initially made a commitment to restore the Islamic emirate, aiming 
at toppling the foreign-installed government in Kabul. In this enterprise, the 
organisation was able to draw upon a clandestine jihadist global network and alleged 
support from neighbouring Pakistan and Gulf-based funds. The following years of 
violent insurgency and sectarian violence are a testament to the organisation’s 
durability, local connections, and global support. Regardless of the group’s successes, 
at the current juncture, the organisation’s aims have shifted and it is now far more 
wary of achieving a monopoly, instead seeking to effect a power-sharing arrangement 
with the Afghanistan government and the various warlords.209 This has been claimed 
as a great success,210 though it must be noted that similar moves have failed in the 
past.211  
There is then the contention that the leadership of the Taliban, having spent 
time overseas, have changed and softened their position on the nature of the Islamic 
state, yet the rank and file will accept nothing short of the Islamic emirate being 
restored.212 The adoption of a more moderate power-sharing agreement is additionally 
likely to separate the Taliban from any revenue streams and foreign support.  
The Taliban finds itself already engaged in a struggle with other Islamist 
groups, such as ISIS. It has even gone as far as to suggest it is now willing to fight the 
group on the US’s behalf.213 It is possible to represent the Taliban’s move towards a 
power-sharing agreement as positive. More cynically, it is possible to suggest that the 
Taliban’s leadership are out of touch with their movement, who remain committed to 
the Islamic emirate. Moreover, ISIS’ global brand ideology of a caliphate could prove 
capable of outbidding the more nationally-orientated Taliban.  
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Conceptualising the Taliban as an intermediate case between today's 
transnational terrorist organisations and more conventional revolutionary movements 
is useful for the following reason: it shows that such an arrangement is unstable; the 
Taliban’s pursuit of dual legitimacy resulting, ultimately, in the loss of both. The case 
of the Taliban may additionally be taken as an indication that recognition is not 
predicated solely upon control of a territory, but requires aspirant nations to make a 
commitment to the fundamental values of the international community.214  
 
6.5.2 Defining ISIS in the context of the “war on terror”; self-defence against a 
global threat?   
 
This chapter has so far considered the possible manners in which ISIS and other 
similar groups can be defined. Two key details can be noted. First, there is difficulty 
aligning ISIS with statehood, or, for that matter, any understanding of a legal 
personality. There is the physical reality of ISIS as a transnational movement in 
addition to its territorial presence. Finally, there is the manner in which ISIS defines 
itself.  
Creating a new personality for a group like ISIS that takes into account its 
peculiar characteristics would probably represent an insurmountable challenge for a 
system of public international law that is inextricably linked with the notion of a 
nation-state as a unitary actor.215 There is a lack of knowledge as to what solution 
would best serve the long-term interests of states and safeguard the integrity of 
international law and its various subfields. Rather than expecting a solution to be 
apparent based upon legal deduction and principles, it may be better to conceive of 
international law itself as a product of historical compromise and circumstance. In this 
vein, this study now considers whether the formal approach to defining ISIS has been 
superseded by the manner in which the organisation and the conflict(s) it participates 
in are identified in practice.  
The first contention to make is that organisations like ISIS have already 
changed international law. As Scharf notes, international law has already made some 
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curious elaborations in relation to the group.216 Whilst ISIS does not participate 
directly in the shaping of international law, by its existence it does force states and 
international organisations to reconsider and revise legal institutions. More broadly, 
the “war on terror” is perhaps rooted in the defensive reaction to the 9/11 attacks and 
subsequent terrorist activities around the world. It began as a formless action against 
a poorly defined gallery of nations and organisations, or the “axis of evil”.217 At the 
current moment, however, the war on terror has progressively evolved, influencing 
international law. It is possible to advance that, in addition to changing legal 
assumptions about the use of force, a new form of legal personality has been applied 
to the groups representing the side of “terror” in the conflict. 
It can be contended that at its instigation, the “war on terror” was engaging 
what Scharf characterised as a “different form of threat”.218 At the war’s initiation, the 
primary target, Al Qaeda, had already accomplished a range of attacks against 
American military and civilian targets, and represented a complex and durable 
networked threat. The inception of the “war on terror” demonstrated the capacity of 
such organisations to commit an attack that equalled and indeed exceeded the capacity 
of many state threats.219 Whilst this has taken shareholders some time to come to terms 
with, the interaction between states, their militaries, the international system, and 
various authorities in the form of legal experts and scholars has begun to articulate a 
new understanding of such groups for the purpose of armed conflict.  
First, based on the “war on terror”, it is possible to suggest that a distinctive 
form of international legal personality has been called into existence specifically to 
differentiate groups like ISIS from more conventional non-state groups (terrorists), 
and states alike. This has been done to account for the specific humanitarian challenges 
it poses and to address their transnational nature. This new system draws not only on 
IHL but is based on domestic legal systems and the advice and orders issued by states. 
In contrast to the manner in which terrorist groups and other organisations were 
identified in the opening years of the “war on terror”, in the case of ISIS, a number of 
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distinctive features that are sufficient to differentiate it from any previously 
established form of legal personality have been acknowledged. 
The first indication that a new form of personality is emerging specifically in 
relation to the “war on terror” is related to self-defence. Self-defence is applicable only 
in instances where one state attacks another.220 The ICJ has been relatively steadfast 
in maintaining this perspective, specifying an element of state involvement as vital for 
an “armed attack” to be said to have taken place.221 The perspective has been 
progressively reinforced by judgments by the ICJ in relation to Israel222 and 
Uganda/DRC.223 The ICJ’s position is fundamentally at odds with reality, with the 
acceptance of self-defence against non-state actors increasingly accepted by states.224 
To be specific, this acceptance of the capacity for non-state groups to 
independently reach the threshold for “armed attack” is largely confined to the “war 
on terror”. The context of the war has in part entailed recognising that non-state actors 
can be just as threatening as states, from their very instigation. It is now broadly 
accepted that the capacity to commit an “armed attack” is not exclusive to states.225 
This, in turn, has altered how self-defence is understood. As Hakimi summarises, US 
operations in Syria illustrate the erosion of the principle that defensive force may not 
be used against non-state actors, though there is a lack of a precise legal standard by 
which to abide in such situations.226 It cannot, however, be assumed that such a 
position would be applicable to all non-state groups, but would be limited to groups 
of a certain capacity, or of a certain nature. This suggests an imminent schism between 
more conventional non-state groups that are not sufficient to warrant the use of 
defensive force, and those, like Al Qaeda and ISIS, that does justify the use of 
defensive force.  
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The “war on terror” is primarily populated by groups of the second nature. The 
invocation of the NATO treaty, Article 5,227 marked the legal initiation of the “war on 
terror”.228 The US expressed to the UN that the attack of 9/11 represented an “armed 
attack”. The early “war on terror” can be conceived of as the rapid realignment of 
treaties in line with the notion that a non-state actor can commit an armed attack, and 
can be the subject of a self-defence argument. Subsequently, the UNSC omitted 
reference to states in Resolutions 1368 and 1373.229 
There was widespread support for the coalition intervention in Afghanistan, as 
with earlier instances of international intervention seen as primarily humanitarian in 
nature; more criticism has been levelled since the 2003 Iraq intervention, which has 
been framed as “pre-emptive self-defence”.230 Self-defence has been used by a range 
of nation-states to justify the use of airpower against ISIS.231 In the initial phase of the 
war, the notion of states “harbouring” terrorists was a central point of contention; there 
were discussions as to the responsibilities of a state with regard to preventing terrorist 
activity within their respective territories.232 The group ISIS has required this notion 
to be revised; the contention made by the US is that the territorial dimension of ISIS 
existed in an area that may be likened to the concept of “ungoverned space” or a “no 
man’s land”. The contention that Iraq and Syria lost legal control of this territory has 
profound implications for international law, should it become recognised as a new 
customary law.233  
Nevertheless, there are now sufficient events that can be framed as self-defence 
against non-state actors, suggesting that armed attacks can take place without the 
involvement of an opposing state that either supports or harbours the group in 
question.234 It is additionally possible to contend that the notion of invoking self-
defence against non-state groups is spurred by the inclination of non-state actors 
within the context of the “war on terror” to attack or encourage others to preform 
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228 John C. Yoo and James C. Ho, ‘The Status of Terrorists’ (2003). 
229 UNSC 1368 and UNSC 1373. 
230 See John Yoo, ‘Using Force’ (2004) 71 University of Chicago Law Review 729. 
231 Specifically, France, UK and USA. See UN Doc. S/PV.7565, 2–9; see also SC Res. 2249 (2015); 
and Australia UN Doc. S/2015/693, 9 September 2015.  
232 Scharf (n 216) 24; Theresa Reinold, ‘State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-
defense Post-9/11’ (2011) 105 American Journal of International Law 244, 245. 
233 See Russell K. Jackson, ‘Lawlessness Within a Foreign State as a Legal Basis for United States 
Military Intervention to Restore the Rule of Law’ (2006) 187 Military Law Review 1. 
234 Reinold (n 232). 
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attacks within a wide range of states. Al Qaeda and, to a lesser extent perhaps, ISIS, 
have exhibited capacities in this regard. A non-state group behaving conventionally 
would be unlikely to be capable of causing equivalent damage to western states.235 
The development of self-defence in the context of the “war on terror” has been 
undoubtedly spurred by the persistent anxiety of a terrorist group armed with weapons 
of mass destruction.236 Whatever the precise reasoning behind the broadening of self-
defence to non-state groups, it is accepted that the most convincing arguments are 
made in relation to terrorist groups within the “war on terror”.237 It can, therefore, be 
stated that non-state armed groups operating within the “war on terror” are attributed 
to a characteristic that is not reflected outside of this context. At the current juncture, 
it must be stressed that there is a certain degree of uncertainty regarding when and 
where it is possible to utilise defensive force against a non-state organisation or group. 
Reinhold suggests that there is, however, a willingness on the part of states to revise 
self-defence in order to better reflect changing realities.238  
On the one hand, it is possible to specify features exclusive to states and 
attributed to armed groups within the context of the “war on terror”. On the other hand, 
it is possible to specify features attributed to armed groups within the context of the 
“war on terror” that serve to disassociate an organisation like ISIS from statehood and 
other existing forms of legal personality.  
At this point in the war on terror, it can conclusively be stated that in relation to 
armed conflict, combat, targeted killing, and other uses of force or the threat thereof, 
terrorist groups, territorial or otherwise, and their associated individuals are presented 
as not having the rights and privileges generally understood to exist in such contexts. 
Speaking generally, there has been a great deal of discussion surrounding the treatment 
of enemy combatants in the context of the war on terror, particularly in relation to the 
various tribunals and systems utilised by the US regarding detainees affiliated with 
terrorist groups.239 By the time ISIS emerged, a range of states had developed specific 
approaches to dealing with detained terrorists/combatants. By this time, the notion of 
 
235 Bruce Hoffman, ‘Rethinking Terrorism and Counterterrorism Since 9/11’ (2002) 25 Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 303, 307. 
236 Michael Lacey, ‘Self-defense or Self-denial: the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ 
(2000) 10 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 293. 
237Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-state Actors (Law Academy of European ed, 
Oxford University Press 2006) 271–300.  
238 Reinold (n 232). 
239 George H. Aldrich, ‘The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal Combatants’ (2002) 
96 The American Journal of International Law 891. 
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such individuals inhabiting a “legal gap”240 had given way to a recognised need to 
place such individuals within a stable legal framework. It is naturally important to 
consider the starting point for classifying the status of terrorist individuals in the “war 
on terror”. First an enemy combatant can be described as an individual to be detained 
for the duration of hostilities,241 likewise recognised in the Geneva conventions.242 The 
treatment of those under arms in the context of the “war on terror” has not diverged 
radically from the notion of a combatant contained in the Geneva Convention, though 
states have sought to present that groups are not entitled to such treatment.243 They 
have, however, recognised that enhanced detention is inconsistent with the orthodox 
interpretation of the Geneva Convention. The ongoing nature of the conflict has been 
framed as an endless, shifting confrontation, contained within the “war on terror”. 
As hostilities against groups like ISIS have never really come to an end, there is 
a risk that once a sentence or period of detention runs out, an individual can simply 
rejoin the conflict at the nearest front. Whilst states have developed programmes of 
deradicalization to prevent this, the efficacy of these programmes is frequently called 
into question. It can be contended that the shift towards a more ambiguous form of 
detention reflects the reality of conflict within the “forever war”. States have struggled 
to generate a reliable framework that is consistent with human rights whilst 
concurrently containing the threat posed by individuals affiliated with terrorist groups. 
This marks a departure from existing standards within the context of the “war on 
terror”.  
Several observers have sought to align the status of hostile individuals within 
the “war on terror” with Hostis humani generis.244 In examining modern terrorists, 
some have concluded that this is not a great leap, given the similarity of contemporary 
terrorism to activities previously designated as such.245 Such a designation has 
 
240 See Fionnuala Aolain, ‘Hamdan and Common Article 3: Did the Supreme Court Get it Right? (9/11 
Five Years on: A Look at the Global Response to Terrorism)’ (2007) 91 Minnesota Law Review 1532; 
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20, 36 Stat. 2277, 2301. 
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ramifications that reach beyond other immediate clear consequences in criminal law 
terms.  
 
6.6 The “unconventional armed group” in the “war on terror”: a twenty-first 
century “uncivilised state”?  
 
This chapter commenced with a conceptual discussion, contrasting the ideas about 
statehood and legal personality held historically in European public international law 
with the definitions of statehood that prevail today. The distinction between civilised 
and uncivilised nations had the benefit of limiting the provision of legal personality to 
nations that shared history, religion, and culture. This prevented the inclusion of 
peoples that, in the sensibilities of the era, were seen as incapable or unwilling to 
conform to the same standards as European nations. It additionally permitted European 
states to act decisively and without legal impediment against the then alien, uncivilised 
nations of the world. This system, it can be contended, is no longer extant; no longer 
is legal personality rooted in a normative shibboleth but is attainable by any people 
upon the realisation of certain features. Moreover, any community imagined upon 
racial or religious grounds can confidently set out upon the path to statehood, should 
circumstances merit such a move.  
In examining the problem of unconventional non-state armed groups today, 
particularly in relation to the war on terror, it is possible to observe challenges to the 
manner in which statehood is understood. Based upon the assessment of this chapter, 
it is difficult to conclude whether ISIS ever achieved the objective standards generally 
regarded in relation to statehood, nor can they be interpreted as being in a legitimate 
rebellion against an oppressive occupation. If statehood or other forms of legal 
personality are purely a matter of historical fact, however, then there is nothing to stop 
a group like ISIS from attaining such status, and thereby benefiting from the rights and 
privileges afforded to states. It is therefore compelling to ask what would happen if 
another similar group could be conclusively demonstrated to be in adherence with the 
specified criteria.  
This chapter has sought to introduce additional perspectives in relation to 
unconventional armed groups that alienate them from statehood. First, there is the 
immutable reality that recognition of any legal personality is dependent upon the 
behaviour of other actors in the system; namely, the recognition and treatment by 
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states and international organisations. There is then the self-image of organisations 
like ISIS and its imagined trajectory, as suggested by publications and statements 
made by its leaders. Upon this basis, it is possible to suggest that ISIS conceives of 
itself as a “universal state”, or in Islamic parlance, a caliphate.  
A key touchstone in thinking about the evolving nature of such groups and their 
position should be the legal manoeuvres accomplished in relation to Kadic v 
Karadžić.246 It may be the case that groups like ISIS have exceeded the features of 
governance that were specified in relation to this case. The critical detail that may be 
specified, however, is that unlike the incipient Serb republic, groups like ISIS do not 
aspire to become states or autonomous actors of any sort within the international 
system. This is significant.  
There is no distinction existing in international law that recognises the notion of 
a universal state. This chapter has however suggested that in the context of the war on 
terror, an elaborate identity has begun to emerge that is perhaps best articulated in 
relation to ISIS. Whilst not recognised as a state, ISIS has been attributed to a range 
of state-like capacities, many of which are not generally attributed to “non-state” 
groups. This distinctive legal personality has a range of visible ramifications that not 
only encapsulate how ISIS is treated on the battlefield, but also affect how institutions 
and individuals’ interface with the group.  
Where acknowledged in the modern parlance, ISIS is often referred to as a proto-
state – proto often taken to mean primitive. Such a word is not burdened by the history 
of the term “civilised”, though it obscures the very clear connection between ISIS and 
past incarnations of the universal state. Today the capacity of international law is 
somewhat greater, and, whilst the idea of an “uncivilised state” can be used in the 
context of ISIS, there is nothing to suggest that such a category of legal personality 
today would entail the complete absence of either legitimacy or personality. Nor need 
it be the case that nation states be given the freedom to contend such organisations 
today, as they did in the past.  
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
 
246 Kadic v Karadžić (Opinion of 2nd Circuit re: Subject Matter Jurisdiction) Docket Nos 94-9035, -
9069 (13 October 1995). 
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In an essay written in 1882, Ernest Renan sought to define the origins of a nation; 
discussing the kingdoms, empires, and the tribes of history, he concluded that these 
earlier states, depending on shared ethnicity or imposed religion, quickly reach their 
breaking point. He believed that a true, legitimate nation must be grounded on a shared 
moral purpose, describing state as the expression of ideals. In suggesting this, Renan 
touched on the identity of the modern nation-state.247 
As part of this essay, Renan discussed the other forms of historical nation into 
which humans have organised themselves. In the past, a “nation” may have been 
defined in terms of familial connections, extended over generations, ethnic homogeny, 
or the imposition of religious identity as a criterion for membership.248 Renan argues 
that such notions are outmoded; these systems could not be expected to meet the global 
complexities of the nineteenth century, this argument based on the frequency with 
which they resorted to barbarity and subsequently collapsed.  
It is possible to go back and recognise that in early permutations of international 
law, it was possible to conceive of territorial organisations existing outside of 
international law, effectively excluded upon largely normative characteristics. This 
chapter has sought to suggest that this was in part the result of western nation-states 
lacking the means of determining what qualities were required to participate 
meaningfully in a shared system of regulation. It is also the case that at this juncture 
in world history, there existed a range of political arrangements that could not be 
expected to accept the existence of stable borders and conventions required by early 
international law. It is possible to specify the “caliphate” as one such form of political 
arrangement. In relation to the war on terror, international law finds itself confronting 
a territorial organisation that share many of the characteristics frequently associated 
with statehood, yet critically does not desire any stable relationship with other states 
or the international system. 
Naturally, it is neither desirable nor practical to reimagine an “uncivilised state” 
in relation to current problems regarding groups like ISIS. Total exclusion from the 
international system would perhaps suit the needs of states in terms of destroying such 
organisations, but would leave little room for criminal liability, or inducing 
 
247 See E. Renan, What is a Nation? (Tapir Press 1996) 28, ‘Man is neither a slave to his race, nor to 
his language, nor to his religion, nor to the course of rivers, nor to the direction of mountain ranges. A 
great aggregation of men, sane and warm-hearted, creates a moral conscience called a nation’. 
248 Ibid. 
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compliance. The notion that the disposition of a territorial entity can dominate and 
govern a territory yet not achieve anything approaching the legitimacy of a sovereign 
nation is an important feature of early international law, and it is worth considering 
how this may be significant in relation to contemporary problems. Today’s problem is 
that, as in the past, there exist organisations that have the objective features of states, 
yet do not aspire to be states. This is perhaps most apparent in the example of ISIS, 
though it is possible to specify other similar organisations whose fundamental 
ideology makes their behaviour inconsistent with inclusion in a system of states. There 
is significant difficulty in aligning the group with existing legal subjects in 
international law. This is not to say that they have no personality, however.  
In examining the legal personality of groups within the war on terror, it is possible 
to suggest that an evolution in thinking about legal personality is taking place. This 
evolution reflects a need to separate legitimacy from capacity; to acknowledge that an 
organisation may, for instance, achieve the objective features of statehood, yet its 
means of doing so, as well as its future intentions, mean that it does not receive the 
considerations usually granted to states. It is important to recognise that such 
organisations of which ISIS is emblematic have state features which are important to 
consider when thinking about self-defence, or in relation to the criminal liability of 
commanders and leadership.  
The wider implications of ISIS for public international law are of immense 
significance. In today’s thinking, some have considered the proto-state of which ISIS 
are emblematic as a possible future direction for international law. As this chapter has 
argued, however, it is of no small importance that ISIS, in its own self-perception, 
resembles the type of organisation that was historically specifically excluded from 
earlier iterations of international law – the universal state. By examining the real 
treatment and legal understanding of non-state groups in the context of the war on 
terror, it is possible to contend that international law is developing a modified 
understanding of a non-state group that can be likened to “an uncivilised state” of the 
past.  
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7 Is IHL Capable of Recognising that ISIS/Unconventional 
Armed Groups Are Different, and Applying Rules 
Appropriately? 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
This study is now in a position to consider exactly the legal challenge generated by 
unconventional armed groups of which ISIS is emblematic, in view of both their 
specific characteristics and the challenges brought about by the divergence of such 
groups from the typology of the non-state group in IHL. This chapter will first assess 
how IHL has conventionally categorised armed conflict, before identifying trends that 
serve to question the effectiveness of these categories; namely the 
“transnationalisation” of conflict, and the challenge of triggering humanitarian 
protections in situations involving unconventional armed groups – in particular, the 
challenge in aligning these conflicts with the criteria used by IHL to both identify and 
classify armed conflicts. The chapter will then consider the theoretical approaches that 
have been developed to more closely bring into line IHL and the realities of modern 
conflict, considering transformative approaches, as well as more modest adjustments. 
This serves to demonstrate the need to adapt, as well as the procedural challenge 
associated with any change in the manner in which IHL categorises conflicts. Finally, 
this chapter will discuss the possibility of generating a more effective framework that 
ensures appropriate protections are applied to conflicts involving unconventional 
armed groups.  
As this chapter will suggest, the key problem is an epistemological one, in that 
the means of understanding warfare upon which IHL relies does not represent an 
effective means of understanding the type of conflict perpetrated by groups like ISIS. 
This in turn would suggest that formal credentials (statehood) or indices (intensity, 
organisation) that IHL has conventionally relied upon to identify and categorise armed 
conflict do not represent good hallmarks for determining what type of force states 
should be permitted to use, or when assessing the humanitarian needs in relation to 
many new conflicts. As IHL presents no effective framework for “knowing” such new 
wars, the categorisation of armed conflict is often misapplied, resulting in a shortfall 
of humanitarian protections. This serves to suggest a need for either a revision to the 
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existing categories, or the inclusion of additional criteria that permit such conflicts to 
be understood. 
 
7.2 IHL’s understanding of armed conflict, and the challenge posed by 
unconventional armed groups like ISIS 
 
IHL is frequently presented as universal, with its essential principles present across 
different historical approaches to warfare. Consistent with this principle, a range of 
different origins of the system has been postulated from a vast range of religious and 
cultural perspectives.1 Whilst the moral foundations of IHL may indeed be present in 
multiple different traditions, the specific formal origin of IHL in twentieth-century 
Europe2 imposes some limitations upon the universal applicability of the system, and 
critically, the manner in which war is defined and categorised. Contemporary IHL is 
to some degree, an artefact of this place and period. Whilst IHL has subsequently been 
revised to better apply to different contexts, it may be contended that there is still a 
commitment to classical state conflict as an “ideal” form of warfare, with both states 
and non-state groups anticipated to adhere to this model.  
Naturally, IHL’s continuing commitment to the state variety of warfare 
presents blind spots. Groups like ISIS serve to question the conventional paradigms of 
state conflict and conflict against conventional non-state groups.3 Both ISIS and other 
unconventional armed groups represent the realisation of a number of longstanding 
trends in warfare that, taken together, represent a foundational threat to applying IHL; 
asymmetric tactics, ideology comprising intractable hatred, and rejection of the 
conventional incentives for inducing compliance. Taken together, these features mean 
that such groups are difficult to identify with “non-state” groups as they are described 
in IHL. In order to understand how such trends, represent a challenge, it is necessary 
 
1 Linkages between IHL and various traditions have been established in relation to Islamic, Indian and 
Chinese approaches to war to specify just a few possible origins. See respectively Mohamed Elewa 
Badar, ‘Jus in Bello under Islamic International Law’ (2013) 13 International Criminal Law Review 
593; V. Mani, ‘International Humanitarian Law: An Indo-Asian Perspective’ (2001) 83 International 
Review of the Red Cross 59; He Xiaodong, ‘The Chinese Humanitarian Heritage and the Dissemination 
of and Education in International Humanitarian Law in the Chinese People's Liberation Army’ (2001) 
83 International Review of the Red Cross 141.  
2 Gary D. Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict: International Humanitarian Law in War (Cambridge 
University Press 2010) 119. 
3 See Benedetta Berti, ‘What’s in a Name? Re-conceptualizing Non-state Armed Groups in the Middle 
East’ Palgrave Communications <https://doi.org/10.1057/palcomms.2016.89> accessed 29 November 
2016, 1. 
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to first understand the current order and the manner in which IHL defines armed 
conflict.  
 
7.2.1 The incumbent system of IHL 
 
The laws of armed conflict were initially crafted to regulate armed conflict between 
states.4 Successively, however, non-state armed groups became potential participants 
within the laws of armed conflict. Whilst this expansion represented a positive step 
from the point of view of humanitarian organisations, it is possible to suggest that IHL 
is only capable of effectively responding to situations involving armed groups that 
mimic states; this is not surprising in that the humanitarian protections applied in non-
state conflicts are derivative of the protections developed in order to regulate states, 
though the extension of IHL to non-state groups is curtailed by the nature of state 
sovereignty.5 Through customary law, the situation has since developed in such a way 
as to ensure that the majority of protections applied to international armed conflict 
(IAC) can be applicable in non-international armed conflict (NIAC).6 This represents 
a challenge in relation to the increasing involvement of armed groups utilising 
unconventional methods and means in warfare. In such cases, expecting states to 
follow such rules may be inconsistent with the reality of unconventional situations, 
these restrictions having been contrived for a very different sort of war.  
IHL is recognised as a legal attempt to introduce humanitarian principles into 
war. To some extent, it represents a continuation of the longstanding sentiment that 
war is not the absence of a legal order, but a separate one.7 Whilst the laws governing 
armed conflict today are formally very young,8 they are in some aspects related to the 
laws and customs established following the construction of the state system.9 Though 
 
4 See Nicolas Lamp, ‘Conceptions of War and Paradigms of Compliance: The “New War” Challenge 
to International Humanitarian Law’ (2011) 16 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 225, 225–226. 
5 Rodger Bartels, ‘Timelines, Borderlines and Conflicts: the Historical Evolution of the Legal Divide 
Between International and Non-international Armed Conflicts’ (2009) 91 International Review of the 
Red Cross 35. 
6 Ibid. 
7 ‘A good definition must bring out […] that war is a state or condition of affairs, not a mere series of 
acts of force”. See Arnold D. McNair, ‘The Legal Meaning of War, and the Relation of War to 
Reprisals’ (1925) 11 Transactions of the Grotius Society 29, 33. 
8 Solis (n 2) 119. 
9 ‘It may be a matter of some controversy among historians as to when one should date the beginning 
of the modem states-system. […] Less open to debate, however, is that somehow the idea of such a 
system is historically as well as conceptually linked with that of an international Rule of Law’. See 
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it is more generally stressed that the moral basis for this system of regulation is much 
older and less exclusive,10 it is not unreasonable to suggest that some specific aspects 
of IHL are inherited from the classical western laws of war. It is difficult to determine 
to what extent the formal historical origins of IHL limit its applicability to new 
situations, though there are a number of definitions and principles that may be 
considered a legacy of earlier thinking about warfare. It cannot be implied however, 
that IHL has remained static. In the classical laws of war, war was considered a state 
activity. The balance between “civilised nations” was sustained by reciprocity, in that 
a sovereign nation’s inclusion in the system of regulation was predicated upon 
conforming with the laws of war.11 Under this system, conduct of states in war was, 
to an extent, constrained by the recognition that any infraction would generate a 
response, to the ultimate detriment of the instigating state. Today, the balance is not 
maintained by reciprocity, with humanitarian principles instead providing the 
counterweight to the military inclination of states.12 Despite realist misgivings, the 
system of IHL has worked well to constrain states,13 though it may well be the case 
that, despite taking on a more humanitarian appearance, the notion of reciprocity 
remains important.14 Today, the classical “laws of war” are superseded by the Geneva 
Conventions and customary elements of IHL which have established that a number of 
rights and privileges enjoyed by both civilians and combatants that are non-reciprocal 
in nature, exist irrespective of whether or not all participants in a conflict choose to 
abide by them.15 At the basal level, the IHL aims to balance the need to use violence 
 
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International 
Law 4, 4. 
10 ‘First and foremost, the precepts of international humanitarian law belong to the whole of humanity, 
both politically and culturally’. See V.S. Mani, ‘International Humanitarian Law: an Indo-Asian 
Perspective’ International Review of the Red Cross 
<https://icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/article/other/57jqzm.htm> accessed 12 January 2019. 
11 Many scholars stress that there has subsequently been a move away from this state of affairs, however. 
See Theodor Meron, ‘The Humanization of Humanitarian Law’ (2000) 94 The American Journal of 
International Law 239, 243; Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International 
Armed Conflict (Cambridge University Press 2004). 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War (Allen 
Lane 2017)366-370. 
14 Steven Watts, ‘Reciprocity and the Law of War’ (2009) 50 Harvard International Law Journal 365, 
366. 
15See ICRC, ‘Practice Relating to Rule 140. The Principle of Reciprocity’ (2018) <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule140> accessed 14 September 2018. 
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against humanitarian principles: necessity, proportionality, distinction, and the 
prohibition against causing unnecessary suffering.16 
The Geneva Conventions changed the reciprocal nature of the laws of war, as 
well as introducing organisations that were not the de jure peers of states into the laws 
of armed conflict. Whilst recognising that there was a need to ensure that certain 
rebellions and uprisings were recognised, the desire to maintain the sovereignty of the 
state ensured that the same protections were not applied to all internal matters.17 The 
expedient compromise was to create one set of rules for when states fight each other, 
and a separate set of rules for when states fight “non-state” organised armed groups 
within their own borders. At the point of drafting, the threats posed by non-state armed 
groups were not particularly pressing when compared to state on state conflict.18 This 
justifies the sparse nature of the discussion surrounding non-state armed conflict at 
this point. At first glance, the inclusion of non-state situations may be taken to suggest 
that IHL has made significant progress in expanding beyond the constraints found in 
the classical laws of war, and better embodying a universal system of regulation for 
the use of armed force.  
A closer examination of how armed conflict is understood, however, suggests 
that there are many commonalities between the two potential categories of armed 
conflict, indeed, that the gap between the two has narrowed considerably over time.19 
That is not to say that the two are identical, however. Based upon the prevailing 
system, conflict status is, and remains, immensely important. This has been the case 
since the 1949 Geneva Convention’s entry into force.20 Prior to these and subsequent 
treaties, the characterisation mattered little. Today, however, the manner in which a 
conflict is classified serves to modify aspects of how force may legitimately be used, 
as well as in determining what may represent a breach or atrocity.21 The prevailing 
taxonomy of armed conflict is relatively straightforward, consisting as it does of only 
 
16 Marco Sassòli, Antoine A. Bouvier and Anne Quintin, How Does Law Protect In War? Cases, 
Documents and Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Humanitarian Law 
(3rd edn, 2011) 1–2. 
17 Bartels (n 5). 
18 ‘The law of NIAC is considerably more under-developed than the law governing IAC’. See Daniel 
Bethlehem and others, International Law Meeting Summary; Classification of Conflicts: The Way 
Forward (Chatham House 2012). 
19 Bartels (n 5). 
20 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva 
Convention), 12 August 1949, Arts 2 & 3.  
21 Leslie C. Green, The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict (Manchester University Press 1993) 65–
66. 
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two categories, though the categories themselves are somewhat vague.22 Importantly, 
the International Criminal Court (ICC) sets out different lists of crimes applicable in 
IAC compared to NIAC.23 Additionally, the existence of a condition of armed conflict 
may permit a state to potentially abrogate aspects of its human rights commitments.24 
These factors make the application of different categories of armed conflict an 
important factor in safeguarding civilians and those otherwise out of combat. 
Nevertheless, the process for determining which category to apply in a given situation 
has been derided as a largely political process,25 which somewhat de-emphasises the 
role played by the objective criteria specified by treaties and custom.  
Today, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocol I are the 
primary mechanisms governing IAC. In the case of NIAC, Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II (1977) are the instruments applicable. 
Beneath NIAC, actors are subject to domestic law, and in some situations, 
international criminal law.  
7.2.2 Armed conflict – IAC (Common Article 2) 
 
The most straightforward situation that may be conceived is the eventuality in which 
two states (high contracting parties) contracted to the Geneva Conventions enter 
declared hostilities with one another. In such a scenario, all of the available rules of 
the Geneva Conventions and often the Additional Protocol I of 1977 apply, depending 
on whether or not they are ratified by the belligerents involved.26 Accordingly, IAC 
represents the most comprehensive of the different categories. 
The instigation of IAC is not reliant upon the level or nature of armed force being 
used, with the participant’s status as states determining that armed conflict exists, 
irrespective of its specific nature. This is confirmed in the 2016 commentary.27 In 
 
22 See Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Re-envisaging the International Law of Internal Armed Conflict’ (2011) 
22 European Journal of International Law 219. 
23 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, Art. 
8.2. 
24 Dietrich Schindler, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross and Human Rights’ (1979) 19 
International Review of the Red Cross 3, 8. 
25 ‘[D]etermining the legal character of an armed conflict is rooted in an inherently political 
interpretation of black letter treaty law”. See Siobhan Wills, ‘The Legal Characterization of the Armed 
Conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq: Implications for Protection’ (2011) 58 Netherlands International Law 
Review 173.  
26 Solis (n 6) 150. 
27 ICRC, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Commentary of 2016 Article 2: Application of the 
Convention (2016) [208] <https://ihl-
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addition however, Protocol I extends the definition of IAC to cover “wars of national 
liberation”,28 being relevant to conflicts against occupiers and racist and colonial 
regimes.29 This means that the existence of IAC is no longer solely defined by both 
parties having the formal credentials of statehood, but may require an assessment of 
the nature of the conflict taking place, and the character of the non-state party.  
Mindful of the euphemistic or clandestine manner in which conflicts are often 
classified by belligerents, the status of IAC is not dependent upon open declaration, 
but requires the armed conflict to take place between two states.30 This has 
conventionally been readily discernible based upon the tendency for states to rely upon 
their conventional armed forces to settle disputes. Naturally, the UN Charter31 now 
bans armed force between states.32 This has represented a positive step in terms of 
limiting armed conflict, and moreover has been effective, as the decline in interstate 
war and conquest continues to exemplify.33 Whilst it is likely that formal state 
declarations of war are relegated to the past, any armed conflict between two states 
would be covered under Article 2, with protections applied to the fullest extent.34  
The ICRC recognises that it is increasingly the case that non-international 
conflict characterises contemporary warfare.35 This could be construed as either a 
change to the geopolitical reality or as an indication that the legal restrictions placed 
upon states have proven effective.36 Regardless of the reasons behind this trend, the 
 
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF
5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518> accessed 11 October 2018. 
28 Additional Protocol I, Art. 1, para 4.  
29 In terms of the scholarship on this matter, distinguishing wars of national liberation from other forms 
of conflict is as challenging as the perennial debate between “terrorist” and “freedom fighter”. 
O’Connell has stressed that the distinction is nothing more than political, being a matter of ‘subjective 
judgment’. See Daniel Patrick O’Connell, ‘Le Principe De Non-intervention dans les Guerres Civiles: 
Observations de M. Daniel Patrick O’Connell’ (1972) 55 Annuaire de l'Institut de Droit International 
589, 589; the notion of such wars being distinct from terrorism remains contentious. See generally, 
Robert A. Friedlander, ‘Terrorism and National Liberation Movements: Can Rights Derive From 
Wrongs?’ (1981) 13 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 281. 
30 Dietrich Schindler, ‘The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions 
and Protocols’ (1979) 163 Collected Courses 119, 131. 
31 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, Art 2(4). 
32 The efficacy of the UN Charter in this regard has been subject to commentary, with scholars 
suggesting that the article aimed to outlaw war, though there has subsequently been grave cynicism 
regarding its efficacy in this regard given the continuous use of force by states, and the looming threat 
of nuclear war. See Oscar Schachter, ‘The Right of States to Use Armed Force’ (1984) 82 Michigan 
Law Review 1620. Some scholars are more optimistic, however, noting the sharp decline in the 
incidence of violence following this declaration. See Hathaway and Shapiro (n 13).  
33 Hathaway and Shapiro (n 13) 353. 
34 Solis (n 2) 151. 
35 ICRC, commentary of 2016, Article 2: Application of the Convention (n 23) [194]. 
36 Hathaway and Shapiro (n 13). 
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challenges involved in regulating NIAC are likely to continue to dominate discussion 
in the absence of major state on state war. 
7.2.3 Non-international armed conflict (Common Article 3) 
 
Conflicts are not always international. “Armed conflict not of an international 
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties” is covered 
by Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.37 NIAC are conflicts that do 
not have international involvement, with the absence of this characteristic serving to 
distinguish them from IAC, as defined in the previous article of the convention.  
NIAC does not, however, define all conflicts that are not IAC. A key 
preoccupation present in Article 3 is distinguishing armed conflict from situations that 
do not reach an appropriate enough scale to be designated as such. The drafting process 
reflected upon the importance of depriving “brigands” and “criminals” the legitimacy 
afforded by the framework of armed conflict, and allowing states to deal with such 
threats without deferring to IHL,38 is a difficult task that has subsequently been 
reflected upon by scholars.39 Accordingly, it was determined that the categorisation of 
NIAC should apply only should certain thresholds be reached. For this purpose, 
“intensity” and “organisation”, are established as relevant to determining the presence 
of armed conflict. The two terms are highly visible in the judgments of the ICTY,40 
and additionally apparent in more recent situations before the ICC, with the trial 
judgments for both the Katanga and Lubanga both containing consideration of the 
criteria.41 This demonstrates the importance of achieving certain thresholds for armed 
conflict to exist; it also infers that failure to achieve these thresholds means that armed 
conflict does not, at least formally speaking, exist. As such, there are many violent 
situations in which the threshold for armed conflict is not achieved, and domestic laws 
prevail.  
 
37 “High contracting parties” referring to states. 
38 This problem emerged in early commentaries. See Jean S. Pictet and others, Commentary; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field 
vol 1 (International Committee of the Red Cross 1952) 44.  
39 The problem has been further discussed by a range of scholars, some of whom have stressed that this 
remains a problem that is particularly visible in relation to terrorist groups. See R.E. Brooks, ‘War 
Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror’ 
(2004) 153 University Of Pennsylvania Law Review 675. 
40 The Prosecutor v Fatmir Limaj (Judgment) ICTY IT-03-66-T (30 November 2005) [94–170].  
41 See The Prosecutor v Lubanga (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (14 March 2012) [506–509]; The 
Prosecutor v Katanga (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/07-3436 (7 March 2014) [521] [1986]. 
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The means to determine if a situation is an armed conflict or not have naturally 
developed. The initial standards for armed conflict are first elaborated in Additional 
Protocol 2. The initial criteria specified in Article 2 of the original Geneva Convention 
were fairly limited in the actual text, which recognised the potential for variable 
interpretation of Article 3 of the same.42 Accordingly, it introduces some essential 
characteristics: the existence of organised armed groups capable of controlling 
territory, and capable of sustained military operations.43  
Subsequently, the ICTY went as far as to define a threshold for triggering the 
instigation of a NIAC, specifying “banditry, unorganised and short-lived insurrections 
and terrorist activities”44 as not being subject to NIAC.45 This, along with the 
organisational capacity of the group46 assists in determining if a situation meets the 
requisite scale for NIAC to be applicable. The category additionally requires armed 
conflict to be of a protracted nature.47 From the outset, the notion of international legal 
involvement in conflicts of an internal nature fostered division.48 Many state 
representatives did not approve of international interest in what they saw as 
fundamentally internal matters.49 Some voices in the drafting process would have seen 
“large-scale civil war” subject to the same restrictions as IACs, whereas others stressed 
the importance of disincentivising civil war, and ensuring that the position of states 
was not compromised.50 This stresses the manner in which state interests have 
influenced how the threshold for armed conflict is established, suggesting that in 
generating treaties, states pragmatically limited the types of organisations that are able 
to access IHL. 
 
42 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977. Commentary of 1987, 
Material Field of Application [4448] <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=15781C741B
A1D4DCC12563CD00439E89> accessed 17 December 2018. 
43 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of 
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 1977, Art 1, para 1. 
44 Prosecutor v Tadic, (Judgment) ICTY IT-94-1 (7 May 1997) [562]. 
45 Mohamed Badar, Ahmed Al-Dawoody and Noelle Higgins, ‘The Origins and Evolution of Islamic 
Law of Rebellion: Its Significance to the Current International Humanitarian Law Discourse’ in Ignacio 
de la Rasilla del Moral and Ayesha Shahid (eds), International Law and Islam (Brill  Nijhoff 2018) 
<https://brill.com/view/book/edcoll/9789004388376/BP000021.xml>  accessed 09/09/19 
46 Ibid. 
47 Prosecutor v Tadic (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction) ICTY 
IT-94-1 (2 October 1995) [70]. 
48 See Final Record Of The Diplomatic Conference Of Geneva of 1949 
 vol 2-b (Federal Political Department 1950). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid 10–11. 
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Some scholars have sought to clarify in general the thresholds for establishing 
a NIAC. Vité suggests that this may be determined when a state is forced to deploy its 
army, any police force being inadequate for the purpose,51 a conclusion that is 
supported somewhat by assessments made by Israel52 and judgments made by ICTY.53 
Others have stressed that the means for determining if a situation is of sufficient 
intensity and of an organised nature is a complex endeavour, with the exact thresholds 
needing a systematic case-specific examination in order to be determined.54 One of 
the criteria to be considered is whether the belligerent organisation considers itself to 
be a state and has comparable attributes to one;55 this explicit statement directly 
addresses the issue that the other criteria only imply; namely that whilst some variation 
may be permitted, the non-state group is expected to emulate a state in order for IHL 
to be applicable.  
The means provided for determining whether an armed group escalates a 
situation to Article 3 situations are guidelines, and some variation is to be expected 
between cases. It is not, however, unfair to say that the features established by Article 
3 relate to armed groups that are capable of mimicking state practice in warfare. This 
has been successively reinforced by the additional protocols and Tadic criteria, 
judgments made by the ICC, and assessments made by courts at the state level. This 
is unsurprising, given how frequently this model has proved to be effective.56 Yet, the 
dependence of the criteria upon state-like features questions the application to 
situations of organised armed conflict in which the non-state armed group does not 
mimic a state in its organisation and operations.  
IHL has extremely limited relevance to an Article 3 conflict when compared 
to an IAC, even if the standards for belligerent rights are achieved by an armed group. 
In such scenarios, the conduct of hostilities is generally regulated by the domestic law 
of the nation in question, any relevant regional system, and human rights regulations. 
Much of IHL is not applicable in the case of a NIAC under Article 3. Yet, as Solis 
 
51 Sylvain Vité, ‘Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and 
Actual Situations’ (2009) 91 International Review of the Red Cross 69, 76. 
52 Ajuri v IDF Commander HCJ 7019/02; HCJ 7015/02 (3 September 2002), [1–4]. 
53 The Prosecutor v Boškoski (Judgment) ICTY IT-04-82-T (10 July 2008) [178]. 
54 Pictet and others (n 41) 49–50. 
55 ‘[…] the insurgents have an organization purporting to be a state’. See ibid 50. 
56 Non-state groups have conventionally deferred to mimicking state capacities and means, not only 
because it is morally preferable to the use of terror but based upon a perception it can be faster and more 
effective. See Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, ‘The Strategy of Protracted People's War: Uganda’ (2008) 88 
Military Review 4, 7–8. 
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suggests, not only are the domestic law of the state, and human rights law additional 
considerations, but wider aspects of IHL are proliferating into NIACs.57 Accordingly, 
it can be suggested that states will find themselves subject to significant restraint 
irrespective of what condition of armed conflict is upheld as applicable in a situation.  
 
7.2.4 From a NIAC to an IAC 
 
Naturally, it is possible for a situation of armed conflict to cross the boundary between 
the two categories. Some guidance on what is required for this to occur is present. 
Speaking generally, the intervention into an existing internal armed conflict by a third-
party state has the potential to escalate the classification to IAC, depending upon the 
role they take in the conflict.58 The subtraction of the international component may 
additionally de-escalate the conflict to a NIAC.  
The Tadic case introduces the prospect of conflicts not fitting into the categories, 
namely in the possible “internationalization”59 of armed conflict. This is in part a 
recognition that the nature of the armed conflict can be transitory. Determining to what 
extent another state can become involved in a conflict, without triggering a change, or 
bring about an internationalisation does not readily submit to a clear threshold, 
however.60 Some indication as to the complexity of this process may be gained from 
the discussion as to the threshold for internationalisation; the ICJ, for instance, offers 
a different insight into the threshold, considering “effective control” as important.61 
Recent commentary on the Geneva Conventions recognises that the debate between 
the more restrictive doctrine of effective control and the ICTY’s broader overall 
control is ongoing,62 a trend that has additionally been acknowledged in the academic 
discourse.63 
 
57 Solis (n 2) 154. 
58 Ibid 24–25. 
59 Schindler, ‘The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and 
Protocols’ (n 30) 225. 
60 A. Cassese, ‘The Nicaragua and Tadić Tests Revisited in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in 
Bosnia’ (2007) 18 European Journal of International Law 649. 
61 Nicaragua v United States of America (Judgment) ICJ (27 June 1986) [109] [111–112]. 
62 Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in 
the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Commentary of 2016 Article 2: Application Of The Convention 
[269] <https://ihl-
databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Comment.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=BE2D518CF
5DE54EAC1257F7D0036B518> accessed 18 December 2018. 
63 A range of scholars have raised this issue regarding both support and occupation. See Cassese (n 58); 
Stefan Talmon, The Responsibility of Outside Powers for Acts of Secessionist Entities, vol 58 (2009). 
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The process for moving between such situations is practically elaborated in the 
Lubanga case in which the ICC extensively discussed the means for classifying armed 
conflict, considering whether a foreign state’s occupation influences the type of armed 
conflict taking place.64 This includes considering whether the involvement of a third-
party state had any bearing on crimes committed by an informal militarised 
organisation with no tangible connection to any state – the question being: does the 
presence of the forces of another state elevate the situation in relation to non-state 
groups operating in the same territory?65 Discussion as to this point varied throughout 
the case, with the pre-trial chamber’s assertion that the situation may have been 
international in nature66 rejected by the subsequent trial chamber.67 This ruling is 
indicative of the challenge in determining more complex situations – in this case, 
occupation.  
The ramifications of a downgrade in the category of armed conflict are 
discussed in some detail by Wills.68 Specifically, the ICRC suggested in relation to 
Afghanistan that the subtraction of the international component and subsequent 
downgrade of the situation to NIAC had profound implications for the protection of 
civilians and non-combatants.69 Wills further notes the importance of this transition 
following the establishment of an interim government in Iraq.70 Essentially, Wills 
contests that the determination of which category exists is a largely political process.71 
Whilst there is no doubt a political aspect to deciding when the transition between 
categories takes place, scholarly insights specifying objective criteria about the 
threshold for escalation/de-escalation also exist. Boothby suggests that generally, the 
level of state support must exceed finance and material elements, though the level of 
control required varies; questions arise based upon the character of the group, as well 
as its precise relationship to another state.72 A foreign state rendering assistance to a 
legitimate government within a conflict is generally permissible, whereas assisting the 
 
64 The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (14 March 2012) [507–511]. 
65 See Gilder Alexander, ‘Bringing Occupation into the 21st Century: the Effective Implementation of 
Occupation by Proxy’ (2017) 13 Utrecht Law Review 60. 
66 The Prosecutor v Lubanga (decision on the conformation of charges) ICC-01/04-01/06-803 (29 
January 2007) [204–207].  
67 The Prosecutor v Lubanga (Judgment) ICC-01/04-01/06-2842 (14 March 2012) [563–566].  
68 Wills (n 25) 192–196. 
69 Ibid 196. 
70 Ibid 197–200. 
71 Ibid 206. 
72 William H. Boothby, Conflict Law: the Influence of New Weapons Technology, Human Rights and 
Emerging Actors (Springer 2014) 25.  
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non-state armed group serves to escalate the condition to an IAC, depending upon the 
nature of the assistance. Proxy involvement does not generally elevate the situation, at 
least until the point of direct combat operations. Solis stresses the interpretive 
framework for moving between different categories of armed conflict is subject to 
change.73 Ongoing situations may result in drastic changes to how movement between 
different categories is interpreted. For now, however, it is perhaps fair to say that 
ongoing debates as to the threshold between the different categories of armed conflict 
are indicative of difficulty in clearly asserting which humanitarian protections apply 
in a given situation. In brief, it is often difficult to assert clearly the type of conflict 
taking place in complex scenarios such as occupation, or in situations with proxy state 
involvement.  
 
7.2.5 Limitations; boundary issues  
 
In attempting to bring forward IHL to better address contemporary situations, some of 
the shortcomings and assumptions of the past need to be considered. It has been 
suggested that “armed conflict” was never especially well defined in IHL, and changes 
the manner in which force has now completely erased any distinctions between 
categories.74 This acknowledgement is compounded by the apparent difficulty in 
applying the categories of armed conflict to new forms of conflict. This may be due to 
the manner in which states become involved in the conflict, which is often ambiguous. 
Additionally, this may be dictated by the manner in which armed groups, though not 
sufficiently organised or competent, nonetheless present a significant humanitarian 
threat. There may be a multitude of factors that limit IHL’s capacity to align modern 
conflicts with the categories that have been established. 
The categorisation of armed conflict found in the current system of IHL is not 
a definitive taxonomy of conflict, as evidenced by the need to elaborate upon it further 
as time elapses. Presumably, in the process of drafting, signatories of the treaties and 
protocols comprising the written portion of IHL did not speculate as to the potential 
scope of future conflict, but sought to better ensure that the balance of operational need 
and humanitarian principles was maintained in relation to the types of conflicts 
 
73 Solis (n 2) 155. 
74 Charles Garraway, ‘To Kill or Not to Kill?—Dilemmas on the Use of Force’ (2009) 14 Journal of 
Conflict and Security Law 499, 500–501. 
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dominant at a given juncture. This is evident in the focus of the early Geneva 
Conventions, in which the threat of state on state violence was the primary type of 
conflict contended with – the challenges arising from non-state groups a secondary 
consideration. Subsequent protocols and changes in customary application of IHL are 
indicative of a growing need to ensure that humanitarian principles are applied in 
conflicts centred on non-state groups. This has served to practically increase the 
volume of rules that apply to situations involving non-state groups.  
At the current juncture, the limitations imposed by the state-centric 
foundations of IHL seem to prevent the appropriate inclusion of humanitarian 
principles in a range of situations: post-conflict occupations, situations with 
international involvement, conflicts of low intensity, or conflicts with a transnational 
aspect. Since 2001, the manner in which states and other actors classify conflict has 
also been called into question.75 The fact that the armed groups of today are 
significantly different from those of the past is now clear,76 challenging, in particular, 
the state-centric manner in which the capacity of non-state armed groups is identified. 
Even attempting to adapt IHL in good faith is complicated by dependence on the types 
of objective criteria for assessing conflict that has been progressively reinforced since 
the initial Geneva conventions.  
Does this result in a shortfall of humanitarian protections in conflicts involving 
such groups? This is difficult to determine, taking into account the aforementioned 
strategic gap – it is impossible to say, with certainty, what level of humanitarian 
protection is appropriate in situations involving more unconventional armed groups. 
It has been stated that the rules of IHL are largely not applicable to most aspects of the 
war on terror,77 which suggests that there is no standard for assessing how 
humanitarian concerns should be balanced in unconventional conflicts. It is therefore 
not untoward to suggest that when the current system is confronted with challenging 
situations, there is a possibility that undesirable or inappropriate sets of regulations 
may be applied.  
 
75 Naz K. Modirzadeh, ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence: A Pro-Civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict’ (2010) 86 US Naval War College International 
Law Studies (Blue Book) Series 349. 
76 Hyeran Jo, Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 2015) 11. 
77 Rosa Brooks, ‘The Politics of the Geneva Conventions: Avoiding Formalist Traps’ (2005) 46 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 197. 
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So far, this chapter has explored how the classification of armed conflict was 
understood historically. It may well be the case that the contemporary condition is 
sufficiently different to advocate for the manner in which conflicts are classified to be 
revisited, in order to address a shortfall in the application of humanitarian protections. 
The prevailing legal order has been effective in terms of limiting state conflict, a factor 
that must be balanced against the trends advocating for a renovation. Yet, when 
conflict does take place, it is proportionally more deadly to civilians.78 Contemporary 
observers have noted that whilst the overall incidence of violence has been decreasing, 
worrying trends in the type of violence taking place are present,79 for instance, the 
growing proportion of civilian casualties relative to overall casualties.80 Whilst the 
reasons behind this are complicated, it is reasonable to assert that this phenomenon is 
partly due to the nature of the existing regulatory system, and its potential to regulate 
new types of conflict. First, the situation has changed, with inter-state warfare 
increasingly rare. It is instead non-state groups that increasingly characterise 
contemporary warfare, a fact acknowledged by the ICRC.81 Only a few rules apply in 
the case of such conflicts, which is to be considered unsatisfactory.82 Second, these 
groups are different enough from the armed groups of the past as to complicate the 
application of IHL as it stands. 
The incongruities, gaps, and overlaps of the current system of IHL provide 
unwilling states with “escape hatches”.83 This is bad, in that states may defect from 
the application of IHL through the clever use of legal lacunae when it is expedient to 
do so. Even states wishing to apply IHL correctly may find themselves unable to do 
so effectively, as conflict moves further away from the expectations imposed by IHL.84 
 
78 Antonio Cassese, ‘Current Trends in the Development of the Law of Armed Conflict’ in The Human 
Dimension of International Law (Oxford University Press 2008) 
<http://oxfordscholarship.com/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199232918.001.0001/acprof-9780199232918-
chapter-1> accessed 24 December 2018. 
79 Max Boot and others, ‘Chapter One: The Changing Character of Conflict’ (2015) 1 Armed Conflict 
Survey 11.  
80 Max Boot and others ‘Chapter Two: Maps, Graphics and Data’ (2015) 1 Armed Conflict Survey 69, 
78. 
81 ICRC, Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field. Geneva, 12 August 1949. Commentary of 2016  
Article 2: Application of The Convention (2018, 2019) [194]. 
82 Cassese (n 76) 34. 
83 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict 
by Non-State Actors’ (2008) 98 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology (1973–) 711 (n 9) 727. 
84 Oona Hathaway and others, ‘Which Law Governs During Armed Conflict? The Relationship 
Between International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law’ (2012) Paper 4724 Faculty 
Scholarship Series 1883, 1885–1886. 
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Additionally, some sprawl is evident in state approaches. This is particularly evident 
when considering targeted killing. The US has embarked upon a lengthy series of 
drone strikes against terrorist targets in other states; domestically, this is justified by 
the 2001 authorisation upon the use of force, which permits action to be taken against 
organisations responsible for the 9/11 attacks.85 Internationally, the US has referred to 
its right to self-defence regarding the 9/11 attacks.86 The no armed conflict approach 
has proved more expedient than acknowledging the need for a specific framework for 
contending the war on terror. The US has steadily been increasing the use of force that 
they frame as taking place outside of armed conflict. New US policy has been 
criticised on the basis of permitting lethal targeting to take place “outside areas outside 
of active hostilities”,87 with the generation of this term itself indicative of an emerging 
grey zone.  
It is additionally possible to invoke events that have questioned the capacity 
for states to determine conflict status. For instance, Colombian intervention against 
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in Ecuador has controversially 
been presented as a NIAC, due to the focus of armed force being directed against the 
FARC, rather than the state of Ecuador.88 The ISIS situation alone introduces 
numerous questions as to how states approach armed conflict classification.89 
American, Turkish, and Russian involvement in either Iraq or Syria has been presented 
by different parties at different times as supporting the de jure governments of Iraq 
and Syria in the contest of a NIAC, or escalating the condition of the conflict to an 
IAC.90 Events such as these demonstrate that an objective determination of the conflict 
status is often beyond the capacity of states.  
 
85 See Benjamin McKelvey, ‘Due Process Rights and the Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: the 
Unconstitutional Scope of Executive Killing Power’ (2011) 44 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
1353. 
86 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law’ 
<https://state.gov/documents/organization/179305.pdf> accessed 15 December 2018. 
87 The phrase is an unusual one. It can be implied that this phrase appears to transcend what has been a 
clear dichotomy between peacetime and armed conflict. See Max Brookman-Byrne, ‘Drone Use 
“Outside Areas of Active Hostilities”: An Examination of the Legal Paradigms Governing US Covert 
Remote Strikes’ (2017) 64 Netherlands International Law Review 3, 5. 
88 Felicity Szenat and Annie R. Bird, ‘Columbia’ in Elizabeth Williamhurst (ed), International Law and 
the Classification of Armed Conflicts (Oxford University Press 2012) 233–235. 
89 It can be suggested that there are factors advocating for placing the ISIS conflict in alternating 
categories; David Wallace, Amy McCarthy and Shane R. Reeves, ‘Trying To Make Sense Of The 
Senseless: Classifying The Syrian War Under The Law Of Armed Conflict’ (2017) 25 Michigan State 
International Law Review 555, 567; others suggest that whilst the situation is on balance rather clear, 
the nature of ISIS does have some challenging implications, for instance in relation to geographical 
application of IHL. See Vaios Koutroulis, The Fight Against the Islamic State and Jus in Bello (2016). 
90 Koutroulis (n 87). 
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This sprawl in state practice has led observers to discuss the manner in which 
the state concept of a “globalised non-international armed conflict” is being 
incorporated into international law, bringing with it changes in how notions of active 
hostility and targeted killing are understood.91 That is to say that state practice is 
already diverging from the existing manner of regulating armed conflict to such an 
extent that it has become possible to speculate as to the existence of potential new 
categories to reflect state needs. Finally, the blurring of boundaries is not something 
exclusive to state practice. The ICRC itself is complicit in this process. For instance, 
it has stated that civilians may participate directly in hostilities, without this 
constituting a war crime.92 Though this was subsequently redacted,93 this indicates that 
no party has a clear picture of how boundaries should be maintained as the use of 
armed force changes. There are then, a number of factors that demonstrate that the 
regulatory system of IHL is not best disposed to the reality of modern conflicts.  
 
7.2.6 Limitations; basic principles 
 
As well as the legal gaps emerging within IHL, there is scope to suggest that as a 
system of regulation, IHL is facing a more existential form of threat arising from the 
shifting nature of modern conflict. This may be articulated through reference to the 
core principles that IHL imposes to govern all actions in relation to armed conflict. 
Irrespective of context, when action is required, military commanders are required to 
direct their actions against military objectives and ensure that any damage to civilian 
populations is not disproportionate to the objective to be achieved.94 Failure to assert 
these conditions within a situation may constitute a breach of IHL. It can be suggested 
that in relation to many contemporary forms of conflict, such assessments cannot 
readily be made. There is a propensity for kinetic operations to reproduce and 
exacerbate many of the factors that fuel groups like ISIS and al Qaeda, whilst the 
rampant brutality of ISIS has conversely met a great deal of support. Moreover, the 
conventional methods used to degrade and destroy ISIS have in no way compromised 
 
91 Naz K. Modirzadeh, ‘International Law and Armed Conflict in Dark Times: A Call for Engagement’ 
(2014) 96 International Review of the Red Cross 737, 744–746. 
92 ICRC, International Humanitarian Law and The Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts 
(2003) 9–10. 
93 Ingrid Detter, ‘The Law of War and Illegal Combatants’ (2007) 75 George Washington Law Review 
1049. 
94 Sassòli, Bouvier and Quintin (n 16). 
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what it expresses as its central mission.95 This may serve as a basis to suggest that 
concepts of proportionality and necessity, when applied to such unconventional armed 
groups, require a significantly different basis for interpretation.  
All of IHL’s criteria are difficult to assert in the absence of clear and effective 
understanding of the military mechanics of the situations in question. For instance, 
changes in the nature of war may, in turn, alter notions of what represents a justifiable 
target. To indicate the potential disruption this could entail, it is possible to indicate a 
divergence in how such principles are interpreted. This problem predates the war on 
terror – for instance, the general awareness of the role propaganda was playing in the 
Yugoslavia conflict was used as the basis for conducting strikes against state-run 
media outlets. The Rwandan genocide has also been invoked in order to justify the 
need to destroy,96 or otherwise address97 broadcast equipment. Despite the clear role 
that propaganda played in these conflicts, this was not considered an acceptable 
justification.98 Yet, as wars become more population-centred,99 the argument for 
strikes against personnel and infrastructure engaged in the psychological aspect of 
warfare are becoming an increasingly common argument to make, particularly in the 
absence of conventional command and control structures to disrupt.100 Just as the 
circumstances present in the industrialised wars of the twentieth century led to a 
general acceptance that targets related to military production and infrastructure could 
be justifiably attacked,101 the structure and nature of modern conflict is increasingly 
 
95 See Graeme Wood, What ISIS Really Wants (Atlantic 2015) which suggests that ISIS is dissimilar to 
earlier violent Islamist movements in that it makes a sincere commitment to restoring a seventh-century 
social order and bringing about the apocalypse, rather than using Islamism to achieve more modern 
political aims; Will McCants, The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the 
Islamic State (St. Martin's Press 2015) additionally maintains that the group’s physical destruction in 
no way compromises their commitment to bringing about a messianic apocalypse.  
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shifting, along with what constitutes an acceptable target. In the context of the war on 
terror, propagandists have become strategic level targets.102 This is in part due to the 
lack of an otherwise discernible command structure to target,103 though could perhaps 
be considered indicative of future state behaviour towards unconventional armed 
groups. 
Can this sprawl into propagandists be justified? It is almost impossible to tell. 
Whilst a range of theorists have indicated the pivotal role the sophisticated propaganda 
is having on the course of the conflict, in such events it is difficult to apply the test 
criteria specified in IHL. Yet by specifying that conflicts involving unconventional 
armed groups must be fought in the same manner as wars against states, or the non-
state groups that mimic them, it may have the side effect of making such wars 
unwinnable for state belligerents. The propagandist question is indicative of a need to 
challenge foundational assumptions as to how war needs to be fought.  
 
7.3 Theoretical approaches to align IHL with unconventional armed groups 
like ISIS 
 
The disconnect between the types of war described in IHL and the reality of modern 
warfare is not an uncommon domain of inquiry. The rapid changes made clear in 
relation to unconventional armed groups raise the question of adaptation; international 
lawyers need to discern where it is appropriate to generate new rules aimed at 
transforming how armed conflict is understood, or if more moderate and incremental 
change is a more appropriate response.  
The humanitarian shortfall has naturally been considered in some detail in 
relation to this problem with a number of potential solutions suggested, many based 
on how IHL has been adapted in the past. In relation to modern conflicts, non-state 
groups have been identified as an anomaly in a state-centric legal system.104 
Realigning IHL around non-state belligerents is accordingly a key consideration. The 
standards for armed conflict defined in the Tadic criteria and additional protocols 
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encounter difficulties in confronting increasingly unconventional opponents in the war 
on terror. Some have suggested that the characteristics of modern conflicts place them 
in a legal gap, in the conceptual space between the categories set out in the Geneva 
Conventions and additional protocols.105 Alternately, some have suggested that 
transnational armed conflicts could be absorbed into an existing category.106 The 
question as to which category is appropriate in terms of balancing needs is subject to 
extensive argumentation.  
The shifting character of war from primarily a form of state interaction to one in 
which non-state groups predominantly instigate conflicts is a key acknowledgement 
of how adjustments should be made. A second critical acknowledgement is the 
“transnationalisation” of conflict, – the propensity for conflicts to straddle borders, or 
in extreme situations be geographically disaggregated to some degree. Finally, there 
is the difficulty in getting the unconventional armed groups themselves to comply with 
conventions and regulations in any sense, with some theorists approaching this as a 
possibility that should be explored, and others dismissing the possibility. 
There have been longstanding criticisms of the manner in which armed conflict 
has been classified, in addition to new criticisms that have emerged or intensified 
following 2001. To begin, there is the increasing role that “armed groups” are taking 
in modern conflict. IHL, state-centric as it is, has taken only an incidental interest in 
non-state violence for much of its history. Recognising that the manner in which armed 
conflict is classified has been adjusted in the past, proposals to place transnational 
armed groups at the centre of a new system of classifying armed conflict have 
emerged. The proposal to renovate IHL is based on (1) the desirability of triggering 
humanitarian protections in atypical conflicts (2) the need to address new types of 
transnational, high capability armed groups, and (3) the need to constrain state 
behaviour in relation to new types of conflict. The need to adapt has condensed around 
discussion of revising the dichotomy between IAC and NIAC to include a “hybrid”107 
or “transnational”108 category of armed conflict as a reflection of modern warfare. 
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Whilst a number of different solutions to the crisis IHL is facing have been advanced, 
they all draw upon the factors identified. Nonetheless, in considering the practicality 
of revising IHL, a range of more modest adjustments have been suggested, along with 
the proposed overhaul required to revise the categorisation of armed conflict.  
 
7.4 New category of armed conflict; Transnational armed conflict  
 
In a reflection of the revolution in military affairs that has characterised the last few 
decades,109 some theorists have suggested that a revolution in the regulation of armed 
conflict should follow. Like all revolutions, the exact outcome of this transition is not 
characterised by a precise outcome, though the implementation of a new category of 
armed conflict is one of the chief suggestions as a means of addressing emergent legal 
gaps. There is, however, little guidance as to how such a category would be 
operationalised. “Transnational armed conflict” itself remains something of a fuzzy 
concept, and is not currently recognised as a legal term.110 The notion of a new 
transnational legal category may in part be defined in opposition to existing categories, 
and the examples of the types of wars these categories have been conventionally 
applied to cover.111 The war on terror, as understood in the US imagination, has been 
cited as an example of this form of conflict,112 though generally, it may refer to wars 
with a transnational footprint, commonly involving a transnational armed group. Some 
better examples may be the actions of Kurdish factions in Iran and Turkey,113 or 
Hezbollah against Israel.114 These conflicts may represent an intermediate form of 
transnational conflict, though arguably the concept has seen its full expression in 
transnational Islamist terrorist groups such as ISIS in the context of the war on terror. 
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Hoffman defines the potential legal classification of transnational armed 
conflict as “armed hostilities with a transboundary character that involve non-State 
actors and thus seemingly escape the classic division of international and non-
international armed conflict”.115 Whilst he is dismissive of the need for such a 
category,116 this definition serves to capture the objective nature of the term, though 
perhaps obfuscates the full challenge of such situations that may be more complex 
than a strictly technical definition. 
In discussing the revision of IHL, it is possible to document a longstanding 
convergence brought about by the ever-increasing influence of customary 
international law in the basic principles of IHL, where the protections associated with 
IAC proliferate into all conflicts. This is evident in the Israeli experience with Hamas 
in Gaza117 as well as in Hamdan v Rumsfeld.118 Scholars have discussed the potential 
for a minimum standard of rights applicable in all situations of armed conflict, which 
would be of particular importance in situations insufficient to trigger protections at the 
lower end of the armed conflict (internal strife).119 Drawing on such a convergence, 
some like Carron argue that all existing categories of armed conflict should be 
dissolved in favour of a single, unitary condition of armed conflict.120 This is 
additionally contended by Mastorodimos, who references potential situations in which 
either NIAC or IAC could conceivably be agreed to exist.121 More commonly, 
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however, transnational armed conflict may be understood as referring to a third 
category, applicable in a situation in which neither existing category is fully realised. 
Unsurprisingly, however, in recognising the revolutionary nature of such revisions to 
IHL, much of the debate has centred around existing instruments and their 
applicability to transnational situations.  
In relation to AQ, Milanovic discusses the ramifications on a global war on 
terror.122 The US had difficulty in deciding what kind of war the global war on terror 
was, initially adopting IAC between the US and AQ, though, after Hamadan v 
Rumsfeld, the conflict has consistently been equated with a global NIAC by US 
administration. Milanovic examines the legal tenability of such a designation, 
stressing the difficulty in aggregating the disparate, transnational wings of AQ, noting 
that it is difficult to tether the transnational features of the organisation to the conflict 
taking place in Afghanistan.123 
In defining transnational armed conflict, Sassòli places transnational armed groups at 
the centre of the concept.124 He recognises that IHL is already applicable to armed 
groups. His discussion of the concept is fundamentally sceptical. In discussing AQ, he 
contends that the war on terror should be split into different situations in which 
different categories of armed conflict may be applicable, rather than framed as a single 
event.125 In this sense, he is recognising AQ as a single, cohesive entity in relation to 
armed conflict. Sassòli defines the critical problem with creating a new category of 
transnational armed conflict – that few if any definite proposals as to how it may be 
accomplished exist.126 He refers explicitly to the lack of specifics on the case of those 
advocating for revisions.127  
Sassòli’s essential criticism that there is a lack of specifics in proposals as to 
how best to adapt IHL is applicable to most discussions of transnational armed 
conflict. Whilst scholars are explicit in the need for such a category, there is little 
content available that explicitly discusses how to best integrate new categories into the 
existing body of IHL. For example, Corn and Jensen set out how transnational armed 
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conflict should be implemented in terms of regulation.128 Their argument is oriented 
around the “fundamental principles” of the law of armed conflict, and they ultimately 
stress a requirement that a certain package of regulatory tools should apply.129 This 
package relates to how persons and property should be targeted, based upon the 
increased risk to which civilians are exposed in new conflicts,130 as well as considering 
how belligerents should be detained.131 Whilst Corn and Jensen are clear in how the 
fundamental humanitarian principles of IHL should be applied to new conflicts of a 
transnational nature, they do not consider any aspect of operationalisation – the 
principles they have identified, and the regulations they advance, are presented as a 
first step.132 Little guidance is offered as to how to implement their package. 
Naturally, excessive and rapid pressure to renovate IHL through grand measures 
is liable to irritate states. Recognising the many barriers to drastic renovations, some 
scholars identify the changing nature of law, but are dismissive of the need for any 
change to the existing body of international law. Rodenhäuser, for instance, situates 
transnational armed groups in the existing framework of IHL, saying that they can 
most readily be absorbed into the existing category of a NIAC.133 Other scholars 
concur with the option of in some way refining existing legal concepts to address new 
trends, for instance, addressing the definition of self-defence in “transnational armed 
conflicts”.134 Such approaches may more readily be implemented, and as such, are 
more pragmatic than pushing for more radical changes.  
Naturally, there are scholars who disregard the need for a new category to reflect 
the transnationalisation of war altogether. Meltzer suggests that the need for an 
additional category may be dismissed – the thresholds defined in Article 3, particularly 
the manner in which these thresholds were interpreted in the Nicaragua case, are 
sufficient to ensure that humanitarian principles are applied in all conflicts.135 This 
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essential point is again advocated for by Vité, who stresses the need to differentiate 
violent events into either NIAC or IAC based upon specific factors present in each 
case.136 The approach taken by these scholars serves to emphasise the desirability of 
not disrupting the practice of IHL. 
Based upon the changing nature of warfare, it is likely that some change to IHL 
will become necessary to address asymmetric conflicts, however. Considering the 
difficulty in creating a new framework for IHL, and the additional challenge of getting 
states to accept it, some scholars have found it more useful to consider what changes 
can take place within the prevailing framework of IHL. These changes either relate to 
the more comprehensive application of existing mechanisms, or minor adjustments 
made to expand certain definitions. For instance, one potential approach is to adjust 
the method used to apply categories of armed conflict in order to encapsulate the 
changing nature of armed groups. John-Hopkins stresses the importance of robust 
social analysis of new non-state groups, in order to correctly understand the 
capabilities and organisational dynamics of new types of non-state organisation, and 
how leadership and capability are distributed within them.137 The need to challenge 
the dependence of IHL on a state-centred understanding of organisation and capability 
has been identified and represents a central avenue to explore in relation to situations 
involving transnational armed groups, or new wars. This essential point has been made 
by a range of “new wars” theorists in relation to conflicts involving today’s Islamist 
networks138 and has been identified as a possible approach for IHL to adopt.  
There have been several robust arguments made for reconstructing the 
definitions of armed conflict so as to include in the definition gangs and terrorist 
entities.139 Sophisticated arguments are made upon the basis that today, rebellions take 
less energy to organise,140 and many states are weak enough to succumb to 
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unconventional and disorganised groups,141 with this serving as the basis for a 
lowering of thresholds in relation to armed conflict. Revising ideas surrounding how 
armed groups are organised is a modest adjustment when compared to generating a 
new category.  
As a means of addressing the enhanced risk to which civilians are exposed in 
contemporary conflict, the prospect of inducing compliance amongst armed groups is 
discussed by a number of authors. This notion may be predicated upon the idea that 
there are codes of honour that, whilst varying from culture to culture, have a form of 
universal salience.142 Kritsiotis discusses this in relation to disintegrated states.143 He 
contends that the basic protections contained in Article 3 should apply to such 
situations, and suggests a number of mechanisms for inducing compliance in such 
scenarios. He further stresses the importance of shared traditions, though 
acknowledges the difficulty of asserting such values in a battlefield populated 
increasingly by irregulars and paramilitary gangs, who often do not express these 
values.144 Some rebel groups, as Jo suggests, are willing to follow international norms, 
and exert restraint.145 Yet, it would be premature to assume that compliance is a 
workable option in all cases based upon the possibility of including some groups.  
The notion of introducing mechanisms to induce compliance is complicated by 
several factors. There are a range of incentives and costs that the international system 
can impose on states that do not translate over to non-state groups.146 Another central 
sticking point is that the armed group in question must wish to pursue legitimacy, in 
either the international or domestic framework, in order to be brought to heel.147 Whilst 
secessionist rebels, for instance, may have a reason to seek legitimacy,148 it cannot be 
assumed that this will be the case with groups motivated by other concerns. In 
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contending with the compliance issue, Sassòli states that armed groups are bound to 
IHL in the same manner as states.149 His proposed method for inducing compliance 
would be to permit armed groups to report their compliance to a designated 
international body, and to craft a range of sanctions against such groups should they 
transgress.150 In a sense, the suggested leverage for inducing compliance in non-state 
armed groups conforms to the approach already applied to states. 
The sticking point in getting non-state groups to comply is summarised most 
succinctly by Lamp. He summarises the problem as follows: the wars of today differ 
fundamentally from the concept of war that the conventional “paradigm of 
compliance” upon which the application of IHL is predicated is not meaningful in the 
new type of wars.151 Compliance of non-state groups may indeed face insurmountable 
barriers. First, any attribution of enhanced rights to non-state groups would be 
unacceptable to states.152 Additionally, the conventions of IHL has proved of limited 
utility in such situations, in that such groups do not abide by treaties.153 Any initiative 
aimed at inducing compliance in more unconventional armed groups faces deep 
challenges; not only do brutality and savagery confer benefits in terms of attention, 
but extreme ideologies also represent a barrier to inducing compliance.154 Ultimately, 
it must be considered that non-state groups are different from states, and seeking to 
impose the same structures of accountability is unlikely to produce progress.155 New 
mechanisms for compliance, if compliance is possible at all, must be considered in 
relation to unconventional armed groups.  
One very reasonable argument is to ensure that states follow the rules of IHL 
more effectively; authors note that any state must certainly conform with IHL’s 
notions of necessity, proportionality, and distinction, irrespective of the specifics of a 
 
149 Sassòli (n 113) 5–6. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Lamp (n 4). 
152 Wills (n 25); John-Hopkins (n 126). 
153 As Kaufman suggests, attempts by the international community to construct more inclusive 
identities, effect power sharing, or to reconstruct states have failed repeatedly in relation to ethnic 
conflicts with long histories of intercommunal violence. See Chaim Kaufmann, ‘Possible and 
Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars’ (1996) 20 International Security 136. 
154 Jo (n 144) 59. 
155 Katharine Fortin, ‘Armed Groups and Procedural Accountability: A Roadmap for Further Thought’ 
in Terry D. Gill and others (eds), Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law Volume 19, 2016 
(T.M.C Asser Press 2018) <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-213-2_6> accessed 14 November 
2018. 
241 
 
conflict.156 There is a justifiable focus on the US in terms of state compliance.157 Based 
upon the US approach in practice, there is evidence to suggest that some states have 
already begun to generate self-imposed restraints in excess of what IHL requires, 
having recognised that the situation is changing.158 An example of this is the guidance 
contained in FM3-24.159 This sentiment is somewhat countermanded by the often 
unsporting manner in which the US has interpreted the rules of armed conflict with 
regards to targeted killing, however.160 Hoffman considers the behaviour of states in 
relation to new types of conflict to represent something tantamount to a defection from 
IHL as a system of regulation, and is therefore resolute that the best solution is to get 
states to obey the laws of armed conflict as they stand.161 It may be considered unfair, 
however, to expect a state to continue to apply IHL when fighting adversaries that 
breach IHL in order to achieve a military advantage.162 The notion of “lawfare”, which 
describes situations in which the law is used in order to achieve military objectives an 
armed actor may be incapable of achieving conventionally, is increasingly 
prevalent.163 The notion of parties utilising IHL in such a manner could serve as a basis 
for state defection from IHL as a regulatory system. Forecasting a way to increase 
compliance is a tricky prospect to begin with;164 the inclusion of unconventional armed 
groups that have limited incentive to comply complicates the future of IHL a 
significant manner.  
One very clear consequence of current trends, documented by John-Hopkins, is 
the inclusion of international human rights law in situations that are tantamount to 
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armed conflict.165 Whilst IHL and human rights are exclusive bodies of law, there is 
increasing interaction between the two bodies, which in turn is drawing increasing 
interest.166 The fusion of the two bodies into “fundamental standards of humanity” has 
subsequently been discussed.167 This potential merger, however, faces definitional 
challenges,168 and moreover would be contrary to longstanding state interests in 
prosecuting the war with a relatively free hand.169 Nevertheless, it is increasingly 
evident that situations can arise in which both bodies may be invoked at the same 
time.170 Whether or not this is indicative of a gradual supersession of IHL in favour of 
human rights is difficult to tell at the current juncture. It is also difficult to discern if 
this would, functionally, be radically different from the convergence of IAC and NIAC 
discussed by Carron, in which the higher standards of IAC would be universally 
applicable.171 The human rights angle is further discussed by Kretzmer, who suggests 
that the development of international human rights law challenges the assumption that 
states are unrestrained in the absence of IHL.172 He suggests that in situations that 
cannot be definitively defined as IAC, states should first be held to the “law 
enforcement model”, and permitted to escalate to an armed conflict model only if the 
thresholds specified in Additional Protocol 2 are met. Like John-Hopkins, he suggests 
that the notion of fundamental standards of humanity should apply in all situations.173 
He recognises a critical barrier in getting states to conform to such prescriptions.174 
Scholarship has served to present a spectrum of different potential avenues that 
could be used individually or in concert in order to ensure that humanitarian principles 
interface better with modern conflicts. In contrast, however, the ICRC reasserts the 
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importance of maintaining the system as it stands.175 This is representative of the 
inertia encountered by any attempt to revise or adjust the incumbent assumptions of 
IHL regarding the manner in which armed conflict is classified. This is not to say that 
IHL is not capable of adapting to new wars – there exists the foundational 
acknowledgement that non-state groups exist and are bringing about change. Where 
recognised, however, these non-state groups are anticipated to behave in a manner that 
is relatable to that of a state.176 This represents a barrier in more unconventional cases 
of non-state groups. The ICRC has, however, recognised the transition towards new 
wars177 and this may serve as a potential point of ingress in presenting change.  
To finalise the discussion as to the varying potential approaches, it must be noted 
that bringing about any significant change to the framework of IHL is challenging. 
Whilst a number of theorists discuss the possibility of change, it is first difficult to 
produce a workable framework for adaptation; no one is sure as to how best to 
operationalise adaptation. The difficulty of any foundational change to conventions is 
made apparent by the discussion surrounding the transnational armed conflict. Yet the 
central acknowledgement that there is a need to better align IHL with the changing 
character of armed conflicts taking place is apparent even in scholarship that is 
dismissive of a need for a radical revision of IHL. 
 
7.5 Explaining the difficulty in applying conventional categories of armed 
conflict to unconventional armed groups (ISIS) 
 
As this chapter has made clear, IHL has made steps to better align itself with the shift 
towards non-state groups. In doing so, it has however cemented many of the 
conventional assumptions regarding the fundamental nature of non-state armed 
groups, with the Tadic criteria and the specifics of Additional Protocol 2 reinforcing 
that IHL applies only to a certain state-centric archetype of war, and therefore requires 
non-state groups to be state-like for IHL to be applicable. Whilst these additions 
indicate a capacity to adjust the criteria for determining different conditions of armed 
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conflict, they also indicate a reliance on objective factors over cognitive ones, and an 
inability to consider how the fundamental nature of more unconventional armed 
groups evades the objective thresholds that have been set out.  
Morgenthau contested the “methodological assumptions” underpinning 
international law, specifying a need to reconcile “the science of international law and 
its subject matter”.178 In this case, it is of value to question the assertion of IHL that 
the level of humanitarian protections available in a conflict can be meaningfully 
aligned with the criteria currently used in each category of armed conflict. It is possible 
to suggest that the problem of adapting IHL to new conflicts involving transnational 
armed groups is predominantly an epistemological problem – IHL has developed and 
refined a limited set of objective criteria that are used to determine what rules and 
limitations should be imposed on how hostilities are conducted in a given situation. 
This is not an attack on the legal-positivist method in international law as such, but a 
questioning of the validity of the indices used in the method. The criteria used at the 
current juncture are not the best means of establishing which humanitarian protections 
need to apply in conflicts involving unconventional armed groups that may constitute 
a different threat to civilians, in comparison to the scale or intensity of the conflict 
taking place. In considering the possibility of adapting how the characteristics of 
armed conflict in IHL are assessed, the challenge in measuring war as a condition must 
be considered, as well as the procedural challenge in establishing thresholds agreeable 
to states. 
War, as a condition, has historically been considered difficult to quantify in 
any meaningful sense. As Dawes writes, the preferential means of understanding war 
historically has been through attempting to quantify it:  
 
“Counting is the epistemology of war. War is bounded by the 
referential extremes of the prebattle roll call and the postbattle body 
count and is constituted by the mundane and innumerable 
calculations (days counted, supplies counted, miles counted) that 
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make war in theoretical writings susceptible to formulation […]. A 
single death is a tragedy […] but a million deaths is a statistic.”179  
 
Base arithmetic is useful to an extent, though numbers alone are not sufficient 
to automatically imply a proportional relationship with the humanitarian threat. The 
disposition of forces or the associated body count does not give a full insight into the 
associated threat posed to civilians, or non-combatants. To its credit, IHL does not rely 
solely upon arithmetic or geometrical methods in the classifying armed conflict. Based 
upon a cursory examination of how armed conflict is categorised, it is possible to say 
that several features matter: formal credentials (state/non state), the competence of 
combatants (intensity, organisation), and, to a lesser extent, as per the Additional 
Protocol 1, certain more abstract, or cognitive factors, have been established in 
determining the category that should apply (wars of liberation/anti-colonialism).  
As a framework for assessing conflict, IHL is limited by the information 
available regarding conflicts. With regard to classifying armed conflict, it is desirable 
to understand the strategy and nature of the belligerents involved. In the absence of a 
defined strategy or stated intentions, decision-makers must instead attempt to identify 
what is happening based upon other factors. The decision made must be defensible, 
and appear to be based on independent standards. Whilst the decision made may have 
a political aspect,180 it is undesirable that this factor be overt. An objective framework 
based upon these objective indices is more desirable and is understood to be capable 
of determining the character of the situation. In the case of the classification of armed 
conflict, this character imposes what protections and standards should apply.  
In IHL, the criteria established have to be agreeable to states, and possible for 
states and other interested parties to identify. This gives an advantage to the more 
objective and physical characteristics associated with belligerents. This may be cited 
as a key factor in the criteria that have been established so far, both for distinguishing 
armed conflict from lesser forms of banditry and criminality, as well as differentiating 
the different sorts of armed conflict from one another. This approach has few 
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drawbacks if new armed conflicts conform with the type of conflicts anticipated by 
IHL. 
Because of dependence on the established indices, when conflicts do not 
conform to expectations, the determination of conflict status may appear to be random, 
with the protections applied unsuitable for the reality of conflict taking place. This 
disconnect has come to be expected in relation to more unconventional instances of 
organised violence. Based upon present conflicts, it is possible to suggest that this is 
somewhat responsible for the confusion that often surrounds the classification of 
armed conflict and the associated shortfall in humanitarian protections.  
The emergent question as to how to revise the classification of armed conflict 
in order to better ensure that appropriate protections are applied to civilians in new 
wars, has generated many potential answers. There is a risk of simply replicating the 
same problems as before, however. The conflicts of today are not solely defined by 
their transnational nature; the groups responsible are not simply non-state groups who 
operate in multiple territories, but have additional characteristics that must be 
considered. As this study will argue, there is a definite need to understand the changing 
cognitive aspects of warfare, and integrate this understanding into how conflicts 
involving unconventional armed groups are classified.  
 
7.5.1 The connection between IHL and the Clausewitzian theory of war  
 
To grasp the gravity of changes in terms of the regulation of armed conflict, it is 
important to understand that the system of IHL is based upon certain assumptions of 
how force is used, who uses it, and to what end. Put simply, when drafting IHL as a 
system of regulation, the parties responsible had to rely upon the understanding of 
warfare that could be extracted from conflicts past and present, as well as relying upon 
the assumptions of the philosophy of war. 
Without contesting the universal origins of the moral component of IHL, the 
historical circumstances of IHL’s formal origins suggest an association with a 
particular approach to understanding war. It is fair to say that in IHL, the technique 
for knowing about the war that prevails is distinctly Clausewitzian.181 In broad terms, 
 
181 Clausewitzian – relating to the philosophical understanding of war articulated by Carl Von 
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this means that it is dependent upon convention, and places states at the centre of its 
model of understanding.182 These characteristics are common to both IHL and the 
classic manual on war. Enshrining this approach in IHL has proved expedient for the 
purpose of state on state interaction and has additionally proved an effective means of 
understanding groups that are not formally a state, but emulate state features. If one 
accepts that IHL exists primarily to regulate state on state violence,183 then the 
Clausewitzian framework represents an effective means of knowing about the war for 
the purposes of regulating the instigation and conduct of wars. This is not least because 
the type of war that Clausewitz considers is interstate war.184 At the time Clausewitz 
codified his philosophy of war, many of the customs and laws we recognise today 
existed in contests between European states,185 suggesting that Clausewitzian 
assumptions are not at odds with today’s systems of international law. 
Despite the contention that Clausewitz purely advocated for war, van Creveld 
contends that it is the Clausewitzian paradigm that serves as the foundation for today’s 
international system of regulation.186 Van Creveld suggests that in the Clausewitzian 
universe, regulations placed upon warfare are justifiable from a purely practical 
perspective. War is an organised condition, and war between states would be 
unthinkable without a degree of regulation.187 The Clausewitzian understanding of war 
as a contest in a series of both political and violent contests additionally necessitates 
that constraints be imposed. 
So far as there is such a thing, a Clausewitzian war is a “good war”. As Hayashi 
relates in terms of military necessity: 
 
To the rational soldier of the Clausewitzian cast, a good war is one 
in which every act is ‘militarily necessary’ – that is, executed 
professionally and with the optimal resource mobilisation, and 
directed towards a clearly defined, strategically sound and 
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reasonably attainable military goal. Here, military necessity is 
essentially a matter of identifying the range of realistic courses of 
action having reasonable chances of generating the desired 
outcome, and selecting and pursuing one that is superior to the 
others on the strength of its chances and resource efficiency. 
Conversely, wars can be poorly fought in a variety of ways. For 
example, the acts taken may be insufficient, though necessary, for 
the achievement of their respective military goals; they may be 
excessive (i.e., more than necessary) in relation to the goals; they 
may simply have no bearing whatsoever on their supposed goals; 
and/or they may be taken for their own sake and without any 
particular purpose at all. Inefficiencies would also emanate from 
ill-advised, unrealistic or otherwise badly defined military goals. In 
reality, uneconomical wars are often the combined result of these 
acts and goals.”.188 
 
To simply summarise actors in a Clausewitzian war: they are unitary actors 
capable of conducting a “rational calculus” of ends and means and constraining their 
use of force accordingly.189 States, whilst the ideal practitioners of this archetype of 
war, do not hold it in complete monopoly. A war involving non-state actors is nothing 
new. As Smith contends, whilst numerous rebellions and uprisings have taken place 
in the past, they did not radically alter the Clausewitzian approach to war; for instance, 
revolutionary movements of the past still orientated themselves around the grand 
strategic aim of governing a state.190 The maintenance of the central objective of 
becoming a state was sufficient to ensure that rebel groups, whilst innovating at a 
tactical level, did not differ fundamentally from states in their overall organisation.191 
This to some account suggests why IHL models its understanding of non-state groups 
on the state itself. Plainly, a non-state group of conventional attributes would be 
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capable of the same “rational calculus” that Clausewitz technically preserves for 
states.192  
War, for the purposes of IHL, does not represent the absence of the legal 
system that prevails when nations are at peace, but a separate legal order invoked when 
certain conditions are met. Indeed, the conduct of war is one of the most regulated 
human endeavours.193 This again is a further indication of the connection between IHL 
and the Clausewitzian epistemology of war. IHL first envisions war as a contest in 
which the parties are states, or are similar to states in the manner in which they 
organise a force.194 This notion is borne out by both the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocol 2 of 1977.195 Additionally, IHL presupposes that the utility of 
force is to achieve victory over a military adversary. It is expected that states or sub-
states, will use some sort of military force in order to achieve this aim.196 In this 
context, the notion of a “combatant” makes sense. This expectation is common to both 
state conflicts and those involving sub-state armed groups. This aspect has remained 
unchanged from the classical European laws of war.  
There are, naturally, those actors who argue that on a fundamental level, the 
Clausewitzian understanding of law remains a useful tool in understanding 
contemporary non-state conflicts, or new wars.197 The Clausewitzian approach to war 
naturally has its blind spots, however. As the Leiber code makes clear, the 
foundational understanding of war in IHL is burdened with assumptions: 
 
Modern wars are not internecine wars, in which the killing of the 
enemy is the object. The destruction of the enemy in modern war, 
and, indeed, modern war itself, are means to obtain that object of 
the belligerent which lies beyond the war”.198 
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The restriction of the laws of war to the Clausewitzian paradigm of war in early 
treaties comprising armed conflict is additionally made apparent in the application of 
the term “civilised nations”. Whilst these same assumptions are not explicit in the 
Geneva Conventions or Additional Protocols, the essential understanding is that the 
term “war” or “armed conflict” is limited to the type of contest in which nation-states 
habitually engage. A form of war modulated by rationality suggests that a state only 
uses force to the extent of its utility.199 This is apparent in the reliance on the state 
model, which is explicit in IAC and implied by NIAC.  
It is fair to conclude that the prevailing system of IHL has more than a passing 
relationship with the Clausewitzian theory of war, a relationship that is particularly 
clear in how war is defined in IHL. This relationship, however, becomes an issue as 
the war in practice moves away from the state contest described by Clausewitz, the 
Leiber code, and presumably, the subsequent Geneva conventions. Part of this 
dislocation is that the aforementioned approach that IHL has taken in identifying and 
classifying wars may no longer be sufficient to understand the nature of a conflict.  
 
7.6 Questioning the epistemology of IHL in the case of unconventional armed 
groups  
 
It can be conceded that the manner in which IHL understands war is of some utility in 
relation to state conflict, and additionally, it is capable of grasping non-state violence, 
so long as the non-state belligerent mimics the state way of doing things. The 
categories based upon the criteria bear a reasonable relationship to the humanitarian 
risk in each situation, and therefore, the categorisation of armed conflict is, if not 
perfect, a reasonable representation of what considerations should be granted to 
civilians in different situations involving the use of armed force. This is naturally 
mitigated by state interest and of course, the chaotic nature of war.  
First, it must be stressed that the challenged posed by today’s unconventional armed 
groups is by no means an original one. So-called “new wars” are not really new but 
have been understood to a degree at least as long as On War has been around. Von-
Decker, in an early criticism of Clausewitz, suggests that there is an absence of a 
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“centre of gravity”200 in conflicts that deviate from the conventional model; drawing 
on experience of asymmetric warfare, he suggests that conventional theories and 
approaches to war are largely obsolete when applied outside of Europe.201 Decker’s 
experience in Algeria is indicative of the boundaries drawn in the early laws of war, 
limiting the laws of war to “civilised nations”, with conflict on the fringes of Europe 
and the US subject to the different framework of understanding.202 
To return to the notion that there has been a cultural shift in the nature of war,203 
the assumption that conflict has changed is sufficient to suggest that the means of 
understanding conflict should be examined. Indeed, there is no guarantee that the 
means of assessing conflict that has been useful in the past bears any relationship to 
the threat posed to civilians and those otherwise out of combat in new wars. An 
assessment of wars involving unconventional armed groups is sufficient grounds to 
challenge the manner in which IHL understands wars and applies categories. If wars 
can no longer be aligned with the Clausewitzian model, then this would have profound 
effects on the utility of IHL. In these new wars, the nature of the humanitarian threat 
may not scale effectively with the formal credentials of the belligerents, or the 
organisation and intensity achieved by non-state groups. This possibility has been 
acknowledged in the consideration of “new wars”.204 The new wars concept suggests 
that the types of conflicts taking place today may be antithetical to the Clausewitzian 
approach to war. New wars, whilst wide-ranging in their actual exhibition, have the 
common feature of inverting the expectations of war imposed by reliance on the 
Clausewitzian model.205  
Recognising that the wars of today are different from the wars of the past, a 
range of different terms has emerged to mark this transition. Asymmetric wars, a 
revolution in military affairs, fourth generation wars, etc. are just a few of the potential 
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approaches. To avoid the complex lexicon associated with this transition, for the 
purposes of the study the term “new wars”206 will be used. As common features, these 
conflicts are asymmetrical in nature. Western, or more specifically, US dominance on 
the conventional battlefield means that opposing actors need to develop manners of 
fighting that are different enough so as to evade our power – this difference having 
become so pronounced as to represent a different form of warfare.207 As such, the 
conflicts considered today are not distinguished solely by non-state groups’ proclivity 
to operate transitionally, but can be attributed a range of features that together, are 
sufficient to situate them outside of the conventional understanding of warfare.  
There are a number of factors that contribute to the unconventional nature of 
today’s non-state actors. Victory in a conflict today is not articulated in terms of battles 
won, body count, or control of territory, but in winning the hearts and minds of the 
people.208 As it is the control of the civilians that opposing sides now frequently 
contest, a greater degree of civilian casualties is to be expected.209 This transition 
towards populations has been well-documented by a range of theorists210 and forms 
the core of contemporary military doctrine.211 Additionally, many modern conflicts 
simply do not respond to convention or treaty. Longstanding hatred of a religious 
nature means that peace or ceasefire does not mark the end of hostilities. A 
development of this nature may simply mark a transition to lower intensity conflict, 
with the constant threat of a resurgence in higher intensity violence.212 This 
fundamentally challenges the regulatory framework that IHL has conventionally 
applied to constrain war.  
These trends, as with many of relevance to the unconventional nature of armed 
groups, are longstanding and predate 2001. This, in the eyes of some observers, is 
sufficient to dismiss the notion that the essential character of conflict has changed.213 
Legal scholarship is, to some extent, cognizant of the shift taking place in how war, 
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and more broadly force, is understood. The dichotomy between the longstanding 
“Clausewitzian” understanding of war and the understanding of armed conflict 
proffered by “new wars theorists” is discussed by Grey, for instance.214 The instigation 
of the war on terror has however served to exacerbate and aggregate longstanding 
trends in armed conflict to the extent that nation-states have difficulty applying IHL 
to new situations.215 As Muncler explains, the presence of the factors identified 
simultaneously is sufficient to alter the character of war.216 This serves to emphasise 
the importance of conflicts involving ISIS and groups like it in any revisions to the 
mechanisms of IHL. 
The challenge to the longstanding Clausewitzian paradigm is summarized by 
Kaldor. The past inter-state form of conflict has now been superseded by new forms 
of violence that encapsulate aspects of war, organised crime, and the use of terrorism 
and atrocities.217 New wars are fought with different goals in mind, utilise different 
methods, and are financed by different means.218 
 
“The political narrative of the warring parties is what holds 
together dispersed loose networks of paramilitary groups, regular 
forces, criminals, mercenaries and fanatics, representing a wide 
array of tendencies –economic and/or criminal self-interest, love of 
adventure, personal or family vendettas or even just a fascination 
with violence. It is what provides a licence for these varying 
tendencies. Most new wars are about identity politics – that is to 
say, the claim to power in the name of a religious or ethnic identity. 
Moreover, these identities are often constructed through war.”219 
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New wars are fought by groups that are conventionally disorganised and driven by 
multivariate motivations. Such groups cannot be expected to perform the “rational 
calculus” that Clausewitz prizes. 
The armed groups in new wars take on a variety of different forms.220 Many of 
these new forms diverge radically from the assumptions about the nature of the 
organisation and competence conveyed by IHL in the past. As McInnes notes, the 
instigation of the war on terror also brought to the fore new technical aspects. Past 
wars were localised, undertaken upon the basis that civilian deaths should be 
minimised, and fought by professionals within a framework in which those involved 
only experienced risk within the phrase, and had certain privileges.221 The single event 
of 9/11 represented an inversion of these expectations.222 The war on terror has been 
defined as a global Islamist insurgency,223 questioning the logic of disaggregating it 
into a range of regional situations. To link together groups and individuals, Kilcullen 
draws upon a number of distinctly non-state means of organising – he references 
family links and marriages, financial networks, and patron relationships in order to 
depict the organisational features common to the global Islamist movement.224 These 
do not enter into conventional understandings of organisation.  
 
There are then the theorists arguing that there is nothing new about conflict today, 
such as Smith, who references longstanding guerrilla techniques.225 Some other 
scholars suggest additional reasons for being sceptical of the new wars concept. 
Dexter, for instance, suggests that the new wars concept serves only as an excuse for 
western interventions in conflicts.226 Dexter additionally presents any adaptation of 
law to reflect such new wars as the criminalisation of wars fought by non-westerners, 
or in a non-western way.227 Echeverria notes how the concept has revised itself several 
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times already.228 These normative criticisms do not, however, alter the changing nature 
of humanitarian needs in modern conflict.  
Lamp summarises one aspect of the problem as follows; the wars of today differ 
fundamentally from the concept of war in the conventional “paradigm of compliance” 
(upon which the application of IHL is predicated), and is not meaningful in the new 
type of wars.229 “New wars” fundamentally challenge the understanding of war upon 
which the function of IHL is predicated.230 This is partially a consequence of a 
divergence from the Clausewitzian “ideal type” undertaken by the armed groups of 
today.231 The initial challenge comes in the resurgence of savagery and barbarity 
associated with non-state groups participating in these conflicts. A secondary 
challenge, though one of perhaps greater importance to address, is the position adopted 
by states when fighting this type of conflict. Fighting non-state groups requires states 
to adapt in turn, which, due to the nature of the adversary, often results in 
civilians/non-combatants experiencing greater exposure to violence than would be 
acceptable in the past state on state, Clausewitzian type of war. This is partially 
dictated by operational reality, and partly due to uncertainty as to what rules should 
apply when fighting unconventional non-state groups.  
First to address is the inclination towards savagery exhibited by new non-state 
groups. This somewhat emotive language refers to the propensity for non-state groups 
to have aims and employ methods that are not in keeping with the expectations 
imposed by humanitarian principles. This in part, may relate to Kaldor’s recognition 
of the difference between wars fought upon the basis of ideology and those fought for 
identity.232 Many of the identities around which non-state groups coalesce have drawn 
an association with excessive violence; religious233 and ethnic234 identities having both 
been identified in this manner. The notion that fighting for such reasons fundamentally 
alters the manner in which armed force is used is not always direct, however. For 
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instance, it has been contended that what would conventionally be understood as war 
crimes and atrocities are in fact methods essential to the operation of these new 
wars.235 Whilst non-state actors may be capable of fighting in accordance with the 
laws of armed conflict, the advantages conferred on them by breaking the laws 
significantly outweigh any benefit incurred by behaving within the expectations 
imposed by the system. Ignatieff makes this point in relation to the Balkan conflict.236 
The benefits afforded by behaving in such an adverse manner are perhaps most visible 
in relation to Islamic extremist groups; groups like Al Qaeda and ISIS prove the dual 
benefit of such perfidy; the “propaganda by deed” afforded by acts of atrocity, as well 
as the tactical advantages gained through inducing terror in civilian populations. 
Kaufman suggests that in such identity-driven struggles, segregation is the only viable 
option for ending such conflict – intractable hatred not yielding to any convention or 
treaty.237 This serves to demonstrate a critical problem with assumptions concerning 
convention and compliance. 
It must be stressed, however, that there are no truly objective means of 
establishing a causal link between the ideological motivation behind non-state groups 
and the manner in which they challenge IHL in any specific manner. First, concepts 
such as ethnicity or religious groups are not altogether concrete, as countless 
postmodern critiques of such conceptualisations would suggest.238 Additionally, the 
notion that there is an indelible link between ethnicity or religion, and particularly 
adverse battlefield behaviour, is first of all contested, with some theorists indicating 
the importance of considering other variables that could be responsible,239 as well as 
scholars who consider religion specifically as having an opposite causal effect in 
relation to humanitarian behaviour in war. For instance, there is often a significant 
division between the purported message of armed groups and their actual motivations; 
 
235As Ignatieff summarises, war crimes and atrocities are now integral to the prosecution of war. See 
ibid 5–6. 
236 Ibid 5–6. 
237 As Kaufman suggests, attempts by the international community to construct more inclusive 
identities, effect power sharing, or reconstruct states have failed repeatedly in relation to ethnic conflicts 
with long histories of intercommunal violence. See Kaufmann (n 152). 
238 In terms of ethnicity, it is possible to survey a multitude of critiques that suggest ethnicity isn’t 
concrete, or significantly less important in conflict than it is proposed to be. See B. Gilley, ‘Against the 
Concept of Ethnic Conflict’ (2004) 25 Third World Quarterly 1155; in relation to religion, Cavanagh 
has famously argued that the influence of religion on violence cannot be defined in substantive terms, 
being inseparable from other historic and political influences. See William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of 
Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Modern Conflict (Oxford University Press 2009) 
123–127. 
239 Cavanaugh (n 238). 
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this is made apparent, albeit with hindsight of the brushfire conflicts and liberation 
movements of the Cold War era, in which there was often a disjunction between the 
ideology of movements that leaders sought to align themselves with and the 
motivations of the rank and file of their organisations.240 Despite taking on the 
trappings of liberation movements, many groups identified as “non-state armed 
groups” aspire to nothing more than continuous banditry.241 Even organisations like 
ISIS that have been suggested to consist of true believers with a consistent 
commitment to a shared religious ideology from the bottom up,242 may likewise be 
revealed to be more complex or fragmentary in retrospect. Such possibilities 
eloquently present reasons for excluding any consideration of ideology from IHL, and 
instead sticking with characteristics that are more objective and less transitory when 
determining what humanitarian protections should apply.  
The shift towards new wars has not passed unnoticed by states, however, with 
state practice acknowledging a need to fight new wars differently. In the Clausewitzian 
understanding of war, it is possible to articulate reasonable limitations on the use of 
force that serves to protect individuals, whilst permitting states sufficient space to 
assert themselves. In the state context, the strategic focus has most often fallen upon 
the destruction of the state’s military forces,243 this being sufficient to the type of 
objectives that states conventionally consider worth pursuing. IHL, for its part, framed 
the conventional “centre of gravity” effectively, permitting states the space to pursue 
it within both NIAC and IAC. In new wars, the defeat of the enemy cannot be 
articulated solely in military terms. Moreover, unlike the stable form of Clausewitzian 
 
240 This risk was identified by Lan, who suggested that traditions and religion proved more attractive to 
Zimbabwean peasants involved in liberation, in contrast to the ideological commitments held by the 
movement’s leadership. See David Lan, Guns and Rain Guerillas and Spirit Mediums in Zimbabwe 
(James Currey 1985); this characteristic is additionally identified in relation to the Simba rebellion; 
whilst leaders claimed to be Maoist, the ideology of the rebels themselves was more traditional, as 
evidenced by their adherence to pre-colonial bantu war rituals, which in the eyes of some, constitutes a 
sort of proto-nationalism. See Luca Jourdan, ‘Mayi-Mayi: Young Rebels in Kivu, DRC’ (2011) 36 
Africa Development 89. 
241 Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Africa’s Forever Wars: Why the Continent's Conflicts Never End’ (Foreign 
Policy 11 February 2010) <https://foreignpolicy.com/2010/02/11/africas-forever-wars/> accessed 11 
December 2018. 
242 Wood (n 95). 
243 ‘What do we mean by the defeat of the enemy? Simply the destruction of his forces, whether by 
death, injury, or any other means; either completely or enough to make him stop fighting […] The 
complete or partial destruction of the enemy must be regarded as the sole object of all engagements 
[…] Direct annihilation of the enemy's forces must always be the dominant consideration’. Clausewitz 
(n 200). 
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war,244 the opposing sides may have very different ideas of what victory entails.245 
Critically, this has implications for state practice. The rules of engagement required to 
engage modern unconventional armed groups have become so complicated as to 
impact conventional militaries’ ability to fight effectively.246 State militaries, 
therefore, are incentivised to fight wars differently, pioneering new ways to disrupt 
unconventional armed groups247 by, for example, striking at different kinds of targets, 
and utilising the language of IHL in order to articulate and justify changing 
approaches. From the state perspective, it is again possible to suggest that there are 
some foundational difficulties in fighting new wars. The first problem is that, 
practically speaking, no one knows how to win them. It is difficult to say, for instance, 
if a sprawl into killing propagandists has any discernible impact on an unconventional 
armed group. This, in turn, has ramifications in how the rules and principles of IHL 
are considered in light of new state practice.  
The fact that no one knows how to win new wars is of immense importance. As 
considered earlier in this chapter, states may have already identified the elusive “centre 
of gravity” in conflicts against unconventional non-state groups, namely through the 
termination of ideologues and propagandists. This is, however, far from certain and 
additionally lies outside of actions typically considered acceptable by IHL. There is 
some limited recognition that when states fight these new unconventional non-state 
groups, a higher proportion of civilian casualties is to be expected than when 
conventional militaries fight. This is dictated by the reality of fighting an adversary 
that is often indistinguishable from civilians, or is willing to utilise civilian populations 
to offset any military advantage states have. As yet, however, it is difficult to consider 
the maximum exposure civilians should experience. In the absence of such 
information, it is immensely difficult to effect a balance between operational 
requirements and humanitarian principles in relation to situations involving 
unconventional armed groups. A second failing from the state perspective is that whilst 
states have an interest in abiding by humanitarian principles and applying IHL, it is 
often difficult to determine what rules to apply. Notions of intensity and organisation 
 
244 ‘The natural aim of military operations is the enemy's overthrow […] Since both belligerents hold 
that view, it would follow that military operations could not be suspended […] until one or other side 
were finally defeated. Ibid. 
245 Odermatt (n 183) 29. 
246 Martin Van Creveld, Transformation of War (Free Press 2009) 176. 
247 In the last few decades, a remarkable variety of manuals and texts considering how to effectively 
fight new wars have emerged.  
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are assessed in relation to state-based competencies. There is little scope for 
aggregating a transnational conflict if the central belligerent is of an unconventional 
nature, employing methods of command and organisation that cannot be recognised 
by state criteria;248 there are layers of converging complexity to confront. 
Adapting to new wars is not simply a question of incorporating non-state groups 
more fully into IHL. This may have served in the case of past wars of revolution. 
Recognition is required that the incentives and punishments that have worked in 
altering the behaviour of states in a humanitarian way are not automatically applicable 
to all forms of non-state groups. Both states and the ICRC are increasingly struggling 
to assert the boundaries between peace, NIAC, and IAC. This is particularly apparent 
when dealing with non-state groups related to the war on terror. 
 
7.7 Generating a new approach to aligning humanitarian needs and the reality 
of armed conflict through revising categorisation in IHL 
 
The outcome of the analysis conducted so far in the chapter is an awareness that there 
are a number of factors that need to be considered in creating a successful alignment 
between IHL and conflicts involving unconventional non-state groups like ISIS; the 
problem in achieving alignment encapsulates a range of problems in addition to the 
commonly discussed transnational element. As this chapter has recognised, there is a 
range of potential strategies for renovating IHL in relation to the change brought about 
by unconventional armed groups. These range between the transformative, such as the 
implementation of a new category of armed conflict, through to relatively minor 
changes to the interpretation of existing rules in order to accommodate changes. 
Additionally, this chapter has sought to develop an understanding of the 
reasoning behind the conventional classification of conflict, drawing upon the 
understanding of war underpinning the manner in which conflict is classified. An 
indelible link may be drawn between the western, Clausewitzian philosophy of war 
and IHL that has translated through to the manner in which armed conflict is classified 
and defined. Following consideration of the different nature of conflict involving 
unconventional armed groups, there are reasonable grounds to suggest that the criteria 
that IHL uses to detect and classify armed conflict bear little relationship to the 
 
248 Milanovic (n 112). 
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humanitarian threat associated with conflicts involving unconventional armed groups. 
The problem is that IHL assumes a stable relationship between the criteria it has 
established for classifying armed conflict and the extent to which humanitarian 
protections should be applied. This is representative of dependence upon a particular 
objective means of “knowing” armed conflict. It has additionally been presented that 
the nature of conflicts involving unconventional armed groups is sufficiently different 
as to suggest that the criteria/indices used to classify armed conflict need to expand 
and consider other factors if they are to have any prospect of correctly aligning IHL 
with conflicts involving unconventional armed groups. 
What the proposed approaches to align IHL with the changing nature of conflict have 
in common is a reliance upon the conceptual tools that have been established for 
assessing the categories of armed conflict. This indicates that there is difficulty in 
moving away from the notions of organisation, intensity, and statehood that have 
conventionally been used to classify conflict. The conventional categorisation of 
armed conflict resulted from assumptions prevalent concerning the nature of war at 
the time of drafting, and these assumptions have been subsequently reinforced by the 
additional protocols and the Tadic criteria. It is possible to suggest, based on the “new 
wars” approach, that contemporary conflicts involving unconventional non-state 
groups diverge from the assumptions inherent in IHL’s approach to armed conflict. 
This suggests that inclusion or substitution of other indices may allow for a more 
comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian threat to be made. The integration of 
a new mechanism for distinguishing armed conflict based on cognitive identification 
may allow for the humanitarian threat posed in conflicts involving unconventional 
armed groups to be better aligned with the categories of armed conflict. This chapter 
has briefly discussed the possibility of integrating ideology into IHL for this purpose. 
The question as to whether this would represent a positive evolution in IHL will be 
discussed. 
 
7.7.1 How to define a “successful alignment”? 
 
As referred to through the course of this chapter, the desired outcome is to make 
certain that IHL ensures appropriate civilian protections are applied in a conflict 
involving unconventional armed groups. Whilst progress has been made in developing 
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NIAC as a category applicable to non-state armed groups in general, there is scope to 
question whether the adjustments that have been made since the initial convention are 
helpful in correctly categorising conflicts involving unconventional armed groups. It 
is not clear how the elaborations upon the category of NIAC made so far relate to 
unconventional armed groups. Additionally, there is a lack of any means that could 
consistently and reliably see conflicts involving unconventional armed groups being 
placed in any single category of armed conflict.  
A failure to articulate a workable framework for the inclusion of wars involving 
unconventional armed groups by IHL risks either the tacit recognition of a legal blind 
spot or the initiation of an unrestrained “Grotian moment”,249 in which the law 
develops rapidly as the threat posed by unconventional armed groups continues to 
grow. The divergence observed in state practice towards such groups stresses the 
imminence of such a transition. This is not automatically a bad thing, but it is perhaps 
more desirable that such a moment be managed. 
The initial problem is that defining success in the landscape of IHL is a 
contentious task. First, there is no agreement as to how questions arising through the 
application of international law should be approached.250 Second, IHL, having in the 
past developed through pluralistic means251 introduces a range of different influences 
in considering how it may evolve in the future. A good starting point is to consider the 
different parties involved in the generation and interpretation of IHL. States, for 
instance, have recognised that in order to effectively fight unconventional armed 
groups, they need to interpret aspects of IHL differently, which has manifested clearly 
in how they interpret the categories of armed conflict. A successful alteration from the 
state perspective would entail, for instance, the implementation of a new category of 
armed conflict which clarifies and systematises the different approach to 
unconventional armed groups that are emerging in practice. As an additional 
component, state interests are often at odds with one another.252 
Whilst it is difficult to determine where precisely the ICRC fits into the 
generation of IHL, it represents an authoritative voice that would seek to prioritise 
 
249 See Michael P. Scharf, Customary International Law in Times of Fundamental Change: Recognizing 
Grotian Moments (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
250 See Steven R. Ratner and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A 
Prospectus for Readers’ (1999) 93 The American Journal of International Law 291. 
251 Green (n 21) 24. 
252 Mastorodimos observes this in relation to the categorisation of the Gaza conflict. See Mastorodimos 
(n 212). 
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humanitarian need in any evolution of IHL. The application of existing standards 
represents a good starting point in assessing the inclinations of the ICRC. Some 
theorists suggest that the non-state armed groups of today are capable of influencing 
the direction of IHL. Whilst this may prove palatable in regard to more conventional 
armed groups such as those specified in Additional Protocol 1, the prospect of more 
unconventional armed groups which are characterised in part by their proclivity 
towards savagery, is less desirable.  
In terms of effecting a balance between the different inclinations of parties 
involved in the formulation, regarding a successful alignment between IHL requires 
reference to IHL as it stands. There is a need to understand first the foundational 
principles that form the basis for decisions made within a particular body;253 in the 
case of IHL, these are well established in the wider scholarship. There is accordingly 
a need to ensure that any realignment is consistent with the broad humanitarian 
principles underpinning the theory and application of IHL if one accepts that these 
principles remain a constant. 
The influence of existing treaties and conventions is uncertain. Discussion of 
“transnational armed conflicts” in IHL yields a number of different potential 
approaches, ranging from the argument that such conflicts take place in a legal void, 
through to arguments for incorporating it into existing categories. It has been 
acknowledged that the many modern conflicts have already demonstrated the 
shortcomings of the criteria that have conventionally been utilised to trigger the 
application of IHL to a conflict.254 The difficulty of ensuring civilians receive adequate 
protections is a product of the difficulty in determining when an “internal 
disturbance”255 becomes an armed conflict of a non-international character, and at the 
boundary between NIAC and IAC.  
As for a conceptual approach in developing a possible solution, a purely 
positivist approach to this question seems inadequate based upon the reliance of the 
approach upon formal criteria.256 After all, this chapter has taken a critical view of the 
value of the rules as they stand, and additionally has stressed the need for an 
understanding of unconventional armed groups, which is beyond the scope of the 
 
253 L. Oppenheim, ‘The Science of International Law: Its Task and Method’ (2017) 2 American Journal 
of International Law 313, 341.  
254 Corn (n 96) 296. 
255 Additional Protocol 2. 
256 For an assessment of the limitations of positivism, see Morgenthau (n 178) 
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positivist approach. There is, therefore, scope to explore supplementary means of 
analysis in relation to the problem. On the other hand, it is not useful to disregard 
conventional legal scholarship in its entirety. 
First, a common feature of discussion is the effort it takes to re-align IHL in any drastic 
sense. Any significant change, such as the implementation of a new category of 
transnational armed conflict, requires a new convention to be developed, or at the very 
least, new additions to be made to existing ones. Such an approach would not only 
entail significant disruptions but would also require an extensive timeline to bring into 
existence. The practical considerations of changing or adjusting armed conflict in IHL 
should, therefore, centre around modest goals that are more likely to be palatable to 
states and practical to accomplish. A second priority should be preventing undue 
disruption to the operation of IHL as an instrument for regulating conflict between 
states. Any erosion to the primary function of IHL in favour of better regulating 
conflicts involving unconventional armed groups, who are, largely speaking, inferior 
in their capacity to commit violence, would represent more of a failure than a success. 
The ability to enforce IHL upon unconventional armed groups is a quantity 
relevant to success in regard to the stated problem. As international legal compliance 
remains something of a “primitive science”,257 this is by no means an easy 
undertaking. Inflicting costs upon the non-compliant is often taken as a measure of 
success,258 and may have to serve in lieu of compliance. 
 
7.7.2 Moving forward/boundaries  
 
The analysis conducted in the course of this chapter has sought to question the 
applicability of the conventional approach in IHL to understanding and subsequently 
categorising armed conflict. This has been conducted upon an understanding that 
assessments of “intensity” and “organisation” as conventionally set out in IHL do not 
form an effective basis for classifying armed conflicts involving a non-state armed 
group that is unconventional in nature. Ideology plays a key role in distinguishing 
unconventional armed groups from their conventional counterpoints and suggest that 
 
257 Bradford (n 152) 1244. 
258 John C. Harsanyi, ‘Measurement of Social Power, Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two‐person 
Bargaining Games’ (1962) 7 Behavioral Science 67. 
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it may be of utility to integrate different, more cognitive criteria into classifying such 
conflicts. 
In the language of IHL, protections should apply “without any adverse 
distinction based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict or on the causes 
espoused by or attributed to the Parties to the conflict”.259 Without challenging the 
normative implications of this assertion, an awareness of the new wars approach 
suggests that appropriately tailoring humanitarian protections to situations involving 
unconventional armed groups requires an understanding of the nature and origin of the 
conflict – the manner in which these unconventional armed groups diverge in terms of 
their aims and means of achieving them is of a critical nature. Suggesting that a 
group’s ideology, or convictions, have an influence over how they fight is not 
particularly controversial.260 In inferring from this that a group’s ideology may have a 
deterministic relationship over the scale and nature of the humanitarian threat that they 
produce when involved in an armed conflict, it is possible to draw again upon the rich 
body of literature surrounding “new wars” which suggests that this is the case.261 
Suggesting that IHL could draw upon the causal relationship between ideology and 
humanitarian threat in order to better ensure that humanitarian protections and military 
needs are aligned in such conflicts immediately runs into fierce resistance, however.  
The complication in adjusting IHL to include more cognitive criteria along 
with the objective ones is challenging to assert. Categorisation based on largely 
objective criteria is already often criticised on political grounds.262 The inclusion of 
more cognitive criteria redoubles the possibility for politicisation; for instance, there 
is the immense difficulty in labelling modern transnational terrorist groups in a manner 
that is not political,263 in addition to the challenge of defining any additional cognitive 
criteria in a manner that can be easily understood and applied. Yet, some headway in 
 
259 This language is exhibited both within the content of the Geneva Convention and additionally in the 
ICRC’s database of customary IHL. See ICRC IHL database; Customary IHL, Rule 88. Non-
discrimination <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule88> accessed 2 
January 2019. 
260 Olivier Bangerter, ‘Reasons Why Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law 
or Not’ (2011) 93 International Review of the Red Cross 353, 359–360. 
261 The notion that the changing dynamics of “new wars” is to some extent rooted in the changing nature 
of ideology is explicitly stated by a number of new wars theorists, see Kaldor (n 205). 
262 Wills (n 25). 
263 Robert Barnidge, Non-state Actors and Terrorism: Applying the Law of State Responsibility and the 
Due Diligence Principle (T.M.C Asser Press 2008) 17. 
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the classification of armed conflict is present, as indicated by the inclusion of “national 
wars of liberation” in the criteria for the application of IAC.  
Scholars that have recognised a shift have taken place do not always suggest that 
international law should change, but suggest additional factors need to be considered. 
Reisman would suggest that the growing disconnect between the law and the facts on 
the ground can be in part resolved by drawing upon how elites react to “incidents” 
taking place.264 As he himself admits, this is difficult in many incidents, in which facts 
are often obscure.265 Yet, there is perhaps the possibility of considering the deeper 
synthesis between unconventional armed groups and the use of force by states evident 
in the practice of key actors, such as the US. 
Based upon an assessment of how to define a successful alignment between the 
manner in which IHL is categorised and the reality of armed conflict, it can first be 
determined that the existing process faces limitations when applied in relation to 
conflicts involving unconventional armed groups. There is then the pluralist nature of 
IHL and the definitional and procedural challenges in approaching conflicts involving 
unconventional armed groups to consider. This complexity serves to advocate for a 
highly specific case-based approach in order to determine if the understanding of the 
armed conflict that prevails in IHL may be effectively realigned in order to ensure that 
appropriate protections are set out with regard to armed conflicts involving non-state 
armed groups. 
The criteria established in order to determine what category should be imposed, 
however, have come unstuck in relation to conflicts involving unconventional armed 
groups. There are grounds to consider the inclusion of additional factors in defining 
armed conflict status, as well as to challenge the ones that are widely accepted. Whilst 
a causal relationship between ideology and humanitarian threat can be extracted from 
the scholarship surrounding “new wars”, incorporating this relationship into how IHL 
assesses the nature of an armed conflict faces many challenges. Even a cursory 
examination of the scholarship surrounding the nature of armed conflict suggests that 
an increasing proportion of civilian casualties is an immutable reality of modern 
 
264 W. Michael Reisman, ‘International Incidents: Introduction to a New Genre in the Study of 
International Law. (Special Feature – The Incident as a Decisional Unit in International Law)’ (1984) 
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conflict.266 This serves to stress the importance of invoking humanitarian principles 
when possible. This is, however, a matter of increasing complexity as many 
contemporary conflicts fail to reach the thresholds required for humanitarian 
protections to be invoked. This stresses that killing civilians does not require much in 
the way of competence, and can perhaps even be accomplished without a dedicated 
military. 
 
7.8 Conclusions  
 
This chapter began by stating that IHL represents a balance between humanitarian 
concerns and the need for states to wage war. The current manner in which IHL 
balances these conditions was presented, along with some current trends that threaten 
the application of IHL, specifically concerning how armed conflict is categorised. 
Moving forward, this chapter surveyed the potential responses suggested as a means 
for better aligning the balance of IHL, based upon the assertion that the nature of war 
has shifted, with this shift in part due to the change imposed by the increasing 
prevalence and impact of unconventional armed groups. 
The “new wars” approach recognises a change in the character of armed 
conflict. Not only does conflict frequently involve non-state groups, the nature of these 
non-state groups is often alien when compared to the state model. As the war on terror 
has made clear, neither states nor new unconventional armed groups have developed 
effective strategies for achieving their objectives. This strategic gap makes it difficult 
to define precisely how to resolve the balance between humanitarian concerns and 
states’ use of violence.  
This chapter asserted that the challenge facing IHL is deeper and more expansive than 
can be encapsulated by the sole focus on the transnational proclivity of contemporary 
conflict. The unconventional armed groups of today are not simply distinguished from 
conventional armed groups and states by their transnational nature but operate in a 
fundamentally different way. This divergence places them outside of the state-centric, 
Clausewitzian understanding of armed conflict central to IHL’s understanding of 
warfare. The analysis conducted in this chapter is illustrative of some key themes of 
 
266 ‘the percentage of civilian casualties has risen from 19% in world war one […] to 90% in the armed 
conflicts of the 1990s’. Corn and Jensen (n 117) 62. 
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relevance to the wider thesis. First, aligning IHL to reflect the reality of modern 
conflict is a key concern. Second, the challenge posed by unconventional armed 
groups goes much deeper than their transnational nature.  
Introducing a transnational condition of armed conflict would permit states the 
operational space they require in order to effectively fight such groups, whilst ensuring 
that relevant protections in relation to civilians, combatants, and property are 
triggered. It would draw into the fold the type of conflict that has increasingly 
characterised the twenty-first century. This new category, however, must reconcile 
itself not only with the transactional proclivities of unconventional armed groups, but 
the “way of war” practised by these groups, and most importantly, the specific 
pressures imposed on states by unconventional armed groups.  
To return to the case central to this thesis, integrating a detailed understanding of neo-
jihadist goals and methods allows for a better bounding of a new category of 
transnational armed conflict in the case in question.  
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8  Concluding Examination  
 
8.1  Findings  
 
The advocates of IHL suggest that it represents a universal system that has transcended 
the circumstances of its origins and can provide states with an approach to humanely 
winning any conflict.1 The ICRC, for instance,  would specify that in relation to new 
challenges like ISIS, parties need only carefully consider how to apply existing rules, 
which will allow new transnational threats of this nature to be neatly and 
comprehensively dissected into a range of discrete international and non-international 
conflicts, as well as situations that are not conflicts and that may be addressed as 
domestic criminal situations.2 Exactly how this will work is however as yet unclear. 
Moreover, proponents of IHL as it stands assume that involved states are aware of an 
approach to humanely confront such organisations and ultimately beat them, all whilst 
only causing an acceptable amount of collateral damage.3 If states are aware of such 
an approach in relation to groups like ISIS, then they are certainly concealing it 
effectively.  
The first problem identified by this thesis is that IHL is dependent upon it’ 
understanding of the interstate approach to warfare in relation to all instances of armed 
conflict. This has been evidenced first by examining the history of IHL, its sources, 
and the manner in which concrete material elements have been set out in order to 
understand non state armed conflicts. Whilst in theory, IHL represents a body of law 
that is capable of adapting to changes in the nature of armed conflict, it’s capacity to 
understand, and therefore effectively regulate conflicts that diverge rapidly from its 
state centred expectations is questionable. As current approaches to the use of force 
 
1This is after all the purpose of IHL; the assertion of universality is central to the system’s identity. See 
Hans-Peter Gasser, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of War Victims: Extract from 
“International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction”, (ICRC, 30 November 1998) 
<https://icrc.org/en/doc/resources/documents/misc/57jm93.htm> accessed 20 November 2018. 
2 See ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts’. 
Report prepared for the 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (October 
2007). 
3 As this thesis has stated determining what represents humanitarian behaviour is understood to usually 
represent a “common sense” exercise; it is however apparent that states do not even know how to win 
many modern conflicts, let alone do so in a humane manner. See Gabriella Blum, ‘The Fog of Victory’ 
(2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 391, 391-392. 
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by non-state armed groups such as ISIS do not conform to the state approach, problems 
have begun to emerge.  Later chapters set out in detail the problems arising from IHL’s 
dependence on interstate war. Perhaps most visibly, the categories comprising IHL do 
not cover all potential forms armed conflict can take; moreover, there are gaps between 
these categories that can provide an advantage to noncompliant armed groups,4 with 
ISIS providing an interesting example of the possible adverse ramifications of these 
gaps and boundary issues. There are a number of specific problems that can be 
specified. Trying to fit organisations like ISIS in the current framework falls to account 
for the way in which geographically dispersed conflicts can be connected to one 
another,5 and the lack of conventional competence these groups often display.6 
Secondly, the criteria that international law has for determining if an organisation is 
capable of waging an armed conflict and when one is taking place are not correctly 
disposed to fully understand an organisation like ISIS and its approach to the use of 
force. This leads to what military scientists would describe as friction.7 Rather than 
simplifying matters, applying international law as it stands has instigated a piecemeal, 
disaggregated and often confusing response that may well be part of the reason behind 
the ongoing nature of this conflict, and therefore, its often outsized impact on human 
welfare.  
There are some very good reasons as to why international law should hold its 
course, however. IHL has served effectively in constraining many state and non-state 
conflicts and certainly has contributed to the incremental decline of armed conflict and 
its adverse impacts.8 Incorporating unconventional armed groups like ISIS would 
require adjustments to be made. The inventible changes required to do so effectively 
risks destabilising the progress that has been made in regulating more conventional 
forms of warfare. There are additionally compelling arguments supporting the status 
quo arrangement and its capacity to effectively address ISIS, stressing the value of 
 
4 See Mark Klamberg “Exploiting legal thresholds, fault-lines and gaps in the context of remote 
warfare” in Jens David Ohlin, (eds) Research Handbook on Remote Warfare (Edward Elgar 2017) 201. 
5 As the group’s grip on territory in Iraq and Syria has weakened, these connections become even more 
important to acknowledge. See  Greg Simons, ‘Brand ISIS: Interactions of the Tangible and Intangible 
Environments’ (2018) 17 Journal of Political Marketing 322.  
6 As thesis has contested, Groups like ISIS are not conventionally equipped to meet the standards of 
“intensity and organisation” required to trigger a state of “armed conflict.” 
7 Specifically, the law serves to constrain the freedom of states to undertake military action. Whilst 
Clausewitz did not consider international law as a source of friction, as van Creveld indicates it is 
supremely relevant to wars today. See M. Van Creveld, Transformation of War (Free Press 2009) 89. 
8 Oona Hathaway and Scott Shapiro, The Internationalists: And Their Plan to Outlaw War (Allen Lane 
2017) 334-335. 
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being able to respond in detail, and the value of approaching the organisation as a 
criminal organisation where possible.9  
There is another perspective, however, one that this thesis has sought to 
cultivate. An organisation like ISIS and perhaps unconventional armed groups, in 
general, can only survive and prosper in an international environment in which states 
are constrained from addressing them in a rapid and decisive manner.10 ISIS 
exemplifies how an organisation can take advantage of globalisation and a  liberal 
legal framework governing the use of force. IHL is currently ill-equipped to 
understand and address such groups. This needs to change, and rapidly, if IHL is to 
maintain its position as the most widely recognised approach to regulating the conduct 
of warfare; should it fail to support states in addressing such groups it is likely that 
they will simply defect form the system.  
This thesis can advance some modest suggestions regarding the course IHL and 
international law could take in order to better address the central case of this thesis, 
ISIS, and by extension unconventional armed groups more generally. These 
suggestions mainly relate to the two major problems covered in the course of this 
thesis- how groups like ISIS should be identified in international public law, and to 
what extent and how IHL should be revised in order to better address such groups. 
Additionally, it is reasonable to post some conclusions regarding the distinctive nature 
of religious conflict in contrast to interstate war and more conventional approaches to 
the use of force, and the importance of this difference being acknowledged.  
 
 
8.1.1 Unconventional armed groups challenge IHL by not behaving like states in 
how they organise and use force.   
 
This study began by examining why international law views armed conflict in 
the way it does, and what events and assumptions have determined the type of 
organisations understood as capable of contesting one. It has been asserted in this 
thesis that IHL is orientated around interstate warfare, and though mechanisms exit to 
 
9 Benjamin Wittes, ‘What Is Hybrid Conflict?’ (Lawfare, 11 September 2015) 
<https://lawfareblog.com/what-hybrid-conflict> accessed 1 August 2018 
10 Tanisha. M. Fazal, Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict 
(2018) 248-249. 
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adapt to new trends in armed conflict, the more radically a situation diverges from 
interstate war, the more limited the capacity for IHL to comprehend the challenge 
becomes.  This state of affairs is understandable given that it is perhaps the most 
threatening form of armed conflict, and moreover, for much of the recent past, the 
most prolific. This orientation does, however, challenge IHL’s capacity to understand 
and relate regulations in more contemporary situations that do not conform to this 
archetype; this is limitation is most apparent in relation to IHL’s definition of non-
state armed groups.   
In chapter 2, it was recognised that IHL is very much a living body of law; 
providing sufficient will exists, it is possible to produce new treaties to legislate the 
conduct of hostilities, or through the mechanisms of customary law, assert new rules 
arising from state behaviour against groups like ISIS. In relation to the problem, 
however, it is questionable as to whether or not there is sufficient will to alter IHL. 
Even was this the case, it was suggested that there is no basis to assert what adaptations 
would bring IHL into better alignment with new conflicts, there being a distinct lack 
of any understanding of unconventional armed groups like ISIS and the key 
differences between wars contested by such groups and those fought by more 
conventional non state groups in the past. As IHL is focused around the state approach 
to using force, with state like competencies forming the basis for recognising non-state 
parties to armed conflict, this becomes a problem in that many modern organisations 
do not organise along state lines and often fight in a different manner. This chapter 
further contended that this is what is occurring, using the “war on terror” and ISIS as 
an example. Groups mobilising on the basis of religious extremism, in particular, have 
deviated from the assumptions IHL has cultivated in terms of what groups should be 
defined as capable of engaging in armed conflict. This also permitted some initial 
insights into why unconventional armed groups cloud represent a deeper challenge, 
indicating distinctive underlying social structures, as well as different aims and 
objectives that may cause further deviations from the state approach to armed conflict.   
In contending with unconventional armed groups, IHL is disposed to presume 
that all belligerents consider armed conflict as a contest of military force, fought for 
rational objectives.11 In later chapters, these assumptions were related to the 
 
11In the past “provisions of international law for the protection of civilians fitted well with the 
organizational rationality of the military apparatus.”  Herfried Münkler, The New Wars (Polity Press 
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Clausewitzian approach to warfare. Unconventional armed groups represent a clear 
challenge to IHL in this regard, subverting the assumptions resulting from dependence 
on this approach. Unconventional armed groups are liable to challenge IHL in different 
ways; indeed, unconventional armed groups can only be unified in a negative sense; 
organised armed groups that contest the application of IHL.12  Focusing, as this study 
has upon a central example, however, it is possible to go into a little more detail. This 
study first realises a distinction between conventional armed groups -those generally 
deemed capable of actuating a NIAC- and unconventional armed groups. An 
unconventional armed group is disinclined, unwilling or unable to mimic state 
behaviour both on and off the battlefield. Most likely, as is the case with ISIS, they do 
not aspire to become part of the international system.13 Even should they, they are 
generally incapable of achieving this aim in a meaningful sense.14 To consider their 
battlefield behaviour, firstly, meaningfully and decisively defeating such groups in a 
conventional sense does not result in victory. As Blum writes;  
“Victory is still frequently imagined in World War II terms: 
invasion, defeat of armed forces, capitulation of the defeated, 
capture of the capital and leaders, and installation of a new 
government. Many earlier wars have taken a similar form, and some 
recent wars included certain elements that resemble this model. But 
not all wars require such elements for victory; nor is it that when 
these elements do present themselves (for instance, in Afghanistan 
or Iraq), we commonly think about these wars as having been 
decisively ‘won’.”15  
 
2005) 83; see additionally Morrow, who suggests that the laws on war codify a shared understanding, 
inverting the causality of IHL. See Morrow (n 11) 49-50. 
12 Gangs, criminal organisations, religious groups; all could be described as unconventional armed 
groups.  Benjamin Lessing, ‘The Logic of Violence in Criminal War: Cartel-State Conflict in Mexico, 
Colombia, and Brazil’ (2012); Letizia Paoli and others, ‘Tajikistan: The Rise of a Narco-State’ (2007) 
37 Journal of Drug Issues 951; Jennifer Hazen, ‘Understanding Gangs as Armed Groups’ (2010) 92 
International Review of the Red Cross 369. Is it Possible to suggest these varieties of armed actor are 
as different from one another as they are from conventional armed groups or states. 
13 As Maher notes, a caliphate is very different to a nation state. See Shriaz Maher, Salafi-Jihadism The 
History of an Idea (Hurst 2016) 4-5. 
14 The Taliban served as an excellent example in this regard. Whilst possessing much of the territory of 
Afghanistan, doe to amongst other factors, their religious ideology, the Taliban was committed to 
undertaking acts antithetical to being recognised. See Svante Cornell, ‘Taliban Afghanistan: A True 
Islamic State’ in Brenda Shaffer (ed), The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy (Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affair 2006) 264. 
15 Gabriella Blum, ‘The Fog of Victory’ (2013) 24 European Journal of International Law 391, 392. 
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The absence of an appropriate, accessible means to defeat such groups, it becomes 
difficult to determine what actions are justifiable for states to undertake. For instance, 
it is generally acceptable to inflict some civilian casualties, should the value of the 
object justify such action. Now, however, the objectives in state war- destroying 
military capacity, killing leaders and capturing territory- have an undetermined impact 
on how the conflict unfolds. Such unconventional armed groups do not even 
understand the use of force in a conventional military sense. Moreover, even the most 
humiliating defeats can be transmuted into propaganda victories; either due to the 
prohibitively heavy humanitarian costs imposed upon states in engaging an adversary 
that does not express regard for distinction, or to call for yet more mobilisation against 
their enemy. Most worryingly, the application of conventional force simply brings 
about a mutation in organisation and methods.16 This means that the strategies 
delineated as acceptable for states to use by IHL are not necessarily an appropriate 
approach, considering the way unconventional armed groups diverge from the type of 
actors IHL is prepared for. It may additionally dictate that the balance of military 
necessity and humanitarian need is calculated differently. A critical consideration is 
therefore that IHL must be mindful that in such new conflicts, Non-state groups are 
not compelled to mimic the state approach to the use of force. Accordingly, they may 
not exhibit the features that IHL requires for establishing a condition of armed conflict. 
The split this thesis has proposed between conventional and unconventional armed 
groups can be considered a fairly novel way of identifying the challenge; the fact that 
each unconventional armed group my merit extremely specific consideration 
additionally justifies the restricted nature of this study.  
 
8.1.2 Religion can have a deterministic influence on the armed groups it mobilises, 
altering how they are organised and how they use force. IHL needs to be 
mindful of these differences.  
 
The challenge of religious groups in relation to IHL is far from hypothetical, with 
groups like ISIS having already necessitated alterations.17 In light of this, the thesis set 
out to first establish the distinctive nature of religious conflict. This approach is 
 
16 Anthony H. Cordesman, ‘Modern Warfare: The Changing Nature of War in the Middle East and 
North Africa’ (2016) 37 Harvard International Review 21, 21-22. 
17 Michael P. Scharf, ‘How the War Against ISIS Changed International Law’ (2016) Paper 1638. 
Faculty Publications 1. 
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innovative in that the role religion plays in violence is often obscured, with it being 
identified as a pretext, rather than a root cause of conflict. Religious conflict or warfare 
has, in the estimation of many religious traditions represented a separate, proto-legal 
framework in which the restrictions applied to warfare more generally could be 
disregarded.18 Whilst the historical approach to religious armed conflict is inaccessible 
today, religion remains a potent call to action, and many contemporary movements 
seek to suspend normal practice in the use for force in the manner faiths did in the 
past.   
Contemporary religious conflict, based upon the examination conducted in 
chapter 5 has some typical features that challenge IHL. In relation to the central case, 
taking on religious identity is a prominent aspect of what causes ISIS to exhibit erratic 
and unconventional behaviours. ISIS and a range of similar organisations within the 
context of the war on terror, for instance, prove that the adoption of a religious identity 
necessitates that such organisations take on religious goals. As Bartels suggests;  
“In these contemporary conflicts, armed groups often reject the 
system built around state sovereignty and governmental authority, 
as their aim is not to overthrow the government in order to simply 
replace it. Instead, their fighting largely follows from the desire to 
impose their ideology and values.”19 
This suggests that many conventional aims and objectives are absent or ancillary to 
groups such as ISIS. Being ideologically focused, many of the features associated with 
armed groups will not need to be present. Ultimately, the central problem identified 
was the inability of IHL to understand armed groups of a religious nature; being 
accustomed to equating humanitarian threat upon the basis of either the legitimacy of 
an entity- a characteristic that in many cases has a relationship with destructive 
capacity-20 or competence in military terms.21  
 
18 This was a consistent feature of the three major approaches discussed in chapter 2, all understood that 
war fought for religious purposes as subject to different wars and more limited restraints.  
19 Rogier Bartels, ‘The Relationship between International Humanitarian Law and the Notion of State 
Sovereignty’ (2018) 23 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 461. 
20 States, in the past were considered to have a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within a given 
territory. Consistent with this right, it is fair to assume that the states are capable of bringing the most 
force to bear. 
21 In setting out the requirements for organisation and intensity, IHL established bounds for 
differentiating “armed conflict” from other forms of violence not meriting the application of special 
rules. These boundaries assume that armed groups will need to mimic state competencies in order to 
present a humanitarian threat.  
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Another issue is compliance. Based on the sources that have been examined, 
some religious ideologies have a deterministic connection with compliance issues. An 
exclusive ideology reasoning along with an awareness of the way states are means that 
groups like ISIS do not consider themselves to be subject to international law. as Jo 
notes; 
“Ideology looms large in the Syrian context, as it dictates the 
military strategies of ISIL and at the same time causes ISIL to see 
legitimacy as stemming from religious principles – which 
fundamentally clashes with the order of international law and with 
political notions of legitimacy. And the consequences of ISIL’s 
religiously based conception of legitimacy has been plain to see 
civilians who do not support ISIL are labelled as enemies of their 
jihad rule and justified as targets for ISIL violence”22  
 
Religion as a supranational form of authority has been observed as having a 
destabilising effect on the secular inclined governments of the middle east.23 It is clear 
that groups like ISIS do not aspire to be seen as legitimate within the framework of 
international public law. International law is therefore exposed to the same problem, 
in that those inculcated with religious ideology will draw legitimacy from an 
alternative framework. Rejecting the norms and values enshrined in IHL seems to 
enhance the reputation of groups like ISIS in this alternative framework. accordingly, 
there is a basis to suggest that neo jihadi ideology causes associated groups to exhibit 
issues with compliance. 
 Based on the case of ISIS, there is a basis to assert that it is important for IHL 
to engage with the problem of contemporary religious violence on two fronts. Firstly, 
it is imperative that a new means for understanding the type of conflict propagated by 
such groups are generated. Secondly, it is important that the deterministic influence 
religion has on unconventional armed groups in terms of participation within both 
international public law and IHL. Many of the trends associated with ISIS and more 
loosely with contemporary religious conflict may naturally prevail more widely. 
Indeed, some of the challenges the author has connected to ISIS could be caused or 
compounded by more widely prevailing trends in armed conflict.  
 
22Hyeran Jo, Compliant Rebels: Rebel Groups and International Law in World Politics (Cambridge 
University Press 2015) 251. 
23 Olivier Roy, ‘Islamism and Nationalism’ (2003) 104 Pouvoirs 45, 56. 
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 The statements made by this thesis regarding the importance of considering 
the aims an armed group expresses are original, in that they seek to expand legal 
discussion into an aspect of IHL previously considered inviolable; the reasons that 
people go to war have conventionally been disregarded, with the aim being to ensure 
fair treatment irrespective of the reasons for fighting. As this thesis determined that 
wars fought for a religious imperative may take on a distinctive character, it is 
imperative that this disinterest is therefore revisited.  
  
 
8.1.3 Before considering how to revise IHL to address ISIS in a humanitarian 
manner, they must be appropriately classified, and an understanding of how to 
defeat the group must be cultivated.   
 
 
The final question posed in relation to this thesis related to how IHL and perhaps 
international law in general should change, with the primary aim of determining how 
best to go about ensuring that civilians and those not in combat are protected in 
practice. A critical consideration in this regard was considering what approach may be 
viable in relation to ISIS.  
The first problem was how to classify organisations like ISIS. Based on the in-
depth analysis of the groups’ ideology, this thesis was able to recognise that ISIS 
cannot comprehensively be classified as a state. The case of the Taliban was 
additionally discussed, by way of demonstrating that pursuing statehood and 
legitimacy within the neo-jihadist framework is likely result in the loss of both.  In 
investigating this thesis, the idea of an “uncivilised state” was encountered; a category 
previously invoked as expedience to describe states and empires that Europeans did 
not fully understand, and did not deem possible to include in their shared international 
law.24  This thesis would not suggest that such a term is useful in relation to ISIS today, 
though it is important to note that the situation broadly reflects the one confronting 
those early, largely Christian, European states. Groups like ISIS cannot be made to 
comply with any shared norms or laws concerning the use of force, do not wish to 
become a state, and for their part, do not recognise the rights of any other state or 
 
24 Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Idea of European International Law’ (2006) 17 European Journal of 
International Law 315. 
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system to exist. As international law is more developed than it was in the 19th century, 
however, simply declaring them to be an outlaw state is neither desirable or necessary. 
It may however prove necessary to produce an approach that insulates states from the 
predations of groups that do not recognise the value of restraining warfare. Finally, 
the notion that a new form of personality is already being synthesised to describe ISIS 
was discussed; in particular, the need to separate the capacity to control territory and 
wage war from the legitimacy that often accompanies these features was identified. 
This approach is quite original; firstly, in looking back to early European international 
law to describe ISIS, this thesis looked back at an aspect of legal history that is perhaps 
rightly recognised as less sophisticated and inferior when compared to today’s system. 
As the approach demonstrated, there is knowledge to be found here; particularly in 
how this early system took account of its limitations, excluding institutions and states 
it was incapable of understanding.  In an era of unprecedented change, international 
law again finds itself confronting organisations beyond its horizon of understanding, 
though this time rooted in transnational threats like ISIS. 
Whilst there is as yet a lack of understanding of groups like ISIS in 
international public law, the threat that groups like ISIS pose has been recognised. 
Many states have begun to find ways to deal with groups like ISIS. There are certainly 
options at hand to deal with the group, as the later chapters of this thesis have 
demonstrated. The fact that many have sought to demonstrate that the actions they are 
undertaking are consistent with IHL is broadly speaking positive. 
In relation to the “war on terror” and ISIS, it is worth restating some of the 
different options discussed in the latter part of this thesis. There are, some proposed 
drastic changes, such as the possibility of generating a new category of armed conflict. 
Radical changes of this nature are however unlikely, would take time to implement, 
and may yet be premature, given the barely formative understanding of how 
unconventional armed groups like ISIS operate, and how states may go about defeating 
them whilst abiding by humanitarian principles.  The critical problem identified was 
IHL’s preoccupation with certain objective means of determining the existence of 
armed conflict and what rules should apply. Finally, it is possible to suggest that an 
understanding of contemporary religious conflict is consistent with some of the 
approaches advocated by scholars and states. Additionally, new wars approaches can 
shed some light on the problem. These bodies of knowledge, whilst useful do not, 
however, provide a solution comparable to the manner in which the Clausewitzian 
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approach to war25 has contributed to IHL’s “common sense”26 approach that has been 
of utility in relation to more conventional instances of armed conflict. A new area of 
inquiry opened up in the course of this study relates to  how IHL goes about balancing 
military necessity and humanitarian concerns, specifically in relation to how IHL goes 
about determining the value of military objects.27 As illuminated by the ISIS case, the 
information needed to make value judgements about military necessity has simply not 
been acquired in relation to unconventional armed groups like ISIS, at least not yet.  
 
 
8.2  Final statement; How can IHL ensure that appropriate protections are 
applied to conflicts involving unconventional armed groups of the type 
exemplified by ISIS? 
 
 
This thesis set out with an important and original question in mind; the central aim of 
this thesis was to use an understanding of contemporary religious conflict to assert that 
a need exists to alter IHL. This was an original question to ask, as today, the notion 
that religious conflict is distinctive from other forms of warfare is not widely 
considered. The thesis has effectively addressed this aim by demonstrating the failure 
of IHL to understand the distinctive nature of contemporary unconventional armed 
groups, as exemplified by its approach to ISIS. Whilst contemporary religious warfare 
is just one of the myriad of potential avenues for exploring shortfalls in IHL, the 
example of ISIS is sufficient to question IHL’s assertion of universality, particularly 
in its approach to understanding non-state armed groups. Naturally, this conclusion 
really just raises more questions; If IHL needs to change to address groups like ISIS, 
then what other groups pose a comparable challenge? Is the emergence of 
contemporary religious armed groups the only looming challenge, or are there other 
similar challenges that need to be addressed? Precisely what measures are called for? 
 
25 Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, ‘Introduction’ in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-
Rothe (eds), Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century (Oxford University Press 2008). 
26 David Éric, Principes de Droit des Conflits Armés (3rd edn, Bruylant 2002) 921–922.  
27 This study has adopted the position that in undertaking this balance, IHL relies upon some 
assumptions that limit its utility to more conventional types of war. See Nobuo Hayashi, ‘Requirements 
of military necessity in international humanitarian law and international criminal law’ (2010) 28 Boston 
University International Law Journal 39, 44. 
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This study is by no means the first to question the capacity for IHL and other 
aspects of international law to appropriately define the rules that should apply in 
situations of contemporary conflict that do not conform with previously established 
assumptions. Back in 2009, Sitaraman suggested that in some cases, the laws 
surrounding the conduct of armed conflict do not permit enough engagement to protect 
civilians, an in other cases, actively punished states engaging in counterinsurgency.28 
This thesis has simply reiterated this established conclusion, though going into some 
detail as to why modern conflicts may be so uniquely challenging, referring to the case 
of ISIS and the contemporary religious ideology which they embody. Neither this 
study the first to suggest that ISIS and similar organisations merit a new designation 
in international public law; recently Johnson suggested the term “Terror non-state” in 
this regard.29 This thesis has suggested something similar to this designation, 
particularly in stating the need to separate legitimacy from the capacity to hold 
territory and wage war. Rather than contriving something new, however, this thesis 
instead looked back to the notion of the “uncivilised state” as a means of articulating 
how groups like ISIS could be understood.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning another issue contended in this thesis- that the 
law is increasingly out of touch with the realities of armed conflict and with the states, 
bodies and individuals that must apply IHL in practice. This is asserted 
comprehensively in the recent publication “Wars of Law.”30 The scholarship is, 
therefore, already cognizant of the questionable role of IHL in modern conflict, 
including the proclivity for IHL to incentivise armed groups to behave in an 
increasingly adverse manner. 
It is, therefore, not untoward to ask what original conclusions and findings this 
thesis can contribute to assist in addressing the shortfall in humanitarian protections 
associated with groups like ISIS. It can be stated that this thesis has developed a novel 
way of looking at the problem, firstly by asserting the need to distinguish between 
religious warfare and more “rational” forms of armed conflict. Moreover, this thesis 
has stressed the importance of understanding today’s armed groups, and the often 
 
28 Sitaraman Ganesh, ‘Counterinsurgency, The War On Terror, And The Laws Of War’ (2009) 95 
Virginia Law Review 1. 
29Darin E. W. Johnson, ‘The Problem of the Terror Non-State: Rescuing International Law From Isis 
and Boko Haram’ (2019) 84 Brooklyn Law Review 475.  
30 Tanisha. M. Fazal, Wars of Law: Unintended Consequences in the Regulation of Armed Conflict 
(2018) (n10). 
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distinctive manner in which they are organised and go about using force. This study 
has been unable to assert that there is any identifiable approach to defeating groups 
like ISIS, let alone doing so in a humanitarian manner. This is perhaps a little troubling 
from a humanitarian standpoint, as it is states and their militaries who must discover 
a quick and effective approach to defeating such groups, not lawyers and 
humanitarians. It may seem wishful, but a nation-state or other actor will eventually 
stumble into a means of conclusively winning the war on terror; to attempt to 
determine what represents a humanitarian approach to groups like ISIS in the absence 
of a proven understanding of how such groups may be defeated is to put the cart before 
the horse. Until this time, IHL should be applied in a manner that serves to incentivise 
innovative behaviour on the part of states. Additionally, IHL has a key role in ensuring 
that when fighting groups like ISIS, states are not permitted to repeatedly undertake 
actions that expose civilians to harm, whilst failing to produce any meaningful 
progress in terms of ultimately ending the conflict. International lawyers should be 
mindful of this, particularly in relation to the strategies and actions that are generally 
permitted in instances of conflict involving conventional armed groups; it should by 
this point be apparent that in relation to groups like ISIS, such approaches are often 
futile, or even counterproductive.  
 Despite the assertion made above and the complex nature of the problem 
however, IHL is not operating in the dark in relation to ISIS. Based upon the manner 
in which ideology can influence how armed groups mobilise and organise, as well as 
the objectives that they pursue, an awareness of this feature can assist in better 
determining what actions states may undertake. The major point to be stressed is that 
whilst IHL has proliferated from it is an initial mandate to govern the conduct of 
interstate war to regulate non-state varieties of warfare, it has not developed an 
awareness of the multivariate and diverse forms armed groups can take. As such IHL 
is not an exercise in common sense, but in relation to unconventional armed groups, 
requires careful consideration in order to assess the precise nature of the threat posed, 
and the capacity of the group in question. As such, IHL needs to appreciate that it is 
unlikely that applying a single regulatory framework to non-state armed conflict in the 
future is perhaps not the best means for protecting civilians. Fortunately, both IHL and 
international law in general are much better equipped for such an exercise today than 
was the case in the past.  
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The findings of this study are significant; firstly, they suggest that IHL actually 
understands war in a very limited and archaic manner; whilst IHL has expanded its 
remit well beyond interstate war, it has not dispensed with the manner in which it 
initially understood war, presuming the same mechanics are common to all varieties 
of armed conflict. Initially, at least, this proved to be the case, as successful non-state 
armed groups generally mimicked the state approach to using force in a broad sense, 
whilst often seeking to become states themselves. Groups like ISIS demonstrate that 
this is no longer the case. A central assertion made by this thesis is that there is no 
universal basis for understanding armed conflict. The thesis suggested an approach to 
overcome this limitation that is fairly radical. Firstly, this thesis has derided the notion 
that all armed groups must mimic the state approach to using force and organising. 
This means that it is extremely difficult to set out any objective criteria for 
demonstrating that an armed group exists, and whether or not they are capable of 
waging armed conflict. Indeed, armed groups are perhaps incentivised to not exhibit 
the features that IHL generally looks for; this would entail engaging in a conventional 
military contest, showing that many of today’s causes are not equipped to accomplish 
effectively. By looking at unconventional armed groups mobilised by religion, it has 
become apparent that using organisation and intensity as they are currently understood 
does not develop an accurate picture of the threat posed by groups like ISIS. 
One further suggestion is truly revolutionary; the approach to warfare taken by 
ISIS is justified and made possible by their aims, and the distinctive religiously 
orientated ideological landscape which they inhabit. Therefore, IHL needs to be 
mindful of the capacity for the aims pursued by armed groups to dictate the rules and 
norms that are appropriate in armed conflicts. This is perhaps challenging as IHL is 
ostensibly disinterested in the reason why war is fought, traditionally asserting that the 
same rules should apply irrespective of the cause of conflict. This thesis would suggest 
that this approach is no longer viable and that disregarding the information provided 
by the expressed aims of armed groups is not the best means of ensuring that 
appropriate protections exist in contemporary situations of armed conflict. The ISIS 
example again demonstrates this to be the case. As a religiously mobilised armed 
group, ISIS has no wish to become a state, as was the case with many previous non-
state groups. This, as this thesis has explored, raises issues that go deeper than the 
immediately apparent compliance problem. It dictates how they use force, in the case 
of ISIS supporting direct attacks on civilians, and possibly, defines how they may be 
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hurt; therefore, what actions are most effective to take in order to end the threat arising 
from such groups. This last point is uncertain, though it can be asserted that it is 
inhumane to insist that states must regard ISIS as they would a state and limit 
themselves to destroying whatever unambiguously military targets the group presents. 
This has repeatedly failed to contribute meaningful progress towards ending the 
conflict, therefore, perhaps, contravening IHL in principle.  
Detractors will indicate the predominant focus of this study upon the single 
example of ISIS; this is, of course, one of the thesis’s boundaries. Such critics should 
be mindful, however, of the wider lessons that can be extrapolated from this example. 
ISIS has generated a successful challenge to the international order, exceeding those 
that have gone before. The groups successes and failures will remain as lessons for 
future non state entities looking to challenge the international order, and therefore it is 
likely that ISIS will serve as a model for other groups to follow. Until international 
law develops an answer to the approach taken by ISIS, its approach will likely be 
revived, reimaged and repurposed well into the future. This thesis has, therefore, made 
an unambiguous contribution to scholarship by identifying a model of armed conflict 
that needs to be addressed. 
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